Detente and disarray 1975

10 no answer to the situation of economic and physical exploitation and oppression of the Zimbabwean people. The only problem that it could solve, and here only temporarily, is the present crisis of imperialism in Southern Africa. The interests of imperialism and the African masses are absolutely contradictory and irreconciliable. At this point a peaceful solution means a neo-colonial solution because of the simple fact that international capitalism is not going to hand over to Africans the control and ownership of the Southern African economies. The only interests that may be reconciled in Rhodesia are those of the aspiring petty bourgeoisie, represented by people like Nkomo, and the economic interests of white minority. beyond the bounds of a mere eradication of minority government to the complete overthrow of capitalism. This is not to reject the nationalist context of the struggle at this point. but to pose two courses open to the Zimbabwean people; firstly, the displacement of the white minority regime by an aspiring African petty bourgeoisie, who will fulfil their neo-colonial position by protecting the economic interests of world capitalism at the inevitable expense of Zimbabwean workers and peasants, or secondly, the concerted challenge of both the political and economic hegemony of both the white minority and international capital, - one as a consequenc of both the internal and external circumstances in which the struggle is taking place, requires the use of a substantial amount of violence. One point should be stressed. We are not of the opinion that the use of violence, either in general or specifically in Zimbabwe, automatically means the success of the struggle in terms of creating the conditions in which a socialist society can be built. No this of course is not the case. What is the case is that given the prevalent conditions in Zimbabwe successful liberation means the complete displacement of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois state, and the complete withdrawal of the economy from the orbit of international capitalism. Given the stakes involved it is extremely unlikely that both the Rhodesian bourgeoisie and international capitalism will concede these fundamental changes without military resistance. The crucial mistake made by so many moralists when they accuse marxists of being violence prone and are quick to support non-violent methods for the liberation of the colonised peoples of Southern Africa, is that they confuse means and end and they fail to grasp the fact that morality has never liberated a physically and economically subjected people. The laws that govern capitalism and imperialism have little to do with morality - basically we live in an amoral world and if we are to conquer the oppressing classes we must approach the situation from a realistic and amoral stand. Marxism does not conceive of force and violence as ends, they are means which the objective conditions of the struggle to overthrow the oppressor forces dictate. Violence is not employed for its cathartic effects on the masses, nor as a channel for the release of pent up aggressive impulses created by a lifetime of economic exploitation, and physical and mental oppression. The aim of the colonial revolution, which in order to be successful must be carried through to a socialist revolution, is the absolute victory of the proletariat and peasants, the total displacement of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois state. These basic requirements for the building of socialism cannot be attained, given the present objective situation in Southern Africa, without the employment of violence and terror. 1.3.76 - Tunde Anthony. DETENTE AND DISARRAY 1975 It looks increasingly likely that the year 1975 will go down as a period in which the struggle for the liberation of the remaining outposts of white supremacy on the continent was successfully defused and derailed. The main factors involved in achieving this were (i) the collaboration between the neo-colonialist states of black Africa and the white racism stronghold of South Africa who possessed an equal interest in ensuring that no ongoing struggles disturbed their dreams of a new "detente" in the area (ii) the appallingly inept leadership of the liberation movements, particularly in Zimbabwe, who have been thrown into total disarray by the easily predictable turns of events this year. The latest search for a "settlement" in Rhodesia has now been going on for a full year since October 1974. It arose basically out of four factors: 1. Since UDI in 1965 Smith has in fact always sought a settlement if it was possible on his own terms. Thus the Tiger and Fearless talks with the British government (1966 and 1968), the new constitutional proposals of 1971 and the admission of the Pearce Commission and the series of talks initiated in 1972/3 with Muzorewa, leader of the ANC, a movement then totally committed to the peaceful road to political change., Although Rhodesia's economy has survived the farce of UN economic sanctions which have been busted with impunity by all the major capitalist powers, a much higher rate of economic growth could have been achieved if there had been no constraints at all on trade. Above all Smith's ambition of bringing a million new white settlers into the country in order to stabilize white supremacy could go beyond paper dreams if contact with European countries especially was completely untramelled. Thus Smith has always been willing to make a settlement of some Kind if it could bring about Rhodesia's complete reintegration, into the capitalist economy. But of course such a settlement would have to be fand this continues to be the case right up to the present) based on some forms of guarantee for the continuatios of white supremacy. 2. The UF government's anxiety to reach a settlement was increased by the stage which was reached by early 1974 in the guerilla war in the North East of the country waged by the guerillas of ZANLA (armed wing of the former ZANU). The success of their war was shown by the decision August 1974 to initiate a massive exercise of "regrouping" the population of the area into new. settlements, surrounded by floodlights and barbed wire which were an exact imitation of the "strategic hamlets" notorious in Indochina. Such a step was necessary in order to cut off the increasingly active guerilla bands from their base in the local population and turn the countryside into a free fire area where the "sacurity" forces could hunt down the armed combatants. This was an important reflection of the increased effectiveness of the ZANLA fighters. Along with the stepping up of Smith's provisions for the call up of all able bodied white males up to the age of 40 for military training each year, it marked a new stage in the development of the struggle and a sign of the increasing pressure to which the whites of Rhodesia were being subjected. It is of course important, particularly in the light of subsequent statements as "the voice ofreason for which we have been waiting" 3. But the decisive turning point for Smith came with the Lisbon coup, April 25th 1974. It was immediately clear that this was the end of the line for the Portuguese colonialists in Angola and Mozambique. Two central props of South Africa's buffer state policy were removed at a stroke. Rhodesia was no longer an essential component of the walls which Vorster had hoped to construct around the white "laager". Instead it could be an isolated outpost surrounded by black ruled states with whom South Africa had an increased need to reach an accomodation. At least one of these states, Mozambique, had come into being as a result of prolonged armed struggle. At this stage it could be reasonably expected that its rulers would be more than sympathetic to the call to support the Zimbabwean freedom fighters and to cut the crucial Umtali- Beira rail link which carries more than 80% of Rhodesia's trade. events, to appreciate that Vorster's policy switch was not, and is not, something which makes it inevitable that change will come about in Rhodesia and Namibia. The fact that two out of the four bricks in the wall of the laager had disintegrated did not mean that South Africa would simply abandon the other two to their fate. On the contrary it would only be if it became too much trouble to maintain them in position that they would be abandonned by their sponsor. Whether that became the case was entirely dependent on the extent to which opposition to white supremacy would develop within the two territories. 4. Finally, Vorster himself reacted very quickly to the changed situation within which he now operated. It is now known that very rapidly contact was established with Kaunda of Zambia. A recent report said that the latter's special advisor and diplomatic emissary, Mark Chona, has made more than 20 trips to Pretoria in the last eighteen months. For both sides a settlement of the Rhodesian issue was the central point at stake. 1(a) For Vorster, with his buffer state policy crumbling, there seemed no afternative but to try and seek an accomodation with the black states to the north which would guarantee the frontiers of South Africa itself against potential guerilla invasion. In addition a "detente" would open the way to greatly increased trading opportunities for the Republic's industries and allow it to resume its logical position as doyen of a southern African sub imperialism stretching up into Zaire, Zambia and Malawi. (b) For Kaunda, the new detente period has coincided with the most serious economic crisis since Independence in 1964. This is of course a direct result of the world wide recession of the imperialist economy which has struck hardest at its weakest components. In 1974 93% of Zambia's exports were of copper. In the first three months of that year these brought in K244,960,000. But in the same period 1975 only K110,849,000 was earnt from that source. Other exports earnt K15,696,000 and K14,249,000 respectively. In the first three months of 1975 the balance of payments deficit was running at an annual rate of K140 million. In addition the copper slump hit government revenue disastrously. Government income for the first four months of 1975 was K43 million short of the budget figure. Most of this shortfall is accounted for by the drastic decline in mineral revenue (Jan-April 1974: K75 m; Jan- April 1975: K16 m;). A settlement of the Rhodesian issue would benefit Zambia economically in two ways: (i) it would enable trade to be expanded once again with South Afriea and particularly with Rhodesia. The latter provided 40% of Zambia's imports in 1964, but of late, especially after the 1973 border closure a mere 2%. Most of these products of Rhodesia's more developed industries have not been replaced by Zambian manufactures but vastly more expensive imports from Europe, Japan, etc. (ii) it would provide the opportunity to re-open Zambia's cheapest route to the sea via the Victoria Falls Bridge, Salisbury, Umtali and Beira. Zambia's economic problems provide the essential backcloth for that country's willingness over the past year to take virtually any steps necessary to forward a settlement in Rhodesia. For an whole period it had been possible for Kaunda, buoyed up by relatively high copper prices, to pose as a foremost advocate of the destruction of the white racist regimes of the south. Such verbal gestures cost nothing and indeed fitted in with his aspirations to take an independent state capitalist Zambia out of the orbit of South African sub imperialism and to diversify her sources of trade and investment. But seven years after the Mulungushi reforms of 1968 heralded this new orientation, Zambia's economy is in its worst ever state. Most indicative is the fact that, despite an whole series of agreements made with multi-national companies from a wide variety of capitalist states, whose aim was to stimulate the manufacturing sector, expansion there is at a standstill (employment in manufacturing: June 1972: 42,560; June 1974 43,130). Now the realities of Life as a minor part of the imperialist world are coming home 11 sharply to the Zambian ruling class. With no chance of a substantial hike in the price of copper until at least the end of 1976, nil growth in her own manutacturing and agricultural sectors and a pressing problem in satisfying the demands of a burgeoning urban population, any even temporary relief will come as a breathing space for them. It is in this context that we must see the diplomatic moves of the Kaunda regime around the Zimbabwean question. The first indication of the "detente" moves which had without doubt been going on secretly for several months, came in October 197A when Kaunda and Vorster exchanged compliments in public speeches expressing their mutual concern with a settlement of "the outstanding issues of Rhodesia and South West Africa". Kaunda's future evolution was heralded by his hailing of Vorster's Neither at this stage nor at any later one did Kaunda allow the fate of the 18 million non whites within South Africa itself to disturb his dealings with their oppressors. In December the first attempt at negociation of the Rhodesian issue took place in. Lusaka. To facilitate this Smith was forced to reléase leading nationalist detainees such as Nkome and Sithole. The agreement which came out of these talks supposedly provided for the release of all Rhodesia's political detainees and the holding of a constitutional conference to discuss progress towards majority rule. In Zambia it was hailed as a great victory for Kaunda's diplomacy and the press spoke confidently of an independent Zimbabwe within a matter of months. Of course it was easy to see that such dreams had small chance of being successfully realised. For Smith the purpose of the Lusaka talks was only to buy time and hope to demobilise the most militant elements of the nationalist movement: particutarly the armed struggle wing. The regime immediately began a big propaganda campaign in the north east which used the Lusaka agreement, with its provision for a ceasefire in the liberation war, to attempt to demobilise the guerilla forces. But it was not just Smith who was involved in these efforts. Immediately after the Lusaka talks their black African sponsors, Nyerere, Kaunda, Machel and Khmaa, press-ganged the nationalist leaders present into signing a unity accord by which ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI, three groupings hitherto committed to armed struggle as the road to liberation Africa in Struggle Supplement On ANGOLA out now were grouped under the leadership of Muzorewa's ANC which had throughout advocated the peaceful, non-violent road to change. Without doubt the hope was that the new formation under its "moderate" leadership could be pressured into a quick settlement which would of necessity involve some compromises with the principle of "majority rule now". But this new unity agreed between 16 leaders and imposed without any form of democratic discussion by the memberships of the organisations involved, never became a reality. Each group kept its structures intact. Indeed the comrades of ZANU rationalised this quite correctly in their monthly publication by explaining that their interpretation of the agreement involved seeing ANC as a united front of organisations for the purpose of conducting negociations and reaching an agreed line but having no powers-to dissolve its individual constituents. In the North East the ZANLA nationalist fighters showed by their continuing actions that they had no intention of adhering to the phony Lusaka ceasefire. alives og. Silhole, who were under threat of arrest inside the country, members of ANC before the opening of any negociations. If the 12 Clearly it was this intransigence which led the Zambian government in April 1975 to demonstrate its fidelity to the new detente orientation. The murder of Herbert Chitepo, ZANU's external chairperson, by a bomb planted in his car in a Lusaka suburb, was. used as an opportunity to round up more than 70 leading nationalists. These were arrested, immediately after Chitepo's funeral and no detailed information has since been forthcoming about their identity, their precise number or subsequent fate. Nor has it yet been established, despite the existence for six months of a prestigious international commission of enquiry, who murdered Chitepo. At all events his death was of considerable use to the Zambian government who were able effectively to destroy ZANU's external organisation and thus to disrupt support to the guerillas fighting within Rhodesia. That Zambia was becoming an increasingly hostile environment for freedom fighters was quickly shown by the chauvinist (campaign orchestrated by the government controlled press against the supposedly totally ungrateful Zimbabweans. Zambia, it was constantly stressed, was making all manner of human and material sacrifices on behalf of people whose refusal to unite as directed and whose engagement in all manner of internecine struggles, was actually disrupting the success of the Kaundá inspired detente exercise. At no time in this campaign did the Zambian press ever acknowledge that it was conceivable that there could actually exist principled political or tactical differences between elements in the nationalist movement. The culminating point of this campaign came with a demonstration of several thousand persons stage managed by the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) in Ndola at which slogans were raised calling for the expulsion of Rhodesian nationals and an end to any forms of assistance to their struggle. destroying the militant wing of the Zimbabwean resistance came on 16 September when there occurred the funeral of a Zambian army officer allegedly killed by guerillas at a training camp in Kabwe. It was also stated that 11 Zimbabweans had been killed in the ensuing melee. But unpublished reports from other militants suggest that the death toll amongst the militants at the hands of the Zambian armed forces was nearer to 25. Furthermore all attempts to see the bodies failed which raised grave suspicions about the nature of the deaths which befell these fighters. frustrate freedom fighter activity throughout southern Africa came with the news that leaders of all liberation movements operating in Zambia had been asked in early September to provide a dossier on their members resident in the country. Amongst the pieces of information demanded were the pseudonyms used by individuals along with their homes in the countries from which they originated. Since the demand for this information came immediately after the meeting 26 August at the Victoria Falls between Kaunda and Vorster and since such information could be of use only to the security services of the white racist states it was easy to deduce what was to be its function. When this manoevre was publicised to the world through the Reuter press agency it was immediately denied by the Zambian government. But our own knowledge of these moves at least 10 days before they received any publicity constitutes concrete proof of their veracity. To their credit, the leaderships of all the liberation movements have refused to supply this information. But the demand for it gave concrete proof, if any were still needed, of the effective removal of Zambia from the ranks of safe refuges for freedom fighters. Certainly the vast majority of Zimbabwean militants committed to the armed struggle have now withdrawn to Tanzania or Mozambique. It is no accident that for the past few weeks, despite the official HQ of ANC's external wing being Lusaka, Muzorewa, Sithole etc. have operated from Dar es Salaam, while most SWAPO members have decamped to safer places in Southern Angola. The latest episode in the attempts by Kaunda and Vorster to impose a settelment on their respective clients, came on August 26th at Victoria Falls where, to an orchestrated campaign of publicity, Smith was brought for the first time face to face with the official leadership of the Zimbabwean movements. In addition Kaunda and Vorster met for the first time and had long hours of discussion. were indicative of their real outcome: 1. Smith said they had broken down and he would now initiate moves to convene constitutional talks with other leaders of African opinion". 2. His immediate adversaries, ANC, insisted that they had made many concessions but had been unable to accept Smith's insistence that further detailed discussions take place inside Rhodesia, unless he in turn guaranteed diplomatic immunity to all their represent- Vorster and Kaunda were the only participants who appeared 3. to think that the talks had not been a failure but a useful beginning upon which to build in the future. Clearly this arose from their determination to lean on their cohorts to reach a settlement, rather than from any sober assessment of the steps forward taken Vat Victoria Falls. Since the abortive talks the real situation has to a certain extent been clarified: As we have detailed above Zambia's self-proclaimed reputation as a 'front line state' in the liberation of the white racist dominated southern part of the continent has taken a severe beating at the hands of its own actions. Almost all its once large population of freedom fighters have wisely decamped from what is now hostile territory. Most significant too is the evidence which is coming to the fore of a split in the once apparently solid front formed by Kaunda, Nyerere, Machel and Khama. Three events in the past two months may be more than straws in the wind: (a) When the four heads of state met in Lusaka early September with the proclaimed intention of analysing the Victoria Balls experience and the future of the Zimbabwean struggle, they were unable to produce any kind of agreed statement on the outcome of their deliberations. This was in marked contrast to previous such gatherings which have always resulted-in renewed declarations of the mutual solidarity of these states in their attitude to the (b) When in September Nyerere became the first head of state to visit Mozambique a joint statement Was issued by him and Machel which laid stress on the fact that Vorster's detente moves had not been accompanied by any sign of real change taking place within the white racist stronghold itself and reaffirmed solidarity with all the movements struggling against the apartheid system. In contradiction to the tone of this statement is Zambian spokespersons' reluctance over the past period to make any reference to the situation inside South Africa itself. (c) When the new Tanzam railway was formally opened on the eve of Zambia's 11th Independence celebrations, a noticeable absentee from the ceremonies was Nyerere, who could logically have been expected to be present as Head of State of the joint sponsor of Having pointed to these indications that differences may have arisen between Zambia on the one side and Mozambique/Tanzania on the other, it is necessary to stress that these have not yet, nor are likely to, assume any fundamental proportions. They are likely rather to constitute only differences of emphasis which may be explained by: (a) in the case of Mozambique a more recent exper ience of the arined struggle against a white racist regime (b) in the case of Tanzania a considerably lower level of economic develop ment which means paradoxically that its economy is rather less susceptible to the dire consequences of the world economic crisis than that of the more developed Zambia. In addition its greater distance from the Republic of South Africa and its position as being far less historically integrated into the southern African market makes it far less dependent than Zambia upon developments in the ared. It is particularly necessary now to raise a very big question mark over the fact that the Mozambiquan regime has so far refused to take that action which is open to it to act, even within the bounds of UN policy, by strangling the 80% of Rhodesia's trade which goes through the port of Beira. Such a move could be of massive material assistance to the task of bring the Smith regime to its knees. Mozambique's failure to take this step marks a qualitative shift to the right in the political positions of the The past two months have seen the reopening of that political differentiation within ANC which was only papered over by the Lusaka unity agreement of December 19. Immediately upon the collapse of the Victoria Falls Talks Nkomo's former ZAPU faction set about the task of installing itself as the group with whom Smith could set about negociating. The culmination of this attempt came at the end of September when a supposed conference of ANC which was attended only by Nkomo supporters who travelled from his stronghold of Bulawayo, was held in Salisbury. This event was in effect sponsored by the Smith regime who provided free transport and accomodation for participants. At it, Nkomo was inevitably elected as President of the reconstructed ANC. At the time of writing he has just emerged from the first of a series of talks scheduled with Smith who described them as "very fruitful". Such compromises which can possibly lead to the offer to this faction of token representation in a new "multi racial executive" in Rhodesia, fall fully within the logic of Nkomo's politics for the past twenty years. Although at this point in time he continues to mouth the demand for "majority rule now" we have no doubt that, with the right offer from Smith, this can prove to be as temporary as his supposedly uncompromising stand after the Victoria Falls, conference for total diplomatic immunity for all leading series of essentially factional attacks on the Nkomo wing. Nor have in the countiy which can provide them with that same continuity of confidence in the existing leadership of the ANC's external wing colonial African states. It will only come from the construction which exist for a substantial mobilisation against the Smith regime the Zimbabwean struggle which are direct and quite independent Smith-Nkomo manoevres succeed in deluding even a significant minority of the population they will constitute a powerful delaying obstacle on the road to the overthrow of white minority rule It is actually to the advantage of the militants of the ANC who are firmly committed to immediate majority rule and to the armed struggle that the Nkomo faction has so clearly delineated its compromising stance at this stage. Unfortunately the leadership of that ving which remains formally committed to the continuation of the fight is currently proving to be highly qualified in verbal "Chimurenga" but sadly lacking in the will to give its protestations concrete manifestations. While the Muzorewa wing has dissociated itself from Nkomo's present manoevres and declared that the armed struggle is the only way forward it has actually totally failed to prepare the way for the intensification of the guerilla war. (i) By being a party for the past nine months to the demobilisation of the guerilla movement sponsored by the Zambian government it has itself been directly responsible for the Zimbabwean freedom struggle reaching its lowest point for a number of years. (ii) While it remains formally committed to the liberation was it is interesting to observe that the first issue of its new magazine, "Revolution", published at the end of September, contains not a single report of any action in the field. Instead it is devoted to a we any indication that the leaders of the Zimbabwe Liberation Council intend to emulate the example of most known guerilla leaders, most recently of the present leadership of Mozambique and actually get involved in the struggle with their forces in the field. It would therefore be absolutely incorrect to place any kind or to render it any kind of political support. Fortunately there are some indications that the future of the Zimbabwean struggle does not rest in their hands. Several indications of the possibilities have been given in the past period: (i) When those forces in Zimbabwe claiming public allegiance to the ANC's external wing called a meeting in Salisbury, 18 October there attended according even to the official reports of Smith's police, 35,000 persons, while the organiser claimed 100,000. Such a turn out completely dwarfed the attendence at the Nkomo organised rally in September. Despite the confusion and lack of. direction of its leadership it is clear that the uncompromising, albeit paper, positions of the external wing, are able to evoke a massive response amongst Rhodesia's Africans. Unfortunately the meeting was broken up under police instructions without any discussion taking place. This combined with the continued lack of revolution. direction shown by the Muzorewa wing leadership means that no planning is going on for the mobilisation of the urban population h support of the ongoing guerilla struggle, and that many people will certainly have left Salisbury that day somewhat confused and disorientated about the perspective for struggle. (ii) Despite the detente associated demobilisation of the armed struggle in the north east there have been several incidents in recent months which testify to the continuation of the fight. In one of these Rhodesia's News Agency claimed that FRELIMO forces had made incursions across the border. But it was obvious that involved in the incident which led to at least 20 deaths, were not FRELIMO, but Zimbabwean freedom fighters. Again Smith's troops made in early October yet another raid into Botswana, making it certain that guerilla forces had become re-activated on the western frontier. Reports received from Rhodesia's schools, especially board- (im) ing establishments in the north east, indicate that hundreds of youth are absconding in order to participate in the freedom struggle. Most of these are assumed to be fleeing across the border with Mozambique. In the region around Umtali all movement near the border has been restricted at night time and several deaths have arisen out of infringements of this curfew. The struggle in Rhodesia continues therefore... but largely, P-we would estimate, in a spontaneous and unco-ordinated fashion. A prime task of militants within the armed wing of ANC will be to throw over that tradition which they have inherited from ZANU in which there was a total lack of political life and avenues for democratic discussion within the liberation army. Such a tradition was the main reason why several hundred Zimbabwean freedom fighters have lost their lives in factional fights over the past year. In addition it is vitally necessary that the new generation of freedom fighters reduce its dependence on the surrounding states. While it is possible and correct at this moment to exploit those divisions which appear to the opening up between Zambia and her erstwhile partners in the detente exercise, it would be politically naive and potentially suicidal to think that there is any fundamental reason why Tanzania and even Mozambique, which remain, for all the rhetoric, firmly within the capitalist world, should not follow the same path as Zambia. It is therefore urgent 13 for the Zimbabwean freedom fighters to establish firm bases withof political intervention and security which can only come from being solidly entrenched there. Of course this is not to discount the importance of external solidarity with the struggle. But this will not come in meaningful and reliable fashion from pandering to the leaderships of neoof real links with the peoples of Africa. This is why it is urgent that wherever comrades in the continent have any kind of influence they should set about the building of forms of solidarity with of the whims of the neo-colonial regimes. Of course this argument applies with even more force to the solidarity movements which we must build throughout the advanced capitalist countries whose governments will be the most involved in the manoevres to create an "independent" Rhodesia remaining totally dependent on them. But while these movements will play an important role in assisting the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, its ultimate success will be guaranteed only by the reconstruction of a new leadership which will decisively break with the past practices of all existing wings of the movement and will be firmly rooted in the masses, urban and rural, who are the only guarantors of success for the John Blair, 6th November 1975. International Marxist Group (British section of the Fourth International) 97 Caledonian Rd., London N.1. / would like more information about the IMG and its activities NAME ADDRESS