Violence and Zimbabwe

8 discussion article VIOLENCE AND ZIMBABWE A marxist type revolution, contend petty bourgois African Socialists and social democrats, involves an unneeessary bloody clash between two opposing forces - it means war and violence. As Bourguibi of Tunisia once put it "Even though I choose socialism, I am opposed to class struggle. I do not believe in the necessity of struggle among men. Once it takes root, a war of extermination is inevitable, as one of the two opposed classes must disappear... Humanity's fate lies in the survival of the motivation for collaboration among men." The question must be posed; Does revolutionary marxism mean an inevitability of violence and civil war? In the 1840's and 1850's Marx and Engels were quite explicit on the point that capitalism would have to be overthrown forcibly - that in the last resort the struggle between classes amounts to the brutal clash between people. This unequivocal insistance on the necessity of violence was influenced by the pattern of the French Revolution and the course of the failed revolution of 1848. Later, in the 1860's and 1870's, Marx and Engels altered their opinion, pointing out that different paths to the transformation of the social relations of production are possible. The actual nature of the revolution, e.g., whether violent or non-violent, will depend upon the conditions prevalent in individual countries. Such conditions as the nature of the state (fascist — social democrat), the composition of the bourgeoisie and its relation to the state, the political status of the territory i.e. colonial, neo-colonial or imperial. Although both Marx and Lenin held the position that under certain realizable conditions a peaceful revolution is possible, we must view this proposition in relative terms, i.e., in relation to civil war. In other words, a completely peaceful revolution is unlikely, not because the revolutionary forces are violence prone but because there will always be sections of the bourgeoisie who will resist the revolution to the end. The basic question in the revolutionary process is who is to rule the country, ie., whether the bourgeoisic or the workers. This vital question cannot be decided in some cordial amiable fashion. The bourgeoisie will not commit suicide as a consequence of morally correct arguments, nor by reference to some constitution or over a conference table. The stakes involved are too high — it is the life or death of the bourgeoisic and bourgeois state. Even in a situation where the dictatorship of the proletariat was established through the framework of social democracy this would not avert a clash between sections of the bourgeoisic and the workers' forces. "As long as class society, found on the most deep-rooted antagonisms, continues to exist, repression remains a necessary means of breaking the will of the opposing side." (Trotsky) But this is not to say that a socialist revolution of necessity must cumulate in civil war. The important point here is that the movement towards socialism involves a struggle which has as its logical aim the displacement of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois state, and that in this struggle violence is inevitable, but the extent and nature of the violence will depend upon the internal and external circumstances of each country. The determining factor in the last analysis is the degree to which the bourgeoisie and other reactionary forces are both willing and able to resist the overthrow "The problem of revolution, as of capitalism. To quote Trotsky, of war, consists in breaking the will of the foe, forcing him to capitulate and accept the conditions of the conqueror. The will, of course, is a fact of the physical world, but in contradistinction of a meeting, a dispute or a congress, the revolution carries out its object by means of the employment of material resources though te a less degree than war... The degree of ferocity of the struggle depends on a series of internal and international circumstances." (3) Armed struggle in Africa It would at this point be ridiculous for us to make any generalised statement concerning the necessary path of revolution in Africa, except of course, those points afready mentioned above. To present well worded prescriptions on the means and strategy of revolution in Africa would be presumptuous — it is for African revolutionaries in each country, through practice based on revolutionary marxist principles and thorough knowledge of the particular conditions of their country, to decide on how best the struggle, must be carried out. Having said this, we can, based on the objective conditions, both internal and external, plus the experience of other liberation struggles, say unequivocally that the struggle for liberation in Southern Africa can only be completely successful if waged with arms. Here we are dealing with deeply racist bourgeois fascist states, very closely tied to both the indigenous and international bourgeoisies, that are totally incapable of committing suicide. The experience of the ex-Portuguese colonies confirms the futility of peaceful struggle in situations where the oppressor has no intention of changing the social order, not even by employing a neo-colonial solution. All the nationalist groups of the ex-Portuguese colonies attempted, at one time or another, to attain a peaceful solution to the colonial question. For instance, in the early stages of their struggle, both the UPA and the MPLA relied exclusively on peaceful methods. They publicised the situation in Portuguese territories, called upon Portugal to negociate for reforms in Angola - Salazar refused to recognise these groups, let alone negociate with them. On 3rd Feb 1961 the MPLA staged a peaceful demonstration march to Luanda prison to demand the release of thousands of political prisoners arrested by the PIDE (the Portuguese secret police). The Portuguese seized upon this as an opportunity to massacre some three thousand Africans. It was as the result of such experiences that the nationalist groups came to the conclusion that liberation will only come through the "barrel of a gun. The objective conditions, both interal and external, dictated the means, - and not some subjective desire for adventure. The experiences of the Portuguese ex-colonies are by nomeans unique. Andreas Shipanga in a brief history of SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation) recounted; "In 1961 we held a very important National Congress in Windhoek where we examined our progress since 1958, in particular the result of our diplomatic efforts at the United Nations. Representatives of our people had gone to New York to petition the UN and we continued clinging to the illusion that the United States could really do something to get South Africa out of Namibia, But now we look back on that day in December when our people were shot down in cold blood and saw what the UN did with the information and petitions it got from SWAPO... the action it took. We came to full agreement: it was nothing but fine-sounding resolutions piling up in the UN archives. This recognition led us to the decision at the Congress of 1961 to prepare for eventual armed struggle in Namibia." Here again, the internal and external circumstances in which the Namibian struggle finds itself dictates an all-out armed struggle for the liberation of that country. Zimbabwe Currently Nkomo is in the process of negociating a settlement with the Smith regime in the name of the Zimbabwean people. Needless to say the present talks on the part of Nkomo and his cronies are an attempt by the African petty bourgeoisie to attain within the racist capitalist Rhodesia concessions in return for pacifying the Zimbabwean people. Nkomo has already been earmarked for the position of Prime Minister in a neo-colonial solution to the present problem confronting both the Rhodesian and international bourgeoisies. We need not here dwell on what is the division of the Zimbabwean people, as between those who want and effect upon workers and students in many neo-colonies. In Nigeria, goodwill amongst some Atrican states, put perhaps more umportant colonial regimes of the continent. The Smith/Nkomo talks provide obvious reactionary role of Nkomo and his ANC supporters. To talk of negodiation with an adamant and racist regime as that of Rhodesia, especially in a situation where imperialism has already suffered a major defeat, is counter-revolutionary. The whole scenario of settlement talks is designed for, at the most, a neo-colonial solution - as an instrument for transfering the economic and political power of Rhodesia to the Zimbabwean people it is irrelevant. The process of negociation pre-supposes the possibility of reconciling the interests of the opposing forces. The position and interests of the Zimbabwean people are diametrically opposed to those of both the Rhodesian state and bourgeoisie, and as such cannot be reconciled without the Zimbabwean masses remaining dispossessed of their economy. Any settlement reached between the aspiring African petty bourgeoisie and either the Smith regime or the Rhodesian bourgeoisie must be unacceptable - that is, unless one believes that the Rhodesian state and bourgeoisie are immediately prepared to commit class suicide. The staging of the Nkomo/Smith talks has its functions both for the Smith regime and international capitalism. The talks provide Smith with time to build up his military defences against what he knows as the imminent all-out arms attack on the racist minority. By going through with the talks Smith hopes to gain some degree of credibility in the eyes of western imperialist nations, on whom he must in the last analysis rely for the future existence of racist oppression in Zimbabwe. Although Smith, has up till now been. adamant on the point of not conceding majority rule to Africa, there can be no doubt that as the guerilla attacks intensify there will be internal pressure upon him to reach a settlement which constitutionally concedes majority rule to the African but whose application would include a transitional period long enough to postpone the whole question of complete self-determination to a further date. Smith must present some constitutional package which will be acceptable to the aspiring African petty bourgeoisie, if he hopes to survive. If he can seduce Nkomo and his supporters with some measure of constitutional power and at the same time guarantee the properties of the white minority against nationalisation, he would not only have managed to lay the basis for the are carrying out the struggle for complete unconditional liberation and those who are willing to accept a classical neo-colonial solution, Smith or the white Rhodesian minority will have guaranteed themselves the complete support of imperialist countries. In such a situation, the intervention of such a force as the UN or the imperialist nations themselves would be interpreted as the defence of the Zimbabwean people against the attacks of communist rebels. The position of Nkomo and his fraction of the ANC is providing the basis for a neo-colonial solution which itself will serve as means for imperialism to further divide the Zimbabwean people, and transform Zimbabwean liberation fighters into rebels. prevention of intensified all out armed struggle in Zimbabwe. The position of South Africa is clear up to the point that she would prefer Smith to accomodate the Zimbabwean petty bourgeoisie and avert a war which would inevitably place South Africa in a dilemma situation, both politically and strategically. Through her involvement in Angola, South Africa has not only suffered a moral and physical defeat but also she has damaged her detente image with some important Atrican states, such as Nigeria. Vorster will probably exercise more pressure on Smith in an attempt to force him to accomodate the Nkomo section of the ANC into the political framework of a new Rhodesian constitutional structure. By intensifying his efforts towards gaining a peaceful solution in Rhodesia, Vorster may hope to regain some political prestige and than this, an all out armed struggle in Zimbabwe would place Vorster and his government in a most precarious position, for although her most sensible policy in such a situation would be to keep out of the conflict in Rhodesia and consolidate her own position in South Africa, there will definitely be strong pressures upon. Vorster to intervene militarily to save both the whites and the economic investments of South Atrican in Rhodesia. Such an intervention would be disastrous for both South Africa and world imperialism. Militarily and strategically, intervention would extend her boundaries, therefore her area of defence - she already has to contend with the growing struggle of SWAPO in Namibia, which means the deployment of vital troops. Politically a military intervention in Zimbabwe will definitely have a greater effect of infuriating many African states and in particular African workers and students, than was the case with her intervention in Angola. Such an intervention would make it more difficult for the western imperialist nations to intervene if the situation arrived which dictated such action. The South African bourgeoisie are not the only ones anxious to see some sort of settlement in Rhodesia. The British government has suddenly regained interest in Rhodesia, and as whence before she could conceive of sending troops over to Rhodesia, she can now lay the basis of such an intervention if the circumstances arrived which dictated such an action. The explanation is simple: ten years ago when African states were naively calling on Britain to militarily remove the Smith regime the Zimbabwean people had not organised themselves into a fighting force capable, not only of defeating the Smith regime but challenging the hegemony of international capitalism in the country. The solution which the Wilson regime is attempting to implement in Zimbabwe is that of neo-colonialism — a plan for which it has the support of the US, South Africa, Zambia and Tanzania. If this plan fails and armed struggle intensifies then Britain in collaboration with the other western powers will attempt to use the UN in Zimbabwe in more or less the same way as it was used in the Congo - to smash the progressive forces and instigate a reactionary pro-western regime. If-British camouflaged intervention does not work, then Britain will find herself in a situation where she will either have to intervene directly or sit back and watch events take their course in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa in general. The British government would prefer not to be put in a situation where she would have to send troops into Rhodesia; such a move would be internally and internationally (i.e. in relation to African states once imperial role that British troops would place in such a situation became evident) disastrous. Britain is prepared to sacrifice Smith in order to avert a situation which would seriously test international capitalism. A friendly prowestern black neo-colonial regime, although not perfect, is at this point much preferable to an intensified armed struggle which would mark the end of white imperialist domination, not only in Zimbabwe but in the whole of Southern Africa. Most African states would prefer to see an end to all armed struggle in Southern Africa, particularly in Zimbabwe, not because of some humanitarian quest for peace and tranquility in the continent but because an intensified armed struggle in Zimbabwe cannot but have its effect in their own neo-colonies. The effects of the struggle of the MPLA (especially with the implication of the South African troops) has already shown itself to have had a progressive students not only demonstrated in support of the MPLA, but demanded that the Mohammed regime send troops to fight alongside the MPLA against imperialism spearheaded by racist South Africa. In Zambia, the situation in Angola greatly contributed to the imposition of a full state of emergency and the arrest of Lionel Cliff. There can be no doubt that a concerted struggle against the racist European Rhodesia, one with the aim of instilling the African's Zimbabwe' will have a profound effect upon the class and nationalist consciousness of workers and students throughout Africa. Neo-colonial African leaders are well aware that an antiimperialist fervent engendered by armed struggle in Southern Africa could have the effect of engendering an anti-capitalist struggle in their respective neo-colonies. The reactionary, role of Kaunda in the attempts to stifle the struggle of the Zimbabwean people is clear. Both he and Nyerere have been collaborating with Britain, South Africa and the US in imperialist efforts to instil a neo-colonial solution in Zimbabwe. As reported in the Observer (22.2.76) "Britain has been authorized by President Kaunda of Zambia and President Nyerere of Tanzania to promise Smith that if Rhodesia agrees to revert to a British colony, they will do all they can to stop the fighting." The OAU, Zambia and Tanzania have in fact been holding back arms and ammunition meant for the ANC freedom The aversion of intensified all out armed struggle in Zimbabwe will only serve the interests of both imperialism and the neo