by Haynes Johnson, 40/- Hutchinson HE attempt to destroy the revolutionary government of | Fidel Castro claimed many victims: principally the creditability of any pronouncements by the Government of the United States and more specifically the last vestiges of radicalism that clung to Kennedy and to Adlai Stevenson. It was the crisis that saw Stevenson defending on the floor of the United Nations Assembly the proposition that Castro’s air force had defected and had bombed Havana only to be given the lie a little later when it was realised that they were CIA planes from Nicaragua. One of the leading participants said, “The trouble was that we were acting like an old whore and trying to pretend that we were just the sweet young girl we used to be.” Haynes Johnson has written a book that, even while it passionately defends the cause of the emigres and the United States, throws considerable light on the events of that period, The emigres themselves were a mixed bag. They included the criminals of the Batista regime, the sons of rich landowners and a section of genuinely idealistic young men. By the end of the adventure one thing united them; they felt that they had been betrayed and used shamefully by the CIA. Johnson is particularly worried by the activities of the CIA during the operation. “The CIA’s men in the field tended to take matters into their own hands, to cross over the line from intelligence to the formation of policy. They did this in Miami when they picked and groomed men and dictated to the Frente. They acted for the United States — or implied they did — when dealing with the - Cubans and led them to believe much that was not true. Later there was no way for the Cubans to prove they had been promised anything.” Johnson finally suggests that even
ee
if the United States had gone through
with all their military promises the
result could not have been much dif-
erent. “The record of factionalism,
opportunism, self - aggrandisement
and even of corruption that marked
the Cuban exile political structure
boded ill for the future of Cuba.
Something more than the tired, often
cynical leadership of the Frente and
the Cuban Revolutionary Council
was needed to offset the dynamic
personal leadership of Fidel Castro.
For the populace to rise in support of
a liberating army, the masses had to
be prepared and stirred as Castro
himself had done so successfully.”
M. Jackson