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PORT UCR SPA TOWARDS THE IBERIAN SOCIALIST REVOLUTION
INTERNATIONAL MARXIST GROUP PAMPHLET PRICE 20p
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First Edition: IMG Publications, September 1975
ISBN 0—85 612 009 x
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION — Portugal and Spzin—A common fate PORTUGAL — Capitalism ina blind ally — The birth of workers’ power The Armed Forces Movement — Reformists in crisis — The way forward . SPAIN — Franco's Spain on the cliff's edge
IMG PUBLICATIONS Published by: 182. Pentonville Road, London N1.
RED BOOKS, Distributed by: 97 Caledonian Road, London NT.
Printed by Prestagate, Heading; Berkshire.
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Portugal and Spain - acommon fate The countries of the Iberian peninsula — Porttember of 1936, the crews of three Portuguese warugal and Spain — are today the scene of the ships moored in the River Tapus mutinied and tried most monumental class struggles on the Eurato take their ships to join the anti-fascist Spanish Meet.
They were only stopped by shelling from Lisbon’s pean continent. shore batteries.
In Portugal the working class, following the On the other side the Portuguese regime welcomed collapse of the brutal fascist resime that bept the fascist rising, which had orginally been hatched it dewn for so long, is shaking the capitalist in the Portuguese seaside resort of Estoril. From the system in this corner of the continent to tts beginning the Franco forces were accorded every facilvery foundations. In Spain the fascist dictatity on Portuguese soil, including the transmission of orship still survives, but the Spanish working military supplies from Germany. As soon as it was class has placed itself at the head of a vast practical — in early 1938°— Salazar recognised Franco s popular movement which is growing in strenggovernment as the official ruler of Spain, and as ihe th from day to day as both the dictatorship war drew to an end his police rounded up Spanish and those capitalist groups who seek simply a republican refugees and dutifully passed them on to liberal facelift prove unable to meet its chal- Franco's butchers. A special unit of reactionary Portlenge either through brutal repression or liberuguese was formed to fight alongside Franco's army al blandishments. — including in its ranks a later faithful spokesman of the Portuguese capitalists, Antonio Spinola.
If the greal battles of the international class war On the home front Salazar — who for long had tried during the past three decades have been centred in to avoid the trappings of the fascisi siates, stressing that part of the globe ruthlessly plundered by imhis regime's ‘Catholic’ inspiration — felt compelled to perialism — Asia, Africa and Latin America — today create his own storm troopers (the Portuguese Legion) they are erupting in Lhe very heartland of world capand a fascist-style youth corps (Portuguese Youth) in italism. In 1917 Lenin tried to explain the apparently order to combal the danger of subversion fram insurironic fact that socialist revolution should have brokgent Spain. en out in Russia, the country least suited for it im In March 1939, the fraternity of the two dictatorterms of its economic development, by saying that ships was sealed in the infamous ‘Iberian Pact’ of mut- “the imperialist chain broke at its weakest link’. Toual assistance. During the war they drew even closer, day the weak links are again starting to buckle, and trying to maintain a two-man Siiancing act between they are to be found on the Iberian peninsula. the fascist Axis powers.and the ‘democratic’ Allies.
During the 1920s and ‘30s Spain and Portugal were While their sympathy — often expressed in material among a number of capitalist countries whose ruling assistance (provision of facilites for espionage and classes responded to the sacial and economic crisis by communications, supply of essential war material)! — imposing brutal fascist regimes in order to shatter the was unashamedly with the former, the two dictators resistance of the working class movement Both were were too skilful oppartunists, and fell too weak in among the most underdeveloped of European capitsuch a clash of giants, lo cast their lol with either side alist nations, and both had known brief and unsuecessuntil the eventual outcome was clear. ful attempts by the capitalist class to rule through the ‘This prudence saved their skins. After the war both institutions of capitalist democracy | Portugal from regimes pradually made their peace with the “democ- 1910-1926 and Spain from 1931-1936). ralic’ powers of Western capitalism. despite the idle In each case this period was brought to a sharp end hopes of opposition forces that the victorious allies by the only force capable of uniting all the quarrelling would reject these offspring of defeated fascism. Prortfactions of the ruling class and taking the decisive ugal was admitted lo NATO in 1949. Spain, symbol of action necessary to deal with the working class; the anti-fascist struggle. whose ties with the Axis had been army. In Portugal, where industrial development was very limited and the working class small and inexperienced in political stragele, this was achieved with little resistance. But in Spain, where lhe workers’ movement had decades of experience of political struggle under both military dictatorship and capital. ist ‘democracy’, the reactionary military plot met with an iron Ting of proletarian resistance which was only broken after three years of bloody civil war.
The histories of Spain and Portu ‘al bive always been closely intertwined — in part because of the similarities of the tivo countries, and in part through conscious co-ordination. When, i. years after their Portuguese counterparts had taken the road to dic- Lalorship, the Spanish ruling class plunged into civil war, the conflagration immediately spilled over the border. The opposition to Salazar’s dictatorship, who had for five years depended upon the territory of the Spanish Republic as a base for their political work, saw their fate inextricably linked with the antifascist strugele in Spain. Portuguese volunteers were recruited to join the international brigades and the Spanish republican army, often using arms which they a had been accumulating for use against Salazar. In Sep- Spanish fascists celebrate anniversary of France uprising
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quite open and direct. had a longer and more difficult Lhe father - were moving towards just such) asituation: haul. But within a few years she too was admitted The inebusion of such regimes in the EEC was thus to the conmunity of the “free world’, lie decor opened out of the question. The European capitalists might by a-military and economic assistance pact with the be quite willing to embrace faseist dictators, bui the United States: insurgent working class thatthey would bring with them Portugal and Spain were both anachronisms in Lhe vais Lolally inaceeplable. The example they would sei to world of post-war, booming Europe. While economic olber European workers, reinforced by the still living ‘miracles’ were being worked in Italy and Germany. memory: of the Spanish civil war and the millions of and the somewhat less miraculous British economy immigrant workers already settled in the EEC.) would managed to take some comfort from the growth of thresten to infect the working class of (he entire conworld trade and the international capitalist economy. tinenl with their spirit of intransigent class strugele and shake the foundations of European capitalist Portugal and Spain remained impoverished backwaters, locked in their isolated cells of fascist ‘national selfsrttok Thus both the Spanish and Portuguese capitalists sufficiency’ — much to the chagrin of their respective had to seek some way by which they could give tapilalists, their regimes a democratic face-lift and creale Lhe Portugal was partly Insulated from these difficult sort of institutions of capitalist democracy tal could ies by her colonial empire, towards which the growing Portuguese monopolies had directed their energies absorb and redirect the energies of the working ¢lass. with good prospects of turning a fast escudo. So it Half a century ago the backwardness of Poriuguese was Spain which was the first to break: in Lhe late capitalism forced its ruling class lo luke a desperate leup to dictatorship that showed Spain the image of 1950s the Spanish economy had to be bailed out-of ils own future. On 25 April this same backwardness an acule economic crisis by the agencies of internaforced Lhe Portugese capitalists to try another desper- Lional capitalism — the World Bank and the Internaale leap — this time te capitalist democracy, tional Monetary Fund. But she had Lo pay a price: _ Under the hammer blows of the heroic liberation the abandoning of her isolationist economic policy, and the opening of her doors to foreign investment and fighters. the colonies had turned trom a source of refreer foreign trade (a policy opposed by the die-hards of lief for the Porluguese capitalists into a millstone around their necks. Faced with a deep and detertorthe fascist regime, but supported by the main groups af Spanish capitalists). aling social crisis, they turned Lo their old ally Lhe With Spain embarking on this new road Portugal army (whieh had ushered in lhe era‘of diclatorship on their behalf 48 years earlier) to try to launch a could aol remain an isolated exception forever, and by the early 1960s her capitalist class had compelled new course, But this was a gamble based on unsound assump- Salazar to tread the same path. Portugal took part m tions. The Portuguese capitalists had overlooked the the formation of the European Free Trade Association in 1960, and other Spanish-slyle economic policies faet that capitalist democracy can-only work to defuse the working class struggle for a new Social order under were adopted by the Portuguese régime shortly aftercertain circutstance: the capitalists must have some wards. leeway so that they can make material concessions 1a Both Spain and Portugal underwent a similar econ: the demands being raised by the working masses, there omic growth in the ensuing decade, with the big monmust be a privileged layer of the population prepared opolies and finance capitalists of the two countries to underwrite Lhe capitalist regime despite ils class characeagerly entering into partnership with European and ler, and there must be a bureaucratic leadership over North American capital to launch select industrialisa- Lhe workers’ movement prepared to sell out the intertion projects. AL Lhe same time the two countries be esis of (heir class in exchange for the maintenance of came drawn more powerfully Lowards the centre of special privileges. Burepean capitalism — the emerging Common Market.
Bul none of these things existed in sufficient quan- The political problems facing the ruling classes of tity in the societies of the Iberian peninsula to make the two countries thus. moved instep. For both, the capitalist democracy work. The Portuguese vapitalextension of the present ties with European ¢apital ists’ gamble thus had alolally different effect — mwas-a life-and-death matter. In an era of growing stead of allowing them-to head off the emergence of crisis, when each capitalist class is turning more and a powerful workers’ movement, it produced an imtore Lo tend ils own garden, membership of Lhe Commense explosion that threatens their class rule alto mon Market is required by both the Portuguese and Spanish capitalists as a guarantee against their indus wether, Once again. Portugal has: revealed to Spain its tries being frozen out of the European market by new future. There is no more a basis for the creation of a protectionist measures. stable capilalist democracy in Spain than there is in But there is a problem here. The Common Market Portugal. White the situation of the Spanish capital isseen by the European ruling lass not simply as an ists is not yet quite as desperate as thal of their Port econonut measures, but as the first step Lowards the creation of a new political set-up:a multi-national upuese Counterparts and they have greater reserves at their disposs! (in particular the army is not nearly as framework thal can belter tame the working class of affected by Lhe political crisis), the development of a each member country. But this in iu requires some real mass upheaval could quickly sweep away these uniformity in the political set-nps of each state. The advantages. What is more. the Spanish wornmg class fascist-style regimes of Spain and Portugal did not fit the common European mold. has a much longer tradition, a much higher degree of organisation. and isa more powerful force throughout This might have been overcome, were Il not for sociely, than was the Portuguese working ¢lass before the facl that regimes such as these inspire an intense 25 April. Things which the Portuguese working class hatred among the masses. bora while their repressive had to spend precious months learning and developpower may drive this underground and prevent mass ing ~ ke regional co-ordination of their own organs struggles emerging. Hut ala cerialy coint the oppression of struggle — the Spanish workers already possess. of the masses becomes unbearable, their determination to struggle exceeds Lheir fear of repression, their crea- What is more, the spanish working class now have tivity oulwits the most efficient repressive machine. the crucial lessons of Lhe Portuguese class struggle at and their struggles erupt into the light of day — in an their disposal. ‘The bankruptey. of class collaboratianever mare uncontrollable form. From the beginning ism. the impossibility of defending democratic of the 1970s. both Portugal and Spain — particularly conquests through the capitalist state. the necessity
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| a a ge, Me. for Lhe working class to take power through its own IL willdo everything in its power to ensure as rapidly class organisations bo solve the problems produced by as possible the defeat of the Porlupuese workers, and the capitalist crisis, have all been hammered home ta to hold back as long as possible the offensive of the the most class-conscious Spanish workers by the living Spanish working class. experience of Lheir Portuguese brothers and sisters.
Twist and tur as they may in the coming months, [tis this which makes international solidarity so there is. no way thal the Spanish capitalists can fore crucial. dust.as the fate of the Portuguese revolution stall the coming explosion. At the moment the Port is tied up with the development of the class struggle upuese working class is running Into heavy water in in Spain, so the struggles of the working class In every its own fight, bul if il can prevent the ruling class European country would receive an unprecedented from regaining the inilialive it will soon find the Spanboost from the eruption of a socialist revolution on ish proletariat marching shoulder-to-shoulder beside European soil. Al the present moment this makes it it. And if the upsurge in Spain can be set into motion essential that we do everything in our power to solidarwhile Che Portuguese proletarial is still marching ahead, ise with the Portuguese and Spanish working class. the strength of Lhe working class on the Iberian penin- We must mobilise the full might of the international sula will be invincible. The birth of a Socialist [beria workers movement to block the imperialist and reacwill be on the order of the day — and such a slruggle tionary plots in Portugal, and prevent the unleashing cannot but herald the birth of a Socialist Europe. of a brutal repressive drive against the Spanish work- ‘This is whal Eurepean capitatisin fears the most. ing class and ils vanguard.
PORTUGAL Capitalism on the Cliff's Edge Ina matter of hours on the night of 25 Apmil The fascist regime of Antonia Salazar had been born in the years of capitalist crisis of the 1920s when 1974 the ruthlessly efficient, dictatorial rethe Portuguese ruling class, along with its counterparts sime which had dominated Portugal for the in many other European countries, found itself in too preceding 4U years was swept away ina deep trouble and too weak to rule through the institutions surgical operation carried out by the Portuof capitalist democracy. Instead it turned to a represguese army. sive regime headed by a ‘strong man’. Salazar, like How could such a dramatic change take his fellow dictator Franco in Spain, was a very clever place so rapidly and with such little resistance? capitalist politician and was able to exploit the anti- There is only one explanation. The army was communist drive launched by imperialism after the not acting simply off its awn bat, but on be- Second World War to ensure the survival of his regime, despile tts association with the defeated fascist Axis half of the most important and most poverful sections of the Portuguese capitalists, who had powers. for some time been convinced of the need for In the years following the Second World War, Portmajor changes in state policy if their interests uguese economics and polities were dominated by were Lo be properly protected, and had finally Lwo factors — the growing connections between Portcome to the conclusion that the overthrow of ugel and the then booming economy of capitalist Hur the old regime, and the Government of Marcelope, on the one hand and Portugal’s colonial empire, primarily centred in Africa, on Lhe other. lo Caetano based on it. was the only means of After the war was over the dictatorship sought to obtaining such changes. 3
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prevent backward Portuguese capitalism falling even fibre plants. further behind its capitalist neighbours by encourag- Meanwhile, the chickens of Portugal’s ruthless -ex- Ing. economic prowth through state aid and support. ploitation of the colonies were come home to roost. The fascist state actively aligned itself with a number Between 1961 and 1964 armed liberation struggles of economically powerful monopoly groups and tried broke out in each of Portugal's African colonies, and to get them to invest-in Portugal's economic developthe regime rapidly found itself embroiled ina major ment by granting them a wide range of special priviloverseas war, which began to gobble up more and more eges, both at home and in the colonies. At the same of its impoverished economy's resources. time the dictatorship (as did its neighbour in Spain)
By the time the old regime collapsed in 1974, the tried to keep up a policy of economic nationalism descolonial wars were eating up about 50 per cent of the igned to prevent the Portuguese economy becoming total Government budget, and about 8 per cent of the dependent on foreign trade and investment, stressing total output of the economy. Some 200,000 coninstead economic ‘self-sufficiency’ and strengthened scripts had been dragged off to fight for Portuguese economic ties with the colonial empire. In order to imperialism —and this ina tiny country of just over slave off competition from the industries of capitalist 8 million people! The casualties sustained by the Europe the fascist state assisted the monopolies to Portuguese army in the wars — 60,000 killed or inconcentrate economic production in their hands. jured — was almost as great, in relative terms, as the Portugal's economic ties with its colonies were based losses of the British army in the Second World War. on the classic colonial relationship of importing raw a ae thaterials at low prices in exchange for industrial exports. A numberof Portugal's export industries were only able'to compete on the world market on the basis of this-supply of cheap raw materials. particularly the textile industry, dependent on colton from Mozambique. This gave the colonies an importance in the Portuguese economy out of all place to their importance in the world capitalist market: as late as 1969 about one-fifth of Portugal's overseas trade was with her OWn empire.
But of course, this set-up had a snap: it dumped the costs of Portugal’s limited economic development -on the backs of the colonies, and could only be maintained througha policy of ruthless exploitation, backed up by brutal repression of the impoverished colonial masses. Eventually it bore fruit in a mounting wave of popular resistance in the colonies.
Meanwhile, the great Portuguese monopolies were The economic and social effects of these wars dovebiting the hand that had fed them. Rather than being tailed with the existing problems of Portuguese capitloyal supporters of the regime's economic plans, the alism to produce a deep-gaing crisis for the capitalists. big Portuguese capitalists found themselves attracted The demands of the army for manpower came on top fat more to the capitalist bonanza of Europe. Instead of the siphoning off of large numbers of workers to of loyally underwriting plans for Portuguese ‘selfthe booming industries of Western Europe, many of sufficiency’ they chose to invest their wealth abroad and grumble about the regime's refusal to allow them them encouraged to do so in order to avoid the prospect of the bloody slaughter in Africa. There were to take part in the international capitalist boom. The 1.5 million emigrants from Portugal in this period regime's economic plans thus fell apart from a lack of and about one third of them left the country illegally. the capital necessary to carry them through.
The upshot of this was to produce an acute labour Faced with this opposition, Salazar had no altershortage in the advanced economic sectors dominated ative bul lo give in. The door was opened, at least by the monopolies, hampering the possibilities for pact way, for foreign investment, and a crash econtheir growth and putting the workers in this sector inomic policy was put into operation with the aim of to a strong bargaining posilion that allowed them to further strengthening the monopolies and gearing push up their real wages, despite the repressive fascist Portuguese industry to resist the increase in foreign order. competition. After 1965, Salazar’s illness and eventual The burden of the wars on this already enfeebled death brought Marcello Caetano to the head of the economy, already suffering from the contradictions regime, and this policy was carried even further. between its modern and backward economic sectors Under the economic policy the great monopolies and the effects-of monopoly domination, led to a extended their tentacles over the economic life of the rapidly accelerating rate of inflation, with Portugal country in-close association with foreign capital and attaining one of the worst rates of inflation in the the big multi-national companies. An important meacapitalist world, Sure of industrialisation developed in this way, delib- At the same time Portugal’s new economic policy erately concentrated in a small number of select zones of opening up relations with capitalist Europe was around the major cities. leading to a closer and closer relationship with the What this meant. was Lhat alongside the traditional, European economy. Portugal wasa founding member backward Portuguese economy of farming, fishing anc of the Buropean Free Trade Association (EF TA} set small-scale industry there grew up a new section of large up in 1960 by those European countries who were . scale industry based on modern technology and highly outside the Common Market. When many of these concentrated production. Thus, while the average Portuguese worker even today works In what i§ little — including Portugal's biggest customer, Britain — joined the EEC, Portugal's capitalists were naturally more than a glorified workshop along with fewer than pulled in the same direction: But Portugal’s political 10 workmates, the country is also the site of the world’ largest ship-repair yards, and sophisticated elecset-up, born out of the fascist era, was an obstacle to tronics and petro-chemical industries. Sometimes its full integration into the EEC, where the capitalist these contrasts exist even inside a single industry: for class maintained its political power through the institutions of capilalist democracy, and a deep hatred of example the key textile industry includes both tiny fascism existed among the working class. Despite sweatshops making clothing and modern man-made
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Portugal's negotiation of a-special tree trade agreement them, serving on the boards of the big monopolies, with the Common Markel in 1972, the main sections for‘example. of the capitalist class continued to aim for eventual Moreover, they found in the army a first-rate canfull membership of Portugal in the Common Market. didate to advance their schemes — General Spinola.
While the big Portuguese monopolies were being Here was a man who shared their views and had great drawn more povertully inte the European orbit, prestige in the armed forces, but who had also proved changes were also laking place in their outlook on his ability in the colonies as a ruthless defender of African affairs. IL was becoming Increasingly obvious capitalist and imperialist interests. Here was the man that the colonial wars, far from protecting their interto seize on the discontent that was riddling the army ests, were leading towards a massive defeal in which and its officer corps and place himself at the head of they could be completely wiped out. Moreover, the a movement that could both sweep the obstacle of growing European orientation of Lhe big monopolies, the old regime out of the monopolists’ way, bul withcoupled with the fact that they were starting to emoul threatening to jeopardise their fundamental interhark on economic exploitation of the colonies through ests. Orso they thought! joint projects with Western imperialism, opened up the possibility of a ‘neo-colonial’ solution to the The birth of wars in which formal political independence would be be granted, but imperialist economic exploitation Thaintained.
Thus for quite some time before 25 April, the workers’ power main sections of the Portuguese capitalist class were im favour of a change of political stratery Lowards the sort of political liberalisation at home that would make Portugal acceptable inside the Common Market, and limited measures of independence for the colon- The downfall of the hated fascist regime was ies that could make possible an end to the colonial followed by an immense outburst. of proletarwars. These were the necessary conditions for carrylan egergy and creativity which swept the last ing through Porlugal’s intended marriage to Huropean remnants of this rotten product of capitalist capitalism and western imperialism. class rule into the dustbin of Portuguese his- At first the capitalists had hopes that the necessary tory. changes could be carried through within the frame- Crowds of irate workers hunted down agents work of the old [aseist machine thal had served them of the brutal secret police, the PLDE, and dishso well, The replacement of Salazar by Caetano, who ed out rough proletarian justice to them before shared many of the monopolists views on these mathanding them over to the army. Workers in ters, gave them grounds for optimism. every sector of the economy went into struggle And Caetano did his best to carry out their proeramme: he introduced a number of liberal trap- — not just for economic demands like decent pings to the fascist state machine. admitting a number wages, paid holidays. and a shorter work week, of moderate opposilionists close to the monopolists but Tor demands which had a political content, inte his Government, a number of moves to stimsuch as the dismissal of managers closely assoulate foreign investment, and set in motion steps ciated with the fascist state or known for their to grant limited self-government toa the colonies. brutal treatment of workers’ struggles. These But Caetano’s plan rapidly ran into serious trouble. struggles were not confined to the factories, On the one hand the workers movement, now stronger but spread into the colleges and school, governthan ever before with the new industrialisation that had taken place, took full advantage of Caetano’s rement departments, the newspapers and mass forms (particularly the decision to allow relatively media, shaking the whole structure of the capfree elections for the state-controlled unions for the italist state. first time) and mounted a wave of industrial struggle At the same time the working class began to forge to defend themselves against the spiralling rate of inthe instruments of its own power. The struggles in flation. At the same time the die-hard reactionaries the factories were organised in a thoroughly demowho continued to hold key positions in various parts cralic fashion through mass meetings and elected and of the fascist regime on which Caetano’s Government instantly re-callable workers’ committees. Similar was based — the army, the political police, and the rulcommillees were created in the universities and coling party — began to gel uneasy about Caetano’s ‘new leges and the workers residential distriets to deal with course’ and started rattling their sabres. their problems. These committees lived on after the By 1970 Caetano was busy liquidating this little first wave of struggle had passed and after the job of liberal experiment, and any hope that the monopolreconstructing the fascist-regulated trade union move ists would gel whal they wanted in this way were ment (now under Communist Party control) was dashed. This made it clear to them that there was no underway, because they best represented the unity of prospect of serious reform from within the fascist the workforce (whereas the trade unions remained repime. divided along craft lines)-and were best suited to deal The problem that they now faced was what force with many of the tasks that the working class had to could they turn to carry out the job? Any attempt at face. a mass campaign to overthrow the Government was After the first few months of struggle the movement went into a dowiswin , caused by the determinout of the question for the capitalists, for even the ation of the monopolist-dominated Drovisiona ene timid reforms of Caetano had shown the determination of the Portuguese masses to unleash militant struggles ernment, backed by the AFM and the Communist if given the slightest chance. Any campaign-of mass Le went the strugele poine too far. ‘The action would thus rapidly lead far beyond the limited Communist Party opposed all struggles as ‘aiding aims of the monopolists. reaction and accepted the Government 5 decision There was little wonder that the hopes of the monctee a derisory minimum wape of 4400 escudos opolists should then centre on the army. The military £12) a week instead of the which almos were the traditional defenders of capitalist interests sections of the working class were demanding (an in Portugal, and its top echlons are both recruited which the CP had itself called for before the coup). from capitalist circles and often retain close ties with ‘TE ; hed i . when th # a A
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workers’ commillees. After the frustrated right-wing voup of 11 March the commiltecs demanded the im mediate nationalisation of the banks, and to back up their demand presented a dossier with full information on the stunts that the bankers ha! been up to huge handouts lo right-wing political groups, massive misappropriation of funds (one banking family, lhe Espirito Santos. issued themselves over £4 million in overdrafts) and all sorlsof misuse of Government funds handed over to the banks to-aid industry.
This determined and efficient action by the bank workers forced the Government to nationalise the banking and financial institutions. 1. also towebed offa wave of action by other workers. A mass rally of thousands of railway workers was beld to call for the nationalisation of the entire Lransport systenr and its reorganisation under a national plan. The workers in the giant CUP monopaly launched # campaign for its nationalisation, and the workers-in the country’s major brewery (acling on information supplied by the bank workers) occupied their plant to demand its nationalisation. All these initiatives eventually ended in victory.
But while this delermined struggle and new forms of organisation created by the Portuguese working ‘This strike involved 35,000 workers and was a model class were capable of forcing the Government into ing class democracy. The decision to Sirike taking important actions against the interests of the was taken by a nalional meeting of workers delega capitalists, and blocking the immediate attempts of alter a series of local mass meetings, and the strike — the capitalists to sabotage such measures. they have leadership was elected in a similar fashion. The strike limitations, They have not been sufficient to prevent was defeated after a vicious campaign led by the CP._ the Porluguese economy, which was in a precarious who denounced the workers as ‘reactionaries’ and _ position even before 25 April, undergoing a major actually mobilised local mobs to attack their strike crisis, with production falling off and unemployment _headquarters, taying the basis for the Government's. rising precipitously (to 600,000 or about 10 per ened threat lo use the army to break the siz of the workforce), and a prave balance of payments After this defeat the Government went on the deficit developing as the world crisis and imperialist offensive. enacting an antistrike law which was much sabotage dries up foreign markets and the inflawof tougher than the Tories’ Industrial Relations Act, lor foreign capital, example. Bul even this did not prevent the workers’
Nor could workers control at the factory level da struggles from continuing, now centring around the much to help the plight of the small traders and poor fighl to purge former fascists and reactionaries from peasants caught in the vice of inflation at home, dectin- Positions of influence in the economy and the state_ ing markets for agricultural produce abroad. and their Again this was a struggle opposed by the Communist indebtedness io the banks and local money-lenders. Party and the APM. After the vielory of the working Voday if is these problems — and the failure of any class on 28 September, made possible because of the force in the country Lo meet them — which is laying preceding and preparatory struggles, a hew upsurge the basis for the political mobilisation of reactionary began which has continued until very recently. forces. and constitutes the gravest threat to the Port- The principal problem facing the working class uguese revolution, became economic sabotage. Both Porluguese and The only answer lo this is workers’ controlof the foreign capitalists responded to the growing power whole economy, and the implementation on this bass of the working class by trying all sorts of tricks to of socialist planning of the economy. This cannot be ereate economic chaos. The workers responded by done simply by local factory committees, bul requires tstablishing workers control over production: they a nationally co-ordinated structure of workers’ power opened up the company’s books, inspected its orders and a Government based on it, its transactions, its bank balance. H they found any- The first step towards such a structure have been thing out of the ordinary they reported it to the laken with Lhe birth of “Popular Assemblies’ in a num- Government, and the more advanced sections took berof areas. These bodies, which group logether action on their own to prevent the bosses continuing democratically elected delegates from the factory their sabotage. commilleés, neighbourhood committees, and in some When factories were shut-down the workers’ cases the local military units. represent the emergence conmilbees stepped in and resumed production under of veritable organs of working class political authority their own control. There were few ilisions that these on the local devel. Beginning witha nunber of such could be turned inte long-term “workers ¢o-operatives’ bodies sel up al the call of the Conmunist Party io — this action was-seen as an emergency measure to play an ‘advisory’ role lo the capitalist slate, and deal with the capitalists’ wrecking, and was often encouraged by a decision of the Armed Forces Move tied with demands for nationelisation under workers’ ment general assembly in favour of the establishment control, of such bodies, the Popelar Assemblies still exist in Nor was workers control limited ta capitalist inonly a féw localities in the industrial regions of Lhe dustry of confined to the local level. On several occa- South. sions (the first being just after 25 April) the highly Moreover. neither the Communist Party oor most currents inside Lhe AFM see them as having any job organised bank workers stepped in and enforced to do other than ‘help’ the machinery of the caprtalist their own control in the banks to prevent attempts state be “more efficient’. In order for the Popular by the capitalists to suddenly pull out their funds and Assemblies to lay the basis of genuine working class create a financial crisis. political power and get on with meeting the problermns At the same time they set in motion @ minute inwracking the country, they must be extended throughvestigation of their bosses’ affairs through the elected
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out the whole country, drawing in the vast majority of the exploited population and must be totally independent of the cupitalist state.
The following is an excerpt from an interview with the vice-president of the Portuguese Textile Workers Union, Marcolo Abrantes, in which he explains the origins and Jevelopment of workers’ control in Portugal.
Fake for example my industry, textiles. There we have firms like Gourtaulds, and sectors such as. manmade fibres and clothing. Foreign capital is very important here — espeically in clothing — because its a labour-intensive industry and Portuguese labour was extremely cheap. Also the Portuquese colonies supplied cheap raw materials, not pay it, and the rhythm of factory closures was Under the old regime the situation was kept stable stepped up. through the various forms of repression that the work- This included many foreign firms. Let me give you ing class were subjected to. After 25 April this represyou one very good example — a textile firm in the sive apparatus broke down and the workers began to north of Portugal, Swedish-owned, called ALGOTE. ush forward their demands. In reaction to this, as After the workers occupied this factory the managethese struggles advanced very quickly due to the end ment tried to sabotage them in every way — by freezof repression, the bosses resorted to economic saboting the money in the banks, making it difficult tor age — using every form possible. This ranged from them to distribute what they produced. Eventually not ordering raw materials so that factories were they had to stop production, but they managed to paralysed, through to not selling goods in stock. They contact their fellow-workers in Sweden and there told lies about the state of the market in order to rewas a solidarity strike which had a big impact in the duce production, tried to declare redundancies, and eventual success of their struggle in Portugal. pretended that they couldn't pay wages — all this Workers control began a3 2 move coming from the working class responding to the concrete problems sort of thing.
The process of the struggle led not only to the they were being confronted with. Then it acquired a need for the workers to begin to contral the producdifferent character when the nationalisations began. tive process and not to he exclusively dependent on These were brought about by the pressure put on the the bosses, but also to the opening of the books Government by the working class to take through occupations, etc. Apart trom finding out over sectors of the industry and economic life. Then that all these problems were actually fabricated by the first problem came in terms of workers power, tre bosses the workers also found out that, for exand the workers began to see it in a different way. ample, money was being transferred abroad.
Who is going to control the nationalised industries?
Confronted with these activities by the workers What is workers’ control? |s it state control, exclusthe bosses took various actions. Many decided to ively through administrative means by the state? Or close dawn their factories, lock out their workers, is it the workers who work in the nationalised indusand so on. The workers then responded by occupy tries who are going to organise that? The thing went ing their factories, and continuing production by even further and due to this developed and reached a themselves. new stage in which people are beginning to raise the The workers soon realised that they had to set up question not only of workers control in relation to a pickets to guard the factories outside of working certain workplace, but also who is going to control hours. This was shown in the case of the Frenchthe economy as a whole? owned textile firm SOGANTAL, a typical case - The working class is already moving in the direction amang many. The French bosses just left this facof guaranteeing that it is the workers committees that tory when it was occupied, and returned to France. are going to control production. There are already For same months the workers continued production, many instances of this. Like in the case of a very organising their own sales. Then one day the bosses important fertiliser factory in which the workers came back with a group of thugs — some Portuguese, already exercise control; and in the Lisnave shipyards some toreign — and in the middle of the night tried where there was a mass meeting in which the workers to overpower the pickets and seize back the factory. decided that they should control production, and that But the pickets were able to resist anc! wive the alarm. this should be exercised through the workers’ commit- They were then jdined not only by the other workers, tees. There are several similar cases in the textile inbut by the whole local population, who drove off the dustry where workers are already effectively in conbosses’ assault. trol of production.
This sort of thing went on all across Portugal, be The example | mentioned of the fertiliser factory is Very important because there are already elected cause the bosses wanted to take away everything that was in store, machinery etc., with the double purpose cammittees farmed in many rural villages that have of rescuing everything they could, and preventing the decided that agrarian reform should be implemented workers carrying on with their work and making the by themselves. The workers in this fertiliser factory occupation successful. have decided to help this move and already supply Under the pressure of the working class a national fertilisers to the committees that are supervising the minimum wage was enacted — about £50 a month, | expropriation of land at a cheaper price than they think this was still very love but all throughout the charge to the landowners. textile industry the bosses started to say they could
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What i§ most vital in the process that is underway jeclany form of compromise, the officers became at the moment is to form and elect workers’ commit more committed to outright political opposition.
Thus ihe Armed Forces Movernent was born with, tees, neighbourhood and village conmittees where from December 1874 onwards. a clear commitinent they don't yet exist, and especially to create elected to-overthrawing the old regime by military action. soldiers committees in the barracks, It is necessary ta The coup of 25 April was exclusively the work of spread. to all places these forms of working class organthese young officers. General Spinola was informed isationy, ofit inadvance. but was in no way involved in its There-are three main areas where these committess planning, nor did he identify himself with it until must act in the first place. First, to establish real success was clear heyond doubt, links between the committees that already exist and The officers hoped to use Spinola’s prestige to ensure as rapid and bloodless a victory as possible to make sure that actions by the different committecs over the old regime, white he sought to harness their are co-ordinated. Beginning with the co-ordination base and organisation inside the army for his own Of conmittees at the area and sector level (ive. in sim: plans. What Spinola and his monopolist backers ilar types of industry) this will hopefully reach the wanted was a regime with a democratic facade, but national level, Second, to make sure that, once these asolid authoritarian core capable of ‘disciplining’ committees are co-ordinated, regular local mass meetlhe workers movement and other opponents of the ings take place to make the decisions and co-ordinate monopolists ambitions. They wanted an economic action, so that the rank-and-file can control what policy that would further strengthen the monopoly their representatives are doing and increase the partsecLors in preparation for full Portuguese entry to icipation of the people in general in the workings of the EEC, and a colonial policy that would end the the committees. wars in exchange for limited measures of independence that would leave the colonial territories firmly within Finally, the major task for the immediate future the impertalist economic orbit. must be ta control production as far as possible, This The programme of the Armed Forces Movement is already being done at factory level, as | have describ- — on paper — seemed to be in sharp eonflict with the ed but it has to be spréad to other places and seen ina objectives of the monopolies, speaking of the need to different way. This is why the neighbourhood comdefend the interests of the most impoverished sections mitteesare particularly important, for production of the population and to recognise the righls of the must not only be controlled at factory level, but all colonial peoples to self-determination. But fine the way through to the delivery of the goods, The words are the stuff of any major political upheaval. distribution system, and the service industries, have Whether they gel carried out or not depends on what to be organised by the people and controlled by class forces are sel in motion. The monopolists hoped io damp down the mass strugele as far as possible and them at the level of the community. bind the officers of the AFM, through General Spin- The ola. toa thoroughly capitalist perspective, which would rapidly push the promises of the AFA programme into the background.
But the monopolists plan was based on a bad mis- Armed Forces calculation- not the last capitalist circles were to make. They underestimated the depth of the upheaval that the coup would set off among the masses, underestimated the determination of the colonial Movement liberation movements to continue the struggle until final victory, underestimated the extent to which the rank-and-file of the army would be affeeted by the political turmoil, and, finally, underestimated While General Spinola was the figure to whom the effects of all these factors on the officers who the Portuguese capitalists looked to head up held the key levers of power. the new regime in their interests, the actual Thus at each crucial turning point in the political situation — when the pro-monopolist politicians tried authors of the coup which brought down the to strengthen the power of Spinola in June, when old regime were a group of much younger and Spinola’s supporters tried to stage their mass “silent lower ranking officers, organised in the Armed majonty march on Lisbon to boost his position on Forces Movement (AFM). 28 September, and when his backers in the army The AFM was created during the colonial attempted a right wing coup on 11 Maarch — the majwars out of a group of diseruntled junior proority-of the AFM officers refused to go along with fessional officers. concerned with the loss of the capitalists’ plans. privilege and status they were suffering asa Of course, they did so only because of growing result of the influx of conscripts inte the mass pressure. The weeks before 28 September were officer corps, recruited fresh from the univermarked by growing activity of [he most class-conscious sities, in order to meet the necds of the wars. sections of the working class inthe Lisbon region against the threat of right-wing reaction. The Lisbon But eventually they began to draw a connection newspaper workers staved a one-day solidarity strike between these narrow professional problems and the with the workerson one paper fi¢hting to purge thet general political problems created by the fascist rereactionary editors, and thousands of steel-helmeted gime. In particular, their experiences in Africa conworkers from Lhe Lisnave shipyard marched through Vinced them that the colonial wars were nol only Lishon demanding tough action against the reactiondestructive and unwinnable, but also that they could aries — “Democracy for the workers ~ repression for not be coded as long as the fascis) regime remained the reactionaries’, as lhey put it. intact. At the same time as they were subject to The AFM officers opposed Lhese moves. But these radicalising forces, sections of them came oppose them or not the AFM could not ignore these under the influence of various democratic and leflactions, for they displayed the fighting determination wing political currents. of the Lisbon proletariat to resist any strengthening As the regime became increasingly bogged down of the right wing and put the entire working class on in the wars, and more and more determined to re-
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[page 12]
astate of alert.
At one moment it is seeking Spinola’s support, at an- ALl this laid the basis for an immense proletarian other it is pushing him out of office, and at another forcing him to flee the country and rounding up his mobilisation throughout the country on 28 September to crush the reactionaries. The Janger of a right wing supporters. On almost all the key political questions vietory. and Lhe knowedge Lhal big sections of the facing Portugal over the past 18 months ~ colonial Lisbon proletariat would be going into action anyway. policy, economic policy, allitude tovards workers conpelled the Communist Party and the organisations struggles — the AFM has taken different and downunder its inflwence to move inte action at the last right contradictory attitudes at different Limes. minute (it had opposed all the mobilisations of the These different attitudes of the APM have reflected previous weeks and backed Spinola and the Governsharp internal differences inside the Movement, the ment all the way). In-the face of such a reaction the development of different currents inside ihe AFM AFM officers were left no room for compromise or under the impact of events, and the varying relationmanoeuvre: to side with Spinola and the mronopolists ship-of forces between these currents. would mean heaving any vestige of their own program- Those who think that the AFM is the ‘vanguard of me inte the dustbin and joining a bloody repression the revolution® must explain why it aligned itself with against the working class (and not a few of their own a reactionary spokesman of the monopolists like General Spinola, supported a Government which remen).
Since 24 September this pattern of events has. flected the views of him and his backers for so long, been repeated many times and in many different and broke with him so reluctantly. Those who think ways: the militancy and determination of the masses that the APM is simply an instrument of capitalist has forced the AFM and the Government under its bonapartism must explain why the AFM did eventually control to-go along with measures that the masses break with Spinola, and persist in their opposition to were vigorously demanding, if not actually putting him, when he actually represented the best opportuninto operation by themselves, ity to establish a bonapartist regime, and liad the back- There exist two views of the character of the AFM ing of the main capitalist groups in Lhe country.
What then is the correct concept of the AFM? on the British left, both of which aré wrong and lead Certainly it originated as a middle class political moveto Seriously incorrect conclusions. The first is the ment among the officers of the capitalist army, witha most dangerous. Tt is the view held by the Communist political programme thal did not go beyond the ideals Party, In line with the position of the Portuguese Com of capitalist democracy. It did organise and carry out munist Party and the world stalinist movement, Chal the coup thal brought down the fascist regime on 25 the AFM is the ‘vanguard of the revolution’ and that April = but, as we have pointed oul above, the coup the way forward for the Portuguese masses lies through was Inno way in contradiction with the dims and aspirthe ‘alliance of the people and the AFM’ and defence ations-of the main sections of the Portuguese capitalof the ‘unity of the AFM’. Such a view bases itself on the teading role played by the AFM in the downfall ists. Under different circumstances such a group would of the old revime on 25 April, and its key role in the have rapidly been pulled into the orbtt of these decisive sections of the capitalist class and integrated into political events which followed. their schemes. On this basis the inevitable tendencies As we have ‘shown, this direction was determined within the AFM (given both their class composition, by the mass struggle of the colonial liberation moveand their relalionship to the state machine) towards ments and the Portuguese masses, In many cases struggling againsl. Lhe officers of the APM and their a bonapartist” political outlook would have gained the upper hand as they became firmly Integrated inta political schemes, The other view — which some on the revolutionthe capitalist state machine. ary left hold — is that the APM is simply a tool of the But the political upheaval that racked Portugal capitalist class, based on the army, an institution of after the coup prevented such a smooth progression. the capitalist slate. and attempling to impose a “bona- The AFM could not smoothly slip into 4 bonaparitst parlist’ military regime — i.e. one that appears to be role based on the capitalist stale because that state above the class struggle, handing out some conceswas in total chaos. A half century of fascism meant sions to the masses, bul actually working to defend both that the state machine had its fingers In every the fundamental interests of capitalism. This view pie in Portuguese society, and that it was thoroughly bases itself on the class character of the AFM — a associated with the fascist regime and its political movement hased on the capitalist state machine — ideas. The collapse of that regime and the mass deter and on the undeniable efforts of the AFM at various mination to wipe away every vestige of hated fascist rule therefore threw the state machine, and the entire stages to defuse and disorient the anti-capitalist strugsociety, into an immense turmoil. Most serious of ale of the masses. all, the ullimate instruments of capitalist class domin- Both of these views. however, fail to explain the ation — the repressive apparatus of armed men — were actual way in which the AFM has developed since among the most affected by this process. The hated 25 April. If it were either the ‘vanguard of the revolupolitical police, the PIDE. were physically dismantled tion’ or the instrument of a “capitalist bonaparlist’ ina vast outburst of popular anger, and the new Govplan if should have had a clear-sighted view of where ernment had no option but to dissolve the PIDE along i was going and 2 relatively consistent strategy for with those political bodies mast directly associated selling there. But-the AFM displays none of this. with the old regime's political leackership (the single state party and the Portuguese Legion}. But they kept intact those of its repressive instruments they dared: the PSP (‘Public Security Police’ — the riot squad) and the GNR (Republican National Guard — para-military police force).
However these forces were infested with reactionaries, on the one hand, and were objecis of widespread popular hatred on the other. Their yalue as instruments of “public order” was therefore very low. In general their use tended to cause more problems than i solved. To recite just one not untypical mcident when the PSP was called toa Lisbon cafe because of
[page 13]
working class became more and more restless. The more reactionary and foolish gol involved in hopeless adventures like the 11 March coup and were rapidly driven off the political scene by the action of the masses. Bul the more astute las:-ditch defenders of capitalism were prepared to go along wilh quite sweeping economic and political measures. realising both Lhal adrastic overhaul was necessary if Portuguese capitalism was to survive and thal concessions had to be made to the masses now in order to lull them and prepare the eventual reimposition of capitalist order.
Until some force should emerge outside the army on which this current could base itself politically it had to limit itself ico a sort of ‘guerilla warfare’ fac- Lional slruggle inside the AFM, creating at least the impression that the APM was united. Bul.as soon as such an outside force did emerge this ‘unity’ was exposed as the hollow sham it had always been. This was provided by the social forces set in motion by the Socialist Party’s reactionary, anti-commiunist campaign, based on its victory in the Constituent Assembly elections, and fuelled by the chaos created by the economic sabotage of the Portuguese capitalists and imperialism. This has provided the basis for the public emergence of the so-called ‘moderate faction’ of the Wiarch were soon put - ¥ AFM, which does not totally identify itself with the lisations against the attempted coup, right by the popular mobi Socialist Party, bul shares its emphasis on a deal with imperialism (and all chat would entail for strengthenan atpument between the owner and a customer over ing capitalism in Portugal) as a means of meeting Portthe price of a cup of coffee, the matter ended with ugal’s economic crisis. 1L couples this with an appeal the customer being shot in the head by the police, and for the ‘strengthening of the [capitalist] state’. irate onlookers then running the police off the street The members of this group include some important and wrecking Lhe cafe.) figures of the AFM — particularly Major Melo Antunes, The handling of all problems of an even vaguely a former Foreign Minister, and Major Vitor Alves, also political nature thus fell to the army. For a period of a former minister and the drafter of the original AFM time they executed these tasks in true “bonapartist’ programme. With the virtual split of this faction Lhe fashion, intervening in strikes to pressure workers AFM is on the verge of total disintegration. Today to settle, evicting occupations of factories and preventdecisions are nol taken by some central “Coordinating ing demonstrations against the colonial wars from tak- Committee” (as they were in the early days after 25 ing place, etc. But the effect of such a situation when April) or even by Assemblies of delegates elected by the masses were On the move and the whole society AFM officers and soldiers (as they were later on), but was in turmoil was to draw all levels of the armed through a hodge-podge of political manoeuvres, interforces more centrally into the arena of the class strugspersed with all sorts of mass meetings (of whole units dle and subject the ranks and junior officers to constant — officers and men - of sergeants in one service or all contact with the masses. three combined).
Thus the leaders of the AFM found themselves in This disintegration is not some dreadful catastrophe a situation where the only capitalist institution left to be bemoaned with pathetic pleas forthe ‘unity’ on which to base themselves was the army -- and the of the AFM, as the Community Party does. It isthe army, far from being drawn into the orbit of the capinevitable result of the strugele of the Portuguese italists, was being riven by the pressures of the working class pushing capitalism Lo the very edge of mass struggle. This prevented the AFM from hbethe precipice. What must be stressed - against both coming the instrument of any coherent “bonapartist® the ‘unity’ crvers and the ‘military bonapartist” thearstratery and led sections of the capitalists to resort to elicians — is thal the present situation is unique opporthe desperate measures of 28 September and 11 March tunity for the working class lo win to its side a whole bul at the same time it doomed those actions Lo failsection of the armed forces, and aseelion thal can ure. draw behind it the vast majority of soldiers and sailors This in tur forced the pro-capitalist forces in the This would make certain the victory of ihe working country, twice defeated, to place their hopes in the class in Porlugal, even in the face of determined opposelections and seek to rebuild a viable capilalist state ition by capitalism and imperialism. on the basis of Lhe Constituent Assembly and the capitalist institutions that il was supposed to create.
Ref ists | The AFM, from its very beginning, was a coalition of different political elements, agreed only on the tmmediale task of removing the fascist regime. The only e e programme on which these different groups could agree was one thal, whatever radical phrases it might contain, did nol go beyond the bounds of capitalism. The failure of the AFM — oranyone else- to put When the Caetano regime collapsed the Forttogether a viable solution to Portugal's problems on usuese Communist Party was the only organised Lhe basis of capitalism may have pushed them to the force in the country with deep roots and mass left, but it also undermined the basis for unity of the influence in the workers movement. iat was AFM. why the monopolists were so eager fo melude As the leftward shift threatened more and more it in the Government (Spinola personally supthe survival of capitalism in Portugal those currents inported their being invited in) —:so0 that they side the AFM who were not prepared to break with could be used to tame the working class, capitalism and cast their lot with the struggles of the
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working class and tying Portugal firmly into the tm:
As events were to show the working class perialist system. A fovernment commilied to was in an immensely powerful position In Portcourse could expect to_encounter tough fesisiance, ugal, and hacl it received decisive and revolufrom the most militant sections of t tionary leadership could have rapidly developed ancd_as. the Communist Party realised, thal eoulel the struggles that succeeded the downtali of greatly damage ils base.of support the old regime into a victorious socialist revol- ‘On the other hand, the PCP was becoming increas: ingly aware that the legacies of a half-century of { ot fascist ish ution: teil Lie continuing hald of reaction:
Eud. the political policies of the Portuguese Communist Party were firmly sel in the stalimist mould the church, local landowners and political bosses — gf the Ce Communist Parties around £ d the world. Tt argued over a large section af the country was going to weaken their showing in the forthcoming elections. A that the task facing the Portuguese masses was simply strategy based on continuing the coalition Government, the construction of a “democratic order in place o the discredited fascist regime, that socialist revolution @ other members of which were placing all their hopes forstabitising capitalist rule on the elections wis nol on the agen or some time Lo come, an dhat it was therefore necessary to inte with and supand the Constituent Assembly, could lead to the PCP port those ‘pr TOgTeSSI Ve ‘capitalist ¢ roups who were heing squeezed out of government and replaced by a coalition of the Soc Talist Party with the openty capprepared to go along with such a “democratic ang and italist parties. national’ revolution.
Tn ine with Stalinist theory’ the PCP’s programme The PCP hoped to avoid this double threat by basing itself on the alliance with the AFM. It would | apitalist allies:as small and mu _try to exploit the prestige of the Al among the businessmen and farmers, whom they saw as in conmasses to boost its own support. and force on the Mhetcwith the big monopolists. But, as we have noted, the major monopolisis backed the ‘democracy’ af other parties in the coalition a political course which pa Fa Peer ie reer p would nol be quit ile as pro-eapitalist = ro- 25 April. The PCP thus ended up ina government that was at the disposal of those same monopolists, Serving as its watehdog and strike breaker mside the int ie coring class. At the same Lime the capitall wore ers movement, mm order to get clase (To the fens Jo tee won programme of the AFM. and ihe presence Init of, of power — even if il was capitalist power. prestigious Wis individuals cut from the cloth of the [he PGP only broke with the monopalists whiten i became absolutely clear that they were making an old capitalist military elite, such as President Costa agoressive bid for power which, if suceessful, would altomes would reassure Ca italism and im erialisia most certainly elimimate the PCP Ire arent and the capitahst state machine. The viebo jeohtion’ the working elass in this confrontation of 2 ber put the PCP ina serious dilemma. Tt was followed In order to carry his strategy through Lhe Communbya new worki ing class upsurge in which it_was clear ist Party had to consolidate its hold over the mass mov AY inside the workers movement who tried ment in order Lo sell itself to the APM as the best to hall ib would be thoroughhy discredited. The PCP 5 representative of the ‘people’ and pressurise them gld strike breaking tactics would be a recipe lor dtsinto adopting its political policies. This in turn re quired eliminating any serious competition, particula Ly A At the same time the passage of the monopolists arly any that could put a different type of pressure on and their allies inio the camp of open reaction meant the AFM from within the ranks of the Government: that the road wasdetL-open for the PC's programme of and that meant the Socialist Party. The PCP therefore ‘democratic and national’ revolulion. lhe Pr had no tic and national revolution. é TG adopted aseetarian and often manipulative drive to king with the cliss-collaberationism £ bre capture key offices in the trade unions, local councils ich was the verv heart of that programme, but it and the slate machinery. now had a choice as to how il could organise this class A good éxample of how this tactic was applied collaboration, was the fight for ‘trade union unity’. Here the Com- On the ope hand, it could continue to base itself on munist Party based themselves on the healthy class inthe coalition Government. where it and the Socialist stinct of the mass of Portuguese workers fora united Party sat alongside the capitalist Popular Democratic trade union movement Lhat could best fight for their Party. Alternatively, it cou se ise an tryin interests. They were opposed by the Socialists and build tip an exclusive alliance with the Popular Democrats who, in the name-of ‘freedom’, Movement. which bec ause of the ee capi played the capilulists’ game of division. But instead af fighting democratically inside the unions for unity For the leaders of the PCP there were report 2 UCI Gat: ; the PCP tried to gel the AFM to create a single trade union Federation by law based on the existing Inter- 6 in channelling their class collaborationism sindical trade union federation which they controlled along the road of the si alled “People AFM alliance’ from before 25 April 1974. iin which they posed thenssely is as the re resentaliy dust how sincere was the PCP’s desire fora united or fighting trade union movement can be judged nol structure of Lhe coalition Government would mean only by its strike-breaking activity of six months earlier sharing the fruits of the Capialist shale with ifs but also by the faet that at the same time as it was Toalition par partners iners and Ww eakenimg the PC's political fighting for ‘unity’ it opposed the fusion of the hold. Moreover, there was a real danger of the PCP chemical and plastie workers’ unions because the —_—_—<—<$— <<<, getting eee ins Epoptien ¥ vice if ae it tried to keen a chemical workers’ union was controlled by a Maoist WOrki iis in tie one band the Soc aE Party and the Popular orpanisation.
After the poor showing of the PCP in the elections ed solve artiurral’s roblems this sectarianism tewards the SP was stepped up. A party penuinely dedicated to advancing the interests aid, encourage foreign investment, sad draw Portugal of the Portuguese working class would have drawn inspircloser to tne Common Markel. As Socialist Party ation from the fact that almost.60 per cent of Lhe leacler “Mario Soares readily admitted, tits would : votes in the election were cast for parties of Lhe working class and called for a government fased on the aking the back of the most militant sectio working class organisations. If would have launched 12 f
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leading members, Raul Rego was able to edit the opposition newspaper Republica under the old regime.
After 25 April the Socialists were inviled inte the Government along with the Communists where they proved themselves devoted class-collaborationists.
Soares became foreigh minister, in which office he oid all the dirty wark of Portuguese imperialism, trying to stall independence for the colonies and ensure the monopolies economic interests.
Subsequently the PSP graduated to defending the interests of international imperialism. The PSP leaders were warmly received by the American Government, and among the renowned ‘socialist’ celebrities the PSP invited to Lisbon to boost their fortunes was - Edward Kennedy! Alongside its campaign against a united trade union federation the PSP organised seminars for trade unionists addressed by spokesmen ef the cold-war, CLA-infiltrated,; International Confederalion of Free Trade Unions. More recently the PSP has become the major advocate of defending the interests of foreign investors in Portugal and ow things have changed — Cunhal (lett) is greeted on h boosting the country’s dependence on foreign capital, and drawing Portugal closer lo the capitalist Common | a drive fora united front with the Socialist Party, not Market.
There can be no question about the class collabor- | in order to allow it to carry out its pro-capitalist proalionist nature of the PSP leadership and its thoroughly pramme, but in order to expose lo Lhe Portuguese reactionary and pro-capitalist pole in the current sitmasses Lhe contradiction between the programme of uation. But we must not lose sight of the fact that the Socialist Party leaders and the possibilities that this leadership still has the confidence of a large and united working class aclion opened up. very important section of the Portuguese working jut the PCP was not this sort of-party. [. was class — which is why it is such an important ally for simply peddling a different brand of class-collaboratianism from that of the Socialist Party, and treated capitalism and able lo do so much damage. One of the SP like a travelling salesman who finds someone — | the effects of the capitalist development of Portugal is screens ei ER the sharp division of the country between highly élse flogging the same product in his territory.
Instead of proposing a united front to the Socialist | developed industrial zones and backward zones where Party leaders to carry the workers’ struggle forward, agriculture and small scale industry prevail. The bulk the PCP leaders tried to use their special position as of the population are thus.small farmers or workers the closest allies of the main current in the AFM ta in tiny factories living in small towns and villages squeeze the Socialist Party aut of the main-stream that are often cut off from the mainstream of national of political life. Thus the PCP leaders adopted a cultural and political life. This section of the population is often under the influence of the Catholic thoroughly sectarian policy towards the Socialist Party and its leaders (for example, trying to exclude Church and other reactionary forces. This has sown the seeds of a very dangerous division in the ranks of them from the 1 May Intersindical demonstration the Portuguese masses, which the PSP leaders capilheld after the elections), which had the effect of alised on, gaining big support in the elections from confusing and angering the rank-and-file of the these more politically backward sections of the popsocialist Party, who felt that their party was as much | 4 part of the workers’ movement as the PCP. This | ulation, including many die-hard reactionaries who saw it as the “best way ta stop Communisnr’. made it easier for Soares and his gang to maintain | | At the same time it cannot be denied that the PSP their influence over their party members, and created also gained numerous votes in the very centres of : all sorts of grievances which the SP leaders were proletarian strength — often ca “al Sia en the ae able to exploit in a demagogic campaign against “dictatorship’. support of the most reactionary measures of the Gov- This policy has born disastrous fruit wilh the abil-ernment after 25.4 one ance as antic strike le islation ity of the Socialist Parly to rally big sections of the masses behind their campaign, effectively splitting the ranks of the working class and for the first time | since 25 April, giving reactionary forces both | amass base and political cover. Ifthe present threat | ic must be said quite tea thal, with this base to the Portuguese revolution is primarily the product of the treacherous pro-capitalist leadership of the | of support, the Socialist. Party must be considered Socialist Party, the class-collaborationism of the part of the workers’ movement, despite ils reformist Communist Party is also to blame for helping make leadership, and must be treated accordingly. The fur = this treachery by the Socialist Party leaders possible. ther progress of the revolution In Portugal can-only The Portuguese Socialist Party has emerged as the 2p assured if the masses at present under the influence highest hope for capitalism and imperialism to retain of the PSP leadership are drawn into the strugele their foothold on Portuguese soil The PSP is nota and broken from that leadership. That makes the party with long standing or deep roots in Lhe Portusort of sectarian approach to the Socialist Party that the PCP — and unfortunately, much of the revolnguese working class. IL was formed in 1972 oul ofa group of intellectuals who were part of the broad tionary left — has adopted dangerously wrong. opposition (ront (along with Lhe CP and various left In order to unite the Portuguese working class Catholic groups) that took part in the phony ‘eleecand win the mass of Socialist Party workers to the side of the revolution it is necessary Lo fight for a solid tions’ that the fascist regime staged. The fascisis conunited front of all workers — Socialist, Communist sidered them sufficiently harmless to allow the present and revolutionaries — te fight the reaction and strengleader Mario Soares to return to the country and engage then the power of the working class. The membership in open political activity for a time during the ‘liberal’ of the PSP can be convinced of the need for such phase just after Gaetano took over. Another of their
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Portugal froni the EEC, and provided the Socialist Measures. If the demands of the SP membership force Party and their reactionary allies with further fuel the PSP leaders to go along with such proposals the development of the revolutionary struggle on the for their pro-imperialisl campalyn. basis of this unity will rapidly push Soares and his As long as Portugal does not break completely and reformist plans lo the sidelines. But if —as is more decisively with capitalism the economy will remain in chaos. the victim of both the world capitalist crisis likely — they oppose them, they will expose theirown commitment to the defence of capitalism and impel and deliberate sabolage, mstabilily will reign throughtheir members to break with them once and for all. out Portuguese society, with confused social groups being pulled backwards and forwards between the The working class and the forces of capitalism, and the possibility of violent counter-revolution will be ever present. The unity of all the oppressed masses of the Portuguese population — the working class in the cities. way forward barracks and farms, the poor peasantry, the small traders and craftsmen and the crushing of the counter-revolutionary forces can only be done by weeding out the anarchy sown by the capilalish system from every corner of Portuguese society. And Capitalism has been driven onto the defensive this in turn. can only be done by one force in presentmore thoroughly in Portugal today than in day Portugal — the working class. any country of the imperialist world since The development of the mass, democratic organisa the days of the Spanish Civil War. tions of the working class that exist in the main in- Very wide sections of capitalist industry dustrial concentrations throughout the entire country, are now tn state hands: the transport system, and the drawing of all sections of [he working masses the banks and insurance companies, most of into these organisations irrespective of party affiliation, would overcone the disunity that is now being the major sections of private industry. The spread by the agents of capital. Through the .orkers’ Importance of the banks in tne set-up of Portcommissions in the factories and the neighbourhood uguese capitalism and their nationalisation commissions these bodies could control economic proas served to break up the most powerful duction and distribution, regulate prices, and begin monopoly groups which dominated the econto solve the other myriad social problems facing the omy. Moreover the single largesL monopoly Portuguese masses. — Cur — has itself been nationalised outright.
Through the creation of democratic soldiers’ com- Altogether more than two-thirds of the Portumittees and their involvement in these organisations osed agrarian reform will serve to break up the the army could be completely broken from the capitheadings of the most powerful landowners in alist state and brought under the authority of the tie south of the country. working class, smashing the schemes of the reaction- At the same time the capitalist state machine is aties and ‘moderates’ against the onward march of in dire straits, with its administrative machine weakthe Portuguese revolution. This, combined with disened and discredited by the widespread purging of solution of the capitalist police forces and their reofficials associated with the old regime, its “bodies placement by an armed workers’ militia, would allow of armed men’ either discredited or infected by the the working class to impose and preserve their own political upsurge of the working class, and the educaproletarian order against the wrecking and sabotage tion svstem and the organs of public information of the reactionaries, and deal with such problenis as (newspaper, radio and TV) falling under the sway of ihe return of hundreds of thousands of former ¢colonthe workers’ struggles. ists whose outlook predisposes them towards the for- This represents a very dangerous situation for capces of reaction. italism. But we should not equate it with the destruc- The coordination of Popular Assemblies at Lhe tion of capitalist rule, confusing the dislocation or regional, and most important of all the national level, expropriation of individual proups of capitalists with would create the sort of set-up that could really bethe destruction of capitalist social relations. The gin to tackle the problems of the economy asa whole, replacing capitalist anarchy with socialist planning, latter have been weakened but are still firmly implantdemocratically determined by the representatives of ed over wide sections of Portuguese society, where the working masses and ala into effect by its small-scale industries and farming predominate. As Lenin put it ‘small scale production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a massseale* (Left Wing Communism).
Moreover, the continued hold of capitalism over MATE aus Portuguese society is further reinforced by its depenag PRES dence on the world imperialist system. Thus far the Government has carefully avoided the nationalisation of foreign capital. Multinational capitalist firms therefore continue to occupy key positions in important sections of the economy. At the same time Portugal remains locked into the imperialist NATO alliance. The Communist Party, with its concept of the “democratic revolution’, and most currents inside the AFM who have equally not broken with capitalism, continue to go along with the myth that Portugal could begin to solve its economic problems through aid from imperialism and closer relations with the capitalist Common Market_ This has helped lay the groundwork for the international campaign by imperialism to blackmail the "Democracy for the workers, repression for reactionaries’ working class through threats to withhold aid and bar — that was the slogan of the Lisnave shipyard workers 14
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democratic organises, A workers’ Government based on such anelwork of proletarian democracy would have the kind of unity and authority necessary to meet all the obstacles thrown in its way by imperialism and reaction. Its writ would run throughout the land. It would not have lo pussyfoal argund with imperialism, but could pull Portugal right out.of the NATO alliance and declare its Lolal support for the anti-imperialist forces in the former Portuguese colonies. lt would be able to appeal to and inspire the sort of international working class solidarity that could tame the multi-national Hf H ih firms and block imperialist economic sabotage. i naa —"s hen a i ower ‘Lt It would not have lo go cap-in-hand to the Common 1 l. t See pe j H Tis press ioe essa [ i Teese oleh Market for help, but could start to salve its economic ane Seems Fier tin apenas tat At} ff "TY Meet ee Femara it problems through a combination of socialist economic 180 AF et Ea ews pers eae plannine at hame and closer economic ties with those The latest issue of Our Common Struggle, journal of other countries that have pulled out of the world imthe Portuguese Workers Co-ordinating Committee, perialist system — the workers’ states of Eastern Eurhas articles on Republica, textile workers’ struggles, ope, Russia, China and south-east Asia. the political crisis in Portugal, NATO and the Azores, All this is not jusl some socialist blueprint to be Spain, local workers’ struggles, and news of the Portdreamed about — il is Lhe only solution Lo the most uguese Solidarity Campaign. Avadable fram Red immediate and pressing problems facing every section Books, 97 Caledonian Road, London N.1, Price of Portuguese society. What is more it is a solution 13p (including postage). that it is possible to slarl moving Lowards: the elements of it — democratic committees in many factories Lhat the working class should place its confidence and working class neighbourhoods, representative in the AFM and look to them to clear the way for- Popular Assemblies in a number of the main proletarwards, but intransigently defended the class indepenian districts, the beginnings of a democratic set-up in dence of lhe working class and its vanguard role in several key army units — already exist. the revolutionary struggle.
The main oostacles to the implementation of this Similarily, the LCI shared the views of Lhe revolusolution are the class collaborationism of the leaderutionary left that the organs of ‘popular power were ships of the main workers’ organisations — the Comthe way forward for the working class struggle. But munist Party and the Socialist Party — and Lhe absence il was always aware Lhal these had to be genuine of any other organised force with mass influence capmass organisations, and could nol be created out of able of uniting the working class in the fight for thin air by asmall group of revolutionaries and thelr these alms. sympathisers as the Revolutionary Party of the Pral- But lnere still exists the possibility of building elarial (PRP) seemed to think with their ‘revolutionsuch a revolutionary leadership in the heat of the ary councils movement. For this reason they avoided class strupele. There exists a working class vanguard the sectarianism of the PRP and their supporters, who consisting of the most class-conscious militants in counlerposed the organs of working class democracy the main industrial areas and the key army units to the existing mass workers parties, instead of underaround Lisbon that numbers in the tens of thousands. standing that they Bad to draw in their militants and (They recently mounted a demonstration of 50,000 the masses they speak for. They were also able ta strong to back the demand for a national Popular avoid the opportunism of the PRP which allowed their proposals to be tied to the star of APM ‘left’ Assembly.) ind il is in this vanguard that the organ- General Carvalho, who sought to use the PRP’s secisations of the revolutionary left have an important base. While they are still fragmented into a multitarian slogans of “a non-party Government’ to promote his own idea of military rule by the AFM unfettered plicity of groups, most of which are very confused by any dependence of the mass workers’ parties. on how te develop the struggle for the leadership of Groups like the MES and the FSP alsa supported the masses and the fight for workers’ power, the curdemands for ‘popular power’ but were unclear about rent crucial struggles will provide a testing-ground the relationship of these bodies lo the existing state for different political programmes and ideas and lay machinery and in particdlar, the AFM-led Government. the basis for the political clarification of the ideas The LCI always insisted that these bodies must beof the revolutionary left and a realignment of the come the basis of a new, prolelanan stale power, and forces who look to them for leadership. Out of this a always connected ils campaign for the creation of revolutionary party and revolutionary leadership can such bodies with the demand for a government based be born which can lead the Portuguese working class on these organs of popular power, in place of a classbo vie Lory.
An important role in all this will be played by the collaborationist Government based on the capitalist stale. militanis of the Fourth International in Portugal, Today there is widespread agreement on the revoluorpanised in the Internationalist Coimmuiist League tionary left on many of these questions, and an im- Despite their small forces the LCI has throughout its portant measure of unily around the demand fora history set an example for the revolutionary left, National Popular Assembly (a proposal first put foravoiding the error into which other groups fell on ward by the LCI during the April elections). The LCI the left and right, and carving out ata essentially is fighting vigorously to ensure that the adoption of correct path, this demand by the most advanced sections of the For example, the LCI avoided the sectarianism of working class can serve as Lhe first step to building many of the Maoist groups who denounced the CP the unity of Lhe working masses under their leaderas “social fascist’ and refused to take part in the mass mobilisations mounted under thetr auspices, prefership. ring to organise little ‘private’ demonstrations on Recently the LCI fell into political error when their own pure version of “marxism-leninism'’.. At the it joined with 6 other organisations of the revolsame time the LCI did not follow the centrist proups utionary left and the Communist Party in a “Revlike the Lefl Socialist Movement (MES) or the Popular olutionary United Front’, the confused political Socialist Front (FSP) in giving credence to the idea 15
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basis of which allowed the PCP to exploit it to vanguard of the working class of the measures neces: support the bankrupt Filth Provisional Goverp- sary to lake the struggle forward, the forging of a ment. This error —born out of the political in- revolutionary leadership and the unification of all the experience of the LCL which only came: into. ex- exploited masses in the struggle to put paid bo the istence just before the 25 April, and its perfect- bloody and bankrupt capitalist system, are the prely correct, desire for the -unily of the workers’ conditions for the further advance of Lhe Portuguese movement (which it has been the most consist- revolution. Drawing on the immense and rich experent champion of) — was criticised by the Unit- ience of the past 18 months of struggle the revolued Secretarial of the Fourth International. It tionary forces in Portugal can carry out these tasks. serves to underline the responsibility of the But they will need every ounce of support they can Fourth International to provide the maximum gel from their comrades around the world in order to political, moral and material support possible combat the capitalist vultures that are now gathering to the revolutionary forces in Portugal. around them in the hope that the present offensive The forging of a clear understanding among the of imperialism and reaction wins the day.
Franco’s Spain Capitalism in a Blind Alley Portugal has been an important experience Caucdillo himself, the rottenness of the Spanish for the Spanish working class, who have been ruling class is so deep that his removal from injected with new enthusiams to rid themsel- the political scene will only emphasise the ves of their dictatorship, now the last in West- crisis of the dictatorship. Without hima erm Europe and a direct descendant of fascism. change in class rule would only be a matter But at the same time it has served as a red-light of time. to the capitalists, who want to avoid a similar The main problem for the ruling class in Spain is sort of show-down in Spain. how to deal with the massive upsurge of Lhe working For one section of the capitalists the lesson class in their fight with the regime for a decent standis that they must quickly find a way of chan- ard of living and the most basic democratic rights. In dealing with this problem the capitalists are divided, fing lhe face of a fascist military dictatorship with one section looking towards Portugal and saying into a model ‘democratic’ state able to take that unless a programme of liberalisation is immediate its place alongside its capitalist competitors ly implemented, the rulers of Spain will nol be able in the Common Market. ‘The main stumbling to head off the explosion of the masses, and the other block towards this ‘democratic’ face-lift would arguing that the only way to avoid another Portugal seem to be the old dictator himself, General is to keep the lid of repression tightly screwed on in France (now $2 and still going strong). Hard- much the same way thal it has been kept on for the ly a week goes by without some conment by last 37 years. Neither of these tactics are realistic in the media thal it is time he made an exit, pre- the present situation and do not provide a solution sumably so that the rest of Spain can get on for the dilemma of the dictatorship. Repression is with ‘democracy’. Even the Financial Times nota long-term answer, since it only forces [he workers into more highly organised and more widesays*Spain has two problems, the first is econspread activities of opposition until they become omic, the second is General Franco, and there completely uncontrollable. Neither are the liberal is no doubt that the first is overshadowed by measures which sections of the regime want to introthe second.’ (June 24th 1975). However, as duce, since any capitalist liberalising measures at this inextricably a part-of the dictatorship as is the stage could only be too little too late, and would in 16
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fact be the signal for the mass movement, oppressed police for their support of the mass movement. On for so long in Spain, to launch a fight for all of their 28 January four priests were arrested in Pamplona as nights in full. a result of sermons which they had preached in sup- On 8 dune 1973, General Franco announced that port of workers on strike. One of those held was he was delegating his powers as head of government fined pis. 500,000 (about £3,500) without trial. The to his 70-year old Vice President, Admiral Luis Car- Bishop immediately paid the fine for him. Fines rero Blanco, who then became Prime Minister. This against Pamplona priests totalled £10,000 in a fortwas intended to be the first stage in Franco's retirenight. Although the relationship between the Church ment, and Carrera Blanco was an obvious choice for and the State is not a harmonious one at present, the Successor as far as Lhe dictator was concemed. Pop- Church is by no means a revolutionary force and in ular with the military, he was the only candidate any big social upheaval would only be two steps away with the right background and strong enough perfrom playing its traditional role of reaction’ in exactly sonality to provide the necessary unifying foree for the same way that it is doing in neighbouring Portugal. the different factions within the regime. Only he The other main pillar of support of the regime, the could step into Franco’s shoes and keep the whole army, is today an unknown ideological quantity. Basset-up of the dictatorship together, while being free ically a conseripl army, it has a professional core of to carry out the different twists and turns required 100,000 officers and senior NCOs. Insulated in its to deal with the new political situations threatening barracks, it has become a closed society, highly Inbred the regime. But after his appointment in June, wilh the bulk of commissioned men the off-spring of Carrero Blaneo had less than six months to live: he military families (during the three years 1961—63, was executed on 20 December, 1973, when militants approximately 70 per cent of the new officer eandidof the Basque nationalist group ETA V blew him ates were sons of Army men). Although the officerup. This immediately posed a severe problem for the. class has shown its solid allegiance to General Franco, tiling class, since Lhere was no other successor who differences within the regime must have some refleccould provide a definite lead, thus adding to their tion within the army itself, although not on the scale anxiety about the “post-Franco’ period. which created the Armed Forces Movement in Portugal.
Carrerc Blanco’s successor as Prime Minister, Arias Events would seem to bear this out. According ta Navarro, a former head of police and former mayor reports in the Financial Times. 24 June, 1975: “A few of Madrid, represented nowhere near the same politweeks ago Madrilenos were treated ta the amazing ical foree. He has since provided a weak government sight of senior officers snapping to salute as Righteither in terms of implementing any liberalising prowing demonstrators sang the Falangist batLle hymn frammes or in terms of dealing with the masses, “Face Lo the sun”, and passed out leaflets demanding Franeo’s designated successor as head of state is the resignation of the Government because there were Don Juan Carlos, son of the exiled Don Juan of “traitors within its ranks” “. Earlier this year in Feb- Bourbon, who is to become king on Franco's death, ruary two army officers were arrested for participating But he was never intended as anything more than a in meetings of young officers discussing the post-Franpuppet — the real fate of the regime will be decided co era, and they were also known to have had contact by others. with centre-left political groups. Some 2,000 soldiers Over the immediate past-period, then, the totterare said Lo have signed the “justice and peace petition’ ing regime has been literally clutching at straws. On calling for an ammesty for all political prisoners. ‘The the one hand it has given pathetic concessions such chief of the general staff, Li. Gen. Manuel Diez Ale as the right to strike (with conditions), when in fact eria, was sacked last summer for keeping in contact the Spanish workers have been unconditionally striking for the past 36 years. On the other hand, with a variety of political opposition figures.
On 29 July this year an army major and six captains it has resorted to brutal repression like the recent State of Emergency imposed in the Basque country were arrested, and later at least seven other officers on 29 April, which polarised opinion so sharply and were detained for political reasons. Military sources produced combative struggles between Lhe state said that the arrests had brought into the open the and militants not seen ‘since the Civil War. growing clash between officers of the Civil War era This apparent vacillation by the regime is proand those commissioned a decade of two later. Since duced by the faction war between the different the Burgos trial in 1970, when six members of the currents of opinion inside it.. The far right, such as Basque nationalist group, ETA V, were saved from the Falangisis with members like General Carlos inthe death penalty by international mobilisations, cerlesta, commander of the 80,000 strong Guardia Civil. tain officers have become increasingly restless about nol too surprisingly advocate an extfteme line of more their repressive functions within the State. Apart oul and oul repression as the Gnly means by which from professional frustrations, they do not like the Prancoism can Survive intact after Franco. Other curmilitary being used to stage court martials of civilians rents of opinion such as Opus Dei, the powerful Cathfor political offences. olic pressure group, want certain institutional reforms Groups of officers began to hold informal seminars which could open a gradual and controlled process of and discussions about broadly economic and political ‘Europeanisation’ of the dictatorship. This would matters, whilst carefully avoiding political parties. It allow direct control by big capitalists of the state apseems that the regime is no longer wholly confident about the army's complete support, particularly in paratus and the rebuilding of its social base, which has become totally depleted as seclion after section the more junior ranks, so that tt cannot even tolerate simple discussion groups. Ii seems that no section is of the regime's traditional supporters — the Church, the army etc, — have lost faith in its abilities. immune from the repressive tentacles of the dictatorship.
The Catholic Church, an extremely powerful in- The evidence would seem to suggest that the army fluence in Spain and one of the main pillars of support would like to play a passive role in the post-Franco throughout the regime's history, is clearly disenchanted era, which could be an important factor in the struggles with the regime. Many priests and even some Archlo come. bishops have given support to workers on strike and Al the same time important sections of the middle have even undergone hunger-strikes in support of political prisoners. Priests have recently been the targets and professional classes have begun to demonstrate of several fascist attacks by members of ‘Guerillas of their impatience with the regime in its present. form. Christ the King’, a right-wing organisation, and many On 6 February, more than 500 senior Spanish civil others have been arrested and even tortured by the servants called publicly for the introduction of dem- 17
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ocracy In a letter which they sent to the Prime Minalmost-as muchas the Somillion dost im the whole of ister, Arias Navarro. They advocated the formation 1971, and nearly twice as many for the same period of free trade unions, a Gavernment ‘controlled by replast year. It is cleareven from the figures that the resentatives of the Spanish people’ and for ‘democworning Classis on the offensive. But what the racy’, in which they said they would willingly particifigures do not tell us is that the workers’ slruggles are pate. The Jetler followed a strike by civil servants going beyond the stave of a fight solely for immediate which paralysed Lhe work of several Ministries. demands. Alongside entirely justified immediate ec- Although “the 500 are only a small percentage of onomic demands, such as equal wage increases for all, chil servanis employed in Madrid, they number among a minimum salary of S00 pesetas a day (aboul £30 a their ranks architects, economists, diplomats, finance — week) and a halt to-lay offs, more far reaching dem inspectors, statisticians, engineers, senior employees ands are being raised, such as the sliding scale of wages of the Bank of Spain, agricultural experis, veterinary opening of the bosses’ books, and certain demands for Surpeans — in fact virtually the whole range of proworkers contrel, Along with these are ihe demands fessional people employed by the State. The only exfor the release of all political prisoners; the right lo ceplion seems to have been the State prosecutors. strike (unconditionally |; trade union freedoms; free- Also in February, two of Madrid's principal! hosdom of association, assembly, demonstration, and Lhe pitals were hit by astrike of nurses and auxiliary staff, press; dissolution of the repressite bodies of the cic- ——E anda more recent doctors strike lasted for several tatorship. These demands begin to pose Lhe queslion months. In Madrid, an actors strike closed {tieatres oF oppostlion to capitalism itself, in the context of and the strike spread to colleagues working in televi the fight against the Francoist dictatorship. sion, radio and drama schools. Although the strikes The mast impressive, and indeed most important were originally for higher wages, the strikers were recent struggle was the general strike inthe Basque also demanding the right for their own elected repre country on 11 December 1974: impressive because it sentatives to negotiate the new pay deals instead of involved an estimated 200,000 people: important bethe state sindicatos; and were also in solidarity with cause its. central demand was for the release of polseveral journelisis who had been victimised. itical prisoners and the dissolution of the repressive In at least one case during the actors strike the corps. It drew in wide layers of Lhe community — not EE SS LE ee audience rose to its feel and applauded when it was even since Burgos in 1970 has a political mabilisation announced that the performance was being called been backed with such solidarity. [t was also one off because of Lhe strike. So much for those artists of the first major mobilisations in which the Spanish in the Spanish National Dance Company wha told Communist Party was nota principal organiser. pickets whoa were picketing the Coliseum in London Demonstrations were held during the strike in Bilwhere they were performing: “We are artists and have bao, San Sebastian, Hernani Estella.and other towns. nothing Lo do with politics’!
At least one worker was shot in Hernan, near San There are hundreds of examples which could be Sebastian, ina Violenl clash between workers and recounted of the many different sections of Spanish rot police. Even in the face of severe repression the sociely which over the past period have been drawn strike somehow managed to take place. Apparently into direc oppasition to the regime: the one hunthe para-military Guardia Civil police force had been dred school teachers in San Sebastian whe in January rounding up all known politieal activists more than were locked-out by the authorities for going on strike, a week prior to (he strike. Many shopkeepers were or the 26 lawyers who staged a sit-in at their prolesthreatened with heavy fines if they-dared ta ¢luse Sianal head-quarters in support af an amnesty [or down during the strike — so instead of closing compolitical prisoners. The number of strikes in solidarity pletely, they switched their lights off and drew their with other struggles are increasing. showing clearly shutters: half way in token solidarity with the strike. the growing consciousness which Spanish working The strike sparked off struggles in Madrid which people have of their strength, and their ability to comquickly spread to include white-collar workers, and bat the dictatorship. most of the major banks were bil by sporadic slap- Against Lhe background of economic recession, pages a5 the year drew to a close. In: January. Spain's wilh unemployment rising, inflation running at 25biggest car manufacturer, SEAT, became engaged in 40 per cent, and no sign of the Spanish economy pulla long-running battle with ils workers. 21,000 men ing oul of decline (forecasts predict that lhe economy who were locked out by SEAT fora week decided will grow only about 2.5 per cent in 1975, as compareventually to return to the factory because hey said ed with 3 per cent last year), Lhe regime has reached that it was the only place where they could meet in its Limits of manoeuvrability. IL cannot in any way any number, All previous demonstrations and meetmeet the challenge of the workers fighting in defence ings, some as large as 4,000 had been brutally dispersof their living standards. ed by the police with many arrests and injuries; and Already in the first six months of this year a total one worker was shot. of 7.795.984 man hours have been log! in strikes:
Further strikes took place in the northern city of
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ingly evident that the workers in the Basque country Pamplona, where the whole of the industrial belt (Buskadi} have emerged as the most combative secaround the city was affected for over two mouths by lion of Lhe vanguard at present leading Lhe struggle analmost continual struggle. The focal point of the against the dictatorship... This leadership has grown peneral strike in Pamplona was a lwo-week underout of the Basque people's struggle with the Spanish ground sit-in by local polash miers who were evenstale for an autonomous Basque State. Since Lhe late Lualhy ejected from the mine when police actually 19th century the Spanish Basques — concentrated in went underground. A youns militant was shot dead the three provinces of Viecaya. Guipuzcoa and Alava, by the para-military Guardia Civilas he was distributjie literature urging support for the Pamplona strikers. and Loa lesser extent in Navarra have campaigned for autonomy. The Basque people have their own In addition to the vicious repression fram the rewime ilself the employers have hit hard al the workers. language, as do the people af Catalonia and Galtcia lit 20 of the main disputes during 1974 approximatewhe also want aulonomy,.
Since Lhe early 1960's Basque separatist [celing ly 16.000 workers were disciplined (usually by lockhas manifested itself in its support for ETA, a popular outs} and 6.500 sacked. In the first three months of this year alone 1,600 men were sacked in Lhe region movement for‘Basque freedom When 6 of WA's militants were sentenced to death in December 1970) by of Catalonia, a heavy proporuion of Lhem coming from SEAT. while in the whole of Spain the number lopped a Burgos Military Court this louched aff the most mn L000 during January and February. Whilst many of the tensive and generalised struggle Lhroushout Spain Lhese sacking: resull from the economic recession since the Civil War. Coupled with a massive international mobilisalion and outery, General Franco had which is affecting Spain quite badly, especially in the Lo capitulate and Lo commute the death sentences. car manufacluring industries, as in the rest of Europe, Ley are alsa tied up with attempts Lo remove the It therefore came as no surprise when, earlier this principal working class militanis. Over 80 Fasa-Renyear, the dictatorship imposed a Stale of Kimergency in the Basque country, in an attempt Losmash that ault car workers alone have lost their jobs this year for ‘labour indiscipline’. In spite of these measures, the vanguard. Under this umbrella it launched one of the bloodiest and most outrageous offensives against the workers are able to hil back al the employers because of Lheir conscious strength and combativily. their Basque people, Within a few weeks of the decliralion sense of solidarity, but principally because of their of the State of Emergency il was estimated thal the ability to organise themselves independently through number of people detained in the city of Bilbao alone such bodies as the workers’ commissions. was about 2.000 to 4,000 (the majority of whom The commissions are rank-and-file bodies which were aclually released after a detention ot four to unite and organise the workers’ struggles at factory, eight hours}. By 17 May. the number of detentions local regional, and recently even the national level. in the province of Guipuzcoa had exceeded Lo ,UU0. They grew up in the early 196s out of the successful At one point at least 500 people were actually dewage struggles of Lhat period. and it was their spontan- Lained in the Bilbao bull ring because all tlhe police eous character which proved to be their strength. stations were full. [tseems ironic that this warticular Since they were not permanent bodies, they were nol event fand other alrocities) were hardly meauioned legal — any trade union except for the official sinby the British media.and yel a passing remark by dicates or vertical trade unions was illegal. However, General Carvalho of Portugal thal his government as they gradually replaced the official trade unions in mignt have Lo pul reactionaries in the bull ring set the muss media screaming its head of f. subsequent negolialions Lhey became more and more pettaanent, and by the end of the 60s their leaders The lira right-wing para-mililary organisation calwere arrested. In 1973. 10 militants, charged with led “Guerillas of Christ the King which is directly nothing more than being members of the national colinked with the police has carried oula campaign of ordinating body of the workers’ commissions, were Lerror through bombing, machine-gunning and flood: given long jail sentences. ing people out of their homes. Several people have Nevertheless, because of their mass character. Lhe also been beaten up, including several lawyers and commissions have survived and are daily growing in priesis who have tried to help political prisoners, The their strength and co-ordination. It was Lhe commispolice, of course, have arrested no one for these offensions and the left-wing organisations which organised ces, According Loa correspondent of the ‘Times {21 the December general strike in the Basque country. and more recently the general sirike of 11 June of this year. ‘This was supported by 100000 workers during the Stale of Emergency and in the face of the mosi vicious repressive measures ever launched by the regime.
During the Pamplona general strike a “struggle committee’ was formed Including both the elected committees of several facLories and the workers commissions of others, with the presence of representatives of student and neighbourhood organisalions. In Barcelona acinited co-ordinating body of the workers commissions is already functioning; i) the Basque country this objective is on the way to realisation. In Madrid, Galicia, and Asturias siguificant efforts at co-ordination are under way. In Valladolid a central strike commitiee in the building trac! was set ap dur ing the April 87S strike. and efforts to co-ordinate with the strike of the workers at the PFASA/ Renault factory were skelched out. The unification of all the workers cammissions of the Spanish state, going beyond the insufficient framework of the present national co-ordination, which links up the forees controlled by the Communist Party fiction, is becoming increasingly possible. It is broadly felt as an urgent necessity by Lhe workers themselves.
During the recent struggles il has become increas 19
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| under canditions that would leave intact not only its April,1975) —Police Inspector Liorente for example, economic power and private property, bul even ils was nicknamed “Pitillo”’, a slang term Tor cigarette, state and its Instruments of repression against the because he frequently extinguished cigarettes on the workers. This is the real content of their treacherous chests of people under interrogation. One girl showed policy. While the effects of this policy remain weak me her breasts, Lhe nipples of which were partly burnt today. this may not be the case immediately after off. She said this happened during her interrogation the overthrow of the dictatorship. At that point, an by Liorente,” Llorente was later executed by a squad alliance with the Social Democratic reformist: and of ETA militants.
Stalinists could appear to significant sectors of the The State of Emergency in the Basque country, however, has not solved any of the problems of the capitalists asa last resort in halting the revolutionary dictatorship, since there is every indication that the upsurge.
Revolutionary Marxists have always counterposed Basque people are even more militant than they. were a consistent class strategy to the stralegy of class colbefore, and that the crimes against them will be paid laboration pul forward by the CP. They are fighting for even more dearly when the dictatorship falls. One of the first things which the oppressed masses of Portto develop the sort of independent working class uag! did after the coup was to hunt down their known action that can bring down the dictatorship — a revolulionary general strike. Whether the dictatorship torturers inthe streets of Lisbon. is destroyed in such a confrontation, or.ts dismantled The only political group which has the sort of influence necessary {o sound the death-knell of the dicby Lhe capitalists in an attempt Lo forestall such an latorshin is the Spanish Communist Party. However, eventuality, the perspective that will begin in Spain the Conmunist Party is not interested in organising will be that of proletarian revolution, not that of an experiment in the peaceful transfer of power from. a workers offensive — il is too busy trying lo woo maverick capitalists to join its “Junta Democratica’ one team of capitalist politicians to another. (Democratic Council). Since the 1950's the Commun- In the present situation it is particularly important ist Party has preached a policy of “national reconeiliafor the international workers’ movement to understand tion’ — that the different sides that took part in the the part that the political prisoners and the fight for [heir release plays in developing the fight against the Civil War should forget their differences (and the 800,000 corpses) that lie between them and get todictatorship in Spain. Throughout the recent upheavals — mass occupations, strikes and mass demonstrations gether to work for a ‘democratic’ Spain. Quite conveniently, in the process of arguing thal everyone — the cause of the political prisoners has been taken up by the workers in struggle. This particular issue else should forget about the Civil War, the Communist Party is also able to ‘forget’ about the fact that has also been taken up by ever-wider layers of Spanthis same policy of subordinating the working class ish society, meluding the 2,000 soldiers in the army and its allies to the political tastes of supposedly ‘demwho signed the petition calling for an amnesty for all ocratic’ capitalists was the main reason for the victory political prisoners. of the fascists in the first place.
It isthe trials of militants such as Eva Forest, In their eagerness to prove to the capitalists how Antonio Duran, Garmendia and Otaegui which ‘responsible’ they are the Communist Party have given now provide the focus for solidarity struggles both the ‘Junta Democratica’ a programme that would inside Spain itself and throughout Europe. The dicleave untouched a big slice of the present regime, tntatorship iiself is hoping to use the fortheoming trials to legally murder these militants and to demoralise cluding much of its repressive machinery, and do the masses in opposition. There is, however, every nothing about the material problems that are worrypossibility that the trials will produce a new ‘Burgos’ ing the mass of the Spanish people. Despite all this ‘moderation’ no significant group of Spanish capitalsituation, setting off a tide of opposition that the ists has shown the slightest interest in uniting with regime will be unable to deal with. At the very least the ‘Junta Democratica’. The only other participants it will create a situation which will go a long way toin it so far have been small left wing groups like the wards pushing the tottering dictatorship over the edge. Partide de Trabajo (formerly the International Com- An international campaign for the defence of Spanmunisis} and the Popular Socialist Party (the smaller ish political prisoners is already mounting in Europe. of the socialist parties) and a collection of individuals We must build that movement in order to help the of Varying importance. The reason for the reluctance mass movement in Spain to break the repressive hold of the Spanish capitalists to collaborate with Lhe of the dictatorship and open the way forward fora Spanish CP is that it does not trust il to control the Socialist Spain, a Socialist Iberia and a Socialist Eurrevolutionary potential of tie masses. Indeed, the ope, capitalists are following wilh anxiety the relative dee- Heda) GHVIM MAHON -olouy line of control by the traditional organisations, the CP and the PSOE (Socialist Party), over the working class. This further weakens the eredibility of their project of re-establishing a capitalix, (smoeracy in which the reformist leaderships wat? o¢ capable of channelling the struggles of the mv. “fo paths compatible with the maintenance aca nsolidation of capitalist rule.
A recent example of the CP's failure was the December general strike in Euskadi. Before the strike the Communist Parly issued leaflets against it on the grounds that it would be ‘opportunist’. But in spite of the CP the general strike took place and involved 300.000 workers, who obviously did not agree wilh the CP fine, he Junta Dem-eratica’ 1s a class collaborationist pipe dream which so far has failed in the sense that 1 has drawn no Signifieant section of the expitalist lass lowards serious action agaitiet the dittalorship.
The leadership of the CP and its allies want to assure fie Spanish vapilalists That the regime tan be changed
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