In a long, well-argued article in The Times of June 14, Home, its defence corres :
pondent, dem Dayan's war." He explained: ’ Olished the myth tha
Charles Douglas-
t it was 'General "The campaign was the
product of years of patient traini involving
: : . * ol of tae VOLO ee for Israel tebeae. ah the preparation
en use that equipment. It was not ¢ weiner ae ears ies a who bought the French opener g ap
Oo the victory, who designed the two special I whose accuracy made the whole unbelievable operation peuigiea as apie Seta
It was not General Dayan who patiently trained the Army i i i i
n nigh ensured that tank crews were drilled each year to attain the tilt it acy at longest ranges and at night, and practised mobilization exercises and individual training to the point where every man had within him the ability to think and readjust to changing situations," Douglas-Home shows that the timing of the war was decided by Israel, even to the extent of provoking the blockade of the Gulf of Akaba: ",ee.the inclusion of General Dayan and the other new Ministers automatically set Israel on a course for war at the time and place of her own choosing. Indeed for many days before General Dayan's appointment Israel was preparing to force the blockade at Sharm el Sheikh with a specially manned cargo ship which was being made ready at the Ethiopian port of Massawa. Any reference I made at the time to the possibility of a test ship being sailed into the Strait of Tiran to establish an wmequivocal pretext for war was categorically forbidden by the censors. Moreover, I have been told on the highest authority that nothing was changed = either in policy or in tactics - between the time General Sayan was appointed and the start of the war." The timing was linked with the morale of Israeli troops: "By the time General Dayan assumed office the plans had already been laid, the training accomplished, the tactics largely agreed. In fact, although most observers believed that the waiting posed an intolerable strain on the reservist army in the desert, General Rabin is of the opinion that those two weeks provided just the period of time necessary to prepare the reserv=ists for war. Any sooner and they would not have been fit and ready for battle; much later, and their morale would have been on the way down."