The United States armed services “have almost exhausted trained and ready wilitary units, with all available forces spread dangerously thin in Vietnam and elsewhere", wrote the military comnentator Manson W. Baldwin, in the New York Times on 21st February. Baldwin's article, entitled “Survay finds shortage of U.S. combat forces", shed some light on the growing contradiction between the limited manpower and material resources of the U.S. and its ambitions for global aggression. He pointed out that “virtually all of the combat~ready mits in the United States have been committed to Vietnau, and except for a few army and marine battalions and a few squadrons of the tactical air command no wre units will be fully trained and equipped for a number of months. In addition to the shortages in trained military man= power and in field~grade officers, there are major existing shortages in uniforms and clothing, and actval or potential shortages of various types of alumunition and equipment that are causing the services increasing concern." "The commitment of more than 200,000 men to Vietnam, supported by stong air and naval forces, and the maintenance of two divisions in Korea, more than five in Burope and of smaller units elsewhere, including the Dowinican Republic have reduced the forces in the U.S. to a training establishment. The level of the Atlantic Fleet and all other commands has been reduced to provide the needs of Vietnam. According to the services, the ‘squeeze’ appears to be getting worse instead of better. General Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, is understood to have requested some 200,000 more men in Vietnam during the 1966 calendar year, and a proportionate increase in air support."
Baldwin went on to say: "In recent weeks the services have been conducting studies ..... to determine how best to meet General Westmoreland's 1966 requirements. The alternatives considered were continuation of the present slow build-up of the regular forces by increased draft calls and voluntary enlistment, transfer of troops from Europe, Panama, Alaska and anywhere else available; or a selected call-up of the national guard and reserves." The studies, as far as could be learned, it said, indicated that “the first course, of dependence upon draft calls and enlistments, could fill only a fraction of the requirements, and that the result would be what one officer called ‘a very slow and disorderly build-up' of the regular forces with a greater and greater lowering of the experience level, and more and more bottle-necks." "fransfer of troops from Gurope and elsewhere would supply a greater propor tion of General Westmorland's stated requirements, but not all of them. Even the mobilization of the national guard md reserve might not supply all his stated needs, it was said, since verious waterial shortages, as well as shortages in certain types of trained manpower, might develop by the end of the year. A recently retired officer, whose last active duty assignment was concerned with the army's mobilization base and strategic reserve, said that ‘whatever the course of action (in Vietnam), whether continued, escalated, or modified downwards, we are in a situation of perilous insufficiency', without much capability of 'a graduated response to any serious challenge.’ “The actual and potential trained manpower and material dhortages are now affecting all the regular services ~ particularly the army and the marines ~ and, of the national guard and reserves, one national guard general said that ‘there is not a guard division in the United States to~day that could fight its way out of a paper bag'."