Paving the Way for Escalation

Writing in the 'New York Times', Arthur Schlesinger, former special assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, says that "ohservers in Washington predict a new venture in escalation before the mid-term elections of 1966. .... Everything in recent weeks suggests that President Johnson has made his choice, and that his choice is the careful (sic) enlargement of the war." Calling for the United States to "reverse the drift towards a great and unnecessary calamity", Mr. Schlesinger castigates the Administration for failing to listen to advice from abroad, "The Vietnam obsession has .stultified our policy and weakened our position in Western Europe and Latin America. .... It has precipitated the decision of U Thant to resign." Adding point to these warnings is Eisenhower's television disclosure of his readiness to use nuclear weapons in Korea, As an instalment in a series entitled 'The Struggle for Peace", it is uncomfortably and, no doubt, pur posely relevant to America's position in South East Asia today. Eisenhower claimed that the war would have been won in a week if the weapons had been used. If the communists had not come forward to sign an armistice, the United States would have used nuclear weapons "enough to win." "So I let it be known — through sever@l channels - that in the absence of an armistice I would not be bound by the kind of weapons we would use. .... My advisers said we might as well get ready to attack with any kind of weapons which we wanted to use," Although the Chinese "kicked a bit", they signed. In a clesing remark, clearly aimed at softening up public opinion for a further extension of the Vietnam War, Eisenhower said, "You cannot just stay and say that day after day we are going to take these casualties and nothing is going to be accomplished."