Reproduced From "WORLD OUTLOOK" 8.4.66.
(The following statement on the meaning of the catastrophic defeat suffered by the workers and peasants in Indonesia at the hands of indigenous counter-revolutionary forces and their foreign imperialist backers was iasued Maroh 20 by the United Secretariat of the Fourth Interneationsl, the world party of socialist revolution founded by Leon Troteky in 1938.)
(1) The United Searetariat of the Fourth International vigoroualy eondemns the barbario repressicn of the leaders, members and sympathiseare of the Indonesian Communist Party unleashed by the reactionary Indonesian army, the comprador and "burwaucratic" bourgeoisie and the clerical wing of the petty bourgeoisie. In this repression, tha lives of more than 100,000 Communists haye been taken and tens of thousands of Communists and other left wingers have been imprisoned or fired from their jobs, which is often equivalent to condemnation to starvation in face of the current mass unemployment. The Communist Party presa and saga or, Lzitions, intluding the largest trade-union federation in the country (S0BSI), have been officislly banned. Many leading Communist Party cadrea have been murdered, and Njono, the general secretary of the S0B3I snd a membar of the Political Bureau of the Indonesian Communist Party, haa been executed after a farcical trial- All this was capped on March 12 with the official banning of the Communist Party (PRI) throughout Indonesia.
The United Secretariat of tha Fourth International asks the workingclass organizations in 41i sountries to start a mass protest campaign, demanding the immediate relensa of all political prisoners, the immediate legalisation of all worting-claas parties, including tho FEI, the Fartal Acoms and the Partai Murbah. I+ calla for establishment of an internetional working-class Commission of Inquiry to investigate the fate of the top PXI lasders, Aidit,Lukman and Njoto, who, according to many anurces, have bean murdered by the military.
Out of sclidarity, tha international working clasa must be mobilized tc the fullest extent to stop the dirty war being waged by the reactionery forces against the left in Indonesia:
(2) If it is now an elementary duty to defend tha vietima of reaction in Indonesia, this by no means signifies that thore ia less need to analyse the debacle suffered by the biggest Communist Party in my ocapitelist country, a party with three million members and millions of sympathizors in various "Sront" organizations, sand to drew the proper legsone from it. The man reasons for the tremendous defeat are aa followa:
(a) The leadership cf the Indonesian Communist Party granted leadership of the Indonesian ravcolution te Sukarno, questioning that the state apparatus on which he stood was bourgecia in character; «and, in sontradiotion to tha Marxist-Leninist theory of the atate, presented thia apparatus aa «a
"people's State," a “nationsl democracy" haing"two sides"="one for ‘tha people, one against the pecple-" The FKI accepted the theory of “revyelution in stages,” limiting the "first stage" in reslity to the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle; and in practice even abandoning the fight for « proletarian, Communist leadership during this stage although it is declared necessary, in theory at least, by the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and even by Aidit himself in some of his writings. (1}
In fast, the leadership of the Indonesian CP went so far as to boast about its close ocllaboration with the Indonesian bourgeoisie, (2) and tn openly express its support for Sukarnc's idealogy of the "Fantja Sila" (five principles), althcugh one of the five is "belief in a single god." The Aidit leadership strossed ita position that the “union” of the ideal ogy of the “revolutionary classes" (including the "nationel" bourgeaisiel) was needed by thea Indonesian revoluticn as long ®s Communism waa not “eliminated” from the unicn. (43) (i) "The Indonesian revolution is at the present atege Wurgesis- damccratis in character and not soodalist and proletarian. But the burgeois-domocratis reveluticn in Indonesia no longer belongs te the o1d type, md ia no longer part of the bourgeois-democrstic world revolution, which belongs to the past; it is a revolution of 4 now type, which is pert of the proletarian socielist world revolution, firmly opposed te imperialian-..-Given tha font thet the Indonesian revolution is « bourgeois=- democratia revolution of a new type, it 4s the historical duty °f the proletariat to struggle to conquer ite lesdership- {D.N.didit: The Indonesian Reyclution and_the Immediate Tosks of the Inéonesian Communist Party. pp. 15-16. Peking- 1965) (2) Ina speech at the School of Advanced Studies cf the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Paking, September 2,1963, D.N-Aidit,chsirmm of the Indonesia 0.P. sade the following quite blunt statemant: "The allim oe with tha national bourgeciale hin aleo been reslized- The netionsl bourgeoisie starts to return (!) te the side of the revolution, pirticularly since the party formulated a correct policy and cvaresme sectarianias in ita ranks...We have mow oollabornted with the Indonesian bourgeoisie for nearly ten yess, and the revolutionary forces have continually developed rather then grown fewer during thig time, wheress the reactionary fortes hova experianced failure after failure: Even the public anti-(cmmunist olomor of five cr six years ago ia officislly condemned today as---agsinet unity- Fresidgent Sukerno has pleyed. an important role in the strugele against Gommunophobia and for national unity." (D.N«iidit: ibid. pp» 82-83 ] It would be difficult te find a better exemple of self-delusory opportuniaz paving the way for a tregic defeat. (3) “Another eoneept which also reflects the unity of the naticn end the unity of NASAKOM is expressed by the Pantja Sila or five prineiples: (1) belie? in 4& Single god; \¢/ humanitarianiam or interna tionalian ; (3 nationalism or patriotism; (4) democracy and (5) aoeial justice. The Indonesian Ocmmuniat Party supports and sustains the Pantja Sila, although ona of its principles ia belief in a single -god, in vwlew of the faot that the Pantja slla, rather than being an attempted substitute for tha philosophy of all ita supportera,
(b) Por these ressons, the Indonesian C-F., concontraing on "ass recruitsent", and failing to provide adequate ideslogical education and revoluticnary training for most of its members, bowed to Qukarmo's initiatives for many years, abstaining from any appesl to masa struggles that could decisively change the relationship of sooial forces in the country. Sukarno arbitrarily suspended the constitution and reduced the Communist Party to 30 seats in hia new "appointed parliament" of 260 mombers; when he suspended democratic freedoma and ordered sll parties to register for government suthorization, the PRI accepted these infringements of its rights and even agreed to participate in the warious cabinets which Sukarno subsequently formed. Included in these governments were such reactionaries as General 4-H-+Nasution, Hamengku Buwone, the sultan of Djokjakarta ond the leading bourgeois politician,Buslan Abdulgsni. Todesy they are the main political brains behind the counter-revclution and membars of the counter-revolutionary Suharto cabinet. Yasaterday the PKI leadership trented the™as "brother revolutionists" and"allies" inside BASSEO! and Sukarno's cabinets. They even tried to use these arbitrary forms of Eonspartist government to eliminate aoma of their own competitors in the labor movement. But these very sama rules end regulations have bean used since Ootober 1.1965, to suppress the PRI itself. Discerning bourgeois observers have noted thit the logie cf the FRI policy was to leave the indtintive with the anti-Communist forces. (4)
(eo) At various times in recent years the Indonesian masses moved inte action against the declining standard of living due to mass unemployment, inflation, high prices, plunder of state property by the army high command, rampant sorruption in the state administration,etc- Again and again they seized imperialist property. ocoupied plmtations and factories, sought to fivide the holdings of the big landowners. ind again and again tho Sukarno regime and its stooges, with the help of the army, drove cut tha maases and placed the administration of the properties in their own corrupt hands. again and agsin the PKI leadership refrsined from supporting these masa uprisings, refrained from educating the masses and their vanguard in the spirit of preparing to fight for power. It even refrained from syatenatically denocuncing the daneerous reaction looming not only in the religious organizations but also in the army high commend in particular. al1iit referrad over and over only to the parties suppressed by Sukarno - the Zasjumi sand the Social Democratio party - as agents of imperialiss and feudel reacticn. (5) combined (1)all existing idealogical tendencies in society. Tha party 1s, however resolutely opposed to those who acek to transform one of the five silas into the leading dominant tendency." (D.N. Aidit: ibid.p-45) (4) An American Liberal bourgeois observer, Donald Hindley, correotly summed up the political situation in Indonesia resulting from Aidit's tactics :"Mean~ while, however, the fate of Indonesia would be detersined largely by the action or inaction of the non-Communists-" (The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963. p-30h. University of California Prees,15@h.)
(5) D.N-Aidit: ibid-p. 85.
de a result the military coup of October 1-2,1965, caught the masses completely by surprise.
It is true that a few months before the counter-revolutionary coup, Aidit shifted his line somewhat to the left. He began to call on Sukarno to arm the workers and peasants (which the Indonesian Bonsparte, of murse, carefully refrained from doing)» Addit called om the masses to "seize" the imperialiat properties as well as the nationalized properties administered by the “bureauoratic bourgeoisie” or the army. (Speech, September 25,1965, at the closing rally of the sixth congress of the plantation workers trade unions, reported in the September 27,1965, issue of the party's central organ, Harian Rakjat. ) It is true that in the same speech he warned the masae2 in an obscure and indirect way: "History has compelled the people and the working-clasa of the antire world to choose between being an anvil and a hamzer. If they become an anvil, they will be like the Indonesian working-class at present, auffering blow after blow from the bureaucratic capitalists, embezslers, grefters and other exploiters ani oppressors." (In his long report to the echool of the Chinese CP's Central Committees, mentioned above, not a word ia said about these blows.) " The workera,with back-breaking toil, earn barely enough in a month to last a week, while the bureaucratic capitalists, embaszlars and erafters wallow in luxury, thanks to the blood and sweat of tho working clasa- If they do not want to be en anvil, they should become a hammer; not en ordinary hateer but s huge hampers Therefore tha Indonesian working class should adopt the following attitude: Boldness,boldness and boldness again! Take over, take over and teke over again! Act, act and aot again! "
But these warnings, voiced on the very eve of the arsy'a counter= revolutionary coup, then already in full preperation, came without my previous or accompanyine measurea for broad maas mobilizations, without pPrapareation for a general strike, without preparstion for arming the masses, without concrete warnings about the intending army coupe The warnings could only heighten the determination of the counter-revolutionaries to strike immediately. They could not create adequate meane to prevent or to reply to the coounter-revyolutione It is not surprising that under these conditions the only concrete response thia belated warning avoked waa the desperate sotion of a small group argund Liewtensnt Goloneal Entung and not «a mess uprising:
It should be added that while the PKI leadership at firat expressed solidarity with thia desperate attempt to stop the counter-revolutionary fenerals from taking over the sountry, (6) they reversed their stand « few days later - after the counter-revyolution won ite first decisive battle: - (6)Hari jan Rakjat,central organ of the PAl,wrote in ita Oct-2-1965,iseue: "Whatever the pretext may hava bean, the coup d'état which the 'Couneil of Generals’ wanted to perpetrate was in any case a counter-revolutionary action which must be condemned... The people-..ara convinced that what the Sept. 30 Mevament did to save the revolution and the people was 4 oorrect action.- The Sept. 30 Movement will enjoy the support and. sympathy of the people."
and disowned Untung's actions, thereby inoreaaing the general confusion among their own followers. (7) As for the Kremlin, it denounced the September 30 avente aso “provocation” without mentioning by a single word the preaparetiona of the Teactionary generals to pull « coup d'état. (8)
According to a dispatch released February 15,1966, by the Indonesian news agency 4intara, the trade-union leader, Njonc, a member of the Political Bureau of the PEI, stated during his trial that the impending sounter-revolutiomary coup of the Indonesian generals woa discussed in the Political Bureay as early aa July,1965. Njono deslared that opinion was divided on wheather it would be better to react before the soup or immediately after it took piace. In any cage it was decided to leave the initiative up to the ‘progressive officers” who were prepared to act within the army agsinst the generals. While it is possible that Njono's torturers falsified this report befora executing him, his murageous and dignified stand during the trial, in whioh he publicly denounced his torturers and the counter-revolutionary generals, lends credit to this version of the facts-
(a) Tha strategy of the PKI was not to conquer power by zcobilizing the passes, but to slowly "transform" the character of the state and tha government by infiltrating sectors of the army and administrative caire. Under this illusion, they gave completely uncritical support to Sukarno, hoping to take over when he diad. This explains why they relied on Sukarno instead of mobilising the broad masses in defense of the ravolution and the PHI, not only before the reactionary coup of October l=2, tut even after thea coup.
(3) These grave politioal mistakes of tha PRL leadership were reinforced and magnified by the opportuniat policies of the Kremlin and Feking, both governments supporting Sukarno uncritically, presenting his as the protetype of the “noneapitalist” leader of "national democracy", the world leader of the "newly emerging forces" and similar enpty,misleading formulas.
For diplomsatis reasons - Sukarno'a temporary posture against Anglo- Dutch imperialism in the Weat Irian and Malaysia affairs - the Kremlin gave
7) The Cetobar 5,1965,issue of Harijan Rakjat disowned the Sept-30 Novement- (8) "The fact that the Communist Party of Indonesia, as carly as October 45, published an official declaration in which it dissociated itaelf from the organisers of the unsuccessful conapiracy and characterised it as ‘an internal affair of the army’ is being completely ignored- Evan if we assume that individual members of leftwing organizations lent thesselyea to the provocation and had something to do with the events of September 30, neverthelasa this can in no way justify repressions against the Communist Party of Indonesiae" (Pratds,October 24,1965.)
full uncritical support to the Sukarno regime, not only internationally but even on the domestic level, supplying his amy with mmy of the weapons now being used to kill the cadres and members of the PRI. After the October 1-2 rilitery coup the Kremlin leaders continued this criminal policy, even trying to blame “putechiat" and "“adventurist” elemants in the FRI for the defeat and calling repeatedly for the “umity" of the Indonesian "revolution" sround NASAKOM; i-c. for "unity" between the butchers and their vietims- On October 12, after Sukarno had alresdy called for a thorough purge of those involved in the "September 30 affair" and had permitted FRI leaders to be arrested and murdered in Djskerta, Breshnev, Mikoyan and Kosygin sent him a special message in which they wrote: "We and our colleagues learned with great Jox{ 1} } that your health has improved-.-We have with interest heard aout your radio appeal to the Indonesian people to remain calm and prevent disorders--- This appeal will mest with profound understanding-" (Pravda,October 12,1965.) Not until December 24 did tha Soviet press publish a clear condemnation of the anti-Communist regime in Indonesie- Before then reporting on the events in that country was limited to reproducing short items from the bourgeola prass agencies coupled with "regrets" about the"anti-Communiat measures-" And at the Tricontinental Conference in Hevana , the Soviet delegation displayed a shameful attitude, trying in every way to block public condemnation of the oounter=-reyolutionary terror raging against the Indonasian Communiate,an attitude which won public praise from the counter-revolutianists in Se cally 6
As for the Peking leaders, cut of similar diplomatic. considerations and manoeuyers - such as supporting Sukarno's walkout from the UN snd trying to pit the "newly emerging forces” agelnat the "old satablished forces" - they likewise gave full and uncritical support to the Indonesian regima. fren after the October 1l=2 military co.n they went ahead in DPjskerta with the World Conference Against Foreign Bases, and without protest stood by as their Indonesien comrades werd arrested in the conferenoa hall iteelf: It ia true that they began to denounce the counter-revolutionsry acttivitiss much sooner than the Sremlin press. Hut even then thoy carefully refrained from any open and olearoeut oriticiem of Sukarno, trying to present things as if Sukarno
(3) In ‘a dispatch from Djakarta, Feb-l4, the Indonesian newa agency antara. gave the text of three resclutiona adopted by the Indonesian parliament,Feb.ll. One denise with the Tricontinental Conferance- after denouncing the refusal of the Preparstory Commission to seat the official delegation sent by the Indonesian government, the resolution atates in Point 5.: "Kepresses full appreciation (!) of the efforts of the delagations of Nepal,Mongolia, the Soviet Union end others at the Solidsrity Conference of the Peoolea of Africs,aaia and Latin America, who successfully newtralized the efforts of the counter= revolutionista (!) of tha so-called Sept.) Movement, and their pretectors and leaders, to intervens in the internal affairs of Indonesia and to induce among the othar delegations a hostile attitude toward the people end government of Indonesia."
had systematically opposed the repression of the Fi, whereas in reality he eovered up the repression in good part, merely trying to linit it in order te Baintain hds own Bonapartist position.
Today sone"frienda of Peking” maintain that the Chinese CP leaders ware in fact critical of Aidit's policies, but they did not want to oritiza his party publicly in view of the fact that they for internal discussion among all the Communist parties that refrained: publicly attacking the Chinese CP and its friends. But this is no valid exouse for remaining silent about a problem of outstanding importance to tha international Communist movement; it is only additional preof of the basically opportunist attitude of the Chinese lesders towards the Indonesian question.
{4,) The events of recent weoks - the elimination of General Nasution from the government, Sukarmo's declaration thet "the revolution is again embarking on its leftwing course," the public collision between Sukarno and the ultrarightwing forces of the Islamic students’ organisations (more or less passively tolerated by the army) - inspired new illusions in officiel CP circles tha the pre-October 1 situation could somehow be restored. Sukarno, 4 typicel Bonapartist figure, representing the "national" and “bureaueratic" bourgecias forces in Indonesia, balanced between the "left", represented mainly by the PEI and its mass proletarian and possant organisations, and the "right", represented mainly by the army and the clerical Moslem orgenisations, sapokea= men of the comprador bourgeoisie and semifeudal landowners. The October 1-2 Military coup delivered a shattering blow to the left, leaving them leaderless and dispersed (while far from completely destroying then), thereby fundamentally upsetting the equilibrium on which Sukarno depended for his leading position. Naturally he then triedto bolster his position by looking for ways and means to somshow reduce the strength of the amy high command and to divide ita ranks. These leaders preferred not to take over rule immediately after Ootober 1-2; in the first place because they were not yet sure of the support they could muster in the countryside, where Sukarno remained very popular; and in the second place because they did not want to assume responsibility for the mismanagement of the economy, the omplete failure of the socalled “heavy rupiah" and the raging inflation plaguing the country. Therefors they left Sukarno in power for another six months, although ha retained only the ahadow of his previous Bonapartist strangths When he tried in desperation to re-establish the equilibrium by ousting General Nasution from his cabinet, thay permitted the students to stage meas demonstrations (paradoxically, the ultraright-wing Islamic atudent associations could now appear to stand in the forefront of the fight egainst inflation and sorruption dua to the extreme weakening of the forces led by the PEI.) In conjunotion with the presaura from the aray high command, these demonstrations compalled Sukarno to turn over the leading role in the government to the army's"strong man", Ganeral Suharto.
(5) It is extremely unlikely, however that the counter-revolutionists now in power in Djakarta will be able to stabilise the situation for any length of time. The country's economy is stripped; and American imperialisr, while able to shore up the new regime with a heavy underpinning of credits,
cannot move in on such a scale as to generate any real momentum in economic growth» The army leadera themselves will not readily eive up their nationalist, anti-inperialist verbiage which reflecta real oonflicts of interest with Beitish imperialiam and the ruling comprador bourgeoisie and semi-feudal landowners of Malayaia- <A large part of the budget will therefore continue to be squandered in maintaining = huge military establishsent and in undertaking oostly experiments like the attempt to make -an Indonestan nuclear bomb. The messes, although leaderless and deeply shaken, have not lost all fighting potential, particularly in the countryside. It will prove impossible to get thousanda of squatters to evacunte the imperialist-owned or “nationalized” plantations Managed by corrupt army officers, or to compel the thousends of plantation and oil workers to revert to the “normal” working conditions of colonial times. 4nd without such a shift to "normalcy", the Indonesian aconomy will not be able to develop in accordance with the necoclonisl pattern. The incapacity of the nilitary leaders to achieve some social and economic stability will undermine the counter-reyolutionary dictatorship politically. This wuld seven oocur in the near future if the military prove unable to cope with the problem of inflation.
The defeat suffered by the FEL is of such dapth that certainly no quick change in the situation oan te forecast. It will take years to regain revolutionary pesaibilities as excellent aa those icst in 1964-66 due te the opportunist policies of the PKI leadership. However, what remains af that leadership slong with the surviving party cadres - aspecially the best educated, thase atesled by the terrible experiences they wont through in the past six months = will heave taken the read of guerrilla war, if only out of scifdefense. If they succeed in regrouping and in regaining a masa following in soma regions of the muntryside by calling on the peasants to immedistely take over the land held by ths landlords, the plantations and army administration, they could gain on a progressive seale due to the insbility of Indonesian reaction to solye the muntry'’s basic economia plight ani due to the divisions in the ranka of the army which that inability will undoubtedly provoke. It will become posaible to link this peasant base to the working class when, under pressure of acononic neceasity, the urbah masses overcome tha atunning effect of tha defeat and once again take the road of actions Such a ¢oteback, involving a renewal of organised influence snong the workers, ia still possible = provided that all the main lessons of the terrible defeat are anal yeed and assimilated.
(6) The mein lessons to be drawn from this tragic defeat, which tha Indonesian revolutionary Marxists must continuslly hamier home, while energetiselly participating in all attompte by revolutionary FAL elements to start armed resistance against the military dictatorship, are aa followa:
(a) While it is correct and necessary to support all anti-imperialiat Mass movements, and even to critioally support all concrete enti-isperisliat Deasures taken by representatives of the oolonial bourgeoisie like Sukarno, for colonial revolution to be viotorious it is abselutely essential to nantain the proletarian organisations strictly independant politically and organisatfonally from the "national" bourgeciaie, to instill snong the masses a spirit
of distrust towards this bourgecisie and e spirit of self-reliance, to lead the Basses towards orgenising indapendont organa of power (committess, workars and peasants militin,cte.} as requisites for the viotory of tha revolution. The Indonesian events have proved onee again that the theory of the capacity of the "progressive" forcas of the "national bourgeoisie” to lead «a "consistent" Pight againet imperialism aa.the “embodiment of the whole nation" - the theory of a "national democratic state" and a"bloe of revolutionary olassea" leads only to defsat.
(bo) While it ia correct and necessary during the first phases of the revolution in backward countries to place the main stress on the problems of winning national independence, unifying the country and.solving the agrarian queation (i-e- the historical tasks of the bourgeoia democratic revolution which constitute tha most burning tasks in the syes of eighty to ninety per cent of the population), it is indispensable to understand that the solution of these tasks is only possible when the working class, in sllisnca with the poor peasantry, haa conquered leadership of the revolution, establishes the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry and pushes the revolution thmugh to ita sooialist phasee The Indonesian events once again confirm that the theory of “revolution by stages" - the first stage being a vyietory under a “national front" led by the “national bourgeoisie” - only paves the way to defeat. Either defeat under "national” bourgeois leaders or victory through the sonquest cf power and the establishment of a workers' etete - this is the dilemma that faces sll colonial revolutions.
(a) While it is necessary to win the broadest possible mass base in the ecuntrysida, a revolutionary party capable of applying that policy must ba based upon a hardened proleterian cadre thoroughly trained in Marxist theory and revolutionary practice, without illusions about a "peaceful trensition" to socialism or “national democratic stetea", a party that relies mainly on miss mobilizations ani mass struggles instead of intrigues and infiltration for achieving its historical goals.
Only by thoroughly assimiia ting these lessons san the Indonesian Communiats and revolutionists overcoma the results of the present defeat and avenge the vietins of the counter-revolutionary terror by organising and leading the workers and poor peasants in their fight for power in Indonesia: