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VIEWS AND POLICIES OF THE PORTUGUESE TROTSKYISTS
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IWWTRUBUC Tun i HE immense upsurge of the Portuguese working class in the wake of the coup which overthrew the fascist regime has raised the banner of socialist revolution on the European continent in a way which * has not been seen since the Spanish civil war. The proletarian creativity displayed by the Portuguese workers in coming to grips with the capitalist crisis and the plots of their ruling class are the-real raw materials out of which workers’ power can be constructed. But the recent elections reveal that although . the ruling class is unable to solve its crisis of leadership, the workers movement suffers from an equally grave crisis. The sweeping electoral victory of the Socialist Party, an organisation whose links with the workers movement are slight and which has often sided objectively with reaction in the recent past,and the PPD, an outright bourgeois party, must in large part be laid at the door of the Portuguese Communist Party’s class collaborationist policies. Their opposition to the emergence of an independent workers power has prevented the growth of the only force which could have broken the Po rtuguese masses from the political influence of the bourgeoisie and united them in the fight against capitalism.
The following pages contain the most important statements of the international Communist “ League(LCI), Portuguse sympathising organisation of the Fourth International. While still a very small group, the LCI is already playing a major role in the fight to forge a revolutionary leadership for tne Portuguese working class and develop its struggles into a fight for workers power.
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Iberian Trotskyists’ declaration The following declaration was issued shortly after the-25 April coup by the LC) (International Communist League: Portuguese sympathising organisation of the Fourth International), LCR—ETA VI (Revolutionary Communist Leaque—Sasque Nation and Freedom, Sixth Congress: Spanish sympathising organisation of the Fourth International), and the UOR (Revolutionary Workers Union: a Partuguese ravalutionary organisation that has since fused with the LCI.) This statement embodies the spirit of proletarian internationalism which the LCI has strived to implant in the Portuguese workers’ struggles, and points the way forward to the unity of tha entire working class of the Iberian peninsula in their common struggla against capitalist reaction.
The sinister Salezar-Caetano dictatorship has ceased ‘to exist. * DOWN WITH PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM! Faced by a situation that promised soon to become intolerable, * {MMEDIATE INDEPENDENCE FOR THE COLONIES! a section of the bourgeoisie acted through its army and over~ * END THE COLONIAL WAR NOW! — threw the fascist regime that was incapable of controlling * LONG LIVE THE ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST PORTUeither the mass movement in Portugal or the struggles In the GUESE IMPERIALISM! colonies. But the working class end the working masses taok * LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITY OF THE advantage of this grave crisis of bourgeois leadership to take WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES OF PORTUGAL AND THE to the streets themselves and to destroy the fascist repressive COLONIES}! . apparatus (the secret police, the Legion, the fascist bands) * FOR THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION IN PORTUGAL AND by their own action.
THE COLONIES!
The mass demonstrations began on April 25, the very day of the coup, and continued through succeeding days -- thousands of people marching with banners, shouting militant slogans, carrying red flags. In the course of these days thousands of voices were raised demanding "End the colonial war now!" "Immediate independence for the colonies!" “Not one more soldier for the colonies! Concurrently, slogans were raised around social demands (minimum wage of 6,000 escudos for all) and democratic demands (right to strike,. freedom of expression and association}. These demands were the ones most deeply felt by the factory workers, employees, and students. Vanguard militants (those of the Liga Comunista Internaciona~ lista and the, Uni&o Operaria Revolucionaria, as well as others) were followed by thousands of demonstrators when they carried banners affirming the independence of the working class and its leading role in the revolutionary process that will end capitalist rule: “Down with capitalist exploitation!" “Power to the Workers!" “Workers, soldiers: Socialist revolution?!" Throughout the country, hundreds and thousands of soldiers LCi demonstration against departure of troops to Africa. and sailors demonstrated, many with fists raised, carrying red banners, marching shoulder to shouides with the workers. They also took up the slogans, especially those calling for the unity of all the workers, whether in uniform or not, like: "Workers After the murder of the anarchist militant Salvador Puig Anand soldiers, it's the same struggle!" tich, the Francaist dictatorship carried out preventive arrests of more than 400 militants of the workers and revolutionary organizations, ameng them several members of the LCR- +, ETA;VI. At the some time, the press has announced that death sentences have been asked against five more people, The "Junta of National Kealth" headed by General Spfnola began to become concerned about these gigantic militinr one anarchist and four Maoists. To defend al! militants of demonstrations and about the beginning of the organization all workers organizations against repression no matter what of the workers, inside and outside the army: the antifascist their political affiliation is an urgent task for all workers actions in the factosies and in the media, the influx of memand revolutionaries. bers into the unions, the meetings of soldiers and sailors in the barracks and on the ships, the emergence and develop~ * SOLIDARITY WiTH 1HE SPANISH WORKERS AND REVUment of political parties, and so on. This combativity and LUTIONARIES AGAINST REPRESSION! this beginni ng of organization showed the junta that the Por- * FREE ALL THE POLITICAL PRISONERS! tuguese workers wil! not let themselves be fooled so easily, * DOWN WITH THE FRANCOIST DICTATORSHIP! that they will respond through struggle to the deterioration of their living and working conditions, that miilions of Portuguese demand an immediate end to the colonial war, that Salozar mede an alliance with this bloody dictatorship. It ever broader sections of soldiers and sailors (workers and emwas called the Iberian Pact. The Junta of Nationa! Health, ployees ig uniform) are not prepared to board ships for the as General Spisclo told the Spanish press, is disinclined to colonies and fight against their African worker comrades. break this pact, or even to "transform" it. The Portuguese workers who overthrew fascism must demand the breaking of the Iberian Pact and afl other alliences with Franco's mur~ The LC1 and the UOR are jointly confronting their tasks of derous dictatorship getting into the working class and mobilizing the students. They are forming anticolonialist committees to support the * NO PACT, NO ALLIANCE WITH THE FRANCOIST DIC~struggle against Portuguese imperialism; they are developing TATORSHIP! antimilitarist activity in the army and among the student ond * PORTUGAL MUST BE A BASE OF SUPPORT FOR SPANISH worker youth, with the active support of the Faurth Interna- REVOLUTIONARIES | tional and in particular of the LCR-ETA, VI of Spain.
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The political situation and the Constituent Assembly The following analysis of the political situation in Portugal was made by the LCl at the beginning of this year and published in their paper Luta Proletaria (Profetarian Struggle) on 14 January. At the same time a special conference of the LCI decided to take part in the Constiucnt Assembly elections. This document outlines the perspectives within which this step was made,
the fighters of the PAIGC, going beyond the in- The fall of the fascist dictatorship became necesstructions coming from Lisbon and thus forcing Spfsary not only because its policy was entering into nola and the Junta of Nationa! Salvation to immecontradiction with the interests and development diately recognize the independence of Guineaof the most dynamic sectors of finance capital, but Bissau under the leadership of the PAIGC. also because it hod proven itself incapable of resolving the political and military crisis created by During this period the working class openly went the intensification of the armed struggle of the workover to the offensive, despite all the political and ers in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau organizational backwardness inherited from the and by the rise of workers struggles in Portugal. period of fascism. Not having any political parties worthy of the name, the. bourgeoisie was compelled The factors thet explain the contradictory character to call upon the Communist and Socialist parties of the situation that arose after April 25, 1974, and the MDP, which integrated themselves into a were the contradictory character of the various National Front government with the PPD, whose forces that were involved in the fall of dictatorship ambition to become the party of finance capital and the fact that the dictatorship was overthrown was already obvious. py the initiative of a layer of young officers subject to diverse influences and threatened by military de- This was made possible because the government crysfeat in Africa. tallized around the recognition and application of the program of the Armed Forces Movement.
For an initial period, the military coup of April 25 This is a program that, while adapted to the interappeared in large part as a preventive maneuver on ests of finance capital, was put forward by some te part of Spinola and the most lucid sectors of petty-bourgeois sectors of the AFM probably influfinance capital. But in the situation prevailing imenced by the policies followed by the Communist mediately after the coup, another factor was brought and Socialist parties; that is, a policy of alliance into play: Certain sectors of the left of the Armed between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie Forces Movement (AFM) had radicalized beand the nonmonopolist sectors of the bourgeoisie. cause of the repressive context in which they had In any case, whether this direct influence existed to work out their action under the fascist dictatoror not, a convergence of the type described would ship and because of the influence exerted on some still have been possible, of the members of the AFM by democratic organizations and reformist worker organizations.
The role of the reformist workers parties within the government inevitably had to be to contain the In addition, through the massive strikes and demonstruggles of the workers within the narrow framestrations that followed the fall of fascism and the work of private property. The guarantee of these powerful May } demonstration the workers succeeded parties' will to act in this way derived from their in improving thei? working and living conditions. own reformist positions, their acceptance of the They dealt many important blows to the fascist state bourgeois-democratic program of the AFM, and apparatus, expelled the administrators and officials their dependence on the president of the republic, tied ro the fascist apparatus and the leaders of the the Junta of National Salvation, and the Coordicorporatist trade unions from the factories. Thus, nating Committee of the AFM, they shifted the relationship of forces between the capitalists and the working class in their favor and The period that we are describing here was the made it difficult for Spthola's development plans period of the strikes at Lisnave, the strike and octo be implemented. cupation of Timex, the struggle of the Lisbon transport workers (Carris), the strikes of the workers of The development of the class struggle extended the TAP (national airlines), and the strikes in the into the army. The struggle of the workers in uni- . postal system (CTT) and the textile industry. it was form, the soldiers and sailors, was directed essen- @ time of many strikes with occupations of the factially against military discipline and the sending tories by the workers and of the emergence of many of troops to the colonies, as well as toward objecworkers commissions. These commissions were in tives related to the conditions of life in the barracks lorge part a response to the division of workers into different unions, even within the same factory In Guinea the Portuguese soldiers fraternized with “
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(fascist union organizations). But the workers! ac- . . . Moreover, both the political situation and ord tions often developed to the point that real strike the regime immediately proved to be unstable. The leaderships were formed and continued with fhe center of the exercise of political power is located a perspective of defending the gains won in struggle in the potitical structures of the AFM and the armed against layoffs, the work pace, and the hierarchical forces themselves. Several bourgeois ond petty-bayrsystem in the plants, all within the framework of . gco's political tendencies, aret even certain sectors workers control. Many workers journals began tied to the workers movement, coexist within the *: coming out (© Trabathador da Messa, © Novo arny at various levels of leadership. While it is Portuario, Jornal da Greve da Efacec-Inel, ete.)}, true thet the army properly so called remains abourgeois institution (like the entire state apparatus), The proletariat, especially its most advanced secit is also true that within the army there is an untors, increased its consciousness of the decisive stable equilibrium between the hierarchy and the role it plays in production and made advances in traditional structures on the one hand and the struc~ combativity, experience, and organization. But tures and hierarchy expressing the reformist pettyat the same time, in view of ifs relatively low level bourgecis tendencies that have worked out the proof political consciousness, the working class congram of the AFM on the other hand, Finally, befused partial and conjunctural victories with cause of the relative equilibrium in the strength of definitive, irreversible ones. the classes, the relative equilibrium within the army itself, and the relations the army maintains with social In face of the development of struggles, and ina movements, the Junta of Netional Salvation, the context in which no new regime could stabilize jt- Coordinating Commission, and the AFM itself apself, the capitalists, the Junta of National Salvepear on the political scene as relatively indepention, and the AFM, each in its own way, demondent mediators. strated two major concerns: avoiding a massive and_. direct repression, and at the same time moking some social and wage concessions in certain sectors and seeking to control inflation and hold prices The ruling class, the bourgeoisie, rules through a reformist petty-bourgeois military caste. This milidown, But above all they based themselves on the illusion of the workers in the intentions of the AFM tary caste, in turn, rules thanks to bourgeois institutions, laws, and ideology. Hence, it is clear generated by the new situation, that conflicts had to arise within the state apparatus These illusions, created in part by the very support between the ruling class and the form through which that the reformist workers parties gave to the AFM, it rules, conflicts that express themselves more specifically in confrontations between various centers were to permit the AFM to isolate and even break the most advanced workers struggles (CTT, TAP, of the exercise of political power. It is thus that Lisnave, etc); and this wes done with the crucial the development of the class struggle and the political choices that it necessitated, especially on the support of the CP and even of the Trade Union colonial question, led to an intense struggle be- Federation, which strengthened itself through the tween the Spfnola forces and the radical petty-bouradherence of new layers of workers awakening to struggle, geois sectors of the AFM. While the Bonapartist regime was consolidating its hold, the continuation While the AFM was gaining experience in practical of the armed struggle of the workers of Angola and politics, in asserting its own importance, and was Mozambique, the signs of fraternization between pursuing its Bonapartist ambitions, the Communist "Portuguese soldiers and fighters of the liberation ard Socialist parties set themselves the task of premovements, and the pressures of sectors of the left venting any generalization of the struggles, isolatin wing of the AFM and of the reformist workers parthe most conscious ond combotive workers from the ties compelled Spinela to retreat in the implementarest of the working class, and centering more and tion of his neocolonial plans, while nevertheless more on the Trade Union Federation, directing it continuing te try to force the liberation movements toward playing the role of a reformist apparatus to make maximum concessions (especially in Angola) keeping the workers in line. so as to impose a neocolonial solution with imperialism and the political forces tied to it (the Angola National Liberation Front, UNITA, Mobutu).. At Bonapartist military regime the same time, the sectors of the state apparatus of the bourgeoisie most directly representing the interests of finance capita! took advantage of the relative ebb in work- We now find ourselves in a society in which bourers struggles (after the end of June) to repress the geois relations of production continue to reign and action of the revolutionary organizations and issue , capitalists continue to dominate, but in which the decrees repressing the right to strike, the right of centers of political power escape the direct contro] assembly, ete. They tried in this way to open the of the bourgeoisie; or, rather they escape the conroad for the capitalists to be able to recover what trol of any of the bourgeoisie's parties. A military they had been forced to concede during the period caste has emerged over and above the two fundaimmediately following the fall of the dictatorship. | mental antagonistic social classes, over and above | Layoffs, inflation, and intensification of the work the owners and proletariat, the exploiters and ex~ pace were the means of implementing this operaploited, a caste establishing a regime behind which is hidden the reality of finance capital. tion... .
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This First overall To attain these goals of economic restructuring, of offensive of the bourgeoisie was made possible by integration into the Common Market, the Portuguese the policy of the reformists; but it clashed with the bourgeoisie needed to deprive the workers of the resistance of the most combative sectors of the pro~ gotns the bourgegiste had been forced fo concede. letariat (the TAP strike, the Jornal da Comer¢o, Hence, the bourgeoisie repressed the most advanced Lisnave}. workers struggles, allowed the far-right organizatons to develop, and thus encouraged reaction.
During this whole period the bourgeoisie wos seek- Galvao de Melo did not hesitate to discuss with ing to rapidly resolve the colonial question. But the members of the PIDE (former political police) after the independence of Guinea-Bissau, the Luwho had mutinied. saka accords showed not only that the Portuguese * aan we" : ie 3 bourgeolsie, with the aid of imperialism and the African bourgeoisie, was hopiny to extract accords and concessions from the liberation movements, ‘but also that it was forced to make concessions much more rapidly than it desired. In Angola, where the military situation was not so unfavorable, where the Hberation movements were divided (even the MPLA itself), and where the interests of imperialism end the natural wealth (diamonds, ofl} were greater# the tactic wos different. Spfnola sought to take direct charge of the question of the decolonization of t_ Angola (cease-fire, provisional government including both the liberation movements and the other organizations, elections to a constituent assembly, etc.) with the aim of shunting the MPLA aside and relying on the support of Mobutu and Holden Roberto Savimbi to impose a neocolonial solution.
Political meaning of September 28 On September 19, after an appeal from Spfnola, the “silent majority" was invited to demonstrate its support for the president of the republic. It quickly became clear that many forces of the right and the far right were uniting around a demonstration scheduled for September 28. Capitalist sectors that had The difficulties in the application of the initial tacsupported the April 25 coup (Champallimaud, Gal- 2 tic of Finance capital (federalist decolonization vao de Melo} felt they were being overtaken by and the establishment of a strong state under the events and were concerned about the ties between leadership of Spfnola) encouraged certain of those the AFM and the reformist parties. They linked up sectors most closely tied to colonial exploitation, with legionnaires like Casal, Ribeiro, and well- ’ stock market speculation, and the most backward known colons like Franco Mogueira and Kaulza de industrial branches to act on their own account, to Ariaga. seek to organize certain layers of the petty-bourgeoisie in the context of a reactionary program.
The right and the far right mobilized. There were more and more right-wing banquets; arms were ac-~ After the initial shock, the big bankers and induscumulated. On Septerhber 25 the reactionary forces triglists recovered their forces. . . . They tried occupied the Campo Pequeno (a sports arena). That through various maneuvers to put pressure on the represented the first show of force by the right. provisional government to more clearly define its Spfnola was given an ovation, and he accepted the policy as one in service of finance capital and, in role being offered him. Growing sectors of finance any case, as a policy assuring sufficient profits on capital tied to North American imperialism or Brainvestment. Thus, the guorantees offered by the zilian subimperialism and those sections of the boursecond provisional government — which was formed gecisie most attached to the colonial system (Espirite after the unsuccessful constitutional coup of Palma Santo Bank, etc.) more or less openly supported this Carlos — were not long in coming. Vasco Gongalves's offensive of the right and the far right. If was above speech was clear in this regard. The price of bread, all the rural petty bourgeoisie that mobilized in sugor, and milk were to go up. The necessity of combination with the demonstrations of the reactionsaving was affirmed. All Portuguese, he said, had ary cofons of Angola and Mozambique. This offento make dn effort fo reconstruct the economy that sive aimed at provoking o split In the army and the dissolution of the AFM. The September 28 demonstre= had been led to chaos by fascism. He asked the caption was intended to create a situation of tension italists not to be discouraged, to invest and make a that would allow Spinola to declare a state of siege, profit. He asked the workers to demand jobs, fo acassume full powers, and repress the workers and revo~ cept ail sacrifices, -and not to disturb the smooth lutionary organizations, But against thls demonsira- functioning of the factories... .
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tion there arose a workers mobilization stimulated tied in a thousand ways to bourgeois society, can by the Trade Union Federation and various workers only serve the bourgeoisie itself. It is for that reaand revolutionary organizations, This mobilization, son that the initiatives of the CP (struggle against am, with the formation of barricades, in its turn forced a the monopolies, agrarian reform, advocating thet We the intervention of the AF M.and determined the dithe AFM participate in the elections to the conrection of its action. Spfnola and the various groups stituent assembly) will in every case be changed involved in the operation retreated when they saw around by government bodies that must represent the relationship of forces both within the AFM and the "greatest unity" between the "people and. the. between the AFM and the army was unfavorable to armed forces." [f is for that reason that the CP's them. veiled criticisms of certain ministers and certain laws run up against a discrete but firm opposition The working cless emerged strengthened from the from the Council of Twenty (the AFM) and the test of September 28... Many workers understood Council of Ministers. The CP did not gain anything their own capacity to struggle against reaction. by abandoning the most radical aspects of its eight- This was the case with the typographers, who prepoint program (like nationalization of the monopvented publication of advertisements in favor of olies) during its last extraordinary congress, when the “silent majority,” and with the drivers and conit adapted itself even more to the program of the — ductors, who disorganized the reactionary demon- AFM, At that point a new period opened during stration by refusing to take people to it. Neverthe~ which the strengthening of the AFM was to be comless, it is necessary to distinguish between the workbined with its progressive transformation (through ers' capacity for mobilization and their degree of its managing of the interests of the bourgeoisie) and political consciousness. The reformist organizations its program was developed, but in the “worst” sense and parties succeeded in deflecting the workers At the same time, the AFM is extending its base jn from an anticapitalist struggle concentrating their the armed forces; its hierarchy is merging with the ‘ attention on the struggle against reaction and fas~ traditional hierarchy. This is the moment in which cism, the AFM became dissolved into the state apparatus, rosing its initial independence of the bourgeois state exactly to the extent that its governmental respon- It was the proleteriat's incapacity to intervene . “stbilitfes' increase. All the laws that the AFM prothe crisis as an incapacity to intervene in the crisis _ “poses ‘and ‘that the provisional government adopts as on independent and determining force that al~ are marked by 'stuirgeois seformism. The latest exlowed the AFM to regain control of ‘the situation; ample fs provided by. the-Melo Antunes economic to replace the barricades erected by workers who “and social plan; whose'Social Democratic character’ were exercising class vigilence against the reacwas in no way altered by’ the changes proposed by. tionaries with groups of soldiers who inspected vethe Coordinating Commission and: approved during hicles and even permitted Spinola to deliver a resig- “the. most récent AFM. assembly of delegates. i” nation speech in which he called on national and international capitalists to resort to economic weap- The bourgeoisie, forced to retreat, with the sectors ons and put pressure on the provisional government, most favorable to a new coup crushed, has preparing to bring it down if necessary. changed its tactics. It is now seeking all the influence it can get within the armed forces and the The political backwardness of the Portuguese prolegovernment while actively preparing itself for the tariat and the class-collaborationist policy developed elections. by the reformists also explains one of the immediate results of the events of September 27 and 28: the At the same time, the reformist workers parties, "Sunday workdays" proposed by Vasco Gongalves. and above all the CP, are making desperate ma- These extra workdays were supposed to deepen the neuvers in order fo shift the policy of the AFM in | workers' illusions in the myth of national reconstructheir favor, with the more or less declared intention tion and to prove to imperialism that the government of making the army carry out the process of basic and the AFM were in control of the situation. Unreform, of making the army confirm the decisive doubtedly, one of the political consequences of importance of the CP, guaranteeing its permanent September 28 was the consolidation of the Bonapartist place in the government ond increasing the support military regime. and confidence of the workers for the policy of CP participation in the provisional government, thus making possible an "authentic democracy," or at Since September 28 least a democracy as conceived by the CP, But the The reformist workers parties, above all the CP, AF Mis not a revolutionary vanguard, and big capjudged that their hour had come after September 28. ital cannot be fought with the means and methods Did they not appear as the saviors of the nation and being proposed by the CP and the AFM. The CP is democracy? This, they assumed, would create a betraying the working class by trying to link it to new relationship of forces that would allow them to classes that will in turn betray it. This whole evolustrengthen their influence and position within the tion of political relationships is diminishing the state apparatus. But they succeeded only in strengthfears of the bourgeoisie, strengthening its confidence ening the AFM's power in political life in genera! in the ability of Bonapartism to manage the crisis and in the workers movement in particular. And the and defend the bourgeoisie's own interests; it is per~ AFM, by its very nature as an integral part of the mitting the bourgeoisie to face the future with more armed forces, whose existence and functioning ore _ confidence and to prepare for an electoral victory Page §
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Workers’ power in action: on 28 September workers threw up roadblocks around Lisbon and searched ail vehicles to prévent reactionary forces entering the city for the ‘silent majority’ damonstration of the right-wing parties thanks to their financial with the political backwardness of the peasants and power and political influence, especially in the the traditional inertia of agrarian structures. Finally, the students are not studying and the reform~ rural areas. ist technocratic reform of the educational system is marking time.
Given the Portuguese bourgeoisie's narrow margin for economic maneuver, the political incapacity of The resolution of the economic crisis of the bourthe reformist parties, the present fragility of the revolutionary organizations, and the divisions within gecisie cannot he effected simply through an attack the working class (divisions that are aggravated by on the working and living conditions of the working class; it also and above all necessitates the resoluunemployment, some partial defeats, and the isolation of the most combative sectors of the heavy tion of the crisis of bourgeois rule, The bourgeoisie battalions of the. working class), a rightist electoral is now using two means to achieve this goal: Through victory would give rise to an attempt to set up o an emergency economic and social plan it is reducing the power of certain sections of the bourgeoisie that strong state, that is, a state with a strongly centralhad constituted the main prop of the fascist regime; ized executive able to channe! and repress workers struggles. But in order for it to be possible to estaband it is limiting and attacking the conditions of life and possibilities of struggle of the working class. lish such a state without grave social confrontations breaking out, it is necessary that the resistance of Moreover, the bourgeoisie is especially trying to the working class be virtually nil, that the workers utilize the elections to the constituent assembly to be demoralized and demobilized by the provisional derail the struggles of the workers in the factories, government. trade unions, and factory commissions, directing i The present economic and political situation is full these struggles toward electoral channels; it is tryof difficulties for the bourgeoisie, however, Coning to substitute the demand for a demecratic contrary to the predictions of Minister Rui Vilar, galstituent assembly for the economic and social deloping inflation is continuing, the flight of capital mands of the masses. Further, an electoral victory goes on, and crooked bankruptcies are on the rise; of the forces of the capitalist right (the CDF and PPD) would permit the bourgeoisie to use the conlayoffs are continuing, and the number of unemployed has already risen to 150,000. This figure is bound stituent assembly to legitimize the new forms of rule and to accelerate the formation of a strong state to increase even more because of the return of the soldiers from A frica and the difficulties with which that as fer as possible would conserve a certain ap- Portuguese immigrant workers in West Europe are. pearance of democracy in order better to fool the confronted. Bank deposits remain low despite the workers.
Increase in the interest rate. This implies credit restrictions. Many small and middle-sized compa- In face of all this, it is necessary thet revolution- i nies cre facing grave problems. The balance of trade aries adopt a clear position on the constituent as- i” is deteriorating, with very large deficits appearing. sembly elections. They must intervene actively in i Income from tourism is diminishing and the inflow the elections and implacably denounce the nature and _ of currency sent by immigrant workers is not inereasobjectives of the elections by utilizing them to de- | Ing, thus worsening the balance of payments. Invelop their revolutionary agitation and propaganda, vestment Is being made only cautiously and is even by using the constituent assembly as a tribunal for declining. The crisis in agriculture is rempant. And denouncing the exploitation of capitalist society, if that is not enough, the attempts to modify the but always subordinating the intervention in bouragrarian system through decrees on the rate of culgeois institutions to the struggle for self-manage- Hvatlon and utilization of fatlow land are clashing # ment and direct action by the toiling masses. O
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The following ig an excerpt. from the Programme which the LCI put forward i in its ’ d Assembly elections. Lo ‘To defend the unity of: the work: ‘ ‘Defeated on the terrain of mass struggle, the bourgeoisie i is seeking to ‘ing class, the united front of the class, as the only effective way in which to channel onto the electoral terrain the kers’ government. to combat’ struggle against exploitation, reaction, combativity of which the masses. have ' boycott and aggression by the imperand the political power of the capitalshowti themselves capable. They. are alist powers; seeking to turn the attention of the ists, to avfend aroletariai methods of ‘4. Support for the poor peasants © masses away from. the real centres of struggte, ai.J te criticise the refornnsi methods of class - ollabpration and struggle where their future will be . through the setting up of a system of , _ the gradual and peaceful passage to flecided — —the anti-capitalist struggle «. @redit and technical aid, ‘with an ag- s socialism, . farian reform that frees the poor, pen of the masses in the factories, the. — -*To advocate the programme and working class neighbourhoods, the _ _.: gamts from all debts-and mortgages, |. revolutionary government of the and, as far as tenants’on nationalised ~*~ barracks, and the streets, the creation lands are. concerned, énsutes that they working class; of autonomous organisations of the ‘To advocate the road of the revworkers’ struggle, independent of receive the product of the land they olutionary genera} strike and the armthe bosses and their state— and to work, : ed insurrection of the masses to destturn theic attention towards a false ‘§. Expropriation of ail war indusroy the capitalist state and set up the objective: elections, where the bour-_ tries. dictatorship of the proieiariat and geoisie hope to see a major victory ‘6. Creation of a central economic planning agency, integrated and under socialism, of their parties (the Popular Demo- ‘To fight colonialism: and neo-colcratic Party, the Centre Democrats). the control of the mass crganisations onialism, and imperialist penetration On the basis of such a victory (workers’ commissions, industry committees, trade unions, cooperatthe bourgeoisie will seek to reconin Portugal; ‘To promote proletarian internatives). stitute and reinforce the machinery jonalism, through revolutionary suppof the state which serves them, place “7. A sliding scale of wages and ort for the struggtes of workers thr-new limitations on the social, trade - hours; immediate creation of free soc-union and political rights of the oughout the world. : ' jal services and education; drastic red- .. ‘it.is for these purposes that theworking, class, and so prepare for 2 uction in the price of public transport, . new offensive against the living and LCI is presenting candidates in the energy and housing. elections, aware of the.role which it . ‘8; Repeal of all laws which defend working standards of the workers and all working people... must play in the electoral process: the interests of the bourgeoisie and. __ to promote the unity of the workthe replacement of bourgeois courts by ing class and, at the same time, to A Reacoio ATACA judicial bodies democraticaily elected © present art a!ternative, a revolution: - O RAL-1 £ BOMBARDEADON! . _ by working people. ary solution, to the economic-and . political crisis of Portugal, and a solution tq the crisis of revolutionary ‘9, Participation of the mass organleadership for the workers’ struggles: isations in all levels and forms of the Sap & mapeete mpiriets, 6 Kepée un Geverre hem the construction of amass revolution: running of social life. These mass orgtar te rete, Lew neta ou trevteyinenane de Bettie, arn que ary workers’ party... anisations must be structured accord- 0 POF reves: sentirem ae mariners, fope spt ing to the principles of proletarian de- = minqet Girrerutemty Yee copisieias procurends & ‘Through the development of the uni- Nee © sue Weir mals witrte sinteral o thn one mocracy, which demands elections at ‘Frekint sowndeices, poitinm ¢ sineicele dt vinnas ty and organisation of the working all levels, the regular presentation of rere, hegere epee a mus eherme ete class in the fight against capitalist re- TRABALHADON, MOBNIEEMOG ACTTVAMENTE: accounts, and the permanent control action, we know that it is possible to LCI loafiet put out during abortive coup and right of recall by the base of all replace the present government of elected representatives; the remunerclass collaboration with the bourgeoi- ‘Nevertheless, we understand that ation of these representatives not to sie by a revolutionary workers’ governit is important to raise the voice of exceed the average wage of a manual ment, a-gavernment made up of all worker. revolutionaries in the election campworkers’ and revolutionary organisaaign and in the Constituent Assembly tions, supported by the mobilisation *10. The general arming of the wo: itself: | and permanent offensive of the workkers and the replacement of the army ‘To denounce all! forms of capitaling class against exploitation and the and the police by a workers’ militia ist oppression and exploitation of the power of the capitalist state. Such 4 and voluntary vigilance bodies integrworkers, peasants, and soldiers, and government would be capable of del-: ated and controlled by the working to push forward the struggle to defivering profound blows to the econo Class. end their working and living conditmic and political power of capital. ‘11. Withdrawal of Portugal from ions, the struggle for. their social and ‘The programme of this government NATO, an end to the Iberian Pact . _ economic rights; must involve: [counter-revolutionary defence agree- “Fo denounce all the manoeuvres ‘1. The expropriation without comment signed between Portugal and of capitalist reaction —economic sabpensation of the most important ind- Spainin 1942],repeal of all treaties © otage, the preparation of new reactustrial, commercial and agricultural with imperialist powers, abolition of ‘ ionary attacks and to promote businesses, along with the major means _ secret diplomacy, and the launching ~ forms of struggle and organisation of social communication (TV, radio, of a foreign’ policy of anti-imperialistagainst capitalist reaction, both intcinema, newspapers), and their operasupport for the former. colonies snd ernally and internationally; tion under workers’ control; revolutionary internationalist support ‘To expose the intentions of the for the struggles of the workers of the _ ‘2: Establishment of the power df capitalists to use the Constituent -warld; against the Europe of the exthe workers’ government over the en ° Assembly to restrict the trade union. ploiters and the. monopolies - fight for. tire credit syst’m, and the establishand political rights of the workers, the Sovintist United States of Europe. ment of a single state bank; peasants and soldiers; me