an editorial statement
There are many conflicting interpretations of Johnson's so-called peace gesture and its significance for the movement in support of the Vietnamese people. To us it reveals that American policy in Vietnam was at a dead end and that the success of the Tet offensive had caused a crisis of policy in American ruling circles. Johnson's position as a candidate in the presidential elections was an obstacle to changing that policy. He had only been able to proceed by further and further escalation. He was entirely committed to a victory without compromise. He had become an international symbol of the brutality of American imperialism. In the United States he had become a factor discrediting the American political system and his candidature played into the hands of those opposed to the two-party system which serves U.S. capitalism so well. Johnson's withdrawal as a candidate thus gave the American ruling circles a greater degree of flexibility. They certainly need it from their point of view: one can speculate about U.S. aims and policies but one thing is absolutely certain: Johnson's policies had to be abandoned.
What options are open to the Americans? Total and unconditional withdrawal would mean much more than loss of face; it would demonstrate that it was possible for the policeman of world imperialism to be routed by a small peasant country. This, in turn, would encourage all national liberation movements throughout the world. It would, furthermore, completely undermine the morale and prestige of the chain of American puppets in Asia which would have revolutionary consequences. To this extent, there is something in the so-called domino theory.
FURTHER ESCALATION?
On the other extreme, further escalation after the Americans had "proved" the bad faith of Hanoi would lead to a huge upsurge of anti-American activity on every continent. After the expectations of peace had been aroused it is highly unlikely that even the most intense propaganda effort would persuade the American people that Hanoi was responsible for the breakdown.
Having said this, however, we cannot preclude this possibility. Today it is the policy of American imperialism to posture as being basically democratic; it therefore takes great care not to become too "isolated" from "public opinion" at home and abroad. This need not always be the case, however, and it is quite conceivable that the American ruling circles could decide that their wider interests demanded that they proceed regardless of this factor. If the only alternative was complete military defeat they could very well choose to invade the north and try to cut off the source of supplies for the National Liberation Army.
More important, as limiting factors on their ability to carry out a policy of further escalation are the military and economic difficulties that have arisen from Johnson's Vietnam policy. Wall Street had a boom when the news of the possibility of peace talks broke. All kinds of problems of a military character come to the fore. Some unkind people have suggested that the American forces would not be averse to having a breathing space to regroup and lick their wounds. The successive crises of the dollar and the U.S. balance of payments look like continuing (and, for that matter, getting worse) until America's involvement in Vietnam is at least scaled down.
Thus it seems most likely that the Americans will seek to bring about a solution to the Vietnam war which will not be a complete defeat for them but which enables them to substantially cut their commitment. This is a tall order but they have powerful friends.
THE RUSSIAN ROLE
It is quite clear that there are those in the Communist camp who would welcome a similar type of solution. The continuation of the Vietnam war and, indeed, its continuous escalation has jeopardised the Russian leaders' policy of peaceful co-existence. They, too, would like a solution which would not be decisive: they have no wish to see the Vietnamese example being followed by liberation forces in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and elsewhere. They would like to be free to scale down their military expenditure and develop trade relations with the West so that they could divert some resources to supplying more consumer goods to the Russian people. In this way they hope to head off the growing demands by the Russian people for a better life. Above all, they fear a fusion of the discontent of the intellectuals with that of the workers. Once such a fusion [illegible] domination of Soviet life would be in jeopardy. [illegible] military aid to the Vietnamese, are in a strong position to put pressure upon Hanoi to be more "reasonable". Of course, they have been doing this for a number of years now, but the new factor in the situation is that they now can claim that the Americans are in the mood to make concessions. Having said all this, it is surely obvious that it will be very difficult for the Russian leaders to force the Vietnamese to climb down too drastically. One of the good by-products of the Sino/Soviet dispute is that it narrows down decisively the extent to which either the Russians or the Chinese can manoeuvre in their relation with capitalist powers.
AN AMERICAN DEFEAT
For the movement of solidarity with the Vietnamese people the opening of negotiations with the U.S. under present conditions must be welcomed. It represents a victory because it was the Americans who made the first move towards negotiations just after they had suffered severe military defeats. Partisans of the Vietnamese revolution have always argued that the question of negotiations, and the conditions for negotiations, is the affair of the Vietnamese people themselves. In any national liberation war it is up to the people doing the fighting to decide upon such questions. Only if it were abundantly clear that the Vietnamese leaders were trying to come to a compromise at the expense of, and against the will of, the Vietnamese people would we have the right to criticise. An example of this kind of situation was the way the Geneva Accords were arrived at. It is abundantly clear that this is not the case in Vietnam today.
CONTINUE THE SOLIDARITY FIGHT
If the opening of negotiations represents a continuation of the struggle of the Vietnamese people by diplomatic, as well as military, means; for the solidarity movement it means that its efforts should be intensified. As opposed to those who have called for negotiations and who have now got what they wanted (and who should logically shut up shop) the solidarity movement is needed now more than ever.
We need to mobilise to help the Vietnamese people to achieve the best possible conditions: namely, those which are nearest to the aims of the solidarity movement. A powerful and vigorous solidarity campaign is a powerful counter to those who would try to get the Vietnamese to compromise with American imperialism. And should the peace talks prove abortive the movement will be ready to swing action immediately to counter [illegible] struggle the Americans decide upon.
Everything said underlines the need to: involve the [illegible] in the solidarity campaign; and expose to the fullest extent [illegible] British complicity in the war. Both of these objectives can be [illegible] of the new stage [of] the war. [illegible] Campaign is holding a conference on 18/19 of May. This will provide an important opportunity [illegible].