International Marxist Group Archive

Magazines, bulletins and booklets of the IMG and its forerunners, 1961–1984

Strong Poslibility of American Invasion of North Vistnam

The Week Vol. 7, No. 20, c. 16 May 1967 · pp. 10-11 of the scan · 719 words

The scan: The Week v7 no20.pdf (PDF, Marxists Internet Archive, opens at this page)

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e we Week reader, Willie Thompson of Glaszow writes: Dear Comrade, I am sending ‘én to you this copy of "Stratesic Commentary" by Terence Heelas, as no doubt you will be particularly ‘interested in the contents of this issue and might want to use some extracts in 'The Week'. "There is growing evidence that America may be preparing to invade North Vietnam. This evidence is far from conclusive. The Americans are not eoinrs to provide us with conclusive evidence about their plans for the future cenduct of the Vietnam war, Wevertheless, sufficient evidence exists (albeit of an infcrential kind) to make it worth whibe to alert world opinion to the possibility. Once the world is alerted the danger may recede. Danrerous and controversial decisions are not so likely to be taken once they are <nticipated because opinion can be mobilized arainst them, se 1. President Johnson is faced with a time problem. The U.S. electorate is unlikely to tolerate an indefinite stalemate in Vietnam, with hivh taxcs and casualtics brinsing no appreciable reward. Johnson must be able to offer victory - or reasonable prospects of victory =< ozfore he comes up for re-election next year, Otherwise the pressure will srow to 'brine the boys back home', 2. The means currently employed (even if considerable stepped up) seem unlikely to produce the desired results in the time available. North Vietnam is probably able to sustain much heavier bombing - even on its major cities - without cuttins supplies to the Vietcong, The bombing has not produced the results that were hoped for, and seems unlikely to do so unless it is increased to annihilation leve ‘ Breaching the Red River. dams remains a possibility, but has been stron;ly condemned in advance of the act and is now hardly an available option. 3. The only way to subcue the Vietcong is to cut them off from their sources of supply. The only sure way to do this is to put U.S. troops athwart the supply-routes, The only places where this is feasible short of scaling-off 500 miles of frontier between South Vietnam and its neighbours - are in North Vietnam. Invasion of the North would have the additional merit of tying-up Hanoi's available forces in self defence that the Vietcong would automatically be starved of men. h. In the last resort, the only way of defeating a determined enemy short of extermination bombing, is to meet and defeat his main forces in the field. The only way to achieve this in Vietnam is to seek and destroy the enemy in the North, Failing this, there is no reason to suppose that the Vietcong could not be kept supplied indefinitely - or at least until support for Johnson's war policy was finally eroded. 5. The recall of Ceneral Westmoreland and his unprecedented speech to Congress suggests that something tnusual is in the wine, It is reasonable to suppose that a new emphasis on national unity must presage some new departure in the conduct of an already-accepted wer. 6, The inspired talk in ‘Washington about an imminent invasion from the North across the 17th Parallel susgests a cover for moves in the other direction. An invasion from the North weld make no kind of military sense

>

whatever: Hamoi's strongest card lies in not subjecting its few regular

divisions to the withering fire-power of American troops, dug into defen=

Sive positions and with complete control of the air. Hamoi would be insane

to risk such an invasion, But an invasion northwards would make sense

(as established in points 3 &), provided President Johnson was prepared

to risk a major extension of the war. The proof of the pudding would lie

in whose troops were where within a week of the flare-up. I am ready to

bet there would be more U.S. troops north of the Parallel than North

Vietnamese troops to the south...probablg as the result of ‘an Inchon-type

landing many miles up the coast, requiring months of planning.

The U.S. juggernaut has a brake as well as an accelerator: whether it is

used or not depends very largely on the state of world opinion - and world

opinion needs the clearest possible tnderstanding of what the military

possibilities are, An invasion of North Vietnam certainly cannot be

ruled out." May 5, 1967

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