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INTERNATIONAL MARXIST
INTERNAL GROUP
INFORNATION BULLETIN
No. 3
UNIT
SERIES
THE PORTUGUESE DECEMBER 1975
EDUCATIONAL S
I
sections only. ***-*==***== REVOLUTION
Price: Free
For members of the Fourth
International and sympathising
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UNIT sDUC.TICHALS mIES I: THE FORTUGUMSE REVOLUTION: . : eae ete
This series of educational sessicns on Portugal is the first in a new style of internal educaticnals. They have been compiled by the National Education Commission following the cocuucnt on Education by Comrade Jennings . to the PC (see NTO, 20th November 1975).
The basic- ‘argument. of the Jennings' document, as comrades will know, is that the most effective way to carry out educational work in the units of the organisation is to select a jarticular topic or theme which is decisive in the current conjuncture through which to train comrades in Marxism. The first series organised on these lines has a certain experimental charact: r, and it is hoved the organisation will lecrn a lot from attempting to implement it. # ie Ber ; As comrades will see, these sane: tional sessions disvense vite the standard lecture (although, if comrades find tha: the series is uot going well, it might prove useful for one comrade to prpsare. a very brief, predominantly factual introduction). Instead, the series ave organised in the form of problem-questions. These should. se nut to the unit by the comrade leading and chairing the session, in fact they should be put to individual comrades vhose replies then form the starting point for discussion. In this process, the chair should ain to draw the least experienced members of the unit into the centre of.the arena, and the. nore experienced members should take a back-seat role,.althoug: they will beexpected at. the vecy least to sumaavise and finalise the discussions as the session proceeds. The comrade leading the session. vill have to be a leaging comrade,.and he or she will ve to play.an ageressive, intervent~ ionist role in the session, constantly confronting..comrades with the logic of their replies and provoking them with further counter-arfunment. In this; there is of course an element of improvisation and con. 2cqueutly the cuestions presented here are only Quxsslxxxsy. mn TG inperksntxuones the questicvns.which shoulda onsen discucsion. Through the »rocess as a whole, it is honed that comrades will absorb political e s3005 through debate and, most importantly, through their own mistakes. ; eee pe pe Pes ; The success of an individual session. should not be seasured by the extent to which consensus emerges. If debries are left unanswered, subsequent sessions will almost certainly return and pick them up. Furthermore, the series is designed to end in regional sciools; these schools should. in. fact ass cfi at quice an advanced level of discussion in view of the fact that the sessions willprevare comradcs very well and leadershinaonmrades will be present. However, the wackground reading which is supplied -and. kext to strict limits which are well within comrades' time and 'resources- Wili of course provide, as intended, "sn invaluable aid. oe Comrades should net Boies unl he Seow one educati:nal in one session. - However they should not take more than two. sicch sessicn is divided into two parts to accomcodate this. The series should be completed in three months, and maxkhis it is on this time scale that the repicnal schools will be fixed.
There should be an Scducats.: n officer’ elected by the tranche ‘This andivies ual does not have to conduct all the sessions themselves. In fact, it is’ probably nore efficient if an individual comrade specialises in exch one of: the series, thorou: shly mastering the matericl in advance. However, limits are set on this by the resources of the branch and by the fact that not every comrade in = unit will prove capable, at least at this stage, of conducting one of these sessiuns. The prime task of. the education officer apart from é@nsurinr the avnilability of the background muterial, is to try to centrulise he xp rience of the sesci.ns with a view to fne aationa organisation being able to draw up a central balance sicet of this Fyne of educational.
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Page 2 No.1. The Characts. of the Portuguese Sevolution | — a Reading: Lessons of Uctober (70 pages) MG. | 5 tie feb There is NE agreement anong Trotelyists that ‘the Portuguese upheaval has once again plac&d the socialist revoluti.n on-the agenda: in Europe. Before dealing with what pelicies revoluticnaries should | pursue in Portugal, we should logically deal with the general political question of the Gina eee of the EET EMP eReRe revolution. Part I. ; : te Trotskyists are advocates of the law of combined and uneven development, allowing them-to ssecify the 'weak link’. Give at least three good reasons why the socialist revolution in #uro-e in this period should have first broken out in Portugal. Does the Russian Revolution provide any parallels? 2. The revolutions in Portugal and spain are overthrowing the last.of the fascist rerimes. in Western Europe set up in the 20's and 30's. How would you tackle the following argument: "The Iberian revolution is' a democratic one, strengthening democracy On a #urovean scale and consequently placing the wuro,ean working class in a seronger position to introduce socialism. However, socialist tasks are not immediately on the agenda in Iberia. To arene otherwise is ultra-leftism for the following reisons: ne HA, The proletariat in Portugal is week in historical traditions: as compared to the workers of France,. Britain ete., and is not mature, enough for secialism (e.g. Level of trade union experience and parliamentary experience). ‘the further devclopment of capitalism in Portugal as against the international monopolies is necessary for one further development of the workers movement itself, 4B. The preponderance of nea ae and smald fareere over arian workers Makes.a socialist state premature. "CC. Since a socialist. state in Portugal would meet with eilitary intervention from the stronger imperaalisms of Westérn Sarope, socialist states must appear trere first. * “D. The central task is to prevent the return of fascism to Portugal.
The APM is democr-tic and progressive, as opnosed to the Syinolists, and demonstrates that a wing of the bourgeoisie can mE join with the working class asainst thh monovolies and reaction. The Peo le-ArM alliance is all-importunt and provides the best ruarantce against a: fascist return. te
Part TT, At the time of writing this series, the struggle in Angola gas in a critical state, wuth the HPLA under attack from two imperialist-— backed — armies. Roce April 25th 1974 and November 1975, Portuguese troops remained in angola, Many of them sympathetic to t e¢ MPLA. J. Lenin ‘said that the right to eélf- dvtermination Was not an absolute and did not stand above the dicatorship of the proletariat. Cozscquently, when it comes to units of the Portuguese army who say 'We will neve. fire on the peoplet we will die fer the socialist revolution', should we have called on them to join the HPLAZ and fight wxthxtke UNITA and FNLA? Or would this cut across the campaign for. troop withdrawal andself-determination which revolutionaries in the imperialist countrics have been carrying out in the past?.
é. The Russian and Cuban treops at present in Angola are from workers states, but they are. not there to further the ercation of workers states in Africa. Should wo oppose their presence in this neo-colonial country?
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Reading List for Nose 2 ang De . Leon Trotsky: 'Sermany:Vhat Next!’ (entire text) aml 5 oe ortugal (garggiativ, tag, Sbeytoloey IS and IMG Pamshlet Portugal ispepialiy. the.0 qi
Wo.2 THE UNITZD Front PAL GLE, Cw: (€& Kp In the 'First Five Youre of the te Trotsky wrote; ‘Wherever the communist party already constitutes a big, organised political force, but not the dcetisive-magnitude...it is confronted with the question of the united front in all its acuteness.' (Vol 2. sce p91-97). In Portugal, where the SP sot 40% of the votes in the April elections to the Coustituent Assembly, and where since then, the sroad masses have becomeg sharply divided, the united front is of supreme importance in any revolutionary strategy. z
~« The surEGse of the united front is‘to draw the greatest possible ae of workers into ee against the cavitalists. However, the Socialist.Party has, over the summer, conducted a masa campaign apoinst "gpmnunié t dictatorship’, 'anarchy', ‘labour indispline', and against *SCTS possessing arms. The SP campaign onenecd the way for the fascists and created a decp, perhaps irreparable, split in the masses.
Under these circumstances, where, although it cnjoys support among some sections ci the masses, its brogramme is objectively countcr-revolutionary, is it wrong for us to pnopose a united front with the SP and its followers? ' 2. After the SP's summer campaign, is ib really so unseientific after-all _ to @all the SP "social TASCishs! s despite Trotsky's polemic in 'Germany What Next'? In any case, wouldn't it prove a good tactic in Portugal today where the workers are shoving signs us disgust at the link in action between the: SP and feectionary thugs? 3e What would you make of the arguicnt that the SP lost its base in the working class over the summer and is now largely a part of the rural petty-bourscoisic of the North. There have been no trade union strikes for Soares. Isn't the united front with the 3P an irrelevance under those circumstances? . 4, What is wrong with Tony Cliff's line on the U/F pee-45 Is pamphlet?
Part II le In view of the discussion in Part I,. what should be the aim of a united : Soe front whick included the aP? (If some comrades hold it was unprincipled to call for such a thing in Augsat/Septonber, + hey must anawer the question for the period early summor). In particular, snanid it be for a SP-CP Government? In thinkins about this, decide whethes any of the folloving hypotheses are correct:
Ae "All united fronts of workcrs organisations. must have a governsiental — slogan tle 1 B. "You cant motivat. the masses to build soviets without calling on them to elect such a Government Gf workers partics.
C."A government of such workers partics would be a great step forvard on the MPA and weuld thus stimulste the struggle of the masses.
D."A united front should be built with the base but not the corrupt leadership of social democracy: we should SRere lore not call for a Government of these partics but unite their membcrsa instead around arming the vorkers or working out a plan for the economy. 2. Da the events of November change any of your answers to Parts I or II?
Peading for Nols: “Ag vicld-uae Wisi Hoek = Lessons of UVctober p.29-32.
The Spanish lievolution p,56+95 By this stage of the series, all comrades should be familiar with the debate in ICP Puvueee the IMT and Ltr comrades. *
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eee No.3 DUAL POWER ote Me te Sore rT. cin oe . ’ } 4. On March 1th, the extreme ri ight wing of the milita Ys possibly led by General Gpinola, launched a rightist coup. It failed. orkers militia appeared, linking up with left-wing officers and soldicrs. The workers have since become even more extensively armed, and, at least until November, the army was increasingly paralysed in face of yworkcrs struggles.
Did this mean that dual power existed in Portugal? = ‘2. What is wrong with the PRP-BR slogan: 'soviets without pafties'? Even so, should we have participated in the CRISM's? 3. In Lessons of UVctobe: and in Germany tihat Noxt, Trotsky says that soviets are not indespensible for launching the revolution. Could tiie revolution be made in Portugal through Ay, other body that has or docs exist since April 25th 19949 4 If soviets are the highest form of the united front, and if rovolution in Portugal.is inconccivable without the furces at present represented by the SP, then wou'dn't the appearance of soviets type bodies throughout the country face the workers with the‘same dangers that Trotsky deseribes in Ledsons of Yetober in relation to Russiar that the revolution could be broken by the sheer weight of politically backward, but newly<enfranchised farmers, peasants and isolated workers? Part IT The mbst crucial cuestionz : fecine revoluticnarics in Portur:.1 is how to develop organs of dual power. In April, elections took place Fora Constituent Assembly. Out of these would have come the first elected . Government. How.ver, both the CP and the SP signed a pact with the Mra to leave the military in power and reduce the CA to an advisory role and to draw up a constitution for the indefinite future.
Trotsky elways insisted that sovicts must be built out of the struggles of the masccos, not counterposed to them. Compare his attitude to the Cortes in Spain and his attitude to the Democratic Conference and Pre-Parliament in October 1917. ' 1. Is Trotsky's attitude contradictory? 2. If the SP and CP had broken with the liA and fought for the Constituent Assemtyl, would this have opened the road to soviets in Portugal? 3. kiterastiuriy The EPD soid that the task of revoluticn.ries in a revolutionary upsurge was to prevent the organs of workers power being absorbed back into the bourgeois state. Wasn't this-the aim of the Guide document, the COPCON document, with their ‘people's committecs'? Nevertheless, what should our attitude towards taem have been?
+ Reading for No.4: TMG and IS Pamphlets.
Imprecor No.55, 9 Gctober 1975. pp12-24
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— Page 3. 4. Fhe Bourgeois: Aray and Proletarian Poli ities ey: (Cte May 4H, Fhe S&P and CP have consistently sought an eiteanoe i bh the AFM and have varticiiated with it in several governmental coaliticns.
Was it unprincipled to do’ so, or was such a policy morcly Gaeraind out in a way which failed to mobilise the nasses? 2. How vould you characterise the AFM? Tony Cliff for instance says 'The lsaders of the HFA are middle clase through and through. Gas oe the characteristic fentures of the pet-y-bourgeoisie is its lack of clear policial-social shysiognomy, as it is suspended between the capitalist class and the prolcturiat.' What is the AFH? . : 3. Docs you characterisation allow you to deal with the view thet: | A.'The AFM could not have been an instrument of bourgeois rule -undor Goncalves because a bourgeois army would never nationalise the banks and major monopoli > (Ur stes). ra BR. “in the sumer, ee bourgeoisie backed the SP -offensive ‘azzinst the majority of the MFA, at that time grouped around the Go 1calves—CP axis. This means that the Portuguese ermy ceased te be an instrument ef bo. rgeovis rule. Ke allie
Part II 1. En Portugal, as in Russia in 1917, and to.a lesser extent in Bermeny . in 1918, 2 worlcers army is Dates built, partly out "op tho eas of the bo rgeois army and its goimg over to the workers. ‘+. a) ‘that slogans would you put forward to accclerate the process in Portugal? - b&b) What nolitics1 criticisms would you make of SUV on the basis of its ‘programme? (Enprceor llo.55, 9 October 75, pees) * ay Boos the tact. nee he workers have won over a section of the military throug: mass’ CGALPO with the soldicrs SEED VE. the stra egy of guerrilla warfare anywhere else? - 3. In 1851, Engels wrote to Harx, 'Surcly, the fact is evddent that a disorganised army and a complete breakdown of discipline has been the condition as well as the result of every victorious revolution.' Portugal is m0 exeeptic om to the apo Is a revolution impossible without FS war?
| Sppeenienr ree ee
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ES Ey Oe RE seOr ‘ - Stalinism i, uf bye. ays ee 1 add abigaene apres ‘ff : eee" HH eee CHOU SA ee) ore | : | I ferotl The Portuguese cP. fas of course played: acentral role in Portugal.
Any study of Stalinism must ascimilate this expcricnee. Fortthe first time since the War; loaving aside the“ brict upésode of May 6a, the CP has been ca ght up in ‘a prolctarian revolution in an aavancec | capitalist ee a sat a edge eet” dea] Ba aie ae stenedio 2 alt bole lt -otedoss ts at cath oc atket 2 . The most. pakoerrem thing: ebout sthe Pertugdese “CP, caneeaily nandart': 0} ns ouddt = pa ae el iscthat its actions appean to cut aoness. JEhe main -strategyT Jats of Euro can CP's since the Var, namcly an opportunist alliance: with |-- vite social democracy to »rop up bourgeoss democracy. Yuet the PCP, which lived out the post-war pericd undcr fascism, has shown itself to break re with the 5P and come out against the Constituent Assembly in favour of !4.0i"2 MFA government. In fact, at one stage it made a united front with the... .; revolutionary teft against the SP. As yell msthis, the. -Portuguesé— or “poe oh has borhé-arms, encourages ‘certain armed militias of worliers, and . ie tae ere ee generally behaved in ways whicn other Eurozean norte; : not. .byl the “Spanish “y and It: lian, have roundly condemndeds? «1 wae. suc cag obiwauteragoto ss wth .# Does any of this indicate that the CP in Portuen 1 has broken; of i210" a is breaking, with-reformism? If: aan not; vblens ares sate behaviour Fang 2H in the summer months. Pi cid JIE ee oh ee ehh Tommayoa: “pes in some countrics, ¢.¢. China dnd Vietnaa,. CP's have ineroduged. 4 workers state, albeit after vacillations which cost the proletariat a- ei heavy price and in a bureaucrotic and deformed way. They were forced Thies to do so by excentional circumstances. fren't there some rather exceptional = circumétances in Portugal? Foerhaps we shauld adopt the view that, despite” its wishes, the CP vas BesnE Forced: under iquiea we along as Sere: Fate Fi eal \ z feb aor Hyeeae gece 7 toe te ret ‘itd = 34 ty aait er ae ire ee Veg 25. Gia ; i F Sains viet ; Aa =
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