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Political Resolution ~ Tendency B. - passed by National Committee of 9/3/75 i. The nature of the present period in Eritain, a period characver= ised by a generalised economic, social and political cris and which will culminate in a head-on collision ketween capital’ and labour, Leads to the definition of the strategic Line of the IMG as preparing the working class to ensure the appearance of organs of dual power in such a qualitative confrontation between the classes. The chief instrument in fighting for such a line is the struggle to create united fronts of the organisations @f the working class eround crucial aspetcs of our transitional programme.
The socio-political development which gives us the forces to turn such a line into reality is the appearance, in the context of the generalising seciel wrisis, ef a mass vanguard breaking from the line of reformism. The primary tactic of the ING is to utilise this vanguard to recompose the workers movement alcmg the axis of acceptance ef the crucial demands of our transitional programme. This is to be achieved through a combination of individual propaganda, the popularisation of exemplary struggles, end above ail phrough this mass vanguard, utilising appropriave united front tactics, being able to propel forward in action far larger forces than its oun numbers. The decisive question confronting the IMG at the present conjuncture is how, under the conditions created by the return of a new Labour government, to utilise the forces of the vanguard in the struggle for united action of the working class which can beth deal with the immediate needs of the class atrucele and can carry forward the task of preparing the working clase for the creation of organs of dual power.
Within, and in function cf, the framework of this strategic line we have to undertake the tasks of the orgeniseticon of the vanguard and the building of the revoiutionary part Le The crisis of the Labour Perty_and the political Gynamics of the working class. ee i aN AEN A I RE MY eens HEN MORN “NP mca 2. The present Labour government came te office against the wishes of every significant section of the ruling class. While the decomp~ osition of the Tory Party means that the bourgscisie at present hes to turn to the Latour Party, this is purely an enforced tactical option and in no sense, unlike i964, a clear choice of a long or intermediate term strategy of the ruling class. On i the contrary, the desire ot the bourgeoisie is to create as rapidly as possible an alternative to the Labour government end it is oniy its present inability to achieve this that makes it look to the habour government for solutions. 3. This atti tude of the bourgecisie is soundly rooted in reality. The preseat crisis of British imperialism, the necessity to integrate the British economy on a competitive basis into the ERC, the fusicn of finance, industriel and state capital which is necessary to engage in that competition, require a transfer of resources from the working class to the bourgeoisie on a scale which involves not a holding back of the standard of living of the working class but a significant lowering of its standard of life - important cuts in real wages, a rise in unemployment to levels not seen since the 1830's, cutting back or abolition of the sociel gains made in the immediate post-1945 period. Such an attack requires a clear confrontation with the org~ anisations of the working class. Finally, fn the intermediate term, the bourgeoisie requires the imposition of a strong state. A government of the Labour Party, a party based on the organisations of the working class, cannot be the instrument of the bourgeoisie for the scale of offensive at present recuired against the working class. The main ain which the bourgeoisie can expect from the Labour government is that of the disorientation and demoralisation of the working class sufficient to create the conditions for the return to office af a more efficient instrument.
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- 2 - 4. The obstacies ts the ruling class between the classes and within the r ite its manifest betrayals, the C in creating the demoraliseticn wi readily aliow an alternative te L in the government's period of off Sienificant mobilisation of the ve not succeeded in carrying throug of the most : ¢ sections at i is clear there wil to the nositicn of ; higher than the la To the previcus Labou Ly to carry through its attacks without tence. Within the ruling class itgsel the crisis of Winter 1€73-4 continue by the bourgecisie at that period we icy or of a particular Tory sovernme aditi catalyse the breax up of ths t erganisec through the Tory Par The emergence of the Scottish potion ing of the Liberals, the : orically insignificant working class tinued struggles within the tory Part of the industrial capital and the £2 bloc, with. inevitabie short tere throughout this pericd and x» class to essemole a renal ali i if an anti-Labour cisctcreai oc by no means certain, it coulda only p of carrying through the hourreocisic' ation with the working class. 5. Crisis in Scotlanc represents essentia the Tory Party, finance capital the servicing cof well as section illusicrment of Party it has in social democrac The cuantitatively more advanced sta erisis and the crisis of the institu to a certain autenomy in all asrecis classes in Sectiand and necessitates, transitional programme, the cevelopm the crisis in Scotlancé as the rost a British canitalism. 6. Irehand: The continuing crisis of Ireland ¢reatly exacerbates the pres ruling class, Floowing the Gefeat of fircured it. ¥ imabilit olic mainority, it there in Ireiané uncer the camony cof the has pus hed off the i3 wD of Eritish imperi This has a Tory-Unicnist bio | niaces 2c from the right on the agenda when ism errunts. “he Loyalist General forces against the minc balance of are not merely vemporery opnenomena hut project iie both in the relation uling class itself. So far, despur Party has not st all succéeded which would Even carly wet a. working class he assembled. oe rey oF Chile on in cut t working class, on the "EEC it campeien in the working class loves ef strikes is. already sovernment and in any year of * able on Irelane uas Labour been encountering significant resishye ts of the cutcome of Tre Gefeat suffered cof an incomes voleat which served to % xsuling class bloc s, the relative strengthent of the by ne. means histort for the Tories, the ccon- “y between the representatives naoce capitel/petit-bourgecis part of a trend which, ill continue to develop ifficuit for the ruling © Government . Fven .waich is che Scottisn foeg en rr et: party H 7 ae aitioel hold of te oF the ecocnoric anc social rio bourreeoisie leads of relationship between the AS ecchesive component of our ent of ‘workers’ solutions’ to advanced form cf the crisis in British imperialist rule in ent crisis within the British winter 1978/4. indeed, it pre to Gecisively ¢etcat the Cathrour the bourreois ‘forces sh ruling class, feceral strategy ak-up in the cold bi-partisan policy isis for imerialithourh pus shine the .Chinst the short
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+ term interests of British impesialist. The block ne off of imperialist strategy, the compromise with the Loyalists ‘ @ crisis in the Labour Party which threatens a split in me the left and a stimulat.; a radicalisation inside the The recent success it: restabil ¢ the situetion in Ireland has brought a temporary respite for hese tendencies from openly aprearin;s of view cf the short term interests me hance on the inability of the en within an overall stratesy fo: a two year process - but this by neo we: minority. On the other hand, this rest te the constitutional Convention which at the t promises all thinrs te all men. Any attempt at a restoration i j remobilisation of the mince Constituthonal Conve estoration - will provoke term therefore, precipitating ay continues to be This will determine 7, The greatest diffic the Labour 2 zover pent prevoke ¢ ions of the moof.. internedlate decisive turn » vendency communities. r alternative to create one of present conjuncture to resolve any | of xD LO within clear altemative aa Labour. the -and despite its Lack of the significant problems confroncioe @ usual direct pressure to the Lab reflected both in ti Jncreasing orpanisation 2 tre ceewee t ‘oO! che “ost uitra-riphtist sections of the Labour Party ~ those incapable of breskins with even the day to day interests of the ruling clsss. 8. While the Labcur Party Le tet canazle cof satis the immediate economic demands of the -tourseoisic on the seale wequized ‘by the present crisis, this does not rrevent the covernnent from yine out continual betrayals of the interests of the worki ti e £ th € ng class an workers whom, In the present relation take on. This i it. the actions cuts, Ireland, etc. even the immediate de 9, The effectiveness of class without reetines Siem of the organisational ho! been takins place since the 195 does not mean that the basic ins the working class have disarne in the merbership of tne consti tant consequences for the evolut: is an increasing: willir work of, or directly in particular in the tuabi ealledé off to fit in with October, Foot and HALGO, atively carly stares in this most obviously traitorous of its policies importantly, the ability shewn uncer the Last Labour fy tt et Pe 4 fo mm ve impor navoived the frameis shown iss struggles Fords in at relthe wshury, €tc) anc, most covernment, in the political strikes arainst In Place of Strife, for significant sections of the working class to take direct mass action against the attacks of the Labour sovernment. It is this increasins willingnes of wide layers of the working class to act cutside of and against the line of the Labo rty whicn is what créates the conditions of the relatively high level of social strumsles already seen under this severn-
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- <%= ment, even in the trade union struggles the number of days iost in strikes is higher than in the Last year of the Tory government and higher than any year of the last. Labour government, and the inevitability of a much hicher level still, inclading ‘direct mobilisations against the policies of the government, as the ecisis deepens. , 10; Nhile the orcan nisational hold cf the Labour Party over the working class has reached relatively high proportions, this increasine willingness of the working class to act independan itly of , and arainst, the line of the Labour leadership must not be. confused with an equivalent: decl ine of either the ideological hold of reformism or of the political hold of the Labour Party.
While an objective crisis of the state rachine, and in particular, its p form, is developing, and this affects thé consciousness even of the mas jis not in the sli ightest equivalent to saying that the mass cf the working class has already lost the illusion that it ig possible to solve the decisive questions confronting it, and to achieve socialism, through the institutions of the bourgeois. state. On the contrary, while a vanguard of some tens of thousands is already breaking, on the basis of propaganda and partial experience, with these illusions, only the experience of at least pertial ruptures with the bourreois state, the emergence of at least embryonic organs of dual power, will break the mass of the working class from the concept of solving its problems through the bourgeois state 2 Ec © ct. es pe n iL. It is from this basic illusion, regarding the bourgeois state, rooted in the nrevious ability of the bourgeois state to rrant significant reforms, that the continued political domination of the Labour Party flows, The fact that the work< ing class has never had in its history the experience of a second mass reformist party; the mitery nature of the working class organisations - particularly the trade unions; the fact that the Labor Party is seen not as a political homogeneous atructure but as a’moverent! 7 which every view from open class solleboration to revolution can be expressed: the velative decentralisation and virtual lack of discipline of the Labour. Party, all militete extremely strongly against any project of creating a second reformist party for the working class,» and make it extreme} y unlikely thet, as long as the class remains dominated Ly reformism, it will break with the Labour Party. It is for these @ reasons that the working class, even those sections which entertain no illusions whatever with regard to th Wilson leadevship of the party, continue to maintain a illusion that in a hist~ orie sense the Labour Party can be transforned into an adequate instraurent for he achievement of the needs of the working class. onty a small vanguard, some tens of thousands, has snapped from this iliusion and thus broken wery clearly sith the political dorination of Labour. This vanguard of a few tens of thousands is however extrenely small when compared to the hundreds of thousands, and in the coming period probably ‘nillions, of workers who are prepared to ack ag: ne of the Labour leadership but without as yet break ine from the vo domination of the Labour Part 12. It is this correlation of forces with in the workers movement taht indicates the erucial tasks of the vanguard in the comings period. On a whole range of issues of buraing importance to the international and British class struggle important mobilasations of the masses will not be taking place in the coming period, The existing Eonces iguard must tske up every one of these strugsles regardless of whe ther at any “particular point in time, it finde a resonance in the masses. But it is "equally clear thet an important series of terrains, notably the defence of the living stendards, organisations ans’ social conguests of the working clase, decisive tlisations of wice layers of the working class vanguard and of the masses will be occurrine in the coming period - mobilisations which in-their initial stages will involve very militant struggles but not a clear break politically with the eiareivoaee leadership of the workine class.
The decisive problem for the vanguard is how. within mobilis ations which will invoive hundreds of thousands of + workers, the vanguard, which is breaking from reformism can, starting from a point of relative fragmentation and dispersion, play a real role as a pole helping to determine the course of the class struggle, breaking the working class from the bureaucracy, and participating in. the politicai development of increasingly wide layers of the working class. arliamentary .
Sas
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om Fw a7 #3, The crucial advantage which the vanguard in Britain enjoys: in atten mpcing to transform these struggles is net merely the extremely high degree of cavbeativity of the working class, but also its relatively adwanced traditions of orgenisation~ al independance from the bureaucracy. In particular the shop stewards system, something which is unrivalled in its scope in any other European country, con= stitutes a tiost powerful potential element of proletarian democracy and seiforganisation. The decisive weakness of the working class however is its lack of a clear political break with the bureaucracy. It is this which even now limits the development of the degree of organisational independance from the bureaucracy, but which, in the longer term, can lead to a decisive defeat of the degree cf organiastional independance which has already been gained from the bureaucracy.
It is the development of this political independance from the bureaucracy which is the key clement in the dialectic between the orgenisational strength of the working class and its political weakness 14, The development of the nolitical independance of the base cf the working class organisations from the bureaucracy above all demands the ccmmen acceptance within the working class of the crucial elements of a Transitional Programme - a programme which, taking as its starting point the needs cf the netional and international class struggle creates the link to the consciousness of the working class and with the concrete problems faced to the working class through the social crisis (inflation, un employment, éecline of the social services, crisis of the patriarchal family, racism end xenophobia, erosion of the democratic freedoms of the working class ete). It is through the strussle for such a programme that the working class can acquire the experience and consciousness needed to create orgeus cf dual power, a necessary condition for it to become able to tackle in practice the destruction of the bourgeois state and the suppression of the capitalist relations of production. i5. Tt is the struggle wh ithin the working ¢ ‘Lass for such a pr opramae which dovetails the three most crucial tasks of the coming period in taking forward the class struggle and building the revolutionaxy p sarty. Firstly, and in nits origin, such a oo @ programme is/strictly objective programme ~ it correspon ds to the crucial tasks cf the working class in the strugsle against capitelism and is not in any sense formulated with its starting point as the need to create a differentiation fron the bureaucracy. Secondly, however, because the reformist leaders of the workings class will not in fact struggle for the inter rests Of the oppressed and exploited masses, such a programme becomes a line of divide within the workers moverent against the bureaucracy. Thirdly, such a programme corresponds to the neec, in the struggle acainet capitalism and the bureaucracy, to overcome the present relative fragmentation and dispersal of the vanguard. The chief task of the org~ anisation at this c onference, and in the coming period, is the clear drawing up and struggle around such a clearly defined programm. 16. Put together this Transitional Programme amowmts to the fight to echieve the decisive element which is Lacking in the struggle for political leadership and for which the working class is paying au increasingly hich price ~ the leck of any programe of class wide demands, and organisation which can be bui it on this basis, which can map out the road to revolutionary seizure of state power in Britain. Such e procramme shows how the working class can be organised independantiy £ the bureaucracy, how the intermediate strata can be wou over, how the mass organisations cf the working class can and must be knit together into a wuited front of the whole working class organised om lines of workers democracy. It is the acceptance by the broad vanguard of such a procramme of class wide demands which is the host important precondition for cvercoming the frapmentation of the resistence of the masses to the capitalist offensive. The decisive question of tactics for the IMG is to find the forces with which to fight for such a programme.
Certain of these, those of the mass vanguard, are aiready clearly breakine with the programme of Labour. However in themselves these forces are too weak to lead the scale of mass strucgles which is on the agenda in the coming period. The Perey) task is to develop the appropriate wmited front tactics by which the forces of the mass vanguard can propel forward far wider forces than their own number The objective possibility to achieve this is given by the development of the
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crisis within the Labour Party. 17. The Crisis of the Labour Party annet even. meet the immediate needs of the working class end in which iner acly Large sections cf the working class are prepared tc act avainst the line of the Labour leadership, but without making a clear pelitical break with the Labour Perty, determine a very different pattern of development of the workios uncer the present covernment to either in particular to the 1964-70 of the previous post war kabour cover Labour government. The Labour while betraying the historic interests of the workine class, of cranting sipnificant concessions to the working class, The level of t > union end other mass social struggles fell continuously throuchout the zeriod of the covernment, and if was not until . the fifth year of the soves the heelth ce en that a Major rupture oceurrec se it wes able, for ‘such “a prolonsed period, to avoid a smediate cen sands of the working class thi goveranent ely period of its office, organised poltical resistence only forces who wished to Qreak with the historic interests of capitalism. Similarly, under the 1964 Labour government, waile no sipnificant concessions were made te the workers, a decisive turn to a confrontation with the working cless was only taken in 1969 with the attempt to introduce In Plece of Strife. - For the period 1966-68, apart from lecalised confronaations, the govt did meet si gnificant resistence to one of its policies, on Vietnam, but this resistence was led essentially by vancuard forces opposed not merely to the immediate but to the historic interests of © capitalism. Only from 1969 onwards did simnificent politically organised opposition develop from layers stiil umder the hesereny of social democracy de~ velop. Under cireunstances in which the Labour govt cannot even meet the immediate needs of the workinc class Fesistence is involved right from the beginning of either the 1945 or 1964 ; nis, but layers still under the hegemony of left social democracy. This ¢ car > already be seen both in the individual militant The election of a.tlabour ; ies) struggles ion, une of the welfare state, and on a whole series of particular “hesue 5s (Chil Deki S$. Africa, to some extent Shrewsbury etc}. What is cl de j a series cf left social democratic currents within the working class. 18. The development to the left of base of the Labour Party “and the trade unions, particularily the latte Bat eme contradictions for the social democratic varea ; i ne ¢ mass of the working class, and tne overwhelming majority of the crganising cadres, still t is p he Labour Party bureaucracy retain in the Labour Party it axe remained i monolachically riphé wine “in the comin then net merely a venguard but even sections cf the masses could br the Labour Farty. Cert~ ainly the experiences of Norway and Denmark indicate what can cceur'to a social democratic Party in the present period if it remains..as'a whole, on an openly right wing line. I : ectsely because it feels the pressure on its © base, and the fear'o tions of the working class, that in the last period we have seen of ‘left’ currents within the social cemocratic bureaucracy. This has eppe moet notably in the Scanlon~ Benn wing of the bureaucracy ~ eithouga thi c be now threatened from the left by forces of a Scargill developments de not represent the quirks of incividuals prefounc social press= ures similar in character to those imilar leftist currents within the French Sociali st Party, ist Party, etc. The intent~ ions of these currents are purely t their emergence creates the conditions for « severe crisis, jective effects, within even the a4 E rs ct ‘ paratus of the Labour $s te even within the bureaucracy, particularly 5 19. The development of ‘Left’ curee within the trade union bureaucracy, poses the inevitable break up of the present unstable relations even within the bureaucracy of the Lahour Party in the Labour covernment. The Jenkinsite + of the bureaucracy is incapable of breakine with the immediate interets of the bourgeoisie ~ called for the contin~
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uation of the attempt to int split from the gevt and the from the EEC, etc. Important 969, would bo viencraw of the trade union bureaucracy. 5 ty, however, without breaking with the historic tela capable of breaking with the immeciate intere Fa and would almost certainly resign from the Lon for @xerr peferenample, statutory incomes policy dum decision to adres from t govt, besed on bonapartist rol by. all means no: definitive break example Vilson its withdrawa ad with the hard for a O cM Oh rb (@) Ky oO 4 By Sey Jot ¥ the vote srsnip is that, as 7 2@SS and less. viat “a brozk t re 4 Within the bureaucracy of the Labour Party in abl t nocessary to speculate at present on exactly wh rox f iL erupt in. = resignetion of the ext social 4 POS Signation of the ultra-right the Fa of the eovt through risine hostility of beth its internal-contredicticns ~ but its clea left social derocrs atic currents at the base tions within the t . means that we £ serious crisis “of the Labour Party in 20, The effect cf the de ofa with the develorment of Left hes an extremely contradi fect one hand it is a force br BG wr 2% within the working class and ranre of key political issucs. the EFC, to some extent on im ce feta wr eo bes © ! ne Hee] 9 ct ot oo usu vetgunrd of the working vc less present pertod, have a ‘ser 1264-70. On the contrary necessary to break up the at the base of the Labour ution of the left social _eut off such ceveleonme: ‘formism.
Currents evol- 21. It is these contradi which allow an uncerst namics of the working sands exists hich is and oreal Li base in 3 of ié¢ tHTtiatiy on a frarmernte however invelve two ayrar * amorest the social democrati
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~ 8. which is moving to tho left under the Pressure of the/é and nolitiecal crisis, and on the other wnich is swinsine to. the left me hand a2 uresuc rely to nreserve its base in the workine class and which, ey its very soci ial nature, will never go further than a break wi ith the immediate interests of the bourgeoisie. The tasks ‘of the ING within this Gevelopment BLO twofold, Firstly to fight for the united eotion ef all those who are, On whatever tangent, prepared to fight a ainst the attacks of the boursscisic and the polr ; icies of the Filson govt, Fecondly, within the fic 2 united action, to seek to stre nethen these forces Which are t breaking not merely with the immediate but also with the historic inte rests of cap~ italism. The carrying through of both these tasks, which are dialect~ ically intert¢ wined is precisely _primarily te be ccomplished by the fight for united action on our transitional Programme es concretely related to the decisive links in the class struggle in any particular conjuncture. 7 > ct yb Y S rye 2] “os > = The Priority ity Axes S OF Work az sad 4 22. The development of left social demeeratie curzents ax round a whole Series of relatively fragmented and sectoral struggles and partial issues (unemployment, nationalisation of British Levlane, Shrewsbury, Chile, Defence, EEC) constitute objectively the cegeinning of the formation of an alternative Programme to that cf the leadership of the Labour Party -— not merely a paper set of proposals of the tyre which are always being drawn up but demands which actually have « resonance in wide layers of the working aE Class. These developments are continue quite ree rardless of thi ‘ bee any he which the Iva dees.
Gecided however is to what 1 dnaep those types of developmen succeed in raining nolitical independance from the bureaucracy, what. the full conten: of these demand “wil loni be, how vanidiy such deve cially it S this which can be Crue at 2 e ING, and to which our united fron tial axis of united front iis sv ments will coalesce nationally, ete affected by the intervention of ¢ tactics must be Girectee, nyate act ivity is eveinst the so cia c react S too diffuse for a single united front to be reated. In th: Ceveloping sit~ rea acti : ad uation it will be -» rather - wice range of united front activity that We Will be budldit Aes 7 ot (a) Incomes Policy, The single issue which + Will most Ciearly centralise the class struggle in the coming period is incomes policy. This assumes its central imp ortance as a line for the bourgecisie from the fact that the experi~ ence cf the last tro cecades, cons firmed Strikingly in the last months, is thet in the present relation of class forces the bourgeoisie can~ not take on and defeat the working class ang L a qualitatively raise th factory, ana industry by industry. ievet Of exploitation, facta ory by at thes level the relation of forces is extremely on the contrary vatavourable to In x ic puting Cless and cefeat is rpevitable, Oniy an ’ irerease in unemployment to a scale gualitetivel beyond what presentdevelor BMEnRt to 2-3 million unemployed coulc guali ‘< ly exists, a real ; t % jtatively alter L ’ - To create such a level of unemployment while a une™Ployment of 1 million Or More this vear is abso olutely unavoidable an increase to 2 million nore idlion or nore would he & conscious decision by the bourgeoisie wou n the 3 ituation be both economical 27 end POliticaliy Cisse ous. For this reason, while unemnloymen will increase the bourgec © will be continua ly gome form of conpulsory incones. rolicy. This —_ ted 08 Six cccasions since the Secon world war and it will be #.ttempted afair in the coming months - either Cirectly Of, more likely, 2 complex form as Part of a packare of auste eri ity measures '4ustified' as part of an ideclogical offensive on a ‘nations enercency |. The hope OF | the ruling class is that the combi nation of the nex PPECY of 7 the trade union leaders, the Cefinite rise in unemployment will @nable hs ie = compeilec ts ne introduce hes at ready beon attermn- .) oe ¢
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such an incomes tolicy to work. While it is unlikely that this will succeed the danger is that this combination of elements, in combination with the need of the working class te run faster enc faster in crder te stay with the seme stancerd of living, will create conditions for temoralisation of important secticns of the working cless. In relation to tactics in fighting arainst incomes rolicy it is very likely that sections of the left bureaucracy will oppose it, while naturaily doing as little as possible, under the banner cf ‘Defend the Social Contract'. Our task is twofold. Firstly, we must fight for united action of all these whe opncse such an incomes pcliicy an demand a ‘general strike to force the repeal cf the policy - some othine which will provide the only real method for advance if such a p olicy is introduced in 2 complex fiscal form. Secondly, within any such united front, we must counterpose the appa of 'No to any form of incomes policy under cap sitalisn' to the talk of cefence of the sccial contract. This will be accompanied by propaganda cn sliding scale wages, national minimum wage, etc. (b) Unemployment. in the strugrle arainst unemployment tnere i ing class, notably since UCS, has taken enor tices, The factory occupation as tactic is alised within a broad vanguard of the working class. F is on this issue that the debates within the Labour Bar oopvious effect in pranesne to the fore demands for naticnalisation.
This latter has nat € dous metential for the development 2 a Ous stens no doubt that the workeps f a is) @ a ct by g Hed ® pa eq a 1. turally a bpremencdc of working class eoasciousn ress. The development of a situa aticn in which the clear response of whole groups cf workers faced with redundancy become that of factorm cccunations witn the Comane for nat ionalisation by the Labour govt would create an enormous crisis for social democracy anc raise most profound consecuences for any future moves towarcs organs of cual nower is also this sxis whicn cerresnoncs to the immediate needs o king. class in fighting unemployment. With the present degrce lonment of uncmployment any pernsective which consists of fig ng xv solutions Simply at the Level of individual factories is easingly illu usory . ‘hile demands euch as work sharing with nO loss” ay retain val iaity, ‘the essential axis cf uniteeé front activity will be on the demand for naticnalisation centred around the slogan cf 'Nationalisation without compensation ane under workers control cf all firms creating recuncency' This demand is obvicusly counterposed to the buresucracy's position or the extensicn of tke NEB, handing cut money to bakrupt firms, Keynesian economic policies ete, Our chief slogan on this can be deévelored primarily through actions around particular exemplary struggles and campaigns for nationalisations cf particular inc ustries. (c) Withdrawal from the EEC In relation to Zritain the issue of the Comnon Market has a cunl sig~ nificance in the coming period. Firstly, while the withdravel of.
Britain from the = vould not in itself sneil the end of that hody, nevertheless it would be a real weakening of the forces making for the drawing together of the European bourgeoisies, anda therefore obectively tends in the directicn of helping the breek up of th Common Market. For this reason, because cf the effect it will have on the world relation cf forces, ga crucial task cf the IMG in the coming pericc is that of campaignine for Britain's withcrawai. Put the issue of the EEC will have a second, and ‘internal', sirnificance in the coming rericd, The issue of the HEC is undcubtecly the one single cuestion on whicn an outcome is nessible this year which will have the greatest impact in the intermediate end lore term cn the cevelopment of the class struggie ‘in Britain. This issue of Britain's membership o he EEC is 3 @ et £ ececisive sectas © being a life or death one for the mos ett ¢ e eiriy close
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(e) Withdrawal of Troops fr The crisis cf bourr< preucht to 2a heat by the: a profounc crisis for ion’ brought remains that the Eenubli-~ Loyalist General the British rulins about through nee of a developing confrontatic can nopuletion.
Given this balance towards compromise ascencancy. entified with collancrs The steacily worse ur government will cre a a eri ate oprosition in the TUs Bi ae) oper ses the wuesor ra tien of a majo Siomment C 25 ct bes Ou bg 2 00 of troons. To evelon a Troops Cut Now fs unity and outflankins with thes 3E cur ask of the the oy eA “i e ry IMG on Ireland C ta x is) = At the same time : bourgecisie to olay up class. The main way of epment of a Troons Sut owever qQues~ tion to make stpone ely autonomcus Synamic. ch @ development te fisht iracy and Disaffecticn Acts etc). ne such develorrents that we ¥ hdrawal of troonrs. (f£) The fight for the libereticn ©:
The r take forward However, 3 +7, Working ¥ oeramme te esent period. ny sense ‘our’ pre “reach too the working oppressicn ight, either around sper s y than these, which ¢raw. ié the Charter eg. equal fr ed iiities, defence of ts s will be fought fo it for Free Abertion on = e fe under. comm ts wi balance “ot fo hasis we will (¢) Creation feferce of democratic rights.
This is not 4a & Line of orienteticn in nt between all 03 reanis~ comer etic fe te @ bet bb which we have ations of th This must be of bourgeois ism' laws et (h) feainst 2 As the econom:
Party incre2ses ishment of p increasingly
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in the buil cing of all the our Party take up these Of 'break with the ues BUILDING A_TRADE he Labee#e campaiers we must dema nd that the a ing the gemana Slogans as a Wav Of coneretis secisie,'!
UNION TENDENCY . 1 24. Under the condi tions of the 1980's to mia 1260s the development of left Social demoerea atie Ce rerrents would undoubtedly have taken piace primarily through the constituency habour Parties, In the present si uation within the work “2D€ Class however such currents will deve2op | primarily through the trade unions ~ Placing centrally on tue orae of the day the guestion of the } building of a trade union te endency . Our Strategic goal in the Situation is the constitution of g trade union tendency, around the demands of No to any form of incomes policy . under capitalisr; Sliding scale of wages, hours ang social pene nationalisation of all major industry under workers control; immeaiave naticnalisation without co OMpensation and urder workers control of ali firrs creating vedundancy ; withdrawal from the EEC; withdraws of Troops from Ireland: mplementation of the demands of the Working Women's Charter in full; defence of all democratin rights; opposition tO ail forms of racism, The individual campaigns and united fronts we take up must be seen as esters in this direction and the need for such a tendency must be ae projected in propaganda. in working for such 2 grasped. The first While this has teese are not of great obstacle te its orisec sectarianism between organs ‘lations a have three main levers which can be at of the is rank 2 auc file’ organisation. adequa ies of programme, nevertheless £ they would in thenselves be a Lest onstacle is its the- *uSal of IS to distinguish clearly i £ the vrike committees, shop Stewards cttees etc) Orga nisations of iguard CWWe » OH, etc) and organ: a de isations of the periphery of 4 Intionary Organisation, This leads to Is continually counterposing Organisations of its periphery to ns organisations of the brosd vanguard (org, ‘} OF even to organisatio g wae ay ( t which have the Project of becoming ore ions binding on eections of the masses (eg. London teachers ). Ve have to fight against these errors within 'p and they are so deeply ine prained into Ir file' movement, BS f Iis's whole coucention o i i indeed the term Brecisely obscures a, eee Pu es uu! not likely thet we will be that building LCDI Us front on decisive issu period of the strug eet successf The Second lever is the LCDTU. I+ has been the Case at various times i283 been de facto &® way of creating a united * the at the time of the early fe industrial Relations Act ft is ‘uxes in the future, particularly in uy CP, thet the LODTU coula play such this would be purely a conjunctural question eS not in eny sense nrovide a strategic way contrary the politics of forwar tendency ~ on the . Q ae remove any politica OF Organisational rationale for a trade BS oureaucracy., Py the event of a ‘Lett | ro le SS ae union tendency isdependans The Ee hird Lewcadres of tha jation tO part part tial issues Social democratic organising present s ceveloped both an fre~ n relation to various eains Privy man Po csc, SeetOSt Private Practice:
BEC, against cditure cuts,ete). A present these forces are far more spersea, although _much terger, than those of +e cP oad IS, but the developing crisis and cur intervention must avi to overcome this, It is through developin ne united fronts with this 48yethet the basie strateric road tory ards & trade union tendency Le con= he present united action here will be on a partial, ounctual «nd ¢
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junctural basis. The aim must be to take this up and extend it, where the relation of ferces nermits, ontc a national level. ; Relations within the revolutionary left | 25. In the present relation of forces within the revoluticnary teft | Lt remacns the case that in order to gain united action of the main | organisations of the revolutionary left it is in general necessary to ain an alliance with, or the clear possibility sections of the organising cadres of should continue to pursue proposals for united action with and engage in debates cn left social democratic olutionary left the degree that in particular sces its called-for united action has in the situation. 'triumphalist some In relation to the smaiier for of WF, Big Flame etc) these are ia pene front initiatives. However, their sr to the forces which can be mob ilised circumstances, be an obstacle to inve Workers Fight on Troops Out Now, Big % a Ye should continuc to debate with th gree that joint activity Coes not cur should continue united front activity Ir relation to the regroupment of th the nossible exception of the BCG, i anissations suppers the Fourth Intern their evolution is further Bway from mont of the left will therefcre esse heeemony for the political positions tion to the class struggle in Britain we can hope to win over individral the RCG is slightly different in tt position on the FI and we should e: cdes to sce if a principled basis Organisation of the org: t pericd the TEM poss alliance with, However we the YOVe th TO of an the working clase. necessity for is. the L currents emerge ana the If ' nersnectives not fulfilled, this sibility to Gain ¢ greater pull the revolutionary left (RCG, WSL, rel prepared to join in united esence does not add aualitatively and their tactics can, in many iving Significant forces (eg.
Flame on how to build the TOM). em on these points and to the deacross wider initiatives we with these forces, u evolutionsry left this, with £ nosed as none cor the orginéeec in most cases The fight for a regroupuv ~~ a yo 2onas ~ be FI. ot te ntially ke a public fight of our line in vanguard in w ces. The case not as yet tie n any cussion with these achieved. the FI and 5 3) J 4 wa nity can be a is is 26. In the nas MG t wey in which it attracts forces around yt: he its devel lopment the IMG had attracteé its perishery primari general ideclogical' questions anc iesues of the world deveicpment cf the revolution. How however as it develops its implantation the organisation essentially attracts oar asis of its intervention in particular str -~ and in particular through its interven les. This requires a restructuring of the orga 7 (2a) developing a& homogenisa n the basis of a clearly concretely define: A secticn by section Giscussion on this should t v ship after the senference with the task of mu or pres on to the next conference or betore, a ful ft cf such a op ceraie in acditica to normal educaticnal activi the priority of the organisation will be around the Grawing up of programme. (bo) Ensuring the hecemony of the oreanisaticn on the most advanced cuestions of Marxist politics. This incluces, as an integral ste allocating large resources to Internaticnal beth by appcinting a full time editcr and by ceasing a situation in which written haterial by cdes appears in many journais at the expenee of our own. ; (c) Consolidation of the organisation into particular layers while at the same time creating the structures necessary te organ se tne werk eeceraphically. This means moving, with due canticn, towarcs a
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cells, The Trans? 2%. The develo British x i indeed ee D> bes pod grt pe af pal "hy te 9 O s t co org~ ct a onises & anc this must Selon most i homofenisin ree : es main ch , yawn up ba] Lu. n economic rece: occurs, untike is develen the ve © rm OF Ho 3 js 4% 2D im bg of the cefeat lessons £ imp ort t h utionary rise 5 ri ectner sectors of the y in Incechinea uthern Africa, otionnts, with profound i s sk of solidarising w / ary one of ternakiconalist resnonsibilit Cy onds e nediately to the tasks of developi ne the rees in of the working class anc to breaking Vanes reformism. In partic cing out and ¢ are:
PND iNe se 29. Pithin the ised develci an acu te with the through 3 ct eB w 9 2 WY rom) be Spon H A Aer RAED rah ® crisis react ear wi he collanse of ovident moves towards the s that in at least. four ‘alo and Greece = class steu SSible and cne of which, ct poss ey a *y 3 3 ra) ca et > n pa bel by ist fs bs 4 i) a as n 1] ; i cred 2 struec¢gies in at Greek peonle in the civil war, These cevelorments, are sre strom of these str profoundiy she Forces MEASvUre vane fen 3 at es ity wet had set o me tendenc wards immortant amnoevres of WOrkers ns Lre Colne to have obvious end prefournd for tne ucgle in every country, including EBritai ‘niy because of the chiective impact, eats but also because every major nc sent (social democracy, staliniam, very concei-vable for cf centrism to be in the mael- 4 i e ¢ 1 Me le ot ch pt eos Or se) Os fe) “ ; which, tn nt 5 oe . i i i t H i } i { i } !
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breekthrourh for class strucele: to achieve, period the : UE LLVO i 7 Communists from the y erent s . The ternati te ionel in the coming period of girantic ipitial accumulation ‘terrneticnal ps H £2 SO re O YO moO 8 SF ha » big € the centra a For these se because of whole forces. in s the str etic Ssrein, : ‘ko oof coming period ister we must he 3 tick cefence of SOLIDARITY RELEASE OF 30. While the strugerles in FPurenme Save resched their most obvious forms ticy : ntrie Mes OPES a tof European imp = AY mae . Gimen the impasse tens mS oo. ee: % : 18 quite evicent that the corbinsticn « id : ari class. strucrle hes st to their limit ree France) heveof the EEC 2 ated game ‘oO _attenrti its tnartne while collansine. ‘The Tresen a imost 4 ‘Eritein alg nit. series ot “county ures quite teerly ', German are GY TDR others, not In the comings nerici trenethenine, @ real me ae iss rae ¢ 2, or it will disinterrate. elutic Les Mae | srone deuht as to where they stand j i EC wou be a blow of the first ¢im One Single Furcneas the defence of the the United Stai alist world - 4 least affora it; ope in feveur ¢ ate ly i would weaken the intes ev rmperialist ruling class | in Screps wand real supra-national ccon-mic st Pore OS ent an important consolic Fiox rrome rm against the forces cf world ilalists simultane iy ine revolution, against +t proletariat. For these European revolutionary of the Common Market FEC to nut forwarc of Europe. 31. Britain's for the renres working class : inside the ruline c still econtinuirns, ¢t dancers for the Britis state can be forced ¢ step forward both fe , : if the Republican ness 2S ATE ¢ tec this wil ssult in a consclidation cf reactionary ° 3aS 24 Eri ¢ Go AS ke FE be HOY fi ty statos ey undoubted riod My 3 be eo) et a + my } @ Oy oi creat | rt 3 reine. classes. f° ef Tereland it wi
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-~ 316 Bravest consecuences for beth working classes.
IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH TROOPS FROM IRELAND END INTERNMENT AND RELEASE OF ALL IRISr POLITICAL PRISONERS SELF DETERMINATION FOR TEE IRISE PEOPLE 32. The economic crisis affecting Capitalism expresses itself as one of over-production. The workers mMlovement cannot provide e sclution to this problem by retaining the anarchy of precuction based on profit - the position of the TU leadership. It is necessary to put forward policies which can prepare the workinre class to secure control over the means of production.
It is clear that the most decisive strugeliecs in the coming neriod in defence of the living stamdard of the masses, from the voint of view of the class relation of forces, will eceur on the terrain of inflation and unemployment. The Cevelopment of 'slumpflation' as an international Phenomencn is one which will steacily worser. The pro- Spects of working class radicalisation in response to this are great but the longs term dangers are also Clear.
At present unemployment and inflation, like all other aspects of the social crisis, acts aS & racicalising factor within the working class, unifies the werkines class and, as a manifestation of the social crisis, inclines the intermeciatie strata of society towards the side of the working class. However, if this Situation continues for a long period of time without the working class adopting measures to give it protection then exactly the orpesite process can set in with demoralisation and “isorientation spreading, the creation of disunity within the workers ranks, the move of intermediate strata away from the working class. I+ is for this reason that any Stratery which, for example, calis simply for workers to ¢o ahead with wage claims in the same old fashion is doomed to failure. Even now the weaker sections cf the working class are not able to set sufficient cains to keep them ahead of inflation, increasingly even the stronger sec~ tions of the working class will not have success in maintaining their standard of living by these hethods. Or unemployment it is clear that in the coming period unemployment cannot conceivably be Fought on @ factory by factory basis, The questions of Planned economy, of nationalisation, of workors control are no longer nosed merely as goo socialist propaganda, but as the cnly wey to fight te save jobs. The programme we fight for must centre on:
NO TO SNY PORM OF INCOMFS POLICY UNDER CAPITALISM SLIDING SCALE oF WAGES, BENEFITS Any GRANTS NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE or £4G EQUAL PAY INCREASES FoR ALL TRADE UNION COST oF LIVING INDEK ; WOREERS CONTROL OF PRICES. IMMEDIATE TATIONALISATION WITHOUT COMP = ENSATION OF ALL PIRES VIOLATING A UORKFRS PRICE CODE TEE RIGHT TO WORK WORK SHARING WITE NO Loss OF PAY OPEN TEE BOOKS NATIONALISATION WITHOUT COMPENSATION A IDER WORKERS CONTROL OF ALL FIRMS CREATING REDUNDANCY AND AZZ, EME © LEE FUEL INDUSTRY INCLUDING OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS FULL PAY FOR THE UNEMPLOYED EMERGENCY PROGRAMME oF BOUSING :
LP AND USEFUL PUBLIC WORKS 33, OF all the achievements of British reformism there ig no doubt that the one with the Ereatest impact in the wecent period was the 'establishment' of the ‘social services‘ in the immediate post war neriod. While this corresponded te the needs of the bourgeoisie for a more developed workforce than that of the 1930s there is no doubt that the welfare State representec 2 real fain for the working class. Since 1945 9 high proportion of the oppressed masses real
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income has come through the form of social expenditure. The cerence end extension of the gains made re is a erucial struggle both directly for the proleteriat's s ncard of living and to weld earounc the wor kine class nany c2 the oppressed strata of society:
PENSIONS. GRANTS AND BENEFITS. TO TIED TO A SL ING SCALE OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURE IWMEDIATE ABOLITION OF ALL PRIVATE EFALTE s OLS The larcest. divide within the working € petveen the wor- - class and potential allies, lies in inuing ompressicn vomen. The strucrele acainst the oppre omen is a crucial poth from the point of view of the h coeis of the etariat and from the noint of view cf ii eppressed streao the side of the working class in t! “le against caital- Furthermore if the proletariat duces no cgertake this task then the bourgeoisie will utilise this failure to renerate reactionary movements on the defence cf the family, to increase the existing divide within the working class and to separate the working class from mo stentia 1 ellies. While the full xeraticn of women requires the suppression of all remnants of the spitaList mode cf production, something not achieved ev ¥ by | oleterian re voluti on it~ self, the most important cn Ww © stru-gie arainst the oprression cf “women must meted sent are EQUAL PAY FOR WCU FREE 24 FOUR CCM FREE ABORTICN AND FORMATION OF FOMEN"S cat END . TO DISCRININATIC ON DIS a oS AND ALL SPE ECONGM ; JOBS OPPORTUNITIES, EDUCATION HD POLITICAL LIFE £5325 28, While the social weicht cf stud i tucents within scciaty is net large they sre both a strata which the working class can potentially win to its side and cne whese ability to playa role in political life is testified to by abundant international experienc se in recent years. While the ability of the proletariat to win to its side stu- Gents will tbe cetermined by its abliity te provice @ selution to the general political, economic and social > s facing sccicty, this must be accompanied “by & programme o “offering solutions to the ef fects of the general social dents: | FOR A UL : AGE ~ AS A STEP TS THES, FOR ABOUR TO COMMENCE EXPENS TOM OF EDUCATION & ION FOR TRE the a EDucarh AND INTER a w whe i oS RGENCY SCECOL Ak OF EDUCAT 28, Both the cirect effect of the econcmic and social crisis, anc its effects on the political terrain, are beginning to pose in Brita deen going crisis of the system cf parlismentaczy bourgeois ecracy. In a coneral sense the decline of this eystem of rule is aay ereatec by the necessity of the state to appear more and directly as an arbiter in the economic relaticns between the ses and between the conSlicting factions of the bourgeoisie. conjuncturally the political crisis qualitatively deepens thi ncency to cecline. The classic form cf bourgeois parliamentary ecracy requires strong ruling class rerties capable of orienting th ne state apparatus in o decisive fashion therough tae formation of ant governments on a coherent platform. The ter tinning of the eak up of the tradit: lionel ruling class bloc however tends to a oaitiptec ation of ruling class factions 2 ad parties, none of which is capable of uniting a line for the bourceoisie os a whol e, &
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eat. is) R ce i Vv anc nera Ows us a R cane to ta e 1 strike bo fs a = VYROS. oy by us te d a £ a a ¥ rnism, ac iO ry we i if!
Fe ¥7 ag f fo in i.
Ss AAS IS La BC pe T H ry da ross rice rece OD 2 Adis ‘ x hi 7 P st at on li oS ines MOVES H re i MENT : cism S one Ry 2 ¥ ah 2 ae’ ~ ‘al loit € AB :
NX C J a 7 i Ne 1€ S as t how e) why a) erie i ow ct tee wor a t ae Ss ron Qa od crisi ute Lp: s r n %t ar ct OO £ a) @ r m i non pol @ 93 vu my te Sy i 9 Dry Oo this the trument xtreme ron’ Oe | << t can im-. a) from Jord, Cx
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Cs et workers ord cy » a = Mme ulad? reete around c te Cs +e v x & Cc UPPFoOOL ho rar ck Say + PUES rt Pp ort fo eter RH Me OY OD ont ma oPp KOS GRP AMO RSP Her rn en “nolit~ ives Fe Goa ct hey o gt } ie revelut gh. one ABOLITICE for ao a b “they that the Taby 3 © 4 mf Oo. @ came) op ro) fa) trucr i . 8 the central of A ese = 3 F tend ASS oie JF me 1 peren irom ate BS O ically the wor class contract