Education Bulletin Number 3: Social Democracy

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Education Bulletin Number 3 For Members Only SOCIAL DEMOCRACY * REVISIONISM AND PLANNING - Leon Trotsky. * THE BELGIAN DISPUTE & THE DE MAN PLAN - Leon Trotsky. * THE MINORITY MOVEMENT - Alan Jones. * LABOUR & SOCIAL INEQUALITY - John Marshall. * THE LABOUR PARTY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW TO FIGHT IT - Alan Jones. * WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE LABOUR LEFT - Alan Jones & Andrew Jenkins. * SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALIST CRISIS - Alan Jones.

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REVISIONISM AND PLANNING!* (January 9, 1934)

Dear Comrades: Needless to say, in the last few days I studied with the greatletters and est attention the newspapers, magazines, minutes sent by you. Thanks to a very fine selection of material, 1 was acquaint myself in a comparatively short time with able to the question as a whole and with the essence of the differences that arose in your orgunization. The strietly principled character of your discussion, free from any personal exaggerations, gives a most favorable impression of the whole spirit of your organization and of its moral-poiltical levci. It remains only to express the bearts wish that this spirit not only will be and strengthened in the Belgian section but also preserved will become the prevalent one in all our sections without exception. The considerations that I wish to express on the question in dispute itself cannot pretend either to fullness or complete ness. I am removed from the theater of action. Such important foctors as the mood of the masses cannot be grasped through newspaper reports and documents alone: if is neces sary to feel the pulse of workers' meetings, which, alas. is becond my reach. However, Inasmuch as it is a question of general suggestions on principles, the position of an outside observer has perhaps certain advantages as it enables detach ment from details and concentration on the main thing.

I shall go over now fo thé matter itseif.

First of all —and I consider this the central pomt - 1 do not ser any reason that would impel us to withdraw the slogan. ke power! "Let the Belgian Labor Party iron take power!"

When we first advaneed this slogan, we wen all of course. fully aact the character ed the Belgian Social Demotes, which ders not want tootrapsie mad doc ped kank bow to struggle. which fer a numbet of focades had beer bond Fiang the

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TOL- Writngs of Lcon Trotsky (1933.34) fears power outside of a coalition, as it needs bourgeois allies to be able to reject the demands of une workers.

But we also know that not only the capi- We know all this. talist regime as • whole but also its parliamentary state machinery entered into a stage of an acute crisis that bears in itself the possibility of quick i relatively, changes of mood of the masses, as well as quick successions of purliamentary and government combinations. If it should be taken into consideration that the Belgian Social Democracy together with the reformist trade unions dominate absolutely the proletariat, that the Belgian section of the Comintern is utterly insignificant and the revolutionary wing extremely weak, it would become clear that the whole political situation must suggest to the proletariat the thought of a Social Democratic government.

We considered beforehand that the setting up of such a government would be undoubtedl; a step forward.

Of course, not in the sense that the government of Vandervelde. de Man's and Co. would be capable of playing any progressive role in the replacement of capitalism by socialism, but in the sense that under the given conditions the experiment of a Social Democratic government would be of progressive importance in the revolutionary derelopment of the proletariat. The slogan of a Social Democratic government is thus caleulated not on some exceptional conjuncture but on a more or less lengthy political period. We could give up this slogan only if the Social Democracy - hefore its commo to power- should begin greatly to weaken, ceding its influence to a recolutionars party: but, alas, today such a perspective is purely theoretien!. Neither the general political situation nor the relation of forces within the proletariat permits "power to the Social Democracy!"

The plan of de Man. bombastically called the "Labor Plan" (it would be more correct to call it "the plan to deceive the toilers"), certainly cannot maice us abandon the central political slogan of this period. renovated instrument of bourgeois-democratic cor even semidemocratic) conservatism. Hut the whole lies in the fact that the extreme intensus of the situation, the Imminence of dangers. threateng the very Sonal Democracy Msell, Terrest against de will to see the doubleedped weapon, very not Hough do from the point of tew a demeate sheer alisms The canana can 992 do them poo Soon. the Sarget took deton dhes chant He con Reasonism and Plann 103 servative cquilibrium of poormim. which is forced to den uner the bourgeois regime pebily in order to save it, is beginning te shake.

Such a situation is replete wih great revolutionary possibilities (together with dangers) We must not retract the -logan "power to the Social Democracy," but, on the contrary, give this slogan an all-the mor-militant and sharp character.

In our midst there is no need to say that this slogan must not contain even a shadow of hypocrisy, pretense, softening of contradictions, diplomatizing, pretended or qualified trust. Let the left Social Democrats use butter and honey (in the spirit of Spank 149). We will use as heretofore vinegar and pepper. in the material sent to me. there is expressed the opinion that the working masses are ubsolutels indifferent to the Labor Plan and are in general in a state of depression and that under such conditions the slogan "power to the Social Democrats" can only create illusions and produce disappointment later on.

THIN U'nable from here to get a clear idea of the moods of the different layers and groups of the Beigian proletariat, I fully allow, however, for the possibility of a certain nervous exhaustion and passivity of the workers. But. in the first place, this mood Itself is not final: it must he rather of an expectant than of a hopeless nature. No one of us thinks, of course. that the Belgian proletariat is already incapable of struggle for years to come. Within the proletariat there are plenty of moods of bitterness hatred and resentment. and they are seeking a way out. To save itself from ruin, the Social Democracy needs a certain movement of the workers. It must frighten the bourgeoisie to make it more agreeable. 11 is certainly mortally afraid that this movement might go neer Is head. But with the absolute insigmficance of the Cominters the weakness of the revolutionaty groups and under the frest ispression of the German experience, the Social Democracy expects immediate danger from the right and not from the left. Without these prerequisites, the slogan "power to the Social Demoeracy" would, in general, be meaningless. us can have any doubts that the plan of de Man and the agitation of the Social Democracy connected with it will sow illusions and provoke disappointment But the Social with its infuence on the prolefariat and its plan, 1e Christmas coppress and its agitation, are objective farts: se can netter remove then, her skip over then. Chur took is tested: first, to plan to the disued workers the political coming ed to plan that b carte the manners of to

Posebig water circle of wore that mandar as Pe bour Fear Decle put eace be to tradiaten of the plan we

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194 Writings of Leon Trotsku (1933-34) fight hand in hand with the workers to help them make this experiment. We share the difficulties of the struggle but not the illusions. Our criticism of the Illusions must, however, not increase the passivity of the workers and give it a pseudotheoretic justification but on the contrary, push the workers forward. Under these conditions, the inevitable disappointment with the "Labor Plan" will not spell the deepening of passivity but, on the contrary, the going-over of the workers to the revolutionary road.

To the plan itself I shall devote in the next few days a special article. Because of the extremely urgent character of this letter. I am forced, to limit myself here to just a few words. First of all, I consider it incorrect to liken the plan to the economic policy of fascism. Insolar us fascism advances (before the conquest of power) the slogan of nationalization as a means of struggle with "supercapitalism." it simply steals the phraseology o. the socialist program. In de Man's plan we haveunder the bourgeois character of the Social Democracy — a program of state capralism that the Social Democracy itself passes off, however, for the beginning of socialism and that may become the beginning of socialism, in spite of and actually agnese he opposition of the Socini Democracy Within the Inute of the economic program ("Labor Plan"). we must in my opinion, advance the following three points: 1. On repurchase Considered abstractly, ration does not exclude any and capitalist property. There was a time when Marx expressed the thought that it would be good to "pay off that gang" (the capitalists 1 Prior to the World War, this was still more or less possibic. But taking into consideration the present disruption of the national and world economic system and the impoverishment of the masses, we see that compensation is a ruinous operation that would create for the new regime from the very start utterly@ unbcarable hardships. We must and can bring this lact home to every worker with figures in hand. 2. Simulfaneously with expropriation without compensation. slogan of corkers' control. Despite de we must advance the Man (see Le Movement Syndical Belge 1933, no. 11. p. 297), nationalization and workers' control do not exclude each other at all. Even if the government were an extremely left one and full of the best intentions. we would stand for the control of workers over industry ang, circulation: we do not want a bureaucratic management of nagcnalized industs; we demand direct particpation of the workchetherselves in control and administration through singe conditices, trage snions Recisionism and Planning 195 etc. Only in this way can We lay the supporting bases for proletarian dictatorship in economy. 3. The plan says nothing concerning landed property as such. Here we need a slogan adapted to agricultural workers and the poorest peasants. I shall endeavor to take up separate ly this involved question.

It is necessary now to take up the political side of the plan.

Two questions come naturally to the fore here: (1) the method of struggle for the realization of the plan (in particular the question of legality and illegality, and (2) the attitude toward the petty bourgeoisie of the city and village.

In his programmatic speech published in the trade-union organ, de Man rejects categoriedly the revolutionary struggle (general strike and insurrection). Can anything * pected of these people? No matter what the individual reservabons and changes intended mainly for the consolation of left simpletons may be, the official position of the party remains that of parliamentary cretnism. The main blows of our criticism shouid be aimed along this line-not only against the pany as a whole, but also against its left wing (see below. side of the question - of the methods of struggle for na- This tionalization — are pointed our with equal precision and correctness by both sides in vour discussion, so there is no need for me to dwell on it much longer, 1 wish to bring out only one "small point. Can these people carnestly think of revolutionary struggle when in their heartthey are monarchists? It is great mistake to think that ine king's power in Belgium is a fetion. First of all, this fetion costs money and should be eliminated if only out of economic considerations. But this is not the principal side of the matter. In time of social crisis, ghosts frequently take on flesh and blood. The same role that flindenburg, Hitler's hostler, played in Germany hefore our very eyes may be played by the king in Belgium -following the example of his Italian colleague. A series of gestures made by the Belgian king in the last period dearly indicate this rond. Whoever wants to struggle against fascism must begin with the struggle for the liquidation of the monarchy We must not permit the Social Democracy to hide itself in this question behind all sorts of tricks and reservations. of strategy Posing questions of strategy and tactics in a revolutionary manner dees hot mem at all, however. that our criticisn should not also fellow the Social Democracy to it parhamentary hdraway Now cections will take place ones In 1936, until Mad ame capitalist Teachosenes in allence with hunger tan break the neck of the working class the lone over. We

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Writings of Leon Trotsky (1933-34) must pose this question in all its sharpness to the Social Democratic workers.

There is only one way to speed up new elections: to make the functioning of the present parliament impossible by sharp opposition to it, which merges into parliamentary obstruction. Vandervelde, de Man and Co. must be branded not merely because they do not develop the revolutionary extraparliamentary struggle but also because their parliamentary activity does not at all serve to prepare and bring nearer and realize their own "Labor Plan." Contradictions and hypocrisy in this sphere will be clearly understood even by the average Social Democratic worker who has not yet grown to the understanding of the methods of proletarian revolution.

The question of the attitude to the intermediary classes is of no less importance. It would be foolish to accuse the reform- Ists of placing they want to win over the petty bourgeoisie. We too want to win over the petty bourgeoisie. This is one of the essential conditions for the full success of the proletarian revolution. But there are fagots and there are fagots, as Moliere says. A street peddler or a poor peasant is a petty bourgeois, but u professor, an average official bearing a distinction badge, an average engineer, is also a petty bourgeois. We must choose between them. Capitalist parliamentarism (and no different parliamentarism exists) leads to Messrs. Lawyers, Officials, Journalists coming out as the licensed representatives of the starving artisans, street peddlers, small clerks and semiproletarian And finance capital leads by the nose or simply peasants. bribes the parliamentarians from the sphere of petty-bourgeois lawyers, officials and journalists. When Vandervelde, de Man and Co. talk of attracting the petty-bourgeoisie to the "plan," they have in mind not the masses but their licensed "representatives," that is, the corrupted agents of finance capital. When we speak of winning over the petty bourgeoisie, we have in mind the liberation of the ex ploited, submerged masses from their diplomaticized political In view of the desperate position of the petty representatives. bourgeois masses of the population, the old petty-bourgeois parties (democratic, Catholic and others) burst along all seams. Fascism understood it. It did not seek and does not seek any coalitions with the bankrupt "leaders" of the petty bourgeoisie but tears the masses from under their influence, that is. it per forms in its way and in the interests of reaction that work that the Bolsheviks performed in Russia In the interests of the revolution Precisely in this way the question now presents it self also in Belgium The petty bourgeois parties, or the potty Revisionism and Planning bourgeois flanks of big capitalist parties, are doomed to dis. appearance together with parliamentarism, which sets up for them the necessary stage. The whole question lies in who will lead the oppressed and deceived petty-bourgeois masses, the proletariat under revolutionary leadership or the fascist agency of finance capital. Just as de Man does not want a revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and fears a courageous opposition policy parliament that could lead to a revolutionary struggle, so he does not want and fears a real struggle for the petty-bourgeois masses. He understands of protest, bitterness and hatred, which may turn into revolutionary passions and dangerous "excesses," that is, into revo- Instead of this, de Man seeks parliamentary allies, lution. shabby democrats, Catholics, blood relatives from the right who are needed by him as bulwark against possible revolutionary excesses of the proletariat. We must know how to make this side of the question clear to the reformist workers in the daily experience of facts. For a close revolutionary union of the proletariat with the oppressed petty-bourgeois masses of the cily and village but against government coalition with political representatives and traitors of the petty bourgeoiste! Some comrades express the opinion that the very fact that the Social Democracy comes out with the "labor plan" must shake up the intermediary classes and, with the passivity of the proletariat, case the work of fascism. Of course, if the proletariat will not fight, fascism will be victorious. But this danger follows not from the "plan" but from the great influence of the Social Democracy and the weakness of the revolutionary party. The protracted participation of the German Social Democracy in the bourgeois government paved the way for Hitler. Blum's purely passive abstention from all participation in the government will also create the prerequisites for the growth of fascism. Finally, the announcement of the attack on finance capital without a corresponding mass revolutionary struggle will inevitably speed up the work of Belgian fascism. It is, there fore, a question not of the "plan" but of the treacherous funetion of the Social Democracy and of the fatal role of the Comintern. Insofar as the general situation and in particular the fate of the German Social Democracy force upon its younger, Belgian sister the policy of "nationalization," this, together with the old dangers, opens up new revolutionary possibilities. It would be the greatest error not to see them. We must learn to strike the enemy with his own weapons. The new possibilties can be blized only under the condition that we continue trelessly to stress to the workers the fascist

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Writings of Leon Trotsky (1933-34) danger. For the realization of no matter what plan, workers' organizations must be preserved and strengthened. It is necessary, therefore, first of all to defend them from fascist gangs.

It would be the worst stupidity to hope that a democratic government, even headed by the Social Democracy, could save the workers from fascism by a decree prohibiting the fascists to organize, to arm, ete. No police measures will help if the workers themselves will not learn to deal with fascists. The organization of proletarian defense, the creation of workers' militia is the first, unpostponable task. Whoever fails to support this slogan and does not carry it out in practice does not deserve the name of a proletarian revolutionist.

There remains only to say something on our attitude towards the left Social Democracy. Least of all here do I want to say something final, as until now I was unable to follow the evolution of this grouping. But what I read in the last few days (a series of articles by Spaak, his speech at the party congress, etc.) did not produce a favorable Impression.

When Spaak wants to characterize the interrelation between the legal and illegal struggle, he quotes... Otto Bauer200 as an authority, that is, the theoretician of legal and legal Impotence. "Tell me who your masters are and I will tell you who you are." But let us leave the sphere of theory and turn to actual political questions.

Spaak took de Man's plan as the basis of the campaign and voted for it without any reservations. It may be said that Spaak did not want to give Vandervelde and Co. the opportunity to bring the matter to a split, that is, to eject the weak and still unorganized left wing from the party; Spaak retreated the better to jump. Perhaps such were Spaak's intentions, but in politics we judge not by intentions but by actions. The careful attitude of Spaak at the conference, his pledge to struggle with all determination for the carrying-out of the plan, his statement on discipline, would have in themselves been comprehensible considering the position of the left opposition in the party. But Spaak did something else: he expressed moral confidence in Vandervelde and political solidarity with de Man not only on the abstract aims of the plan but also with regard to the concrete methods of struggle. The words of Spaak, to the effect that we cannot demand that the leaders of the party tell us openly of their plan of action, their forces, clc., had an especially inadmissible character Why cant we? For confidential reasous? But even if Vandaseide and de Man have confidential matters. i is not with the revolutionary workers against the bourgeoisie but eith the bourgeois politicians against the workers. And no Revisionism and Planning one demands that confidential matters be made publie at the congress! It is necessary to give the general plan of the mobilization of the workers and the perspective of struggle. By his declaration, Spaak really helped Vandervelde and de Man to evade the answer to the most important questions of strategy. We can legitimately speak here of secrets between the leaders of the opposition and the leaders of the majority against the revolutionary workers. The fact that Spaak also carried away the Young Socialist Guard to the road of centrist trustfulness only aggravates his guilt.

The Brussels federation introduced at the congress a "left resolution on constitutional and revolutionary struggle The resolution is very weak, has a legalistic and not a political character, is written by a lawyer and not by a revolutionary (if the bourgeoisie will violate the constitution, then we also ..."). Instead of earnestly posing the question of the preparation of revolutionary struggle, the left resolution makes a literary threat in the direction of the bourgeoisie. But what happened at the congress? After the most inane declarations of de Man, who, as we know, considers the revolutionary struggle a harmful myth, the Brussels federation meekly re empty and lyinm phraas not late tracted its resolution. People who are so easily satisfied with empty and lying phrases cannot be considered earnest revolutionists. Punishment was not late in coming. On the very next day, Le Peuple commented on the congress resolution to the effect that the party will stay strictly within constitutional lines, that is, it will "struggle within the limits indicated to it by finance capital aided by the king, judges and police. The organ of the lefts. Action Socialiste, actually wept bitter tears: Why. yesterday, just yesterday, "all were unanimous with regard to the Brussels resolution, why then today? ... Ridiculous lamentations! "Yesterday" the lefts were fooled to make them retract the resolution. And "today" the experienced bureaucratic dodgers gave the ill-fated opposition a little fillip on the nose. Serves them right! These matters are always handled so. But these are only the buds; the fruit will come later. It has occurred more than once that the Social Democratic opposition has developed an extremely left criticism as long as it does not obligate itself to anything. But when the decisive hours come (mass strike movement, menace of war, danger of a government overthrowal, etc.). the opposition lowers its banner immediately. opening up to the besmirched leaders of the party a new credit ed confidence, proving by this that it is itseif unly Mesh of the Besh of reformism The Socialist oppo sition of Belgium is now going through its hrst serous test. We are forced to say that it slipped up badly right away. We must follow attentvel and without prejudice its further steps,

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Writings of Leon Trotsky 1193374) without exaggerating in criticism, without losing ourselves in "social fascism" but also without making senseless chatter on any illusions on the real theoretic and fighting temper of this To help the better elements of the left opposition to grouping. move forward, it is necessary to say what is. I hurry greatly with this letter so that it might yet reach you before the conference of January 14; therefore, its incompleteness and possibly a certain lack of systematic exposition. In conclusion I allow myself to express the hearty conviction that your discussion will end in a harmonious decision that will insure complete unity of acton. The whole situation pre determines a serious growth of your organization in the next period. If the leaders of the Social Democratic opposition should capitulate completely, the direction of the reyolutionary-wing of the proletariat will rest entirely on you. If, on the contrary, the left wing of the reformist party should advance to the side of Marxism, you will find in them a militant ally and a bridge to the masses. With a clear and unanimous polley your success is fully assured. Long live the Belgian section of the Bolshevik-Leninists!

G. G. [Leon Trotsky]

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THE BELGIAN DISPUTE AND THE DE MAN PLAN 207 (March 2, 1935)

To the International Secretariat

Dear Comrades, dispute in our Belgian section. concerning the crisis. I would like to enlarge a little on my point of view. On January 15, 1935, Brussels wrote to all the members of "Our differences merely become intenthe Belgian section: sified.. We cannot as revolutionary militants share. even partially, in the responsibilities." This is the language of split. If the attitude of the national and international organization is so bad that it no longer allows "revolutionary militants" to bear even a part of the responsibility, nothing remains but On January 29, Vereecken wrote to the IS: "1 am anxious to let you know quite frankly that the 'nonentrist comrades and myself consider more and more that this radical step is most harmful and the IS must not maintain the slightest illusions regarding an eventual change in our political position. We consider it a political, historical error of the greatest dimensions, and we shall continue. in the interest of the revolutionary movement and the formation of the Fourth International, to fight this tendency with all our strength."

If the Brussels comrades persuade It is the same language. themselves "more and more" that our tactic is most harmful, if we must have no illusions as to an eventual change in the ideas of the Brussels comrades this can only mean that Comrade Vereecken is busying himself conscientiously and systematically with prepatation for a split. "Our differences merely become intensified." The degeneration of the ICt. becomes, fer the crities of Brussels. "more and The Belgian Dispute and the De Man Plan But since the differences have taken on an more obvious. open and acute character particularly since the discussion on the entry of our French section into the SFIO, we must wait until Comrade Vereecken gives us an analysis of the experience in France since the entry. It is evidently in the light of this experience that he has had to convince himself "more and But this is where the enigma begins. available to me, In all the documents I find no analyses by Comrade Vereecken of the activity of our French section. This may appear surprising. Comrade Vereecken predicted the absolute impossibility of the Bolshevik-Leninists developing their ideas within the Social Democratic party. He predicted the opportunist degeneration and the complete discrediting of our tendency. Does he make any attempt to analyze the real facts? Does he compare his predictions with the living reality? No, not in the least. He was implacable when it was a question of predictions, of discussions, of preliminary questions, but since it has become a reality; Vereecken has lost all interest in the question. fact characterizes perfectly the abstract manner in which Vereecken approaches ideas and problems. But we Marxists are interested. above all. In facts. And on the basis of the five months that have passed since the entry, we say: each day and each new fact only give the lie to the purely negative and sterile attitude of Vereecken at the time of the French discussion. And if he is not capable of seeing it and admitting it openly, it is not surprising if he travels farther and farther from Marxism in the direction of Bordigism. that is, of nothing. "The discussion of the youth [was] Vereecken complains: carried out at a racing speed" and also "the vote was taken in confusion." etc... Vereecken's trouble is that he separates completely the question of the Belgian youth and the question of the French entry and the experience of the French League. For him, political activity is only a series of discussions. The French question was long and bitterly discussed internationally and, above all, in Belgium. In the light of these discussions and, above all, of the experiences that followed them, the question of entry into the Belgian Young Socialist Guard hardly demanded discussion for all Marxists concerned with the facts of reality - but that, unfortunately, was not the case with Vereecken. In turning his back on the French experience. which pitilessly disowns him, he simply wishes to have a new "discussion" and, especially, that it should last, since activity is for him internal discussion. "Our differences merely become intensified." But what is the

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Writings of Leon Trotsky. 1934-35 most important point of these differences in Belgium? The question of the de Man plan, which on its side has reduced itself to the question of inflation. It is amazing to see the importance that Vereecken attributes to this question. His bulletins are full of demonstrations of the evil intentions of de Man, who aspires to inflation. Formalist minds frequently seize upon altogether of all proportion. Are we, for example, knights of the Belgian franc? Is the saving of the existing currency our way of salvation? One cannot understand the anti-inflation fanaticism of Vereecken. In this period of social crisis, of economic shocks, inflation and deflation are two complementary instruments for throwing on to Bourgeois parties organize formidable discussions on the questhe knife. But Vereecken steels himself, above all, against inflation. To expose the plan of de Man, he has created a special aphorism: "nationalization by means of buying back is a kind of inflation." It is the buying back that must be countered without becoming embroiled in questions of financial technique. But no, Vereecken is intent on showing that de Man is an inflationist. He goes so far as to say that a campaign in the paper on this question would have been most significant for our tendency:" But, if I am not mistaken, it is the Theunis20s govin reality and not in discussion, Vereecken remains indifferen He demands from the journal a special campaign against rot the deflation of Theunis but the problematic and, in any far distant inflation of de Man. All of Vereecken's mentAlity is revealed in this instructive episode.

Bestes that shady regination te akin ord one

order to deliver a treacherous blow against the toiling masses, Charleroi209 continues to leave the workers to struggle in total darkness. One goes so far today as le confound ne plan with socialism in La Voir./.. The coitors of To Voir can no longer distinguish betyreen a decgption, a drusion. a treason and socialism." You can see, case is-sprious. Vereecken ne mrades, identifsing deception and treason cuses La Ve The Belgian Dispute and the De Man Plan with socialism but, moreover, of doing it with full knowledge of the fact. The editors of La Voix know that it is a decepbut instead of unmasking it, Lesoll210 and his friends tion, lead the workers into the trap, participate in the cover it up, treason. And our International organization? Let us read about it in the letter of January 15: "We finish by accusing the IS and Comrade Vidal of covering up the position of Charlerol and we say: to each his responsibility."

leadership covers them in this work. But do not hasten to become annoyed. It is not the bad faith of Vereecken that is at stake; it is his anti-Marxist journalist thought that flies from reality and concerns itself with To show that the plan of de Man is a deception, Vereecken builds up a complete Eiffel Tower of demonstrations of the inflationist danger that interests us. De Man is for buying back, and buying back can only be a terrific expense for the people. By what technical process the buying back is effected, that is a question of tenth-degree importance But, imitating Theunis, Vereecken brandishes the specter of inflation. That is the deception, that is the treason of which Lesoil is the accomplice and the IS the "fence." It would be funny if it were not so tragic, at least for Comrade Vereecken.

The criticism of the plan has been made many times; one can complete it If we had to present a plan to the Belgian proletariat, this plan would have had an altogether different aspect. Unfortunately, the Belgian proletariat gave this mandate not to us but to the Belgian Labor Party [POB], and the plan reflects two facts: the pressure of the proletariat on the POB and the conservative character of this party.

In what consists the deception of the plan? In the fact that the leadership of the POB, de Man Included, does not wish to lead the masses into struggle, and without struggle this plan, Then, when inadequate as it is, is completely unrealizable. we say to the masses that to realize this imperfect plan it is necessary to struggle to the end, we are far from covering up the deception; on the contrary, we are helping the masses to expose it by their own experience.

But you Identify the plan with He merely forgets that in the mouth of de Man the word so. cialism means the same deception as the plan. And for the same reason, the leaders of the POB do not want a struggle. But they are caught in the wheels of the crisis of capitalism and of reformism They were forced to proclaim the plan and

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Writings of Leon Trotsky. 1934 35 even to make of it the platform of the Belgian proletariat It is a fact. What is our task? To help the workers to turn the wheels into which the opportunist leaders have been forced to thrust their hands.

sian Social Revolutionary Party formulated in May 1917 its "plan," that is to say, its agrarian program, basing itself on hundreds of peasant demands. expropriation of private landed property, the periodic redistribution of the land among the peasants, the abolition of wagelabor in agriculture, ary slogan (expropriation of the landed gentry) was linked to utopian demands, to petty-bourgeois prejudices. of Kerensky Chernov that had launched this "plan" remained in governmental coalition with the gentry and the capitalists. internal contradictions and inadequacies of the program. But, before all, they recognized that the realization of this program would mean an enormous advantage for the peasants, for the whole people. However, the program could not be realized in collaboration with the exploiters. The Boisheviks did everything to draw the peasants into the struggle for their plan. They even finished by inscribing the plan into their program to the peasants the faults of your program — we will correct them together with you in the light of common experience, when we have gained poweg However, your leaders, Kerensky, Chernov and the others do not want i struggle. Therein lies their deception. Try to draw them into the struggle, and If they are obstinate, drive them out! This policy wns neither trickery nor treason. It was the true Marxist realism. Without Revolution would have been impossible.

The revolutionary task consists in demanding that the POB take power in order to put its own plan into effect. Vereecken replies to this: No! It is necessary to demand a workers' government and not simply a socialist government. We must not forget the Stalinist workers, and besides, the plan is no goodit threatens us with inflation. 1, Vereecken, I will propose a better plan. sets himself outside of reality. He construcis in his imagina tion a united front that does not exist in Belgium, For this imaginary united front he proposes an imaginnry program. that is, Vandervelde and Jacquemotte211 ought to fight together for the perfect plan dreaned up by Vereecken In this way i can in lavor of ts pont of matters will be splendidly arranged. The Belgian Dispute and the De Man Plan the campaign around the plan.

This Is at lenst an View Gourov's letter212 recognized unfortunate misunderstandingthe necessity of taking a position on the basis of the campaign, in favor of the socialist party POB] taking power to carry That's all. Gourov insisted only on the ne out its own plan. cessity of a sharp criticism of the left socialists. At least ninetenths of the Gourov letter coincided with the Charleroi position, whereas Vereccken previously was characterizing the de Man plan as an expression of social fascism. Seizing upon some insufficiently precise formulations in La Voix.

Vereechen accuses its editors of being subservient to the general staff of the POB and the unions and of renouncing Marxist criticism. This new betrayal is committed as the purchase price for the possibility of entering the POB. Take note of the heinousness of the accusation.

The startling disproportion between the facts, that is, the quotations, and the accusation reaches the level of a slander. I take up the issue of La Voir "The victory won by that 1 have Just received. I read there: the government on February 4-and this with the aid of the leaders of the POB and the CS union federation]." The same article says that the leaders of the POB have reaffirmed with all "the declared enemies of the working class their attachment to the bourgeois regime." and so on and so forth. Really, you do not use such langunge when you are trying to sell out to the bureaucracy of the POB and the C'S. In the same issue there is a criticism of l'Action Syndicale | Union Action|. which advises the government to bend under the "pressure" of the demonstration. Those who speak like this to the workers deceive them." says En Vora No, La Vour is not vassalized to the union chiefs; it does not deceive the workers, whatever it otherwise does, or whatever errors if sometimes commits. But these mistakes of La Voir pale into insignificance alongside the mountains of errors, distortions. unwarranted accusations and complete misconceptions of reality on the part of Comrade Vereecken. The gravest mistake for which La Voix can be reproached here 1 am in complete accord with Comrade Martin-is that our Belgian friends identify the revolutionary struggle too much with the general strike. Just as a simple strike has need, above all in this epoch, of a picket line, so a general strike needs a workers' militia, which in the last analysis is nothing cise but a generalized picket line.

The general strike pores the problem of power, but does not resive it What is always involved at bottom is the question of armed forre The fascists penetrate everywhen, in the barracks. toogh the officers on ave dull us wed as those in the reserves The profelatian

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Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1934-35 vanguard should step up their efforts to strengthen their moral ties with their brothers in the barracks. Thus the struggic for power requires not only preparation of the general strike but also education of the will of the defensive to the offensive, to set about creating a workers militia and to win over the workers In the army. But it is very significant that Vereecken doesn't breathe a word about this. He condemns La Vor only when it is perfectly correct.

Vereecken's general attitude resembles that of Bauer. but with a certain time lag. The conservatism of both is offended by the fact that we are passing from the stage of individual propaganda to systematic action among the masses. This transition, which was made inevitable by the logic of things and was foreseen by us a long time ago, seems to them an abnegation of principles, a surrender. a betrayal If there really has been an abandonment of the most fundamental Marxist principles, it has been by Bauer, by Vereecken, by the unavowed Bordigists and Hennautists. 213 The stage of individual educational propaganda was inevitable. When the centrists accused us of sectarianism, we answered them: without a minimal Marxist cadre, principled action among the masses is impossible. But that is the only reason we form cadres. To one of the French opportunists who often spoke of our sectarianism, the Bulletin replied in "among us there are elements who remain June 1929:

Yes, satisfied to sit at home and criticize the mistakes of the official party, without setting themselves any broader tasks, without assuming any practical revolutionary obligations, converting the revolutionary opposition into a title, something akin to an Order of the Legion of Honor. There are, in addition, sectarian tendencies that express themselves in splitting each hair into four parts. It is necessary to struggle against this. And I am personally ready to wage a struggle against it, and not to be deterred, if need be, by old friendships, personal ties. and so forth and so on. These lines were written, comrades, almost six years ago. It is therefore not at all a question of an unexpected turn, provoked by some exceptional circumstances. It is a case of the growth of our tasks and obligations determined by all of our preceding work. The exceptional circumstances only give an extraordinary sharpness to our new tasks. In Engels's correspondence with Sorge, which went on for several decades, on almost every page we can find remarkable observations on the question that concerns us here. In England, as in the United States, Marxism remained for too long a time at the level of a propaganda society repeating that Marxism is not an academie doctrine or a sec The Belgian Dispute and the De Man Plan of faith but an instrument for systematic profession work among the masses. In 1886. Engels soad: "If they succeed in the Sociahst League in educating a nucleus of people who understand thungs theoretically, a great deal will have been gained for the launching of a read mass movement. You see You see that Engels well understood the importance of a hucleus of theoreticaliy educated him an end in itself. That same year he wrote about the German Marxists in the United States: "The Germans have not understood how to use their theory as a lever which could set the American masses in motion; they do not understand the theory themselves for the most part and treat it in a doctrinaire and dogmatic way as something that has to be learned by heart, chich then will satisfy ail requirements forthwith.

To them it is a credo and not a guide to action" (emphasis added). I ask you, isn't this the case with Bauer and Vereecken. who have learned by heart the abstract definitions of reformism and of the Second International, etc., which serve them not to accelerate but, on the contrary, to check our revolutionary activity among the masses? Ome month later Engels wrote again about the pseudo-Marxists who in the face of a real mass movement have fried to make of the "not always understood [Marxist) theory a kind salvationist dogma, and thereby to keep aloof from any movement that did not accept that dogma." Isn't this the ense with Vereecken in the face of the mass movement favoring the In February 1887 Engels wrote: "That great national movement, no matter what its first form, is the real starting point of American working-class development. If the Germans join it, in order to help it or to hasten its development in the right direction, they may do a great deal of good and play a de cisive part in it. If they stand aloof, they will dwindle down into a dogmatic seet and be brushed aside as people scho do not understand their own principles* (emphasis added). Isn't this a mirror created for the Bauers, Vereeckens and others? Two years later, in April 1891, Engels cited an example in order to draw this conclusion from It: "It demonstrates how very useless a platform that is largely theoretieally correct can be. if it does not know how to link Itself with the real needs of the masscs." Pinally, a year before his death. Kopes castigated the English and American Marxists That have man aped to reduct the Marxian theory of development to a rigid orthodoxy what the workers

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Wrismys of Leon Trotsky. 19./ 35 an article of faith." I could mutiply these quotations endlessly find without difficulty the same ideas adapted to dif ferent conditions by Lem, whose revolutionary intransigence. we know, had nothing in common with sectarian sterility: What are our conclusions? Vercecken now represents u renctionary tendency in our ranks. His acts of indiscipline may become very important in and of themselves, but they have in this situation for us only a secondary importance. We should unreservedly condemn his false and sterile conceptions, which, if they won over the leadership, could only reduce our tendency to the pitiful role of the Bordigists, Hennautists, etc. ... It is necessary to declare openly that we cannot and will not accept the slightest responsibility for the Bauer-Vereecken tenone and hat tailed im complet a ton ampose kumi Germany as well as in the emigration, should return to our ranks, he will be welcome. Nobody would impose humiliating Stalinist manner. conditions on him in the It is not possible The crime begins when one to act without making mistakes. refuses to correct mistakes proved by experience. If Comrade Vereecken knew how to overcome his capricious and anarchistic individualism, if he will strive to orient himself not in accord with his own texts but in accord with the reality of the struggle, he has only to reenter the ranks that he deliberately broke away from. On our part he will find the most sincere wish to collaborate. Decisive are not the unfortunate episodes of internal struggle but the revolutionary conception and methods. Do we have these in common or not? That is the question Vereecken should answer if he is to regain his place in our ranks.

Crux [Leon Trotsky)

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The Minority Movement (Red Mole 1/10/70,16/10/70) The National Minority Movement was the largest movement of rank-and-file trade unionists ever to have existed in Britain. Set up by the Communist Party in 1924, it contained many of the most selfless men that British trade unionism has seen. The Minority Movement is important not merely for its size-at one time it had over 950,000 members-but also because most of the problems faced by its members-undemocratic unions, a separation of politics from industrial activity, the problem of political militants in the T.U.s, etc.-are still with us. For anyone struggling to achieve rankand-file control of the unions, a study of the rise and ultimate defeat of the Minority Move. ment is of great value. The experience of the Minority Movement also shows clearly that the "moderate" trade unionists who attempted to compromise with capitalism caused poverty and humiliation for hundreds of thousands of working class families, and that the only "realists" in the situation were those who believed that it was necessary to overthrow capitalism by force. The State of the Unions in the 1920s In the early 1920s British trade unionism was in a bad way. In 1921 there were over two million unemployed (15% of the working class) and on the famous "Black Friday'" the miners had been forced to accept wage cuts of up to 40%. Union membership had fallen from over 6½ million in 1919-1920 to only just over 4 million in 1924. Even worse was the loss of membership by some of the biggest unions; the Engineers Union had lost nearly half its members between 1920 and 1925 and the National Union of Railwaymen lost 130,000 members in the same period. The social conditions reflected in these figures were terrible. The British ruling class showed its gratitude for the hundreds of thousands of working-class men killed during the First World War by forcing tens of thousands of South Wales miners to emigrate, by calling in troops and police to break strikes, and by cutting unemployment pay and rigidly enforc ing the means test. Although to be in work was better than unemployment, nevertheless the employers certainly believed in extracting every ounce of sweat; Aneurin Bevan recalled, for example, that in the labouring gang he worked in in Wales during this period, the men had to work so hard that the blood from their hands ran down the handles of their picks and shovels. What heightened this tragedy was that none of this suffering had been necessary. In Britain in the périod after the end of the First World War a working-class revolution had been within reach. 70,000 troops had been involved in mutinies in South-East England, and demonstrations of 100,000 workers had taken place in Glasgow, while in the great Clyde Strike of 1919 pickets had consisted not of tens or hundreds of men, but of thousands. Even the police went on bace had intand practical the whole body of skilled men, affecting hundreds of thousands of workers". The ruling class reacted to this situation with its customary viciousness, and in Glasgow, the centre of the unrest, tanks appeared in the streets, machine guns were mounted on the tops of buildings, and literally thousands of troops were sent to the city. Despite this fierce repression, the rebellion swelled until the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, admitted to the leaders of the main unions that the government could no longer control the working class and that if the working class acted against the state, they would overthrow it and set up a workers' government, If the leaders of the working class had acted decisively in this situation, a socialist revolution in Britain would have been possible. Following closely on the heels of the Russian revolution, this would have ignited a revolutionary wave throughout Europe. Not merely would such a revolution have prevented the terrible suffering of the British working class during the 1920s and 1930s, but an internationaily successful socialist revolution would have prevented the emergence of Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany, and therefore tae Second World War, In Russia it would have. meant a victory of the revolutionary wing of Trotsky over the reactionary wing of Stalin. In fact it can be said that rarely has a more important decision been taken than that of the British union leaders in 1919 when they decided to submit to the government and not to carry out a revolution.

The disastrous effects of this decision followed almost at once; in 1920 the government passed an emergency powers act including vicious anti-strike laws, with three months in prison and fines of E100 for breaking the new regulations. By March 1921 unemployment had reached 1½ million and the militant union structure which had been built up during the War was largely in ruins. When the government took these actions, the union leaders of course "protested" but by then.it was too late. They had had their chance to take power in 1919 and had not done so. Having seen that the unions would back down in a crisis, the government had no need to be worried about their strength. The Moderate Leaders It is important to realise that those men who were responsible for causing the poverty of unemployment and the humiliation of the means test for hundreds of thousands of working class families were also the main enemies of the Minority Movement. The most notable of these men was J. H. Thomas-a man much praised by the press of his time for his "reasonableness".

J. H. Thomas was the head of the Railwaymen's Union, and had been one of those leaders to whom Lloyd George had declared that the government and the state would fall if the unions acted against it. The Les Cannon of his day, Thomas ruled the NUR as his own private kingdom. The union constitution put him in his position for life, and using the power of his office, he stamped on any sign of democracy in the union. There were no elections of any importance; the six full-time national officials were not subject to re-election and no lay member could be clected to the executive for more than three years in succession. Together with this lack of democracy at the top went a suppression of democracy at the District level. District Councils could only be formed with the permission of the National Executive, and even then they were to be consultative with "no governing or controlling power over any member, branch or official". Just to cap it all, local branches could be dissolved by the Natic nal Executive at any time if they were considered "unnecessary or undesirable or prejudicial to the interests of the union or its members", In practice, of course, this meant that any branch openly opposing the right-wing policies of the national executive and of J. H Thomas would be dissolved. With this type of union structure it was no accident that Thomas was the bitterest opponent of any movement in favour of trade union democracy and the widest possible use of working class power for the achievement of socialism. It was against this sombre background of working class defeat that the National Minority Movement was founded in 1924. Formation of the Minority Movement The reason for the formation of the Movement was simply that the tremendous defeats of the British and world working class movements in the period after 1918 had shown clearly that it was impossible to separate trade unionism and politics. The only way of preventing an almost complete defeat of the trade unions in 1920 and 1921 and the consequent suffering of the working class would have been for the working class to have seized power in 1919. However, such a decision would have been a political and not a trade union decision. The union leaders in 1919 had therefore been faced with the following problem: in order to defend even the most elementary rights to a job it was necessary to take state power, but to take power meant to break down the division between trade unionism and politics which they themselves had always insisted upon. In other words, in order to protect the trade unions it was necessary to act politically. But not to take power is, of course,

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also a political decision-one that leads to the defeat of the working class, In short, this crisis of 1919 had only two solutions: one was the defeat of the working class and the other was the seizure of power by the working class. The belief that there was some other possibility. which was not political but purely a trade union solution, was just a delusion. The + attempt of the working class leaders to separate politics and trade unionism led to inevitable defeat for the working class.

The lessons of this crisis were clearly drawn by the Communist Parties. As the President of the Communist International, Zinoviev, stated "Neutrality of the trade unions in the political struggle is a fantasy." An attempt therefore had to be made to wrest control of the unions away from the men who had condemned millions to unemployment by their actions in 1919. In order to try to do this, the RILU (Red International of Labour Unions) was set up. It was this organisation that gave the maur impetus for the formation of the Minority Movement.

The first conference of the Movement was held in Farringdon Hall on 23rd-24th August 1924. There were 270 delegates, representing approximately 200,000 workers. The main aim of the Movement was declared to be " organise the working masses of Great Britain for the overthrow of capitalism, the emancipa tion of the workers from oppressors and exploiters, and the establishment of a Socialist Commonwealth". The methods for achieving this were to be "...wide agitation and propaganda for the principles of the revolutionary class struggle and...to unite the workers in their everyday struggles against the exploiters...", with the most immediate aim being to fight against the present tendency towards social peace and class collaboration and the delusion of the peacetul transition from capitalism to socialism, and...to maintain the closest relations with the RIL U. The first programme adapted by the macement was an excellent one for the times calling for a pattonal mumunt wage of in an alersend wage increase of Ef a 44 hour week, workers control of mdustry and a streng thened TLIC Council. Growth of the Movement With a good programme and aided by the economic recovery of 1924, the Minority Move ment made rapid progress. The nuffiber of conference delegates rose from 271 in 1924, to 547 in 1926, with the number of trade unionists represented rising from 200,000 in 1924 to 957,000 in March 1926. The main strength of the Movement was in mining, engineering and transport. By 1926 over 200 miners' Minority groups existed; there were 153 in the engineer ing indastry and 126 in the NUR and the TGWU, while five small unions affiliated en bloc. Inside the unions themselves, the Movement built up real strength. In the Mineworkers' Union, for example, its stubborn resistance to the executive over the 1924 pay negotiations led to the South Wales, Scotland and Lancashire areas all voting against the executive decision to accept a wage deal which failed to make up the previous wage cuts. in the AEU, real support was gained for the C1-a-week rise of the Move: ment's programme, which culminated in a narrow defeat for a call for a national strike on the AEU National Committee in March 1926 All in all, it can be said that by 1926 the Minori Minority Movement was a real power in the trade unions and the working class, and that it had in its ranks many of the leading trade unionists in the country. In relatively democra tic unions such as the Mineworkers and the AEU, its influence was reflected right up to the national leadership level, while in totally undemocratic ones such as Thomas's NUR, it provided a militant rank-and-file movement for union democracy and working class policies. In fact, by 1926 the Minority Movement was developing into a movement which could have provided a real basis for a leadership not scated of taking political decisions and capable of preventing any repetition of the betrayal of the working class in 1919.

The leades of the movement enjoyed great preston Productand "Eke Staterman"

W35 Ten Mann He pois beena societist writer and dotator twice the 1380s and hard been one of the leaders off grot 1899 Does Stoke Hoo that time he had bion President of the Dock Whact Riverside and General Labourers' Union General Sectetary of the Independent Labour Party and eventually head of the British section of the RILU. Although by the 1920s he could not take part in day-to day administration, nevertheless his prestige, heightened by the frequency with which he had suffered imprisonment in defence of his principles, was invaluable to the movement. The other major national leaders were Harry Pollitt and J. T. Murphy: and the leader of the key mineworkers' section was Arthur Horner, who joined the Communist Party in 1920, was co-opted on to the Political Bureau in 1923, played a leading role in launching the miners" Minority Movement in South Wales alongside Arthur Cook, Noah Ablett and S. O. Davies, and after a chequered career in the Party and the Minority Movement in the 1920s, became President of the South Wales Miners" Federation in 1936 and General Secretary of the NUM in 1946 With leaders of a high calibre and a large following in the working class, the Minority Movement presented a real threat to the union leaders and they of course lashed out against it viciously. The methods used by these unionleaders show clearly that it is ridiculous.to see them as "moderate" men fighting for union rights, In fact they were men whose policies had led to the defeat of the working class in 1919, who repeated this during the General Strike and who were prepared to use any methods in order to defend the right-wing policies of their unions.

We may summarise at this point the position of the trade unions in the spring of 1926. The leadership of the main unions was still on the hands of the right-wing leaders who had been responsible for the defeat of the working class in 1919. On the other hand the militant Minority Movement, grouped around the Communist Party, had crown mormously and now included almost a quarter of all trade unionists. The Movement had good industrial policies and a leadership of great experience. The trial of strength between this revolutionary movement and the official ation leadership should have corne with the General Stuke of 1926 What in fact happened and the reasons for the eventual collapse ul the Minority Movement are deall with in the next issue of the Mole A Jones in the frst issue of the Mole we saw the social and political conditions that caused the birth and early rise of the Minority Movement. In addition we described the type of union leadership which the Movement had to fight against. The union leaders soon showed that they wore prepared to use any means against the growth of the Movement. The Attack on the Minority Movement The first major clash between the Minority Movement and the union leaders came in the AEU. Here, in complete breach of the Union's constitution, the Executive tried to prevent branches using funds they had collected in order to affiliate to the Movement. When this action was declared unconstitutional by the final court of appeal, the Executive then tried to change the union rules to legalise its actions retrospectively. This was too much for the Rules Revision Conference to stomach, however, and the Executive was defeated.

This incident in itself was enough, but it was oniy a foretaste of the type of methods which could be used in less democratic unions. A good example of the type of manoeuvre carried on is the case of the Boot and Shoe Workers Union. in this Union the Minority Movement gained its first support in the London Metro branch. Here it published a duplicated paper, London Boot and Shoe Worker. This called for a minimum wait of L3 10. O., a 44 hour week, the establishment of factory shop committees, the abolition of arbitration, the adjustment of the wage for union officials to that of average shoe workers' pay, and the ultimate acquisition of the shoe industry by the workers. Within a year of the London group of the Movement being set up, groups were active in Leicester, Northampton, Kettering, Statford, and Kilmarnock and a Minority Movement slate was put forware for the National Executive. Seeing the growth of this thris? to their entrenched position, thie Union leaders, hearled by Union President E. L Poulton de * to enrass the Movement. Poulton inster ted the President of the Leste Metra tench to charge the Movement's header ln the branch G W Chandler, with acting cor trary to the privisions of the Union. When Chandler's support in London preved 1o0 great 0 ther Psalton ask ed the Anuat

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Conference for powers to act over the heads of union branches. The Exetutive then fined Chandler and expelled him from the Union on his refusal to pay. The Executive than sent out a circular prohibiting members of the Communist Party or the Minority Moverent from holding Union office. By these "moderate" "democratic" measures, the Executive succeeded in destroying the power of the Movement in the Union. The Struggle in the Trades Councils In the 1920s, just as now, one of the main problems facing industrial militants was their isolation from each other: For this reason Trades Couricils, which allowed at least militants in the same area to meet regularly, were of great importance in the labour movement. The TUC. realising that the Councils could become a focus for rank-and-file discontent, tried to reduce them to nothing more than talking-shops. Instead of being local centres for coordinating trade union work, the TUC insisted that the Councils should merely *...act through their secretaries as labour correspondents for the TUC General Council, and forward to the same regular reports of their focal proceedings, together with such general information regarding movements among the organised workers as may be of use to the Council." Confined merely to this talking role, the Trades Councils were of little use. Therefore the Minority Movement's attempt to turn them into real "Councils of the working class" met with a ready response among militant workers. By March 1926, 50 Trades Councils, including London, Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds, Coventry and Sheffield, sent delegates to the Movement conference.

The importance of the Trades Councils to the TUC was considerable, for if the Minority Movement had succeeded in gaining a real hold in them, then the Councils could provide a real power base from which it would be possible to challenge the TUC leaders. What might have happened was seen on a small scole during the General Strike. Then Minority Movementcontrolled Councils formed then selves into "Councils of Action" in order to organise mass picketing, protection against police atrocks, etc. Seeing a danger to its entrenched power, the TUC acted against the Minority Movemeit in the Trades Councits almost as soon as it began to gain support there. Its first action was the fairly mild one of sending out a circular against the Movement, which, since the Minority Move ment's policy in the Trades Councils met a real need, had little effect. The TUC therefore decided to act against the Movement with dictatorial methods.

The first move by the TUC in this new cam: paign was to refuse to recognise Trades Councils which were in any way associated with the Minority Movement. They did this by obliging all Councils to sign a form declaring " ..that this Trades Council is not affiliated to the Minority Movement, nor does it receive affiliations from any branch of that organisation, and that, as a body, it is not associated in any way with the Minority Movement." In order to ensure that there was no sidestepping the circufar, every kind of local manoeuvre was carried on. For example, in London a card vote was introduced with delegates selected at district level, so as to ensure that delegates reflected the policy of the union leaders and not that of the local branches, This having been achieved, Communist Party members were then barred from standing for office and local Trades Coun cils which continued to elect Communist delegates were expelled. This mangeuvring by TUC turned the London Trades Council, for example, from a militant organisation performing a real function in linking up working class struggles, into an extremely reactionary organi sation which even refused to take part in the Committee welcoming the South Wales Hunger Marchers. Compared to this type of activity by the TUC, thu C.P.'s ballot rigging in the ETU seems a positive model of democracy! The closest to this method of manipulation we have seen in recent years was "Carron's law" in the AEU, and any engineering militant knows just , how "moderate" Carron was. The Communist Party The main target of attack by the union leaders was the Comnunist Party. This was the core and provided the leadership of the Movement Despitu the violent attacks of the official union leaders, the Party succeeded in maintaining the Minority Movement even after the great defest of the working class during the General Strike However, despite this apparent success by 1926, the C.P. was no longer the same type of organisation as it had been in the early 1920s.

When the British C.P. was founded in 1920, the working class movement was dominated by reactions to the Russian Revolution, For the ruling class, the prospect of a revolution in Britain was the ultimate horror, For the militant workers, on the other hand, the Russian Revolution was the greatest inspiration possible and lod to the kind of uncritical allegiance described later by Harry Pollitt when he said that, When the news of the Russian Revolution on November 7th 1917 came through ... all | knew was that the workers had conquered, were the top dogs somewhere in the world. That was enough for me. These were the lads and lassies I must support through thick and thin. And don't drop dead with fright when I also say that for me these same people could never do, nor ever can do, any wrong against the working class."

Although perhaps understandable, nevertheless this type of uncritical emotional support led ultimately to the collapse of the C.P, into supporting the reactionary policies of Stalin.

However, these dangers did not appear at once and at first the interest in, and willingness to learn from, the Russian Revolution had an enormously good effect on the young Commmnist Party.

When the C.P. was founded, the communist movement was dominated by Lenin and Trotsky.

Lenin had built up the Bolshevik Party which had made the Russian Revolution possible, while Trotsky had planned and actually carried out the Revolution. The policy of these men was summed up in a famous statement of Trotsky's that The working class has nothing but itself and its Party", What this policy meant in practice was that the Commynist Party had to rely on itself and must in no way trust the actions and pretended good wishes of the ruling class. It also meant that there was no substitute fou the slow work of building a revolutionary organisation, In Russia, it had taken twenty yeurs to create such a revolutionary party Lenin and Trotsky hoped that by learning from the mistakes and successes of the Russian Communis: Party the new Parties, such as the British one could complete the process in a far shorter period of time. Initially events seerned to be *proving them correct. For example, the British 17 it first been dominated by Communsts such an a refusal to work in the sectarian id trade union: 3 failure to work around factories. a failure to ork with hour D, ty members, and so on Linin's tomous book, Left Wind Communism-in hetante Disarder, Was largely devored to arrack ino such stupid ties. which only facithe effect of cutting the Communists off rom the working class. This pamphlet led to a great improvement in the work and policy of th early Com snists.

The reaction of thee ght wing unor leaders to the grown of the C.P. was even more hysterical than its reaction to the formation of the flinority Movement, -iners' leadies Fri Hodges, for example, cheched that CP moingers the intelle toal saves nt Mo were unthinking, anheeding, accepting decrens apo decisions without criticisnt or orders from the Asiatic mind, sal pet the (0ch ment of middie-class Russia-the c old regime- not even the sagemen! plan Russom people but the dictate decrees of the same type of ivelles despiser in his countru.!

This wowed ast people it. lanon movementil This Tears the C ted the fart that the bagn lanier vertm concerned to keep their can member order the they were in defeating thi employers and government. This am is clearly expressed in J. H. Thomass speech on the day after the General Strike son called off. He said:

What L eared most boat this suike more than anythi ig else was this it by any chance • should have got out of the hands of those who would be able to exercise some control, every sane man krons what would have happened, I thank God it never did." The General Strike As Thomas was making this speech in the com fort of the House of Commons, millions of British workers were suffering disillusionment and humiliation. Nine days earlier the TUC had called out over a million nien in a General Strike in support of the maters. The Betish working class had responded to the call with a solidarity that had amnzed even its most radical leaders. On the railways not a train moved In the docks not a ship was unloaded, and it the mines not a

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shovelful of coal was touched. In mines throughout the country everything from milk and food supplies to babysitting for men on picket duty was arranged by local union organisations. In effect, there were two powers in the countrythe government, which was based on the physical power of the police and the army, and the power of the working class, which rested on the millions of trade unionists who had demonstrated their loyalty to the ideal of working class soliderity. The aim of the government was simple-to humiliate the miners by reducing their wages, increasing their working hours and worsening their conditions. The aim of the strikers was also clear-to protect the miners and to prevent the government breaking the effective power of the trade union movement. In this struggle the physical power was on the side of the working class. No government, even the most brutal, can defeat a united working class numbered in millions. Yet despite its enormous strength, by the time J. H. Thomas made his speech, the working class had been defeated. Why? Reasons for the Defeat of the General Strike The defeat was certainty not due to any lack of solidarity on the part of the working class, The strength of the strike was amazing and the milttancy far from the Police v. strikers tootball matches" we are taught about at school, In fact there were riots in Canning Town, Poplar, Old Kent Road, Preston, Hull, Middlesborough, Doncaster and Edinburgh, among other places: In Glasgow buses were overturned, troops were sent into Hull, and wai ships were anchored in the Thames, Humber and Tyne. In all, over 3,100 people were arrested for incitement to sedition and violence. Neither was it the case that none of the strikers saw the strike as a political act. One Trades Council reported that the strike "was regarded as a straight fight between the TUC and the government" and was "a fine political weapon for Labour". Ellen Wilkinson related that a meeting cheered for many minutes when a miner said: *If the British Constitution makes a man work underground for less than E2 a week, it is ahout time that that Constitution was challenged. " Another writer quotes an ILP. man from the North as saying to him: "Man, Jolin, there's never been anything use it, it the tighters o leaders dinna let us down we'll hae the Capitalists crawlin' on • theirbellies in a week. Oh, boy, it's the revolution at last! This last view was echoed by many foreign journalists who poured into the country so as to havo a ringside seat for the coming "British Revolution".

In fact the reason for the failure of the General Strike was that the union leaders were terrified of their own power. It was 1919 all Even before the strike had begun, the trade union leaders had shown their half-hearted attitude by retusing to organise supplies for pickets, defence squads against the police, etc. While the yovernment made arrangements for printing its own newspaper, brought in troops to run buses and trains, and recruited thousands of students as scabs, the TUC leaders sat in Memorial Hall and sang the Red Flag. While Churchill called on the government to "act hard , the TUC General Council solemnly declared th at it did not challenge the constitution. Right from the beginning of the strike the TUC tried to call it off. Foremost among those trving to get the strike stopped was our old friend J. H. Thomas. He made contact with of all things, the Liberal Party on the second day of the strike, and finished up by accepting the government's demand for "unconditional , and he called on the Prime Minister to prevent "guerrilla wartare"". The Result of the Defeat of the General Strike The inuediate outcome of the ending of the strike was a tremendous destruction of the fighting spirit of the working class and the creation of a bitterness which lasted for at least twenty years. For the nine days of the strike, towns had been ruled by Strike Committoes, rod flags had flown, and the working class had tasted its own power. After the strike, millions of trade unionists found that they had to return to work on humiliating conditions.

For example: over 200,000 railwaymen wore shut out of work; in Brighton, busmen, tramwaymen and printers were forced to leave their unions, while the miners were left to fight on for six months. During this time they suffered appalling hardships and were forced to go back on worse terms than the mineowners had originally offered.

As for the government and the industrislists, they fully realised the extent of their victory. The government's newspaper, The British , Gazette, summed up their feeling in its headline, "Surrender Received by Premier" "Surrender of the Revo- Daily Mail trumpeted, lutionaries ... Revolution Routed." The capitalist class celebrated its victory by breaking off diplomatic contact with the workers' state in Russia and by passing the notorious 1927 Trades Disputes and Trade Union Act. This savagely restricted rights of picketing, forbade civil servants to join trade unions affiliated to the TUC, abolished the contracting out levy to the Labour Party and made sympathy strikes illegal. And what did our "moderate" trade union leaders have to say? As usual, Thomas put it most cleariy when he said, "1 have never disguised that in a challenge to the Constitution, God heip is unless the Government won." The Minority Movement and the General Strike In 1919 and 1926 we can see the same pattern repeated -a great upsurge of the working class leading to a situation where it is clear that the movement can only go in one of two directions. Either to bringing down the government and establishing a government based on working class power, or backward to a tremendous defeat for the working class. There was no other purely trade union choice. What is also common to these situations is that in both the trade union leaders backed down and as a result the working class was defeated.

It is fairly easy to see why this occurred in both situations; it is because for years beforehand these union leaders had been telling the working class that socialism could be achieved through Parliament and you cannot simply turn *We have said for round and suddenly say. twenty years that socialism could be achieved peacefully, but now we see we're wrong and the working class must achieve power by * On the contrary, if you do this, revolution. people won't act but will just be confused. To convince the working class that something as drastic as a revolution is necessary, at least two things must occur: firstly the working class must see with its own eyes that the government and employers are prepared to use force to protect their property and privileges, and secondly the working class must for years beforehand have heard the arguments in favour of revolution. The union leaders were committed to reformism, they could not tell millions of trade unionists on strike that they must carry out a revolution, even if they had desired it-which of course they didn't. If they had been committed to revolution, they would have had to argue and prepare the working class for it for years beforehand. (The position was exactly like that of Germany a few years later, when politicians who had said for years that violence was unnecessary to achieve socialism could not turn round and tell the working class it was necessary to resist Hitler by force.)

The Communist Party on the other hand was supposedly a revolutionary organisation, so we must ask, "What was its policy during the strike?" The Limits of the Minority Movement As we have seen, during its early history the Communist Party had been guided by Lenin and Trotsky's idea that the working class could only rely on itself and its party. If this policy had been applied in 1926, the difference in the outcome of the General Strike could have been enormous. In this type of great upheaval, a Party with a correct policy and a firm base in the trade unions can have an influence out of all proportion to its size. the Communist Party by 1926 had a firm base in the unions, in the shape of the Minoritv Movement, but its policies were no longer those of a revolutionary Party. They were the policies thrust on the foreign Communist Parties by Stalin, and by 1926 Stalin was trying to do a deal with the left wing of the TUC. This meant that the Communist Party had to adopt an attitude of not criticising "left wing" leaders. To see the difference that this meant to the policy of the C.P., consider the following comment on the subject of a Generat Strike in the Workers Weekly of July 24th 1924. *Immediately a section of workers comes out on strike, mass demonstrations must be organised by the Councils of Action in conjunc tion with the strike committees of particular unions. If the miners come out there must be mass demonstrations to the docks and railway centres, where the workers should be told to form section and job committees and prepare for action if official action is not taken." • Here we have a policy of militant action with a warning that the official leaders cannot be reiied upon. However, by late 1925 Stalin was negotiating, in the shape of the Anglo-

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Russian Trade Union Committee, with trade union leaders such as Cook and Purcell, and as . far as he was concerned, this meant that the British Communist Party must be careful not to offend these men. Instead of pointing out that the TUC could not be relied upon, the Workers Weekly began to speak of "good proletarian leaders like Swales, Hicks, Cook and Purcell." And "this proletarian leadership and the prole: tarian solidarity it was capable of organising and demonstrating was the really big thing that " (The "good proletacame out of the struggle. rians" referred to all agreed to the government's terms of unconditional surrender at the end of • the General Strikel) By spreading this type of confusion as to the nature of the TUC leaders, the C.P. helped to open the way for the calling off of the strike. Of course even if the C.P. had continued to organise and agitate in the way it had originally, there is no guarantee that it would have been successful, but its actual course of creating false illusions in the left "trade union leaders was foredoomed to failure The second reason for the failure of the General Strike was that a lobse organisation such as the Minority Movement is not sufficient to carry out a revolution. Revolution demands tremendous discipline and organisation and this can only come in a revolutionary party in which people are agreed on politics and not in a simple grouping of trade unionists, no matter how militant. Untıl the working class see the need to join a revolutionary party, they will inevitable be defeated in any situation such as the General Strike. Problems in the Trade Unions Today The problems we face in the trade unions today are almost exactly the same as those faced by the members of the Minority Movement, J.H. Thomas's NUR was no worse than Cannon's ETU, and the attack by the GMWU on the tremendous strike of the Pilkington glass workers only repeats on a small scale Thomas's refusal to help the miners in 1921. The thing that appears really different from the 1920s is that politics and trade unionism seem more separated now than they were then-we do not have a mutinous army or strikes of a million miners or troops on the streets.

In the 1920s the real struggle was concerned with whether or not the unions were to be allowed to defend their members. In a period of economic depression such as the 1920s, the industrialists could only maintain their profits by preventing the trade unions from protecting the pay and conditions of their members. This was the real reason behind the government's determination to crush to crush the General Strike, behind the employers' attack on the miners, and behind the 1927 Trades Disputes Act. However, by the 1970s many of the old symptoms have begun to appear again; for example, unemployment is now at its highest rate for twenty years and, most important, profits have begun to slip again. For example, the average rate of profit in industry fell from 13% to 10% between 1964 and 1966. In some key industries the fall is even greater: for example in the car industry profits fell from 35% in 1954 to 2% in 1967, while last year at least two of the big car companies-Rootes and British Leyland-made losses in their most important sections, In this situation, the employers and the government are being forced to attack the unions again, just as they did in the 1920s. This process has already started with the incomes policy. the In Place of Strife White Paper, and the new Tory proposals, Just as in the 1920s, the working class is resisting the government, with actions such as the Feb. 27th and May 1st strikes of 1969. We can also see *the beginnings of a new Minority Movement on the Committees for the Defence of Trade Unions and the ad hoc committees formed for the May 1st strike, It is the job of all revolutionaries to help create and spread these committees, and at the same time to avoid the fateful political mistakes the C.P. made in 1926. A. Jones

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Labour & Social Inequality (Red Mole 16/2/71) Housing The Labour Government's programme on housing was a pack of lies right from the beginning. It made great play during the 1964 election of the Tories' Rachmanite" Rent Act. But when the Labour Government got round to repealing the Act, they did so in a virtually meaningless way. By failing to extend protection of tenure to furnished property, they created a situation where if a landlord stuck a few old chairs in a room, then he could claim that the property was furnished and therefore the tenant had virtually no security at all. All this was pointed out to Harold Wilson & Co. at the time but they somehow "forgot" to de anything about it.

Due to complete neglect by all goverments, the housing situation in Britain is appalling. Even in 1968 it was calculated that an additional three million houses were needed simply to replace those already slums or so old as not to What is more, the oldest be worth repatring. housing falls into those categories where there is least protection for the tenant. For example. 755 of all furnished accommodation is in houses built during or before the First World War.?

The facts on the housing situation were well known to the Labour Government. For example in 1967 an official report came out which found that 1,700,000 houses were unfit for human habitation. The report found that of these houses, 79 out of every 100 lacked a hand washbasin, 77 out of every 100 lacked an inside lavatory, and 72 out of every 100 had no proper bath.

The main speaker at the TUC, Harold Wilson, of course did nothing about the profiteering in human misery which these figures reflect. On the contrary, when it came to. for example. the cuts after devaluation wilebind contrerts The Chopped went strIpembered council houses to be built was cut by 15,000. It is important to realise that despite the cery large number of people living in council housing, almost the entire profit from housing goes into the hands of capitalists. To show this, consiger the main ways of getting a home. If you are buying your own house, then you have got to get a mortgage. In that case, at least 100г profit on the deal will be made by the firm lending the money. For example, if you bought a house at E4,000. you would pay back at least 58,000 on a normal mortgage. £4,000 to the money lender.

On council housing, the vast majority of rent payments also goes to money lenders. For example. for the GLC in 1969-70 it was estimated that 18.3 out of every E1 income from rents will go to money lenders.* Under the Labour Government, the proportion going this way went up steadily from 79; of all income from rents to 89°c of all such income.

The biggest money-making racket of all is in privately rented housing. For a start off private landlords charge the most. For example. on a house worth 3,750, the average rent charged by a private landlord is three times as much as that charged by a local authority and half as much again per week as it would cost the occupier to buy the house himself.f The housing conditions themselves in privatelvrented housing are also the worst. The offieial survey of 1967 found that 33 c of all privatelyrented housing was unfit."

The Labour Government did nothing to sort out this situation. On the contrary, it saw housing as something it could cut back on. Thus. for esample, as we have seen. it cut 16,000 of the council house building scheme. The general effect of the Labour Government's policies can be seen in the housing records of the foilewing No. et houses built int 1968 1969 Tower Hamlets 952 669 720 641 Barking 496 1393 Newham 430 Southwark 3345 688 1317 Gateshead 18 Wallsend 298 87 Jarrow 406 Worksop 181 6 A fine record for the last full year of Labour government! Unemployment It might appear obvious from the housing figures that terrible shortages exist. In the field of bousing, as in every other social service. an enormous inerease in production is necessary In a sensible economic sistem prery single available person would be used to boost prodaction in this and other areas. But such is the economic systein of capitalism that at a time when a great Inereas in effort in theop areas is needed, the government is systematteally involved un putting people out of work. The Labour Party kicked up a big fuss when it was recently announced that unemployment in Januar 1971 was 690,000. Quite rightly, they said that unemployment was unacceptable as an economic control. The trouble was that no one could take their objections seriously as Un Labour Govern ment itself accepted the dictates of the capitalist economic system and had always created unemployment as a way of controlling the economy when it was in office.

In the first five years of the Labour Government alone, and directh due to the policies of that Government. the number of unemploved rose from 340,000 to 551.000. Thas increase in unemployment of over 200.000 represented a Inss in production of over 45 million working days a vear. Yet by October 1968 was Harold Wilson denoureing the lost production which was caused by this deliberately created unemployment? No: instead he was talking of the "wrecking" activities of the seamen, and the "subversives" in the car industry who were causing losses in production, Never in the entire period Labour were in office did the number of days of production lost through strikes reach even one-tenth of that lost through anemployment. But we never heard anythug about the "wreckers" and "subver sives" in the government. Not surprising, If cou accept the capitalist system, then unemplos ment is inevitable. Alter all, what does unemplorment matter to the huge firms? Many large firms. for esample GEC, AEl, ete., enios their greatest prosperity during periods of high anemplosnant. Their caleulation is a simple oak. High unemployment means that we can frighter our workers into accepting that there will be no toal increase in pay. No increases in pat twins higher profits. This particular game need a front man in government to carry out the dirty work of creating the unemployment i the first place. Harold Wilson and the Labour Party were ideally suited for that role.

Apart from the general increase in unemployment, what made the situation far worse was that the duration of unemployment for men out of work went up during this period. The number of men out of work for over a yes went up by nearly half, and the number of mer out of work for over eight weeks doubled.

A feature which was particularly severe about this increase in unemployment was the way it was concentrated in certain areas. For example. in Northern Ireland unemployment even he Defaber 1968 had reached 8.6% and ir Norther Koland it had reached 6.2%

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Low pay and inequalitv of wealth Before he came to power, Harold Wilson liked to give the line about how the Labour Party in general, and himself in particular, were completely opposed to low pay and poverty. He said that, men are very ruggedly equal. The Yorkshire Socialist reacts from poverty not so much because it is a product of inefficiency and a badly run social system, but because it is a crime against God and man. "6 Yet it is probably in the field of low pay that the Labour Government's record was worst-not to say most dishonest. It is now calculated that over one in six children now lives below the poverty line? This figure is practically obscene when compared to calculations that 1% of the population owns 81% of the industrial shares.

The Labour Government did nothing about this situation. Of course they tried to conceal this. For example we were told at first that. the Incomes Policy was aimed at helping the worst off. This claim always was a fast one as the only people who really gained from the holding down of wages were the firms who hoped to make higher profits as a result. After a while even this most dishonest of governments was forced to admit this. Thus Harold Walker, then Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department of Employment and Productivity, was forced to admit that "It is not a primary function of the Government's Prices and Incomes Policy to redistribute wealth." Even this was dishonest as it was no function at all of the Incomes Policy to redistribute wealth in any direction other than that of in favour of the employers.

After their bluff with the Incomes Policy, the Labour Government did not even particularly pretend to help the low-paid. They turned to union-bashing instead. Perhaps to have pretended would have over-stretched the powers for deceit even of H. Wilson, Castle & Co. as during this last four years in office those at or below the Supplementary Benefit level doubled.?

The situation now, after six years of Labour "In the part of the world 1 come from, government is roughly as follows: the TUC calculates that a minimum wage of £16.10.0. 1s an absolute minimum. If they were realistic they would admit that with spiralling prices, rents, etc., this is far too low. But even taking this miserably low level, Labour did nothing to help this minimum wage. If we take even 8/- an hour (equivalent to £16 for a 40-hour week), then there are now still over 75 categories of occupation where at least 25% of the workforce gets less than this an hour. '° Some of the individual figures are frankly horrifying. For example, over 80% of women manual workers (classified by occupation) get under 8/- an hour." What is more, all the talk of a wages explosion is nonsense as far as the low-paid are concerned. The increase in poverty revealed by the report of the Child Poverty Action Group is inevitable when you have a situation where you have a situation where prices have been going up at 6-8% a year but in at least 90 industries wages have only been going up at 4% a year. 12 When Harold Walker admitted that the Incomes Policy was not aimed in any way at reducing inequalities of wealth, he made, in the same speech, a claim that the elimination of this inequality was being carried out by Labour s taxation policy. It is therefore worth looking at just what this policy was aimed at doing.

During the first three years of the Labour Government alone, taxation went up fastest on the worse off. For example, on the wage we discussed before of E16 a week, the proportion of total income paid in all forms of taxation went up by over 15%, whereas for incomes over t60 a week, it only went up by less than 3%.

Even for old age pensioners, the Labour Government did nothing about the fact that over 20% of their miserly pension income goes in tax.

The situation is even worse if children are taken into account. In the case of families with one child, the proportion of income paid in taxes during the first three years of the Labour Government went up as follows. For a family with an income of E11, taxation went up by nearly 30%, whereas for a family with an income of over £35, it went down slightly. Taking the family with two children, we find that by the end of the same period, a family with an income of over E50 a week was paying 31% of its income in tax, while a family with an income of £11 was paying 41%.

Nothing was done about the retrogressive rates system either. A family with an income of E22 a week paid over 50% more, as a proportion of its income, in rates that did a family with an income of over E58 a week.

So much for Harold Walker's claim to be redistributing wealth-through taxation.

As compared to all this, the capitalists did very well indeed under Labour, On a trivial level Arnold Weinstock got a knighthood after sacking 12,000 men and there was even an official honour for the man who made Harold Wilson's raincoats. On a more serious level, the firms raked in the profits to the tune of £1,383, 240,000 for the ten biggest firms alone. The Parliamentary farce We could have investigated many other features

dents, ete. Those points covered should, however, bring home that this was a government carrying out the policies to fit the needs of the capitalist elass. The important lesson to learn is why this was the case. Was it, as the Left Labourites claim, because Wilson "betrayed" the Labour Party, or did it stem from something much more fundamental?

In his more lucid moments even Harold Wilson was on the way to understanding why his government had no choice but to carry out the dictates of the capitalist system. In a speech to the TUC in 1964, he said, "If you borrow from some of the world bankers you will quickly find that you lose... Independence, because of the deflationary policies and the cuts in the Social Services that will be imposed on a goverment that has got itself into that position."15 Wilson was on the right track but he could have looked closer home. It is not only international capitalists, the "gnomes of Zurich", who wanted "deflationary policies and cuts in the social services", but British capitalists as well. That lesson was rammed home in the first few weeks of the Labour Government, when hundreds of millions of pounds-worth of capitalist assets were transferred out of the country simply because the bourgeoisie had a misguided fear that Labour might do something to improve the situation of pensioners.

Exactly the same employers and financiers who now write irate letters to newspapers about the political strikes on Dec. 8th and Jan. 12th then were the people who carried out a capitalist political strike. From then on the lesson to Wilson was clear; either play ball with the capita list class or that class will wreck the economy. Strangely enough, it didn't even need a Marxist to tell Wilson that this action by the bourgeoisie was inevitable. Even dyed-in-thewool reformer Sir Stafford Cripps had pointed out that the "idea that the wielders of economic power will cooperate with a Labour Governmen. is quite fantastic". What he meant here of course was a Labour Goverment which attacked capitalism. A Labour Government which carries out the policies of the capitalist class is of course no threat. On the contrary, because the working class has illusions in the Labour Party, the bougeoisie frequently prefers that attacks on the

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working class shoold he carried out by the Labour Party. Thus, for example. i 1931, a prominent representative of the bourgeoisie gave the following piece of advice to George V: "in view of the fact that the necessary economies would prove most unpalatable to the working classes it would be in the general interest if they were imposed by a Labour Government. "16 The "necessary economies" meant the slacking of unemployment pay in the interests of the employing class. The "general interest" meant of course the interest of big business. Exactly the same role was forced on the last Labour Government. Its "economies": as we have seen, were "most unpalatable to the working classes. "

The Labour Left of course refuses to see that the power of the ruling class is in its economic control, not in its ability to win elections. The Labour Party are united on this, from Harold Wilson to the most "extreme leftwinger. Wilson speaks for the belief of the entire Labour Party when he says, "Whatever people say, at an election, the old establishment only have one vote each at the end of the day. So has the engineer and miner in my constituency. "7 What is more. the Labour "lefts" desperately try to confine the struggle entirely to Parliament. Thus, for example, when one of Tribune's columnists suggested that an M.P. was calling for industrial action, that M.P. sent in a letter saying that "1 should hate Francis Flavius to give anyone the idea that I am now calling for mass action from the trade union movement against it | the Incomes Policy].** The trouble is that while Tribute places such emphasis on elections, unfortunately for them the bourgeoisie does not. It knows that its power to bend any government to carrying out policies in the interests of the bourgeoisie will last as long as that bourgeoisie controls the economy and this has the power to sabotage any steps taken by a Labour Goverment.

Why then does the Labour Left at say clearly that immedatete after being returned to office a Socialist government would have to take econatic control, and therefore ownership. out of the hands of the capitalist class? The reason for this is sample. No class is going to give up its power, wealth and position peacefully. Can you imagine saying to Sir Arnold Weinstock that he has had a good innings but now he is going to have to give up his race. horses and get down to learning how to operate a lathe? Just to ask the question is to see the answer. For anyone who still believes in the uniquely "peaceful and democratic" nature of the British bourgeoisie just consider the example of Belfast, Here we see the whote might of the British Army being used in defence of a regime that refuses to grant even the most elementary rights on housing. jobs, ete. and which is openly "racialist" as regards the Catholic minority: If the British bourgeoisie is prepared to use force in that sitation, it would not hesitate for a moment to use it against a British working class that was trying to deprive the bourgeoisie of the source of its power. The Labour Left can of course point none of this out as if it did it would have to argue for the working class to prepare to meet force with force, and the Labour Lefts would die with fright at this prospect.

The C.P. of course tries to have it both ways, It states that violence is not inevitable but then states in small print in the British Road to Socialism that of course it cannot be ruled out. This is meaningless. The working class will not use violence, even defensive violence, if it has been told for years that it can get everything by peaceful means. It will only use violence if for years before it has heard the arguments which show that violence is inevitable. This is why it is absurd when, for example, C.P.s and Left Labourites say things like, ' Of course it would have been correct for the German working class there resisted Hitler be force " How can cou possibly expect working class to respond to such appeals if it has been told for decades that violence is unnecessary? If force, whether revo lutionary or even anti-fascist force, is necessary. then we must begin to answer the case for it now. The British Road to Socialism, by glossing over the long period needed to persuade the working class of the need to use force, prepares the way for terrible defeats for the working class. It is not the revolutionaries who are "unrealistic" but those who believe that the capitalist class will cooperate in actions against its own interests, or will even peacefully accept its own defeat. After six fruitless years of Labour Government, more workers are coming to see that the onis realists are the revolutionaries and that the most "unreasonable" people are the faded old parliamentarians like Sid Bidwell and all the C.P. leaders who want to ape him.

J. Marshall

1. A Manual of Applied Statistics, ed. Prest. 2. Socially Deprived Families in Britain Ed. Holman

Not a Penny on the Rents. Holman, op cit. The Politics of Harold Wilson P. Foot, p. 326 7. Child Poverty Action Group Press Release, 21/1/71. 8. Robin Blackburn in The Incompatibles. 9. Child Poverty Action Group, op cit. 1D. DEP Gazette, Dec. 1970, p. 1114-6. 12. Incomes DATA report on 126 Industrial Groups. 13. Economic Trends, Feb 1969.

15. Quoted in The Forgotten Englishmen - Coates &

16 Pariamentary Socialism, ed. Milband, p 176. 17 Foot, bo cit p. 337. 18. bid. p. 319

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The Labour Party - what it is & how to fight it (Red Mole 1/6/71) The combination of the increasingly right wing policies of the Labour Party and the tremendous decline in working class involvement in that party have led some revolutionaries. and even a certain number of worker militants, to believe that the working class will now bypass the Labour Party in any struggle. They have advanced the view that the entire working class has somehow "seen through" the Labour party and regards it in exactly the same light as the Tory party. This has led to suggestions such as calling on workers to abstain in any General • Elecion, organising the breaking up of Labour party meetings, and so on. While such attitudes, particularly amongst worker militants, are an extremely welcome siga of increased political radicalisation. nevertheless they constitute a recipe for political disaster. No matter how much the organisational hold of the Labour Party over the working class has declined, as long as there exists no credible alternative to the Labour Party the working class will still be dominated ideologically by that Party. This domination may express itself either in an active for. in terms of involvement in the Labour Party or even in the negative form of refusing to undertake certain courses of action because they see no alternative to Labour.

To understand this domination you simply have to consider for example what would be the effect if prominent members of the left wing of the party were expelled. Even if workers still refused to take a part in the affairs of the party, it would still be the case that every worker would be aware that there was a political dispute, and would in a vague sense know who stood for what. Such an event would politicise certain sections of the working class in a way that, for example, the mass exodus of members from, and crisis in, the Communist Party in 1956-57 never did. For the mass of politically conscious workers politics still means the Labour party, and that fact is not altered in the slightest because they may follow shop stewards who are Communist Party members, or take part in and even organise political strikes which are molently condenined by the Labour Party The most that the changes that hovt lace place over the last 15 or 16 vears can signify is that the tactics for dealing with the Labour party may change. In no way however can these tactics be raised to the level of a principle. The principle still remains that the working class will only break with the Labour Party in the course of a struggle against the leadership and bureaucracy of that party. It will not simply bypass that party.

Without a correct understanding of the role and nature of the Labour Party it Is impossible to make a meaningful untervention in the worl workers movement. Until a really credible alternative exists for workers, polically advanced ones will always vote for Labour rather than Heath & co. In this the instincts of the working class are perfectly correct. A worker who votes Tory is a backward worker. A person who refuses to vote Labour when the only alternative is the Tories is aiding the Tories. He is voting for an explicitly chiss class collaboratist policy As longs this situation continues revolutionaries will ahear tell workers to vote Labour.

But merely to say vote Labour rather thin Tory is not nearly sufficient. If workers were to vote Labour in the belief that a Lahour government will actually solve the problems of unemployment, housing. inflation. etc. then they would suffer a complete demoralisation and become apathetic when they find that this is not the case. This means that aithough revolutionaries explicitly tell workers to vote Labour, never under any circumstances do they tone down their criticism of that party. On the contrary the task is to explain at all times that in order to solve its problems the working class will have to fight not only the Tories but the Labour Party as well. The correct attitude to the Labour party is the one expressed at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, "Vote for it. but prepare to struggle against it". It is not sufficient however to say simply that it is necessary to fight the Labour Party, It is nevessity to tight for something as well as against something It is at this point of decling what demands and policies it is necessary to pur forward that Marxists part company with every type of reformist. WHAT POLICY FOR REVOLUTIONARIES The basis from which the Labour Party and all reformists start their thinking is that it is possible to solve the immediate problems of the working class without destroying capitalism. They believe that Socialism is a good theory but in the short term capitalism can be reformed to solve the problems of unemployment, rising prices, etc. All their energies go into trying to reform capitalisin. This means for example that they put forward plans of economic growth to cure unemployment which rely the investment to create the means to carry them out on the same capialists who are throwing people out of work. In fact the destruction of capitalism is not some distant dream but is the only way of solving the immediate, direct, everyday needs and problems of the working class. Withour the ending of capitalism no government would have the economic means to carry out any programme of measures in the real interests of the working class.

From this simple fact it follows that the demands and policies which revolutionaries must advance are those that directly challenge capitalist ownership of the economy. Simply to advocate 4 or 5 reformist demands not including the ending of capitalist ownership of the economy, is to try to get the working class to. fight for a policy which will not solve its prob. lems even if that policy were carried out. Such a policy is a recipe for disillusionment, and demoralisation, not for success.

But if the policies which need to be fought for are socialist and not reformist ones, this does not solve the problem of where the people o tight for them are to come from, It is at this point that the decline in working class participation in the organisations of the Lahour Portal molentlees unt ahter the general princip as regaeds the Labour parts. namelv that worl i saps bypast an struggle, but i do alter!

Ste Sales that need to be

THE ORGANISTIIONAL DECLINE OF THI LABOUR TARTY Asa dalete polfcies of the last Labour govemen and even more because of the fail of the lete wing of the Labour party to really oppose them. there has been a catastrop fall in the membershup and orgamsational. strength ofthe Labour party. For example sin 1900 0V1 30,000 individual members have let the Labour Party. Attendance at ward meeting has stump s4 ever more. Largely due to this rap fall in membe stup and activity the of the Playin a state of complete dispat The membet of full time party agents is now down to 144 compared to a figure of 290 in 1951.

It isworth looking at the changes in party membership and compare it to say 1951. In that year thore was no doubt that what politic activity there was in the working class express itself in the Labour party. Every single revolutionary organisation carried out serious work inside the Labour party, In that year individu membership of the Labour party stood at 876,000, In the General Election of that year although it lost the election it still received 48.8% of the vote.

The situation now is changed beyond beliet Purely in terms of votes (probably the worst indicator of the working class's interest in the party). in 1951 the Labour Party received 1,800,000 more votes than it did in 1970 and that despite the fact that in the meantime the number of clectors has risen by 3 million. Membership has fallen by nearly 200,000, and from 876.000 it now stands at 680,000. This figure itself is probably a gross exaggeration of the number of members. This exaggeration springs from the fact that no constituency

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Labour Party con affiliate on less than 1,000 members. This means that if only 5 people attend meesings and only a couple af hundred pay any subscription, this still goes down in the figures as 1,000 people It is difficuit to find out what the real figures are but there are only 9D constituencies which have over 1,000 members. All the other 500 or so have less than that igure. (2) One survey which may show just how exaggerated the figures for membership are was one in Birmingham which found that the average membership of the 13 constituency parties in the city was 390. If these figures were typical of the entire country then the Labour Party would only have something like a third of its claimed membership. The decline of interest and participation in party affairs is even greater than the decline in membership. For example last year 172 constituency and borough parties did not even bother to send representatives to the Party's annual conference (3).

Although the policies of the Wilson government were an open attack on the working class, and were seen as such by many workers, this need not necessarily have produced such a fall in participation in the Labour party. On the contrary if the Tribunites and the general "left" had put up real fight many workers would have joined in the activities of the party as a way of fighting Wilston. What really condemned the Labour Party to its present state was the refusal of Michael Foot, Eric Heffer, Stan Newens, ete. to wage any sort of fight against Wilson's policies. This was completely in line with their retreat on previous positions such as the 1960 Labour conference decision calling for Britain to abandon the H bomb. In the name of "unity" working class it does not follow that somehow the so called left winger steadfastly refused to wage a real campaign against Wilson. They are continuing this policy even now by, for example, political analysis that the Labour Party is no! withdrawing their motion against the Industrial Relations Bill in the interests of "unity" with Wilson and Castle. As long as no real fight is put up inside the constituency section of the Labour party, workers are unlikely to rejom in significant numbers and the Tribunites have already shown that they do not intend to fight. It cannot of course be ruled out that in the future. there will not be a revival of activity inside the Labiar Party constitueney pattes, but for now he fores to fight against the policies of the Labour Party and against the Tones must ho sought clsewhere.

THE CLASS NATURE OF THE LABOUR PARTY It is at this point that the decline in participation of the working class does begin to determine tactics even although it does not alter the general principle concerning the Labour Party.

Although in social terms the Labour party draws its support from the working class, in political terms it defends capitalism. It theretore is, as Marxists have always recognised. u bourgeois party (4). In fact in certain situations, stich as 1931 and 1945 it plays a role that in no other-party could defending capitalism However just because Labour is politically speaking a bourgeois party it is not the case that revalutionaries have the same attitude to such - party as they do to for example the Tory party. On the contrary although the Labour party is not a workers party in a political sense it is a party of the working class. An organisation can be a party of the working class on at least two counts. Firstly, it can be such a party if its programme is at least neminally opposed to capitalism. a.e. a socialist one, or it can be one because the party rests on the organisations of the working class. It is now chiefly on the second of these two counts that the Labour Party can be considered a party of the working class.

But because an organisation is a party of the

the workers can take control of such a party. On the contrary it is an elementary principle of reformable. It is a totally burcaucratised party whose leadership maintain them power by any means possible. There is a rigorous system of bans and prescriptions on members ofthe Labour Party. In times of challenge to the leadership these are rigorously enforced and strengthened. If we look simply at the 1960s we can see that the decade opened with the expulsion of many of the leading mumbers of (2iinside the Labour Party for long enough to gain the Labour Party's Young Socalist. Further of the deade revealed m mor: the first ver practic dace agan at the bearbor wugh canference, the simple fact that the teading members of the Party are in no was under the control of the supposedly highest organisations of the Party such as the Annual Conference It does not matter whether the Party is in opposition, as in the case of nuclear disarmament in 1960, or in power, as in the case of Incomes Policy, as in 1970. the leaders of the Labour Party will always obey the dictates of capitalism rather than the wishes of their members and if their members object too strongly or systematicolly then they are simply expelled. This control extends down ulso to the selection of candidates. An example of this was the refusal of the Labour party to allow John Palmer to stand as a candidate in a Croydon constituency despite the fact that he had been selected by the local

Endless examples could be given of the bureaucratic nature of the party. A fairly typical example of this would be the expulsion from the party of the Secretary of the Hazingey Action Committee for Tenants because of activity in opposition to the GL.C's rest rises. Time followed the expulsion from the Labour group of councillors for action they had taken on housing. The type of action thes nd to put up with before they were expelled was for example example the refusal of Harincey borough council on two occasions in 1967 to receive a delegation bringing a petition from the tenants' committees. Although at that time the council had 51 Labour and only 19 Tory councillors. the motion to receive the delegation was refused by 27-23. This vote was determined by the leaders of the L. Bour group of councillors threatening to arpet anyone who voted to receivo the delegation. To take just one example of bureatcratic contrel at a higher level, we might consider the 1963 LPYS conference. Here a threat to the leadership was solved by simply tigzing the vital •standing orders committee by removing the only left winger from it. Even in the unlikely event of any revolutionary tendency surviving the support of the natteut conterence, this would still solve nothing The real leadership of the Labout Party, the parhamentary members, are quite at liberty to ignore any decisions taken. In short the Labour Party is totally unceformable. The only question facing socialists is how to destroy its influence over the working class (5). DESTROYING THE INFLUENCE OF THE LABOUR PARTY The Labour Party is not reformable, but that does not mean that there is no point in carrying on a struggle inside it. On the contrary it is only by a widespread struggle inside the entire working class movement including inside the Labour Party that the working class will be repoliticised. The qualification on that however is that it is not possible to wait until such a struggle has occurred and the working class has become more political before commencing the struggle. On the contrary to wait until then would be fatal. It is necessary to organise the working class for independent action right from the beginning. This point also interlinks with a position on the constituency Labour Parties.

During the 1920s and 1930s if a worker left his constituency Labour Party, it was undoubtedly a sign of political backwardness | the only exception to this of course is those who joined the C.P. during the 1920s). To leave the Labour Party then meant to leave an organisation which was at least on paper incomparably to the leit of the present Labour Party, which activity contained within its organisations a mass of workers, and which had not yet had a chance to really show what it would do when in office. Now however a worker leaving the Labour Party has a totally different significance. In many cases it means that they see the futility of slogging their guts out within a constituency, ward, city party which is powerless to intluence in the slightest the policies of "their" party. Ideologically these people are still dominated by the ideas of the Labour Party, as we have discussed, but in no way can leaving the Labour Party be now equated with a retreat unto political backwardnos. (as it could undoubtedly have done in the "20s or "30s). On the contrary it is minty of ches

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militants who had abandoned work inside the constituency parties who have been responsible for the movement against the Incomes Policy. In Place of Strife, against the Tory anti-union laws ete. What leaving the party means in the present situation is certainly not that the mass of workers are on the verge of joining revolu tionary organisations or that they have rejected the ideology of Labourism, but it does fre. quently mean that they have seen the futility of banging their heads against a brick wall inside a constituency Labour Party.

A realisation that the rank and file of the party cannot change anything is an extremely positive step potentially: If it leads to apathy and giving up all political activity it is of course disastrous, but whether that occurs depends entirely on whether an alternative is seen to work inside the constituency parties. The key to whether this will be the case is work inside the Trade Unions.

The trade unions stand in a very different relation to the working class than does any political party and especially a party like the Labour Party. A political party such as the Labour Party can become a government and attack the working class, The trade unions on the other hand remain defensive organisations of the working class. The working class can leave situation, it is extremely unlikely that the left the organisations of a political party in disgust. the continual pressure of the economic struggle against the bourgeoisie will however keep these same people in the organisation of the trade unions, In particular in a period of intensified class struggle the internal life and authority of the trade unions can only increase. In addition the structural relation of the leaders of the trude unions to the working class is different to the relation of the leaders of the Labour Party to the working class.

The leaders of trade unions are based on organisations of the working class at the point of production. These organisations are involved in relatively continual strugeles, Any movement inside the working class is therefore reflecred! fairly dircetis intide the trade unions.

The sit tation of the Labour Party is very two ways. Fustly directly via the constituency Labour Parites, and secondly indirectly vil the leaders of the trade unions What has happened during the 1950s and 1960s is that the first of these links has shrivelled almost completely This means that the only strong organisational link which the Labour Party retains with the working class in an organisational sense is vin the trade unions and the leaderships (Which is not the same as saying, to repeat for the nith time, that the ideological relation does not still exist).

Given this situation the people who naturally emerge as the leaders of opposition inside the Labour Party are not the "left wing" hambers of the constituency and parliamentary patties. their base inside the working class is now eroded for that, but the lenders of the Trade Unions This means that now these men represent to the muss ot workers hot merely trade unt lenders but the only really credible political altemativa to the present policies and feaders of the Labour Party. It is men like Jones and Scanion who now possess the credibility, because of their "left" positions, and the base inside the the working class to directly challenge for the position of the leadership of the working class They can in fact play a directly politicarole if they wish. Without a complete change in the entire politien! of the constituency and parliamentary Parties can summon cither the political militancy or the organisational base to challenge the leadership of the Labour party in the way that the trade union leaders now cun. Whereas in the 19203. 30s, 40s, '50s and even "60s the key political struggle inside the Labour Party was that between the constituency parties and the leadership (with trade unions frequently standing to the right of the leadership), now the organisational decline of the local parties makes such a conflict extremely unlikely, and its significance lesseven if it does occur. This point is confirmed by the whole trend of recent years I'we lonk moraly at the anneto mun ences of the Labour Party what we typically sia stricale between the constituency Labour purs whip cont liue to cast their votes umion leaders. Even in the event of a resurgence of the CLPs. it is clear that the core of opposition to the party leaders will remain the trade unions 1t b in the light of this situation that revolutionaties must consider their tactics and Mrategy- WHAT NEXT? It is of course impossible to foresee in detail the short term course of the class struggle in Britain. What however is clear is that there is no possibility of British capitalism solving its economic problems. This rules out a period of reforms granted through Parliament. If there is a real struggle it will come from the trade unions. This will continue the situation where their leaders are the main alternative pole of attraction to the present Labour leaders.

There may of course be a revival of activity anside the constituency Labour parties, and particularly inside the LPYS, in the coming period. If this occurs then ohviously some revolutronary forces may have to concentrate their efforts on these groups. However even if these do revive, the core of any oppositional move. ment will be the huge organised power of the trade unions. The main line of argument for revolutionaries would be to argue that the Trade Unions should impose their will on the Labour party conference so as to create a state of continual conflict between the unions and the parliamentary party. This would also really put people like Foot and Heffer on the spot.

The tasks facing revolutionaries are therefore twofold. On the one hand they must of course continue to put forward their traditional siogans of nationalisation, workers control, etc. which present an alternative policy for the working class and which educate people as to the nature of the leaders of the working class movement. Bur vou do not build a real movement simply by putting forward chunks of the transitional programme at the appropriate time. This is a view of politics which consists of "unveiling" the programme as an instrument of recrutment and not of struggle, It fails to understand that the relationship between the working class and one, Is never a ditect one but is mediated through a whole series of organisations, and that to say "build the alternative leadership settles nothing As we noted the mam struggle in the present period is poing to be between the trade union movement and the capitalist class and berween the trade unions and the Labour leadership. In this situation it is not the task of revolutionaries to say that workers must first go through the "stage of engaging in years of impossible struggle inside the constituency Labour parties On the contrary, the task of revolutionaries is to say. "Yes, we agree that the trade untons are at the moment the only organisations actuaily fighting the bourgevisie, and that it is therefore necessary to work steadfastly within the unions But it is impossible to fight capitalism's attacks simply through trade union action. If you believe the trade unions are a weupon of struggle then you must see that they must also become - political weapon. They must impose their policy in the political arena. They must become the core of a political movement against the present lenders of the working class. In short. atry anticapitalist, that is to say, workers" government must buse itself on the trade unions and the trade unions must become the key instrument in struggling for such a government.* It is this orientation that the slogan "A workers government based on the trade unions" indicates It indicater a ine of advance and not some abstract and immediate call for the dictatorsinp of the proletariat. Neither is it a slogan to be counterposed to a call to vote Labour at any General Election. Nor is it a substitute for concrete demands aimed at showing the real nature of the Labour leaders, It simply lays down the main line of argument and development for a real struggle against the present Labour leaders, and it retains that validity whether that struggle is conducted mainly made or outside the Labosi Patty. It c.n. pixirse, in certain circumstances become an agitanional demand and one counterposed to the Labour Party. This would be the case if, as can be by no

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Tabour an at the polite crets polesares | Whatever Happened to the Labour Left (Red Mole 7/2/72 ment entered a coalition with the Tories to "save the country", "prevent anarchy", etc. in these circumstances it becomes a direct call to the Trade Unions to break with the Labour Party and organise politically independently of it. In the coming period however its main significance is to define an orientation of making the trade unions into the core of a struggle against the Labour leaders, and making trade unionists conscious of the fact that this is the

In short the position as regards the Labour Party is as follows: Organisationally it has suffered a catastrophic decline. This must however not be confused with an ending to its ideological domination of the working class. This hold cannot be broken without a struggle inside the labour movement. The tack of revolutionaries is to heighten this struggle by increasing at all times the tension between the Trade Unions and the Labour Party. Such an orientation is summed up in the slogan "A workers government based on the trade unions". It is only by adopting such an orientation that socialist demands for workers control, nationalisation, etc. ceases to be mere propaganda and become instruments of struggle. Without it the only answer you can give to a worker who says "1 agree with your policies, how am I to organise to implement it", is to say "join us" and titat is a formula for a sect not a struggle. The agitational demands which flow from this orientation say organise politically inside the trade unions, use your trade union as a way of organising to fight for these policies inside and if necessary outside the Labour Party." It is only in this way that demands for nationalisation & workers control move out of the realm of 'exposure politics and into the realm of the class struggle. A. Jones IT LEvaBack Review April 1969 (2) There are 8 constituents sua more than 3,000 members 14 with one than 200031 A deures fawn the 1A1 71 (41 Lenin expressed this brillantly when he wrote in Teply to peech by a delegate lo the Second Congres "He cilled the Labour Party the of the Comintem, pobnica orpansation of the trade union movement. and latet repeated the statement when he said that the . the concepts political department of the trade unions or political expression" of the trade unton movement are erroncous Of course, most of the Labour Party's members are working men. However, whether or not a party is really a politeal party of the worker does not depend solely upon a membership of workers but also upon the men that lead it, and the content of its actions and its poli tical tactics Only the latter determines whether we really have before us a political party of the proletatiat. Regarded from this, the only correct, point of view, the Labour Party is a thoroughly bourgeons (Vol 31, p. 256). (5) This is why "Labour to power on a socialist pro is such an atrocious and openly revisionist slogan. It appears to suggest that the Labour party can. presumably under "mass pressure", actually adopt socialist policies. This is made quite clear in the leaflet which the SLL gave out at the Liaison Committee meeting in London carlier this year. This said that when the working class could force a general strike. *it would be able to deal with the traitors in its own tanks, therefore LABOUR TO POWER ON A SOCIA- LIST PROGRAMMI" Apart from being the most complete revision of everything Marists have ever saud about the Labour Party, this lorgets such uttie things as the experience of 1926 in Britain. 1961 in Belaum, 1968 m France, and numerable other such Of course not everyone who advances the slogan of Labour to power on a socialist programme believes that the Labour Party can accept a socialist programme. they merely believe that you can build a massive move ment of the working class on a slogan which you are simultaneously saying it is impossible to achieve. Unfortunately for this line of reasoning the working class is not quite as stupid as those who go in for this type of thought One of the mast intonting thine shout tha tost two yeera of working che strucules loca Loon tha comatate inability of the Lebcur Left to play ony significant rate whatscavor. in thie great industrial struggles tha constituency left has played no rola, and tha "great debate between Jankins and Foot evoked virtually no interest compared to, for example, the tramandous debates on German re-armament in the carly 1550g. As so many political stratagies either bose thamsolves on a rise in the Labour left, or at lecst coe it as a necessary stage through which the working class must pass, it is nacosary to analyso carefully whather the precant insignificance of the constitucncy loft is puroly a temporary pohanomena, or whethor it reflects more profound underlying causes.

historical survey One of the most remarkabla things about the Labour left has always been its helplessness. A first examination must therefore look at its fundamental inability even within its own refermist terms, to make eny dent whatcoovor in the policy of the Labour

Probably the best cremlicd and cortainly tha most militant of all constitesney "eit' greupings was the Solellet League of tha early 1030a. This opthly cit of 'unconctitutional tomod, opposed tha League of Nations es an "Intomational Burglars Union" and called for a Workers Government". The League became one of a core of left croupings that included various supporters of the C.P. and Evan. Bevan was at that time going through a militant period and deciared himself in favour of the General Strike as a political waapon. However, behind all the show of militoncy in fact the Socialist League and the poople around it wore roformists to tho corn, Whon the Socialist Lezgun was banned by the Labour leadership it tamoly discolved Itsclf. "Whon Beven declaring the donger of tha "fascist throt" formed a Workors Gofance Group he did not instruct it in how to ficht but instood took it on long hiltes coroms the South Wales mountains. Nevertheless, compared to later "lefts', the Socialist Lescue and its followers were a positive hot bed of revolutionary fervour and agitation. The next significant opposititional movement to appear inside the Labour Party were the Bovanites of the early 1950s. This was possibly lorgor than the Socialist League but was never a serious threat to tho Right. In October 1952 the Bevanites won a considerablo victory at tho Labour Porty confcrenco when the Labour loadors Morrison and Dalton wore romoved from the National Executive Committee (NEC). Bevanites were elected to six of the saven NEC places voted on by the constituencies. However, in exactly the sama month tha Perlamentary Lobour Party voted for an end to organised groups in the Party. The Bo. vanites tomcly disbanded, in cay case tho Cevanito rovolt of tha 1000s hare only a superficial ro ica to the Soulslist Leagu of tita 1020s. iucso land" movement onal action, but it covocsted no unconstitu nor, more importally, did i antici from the right. The last reat Wing of the Labour left was in the nuclear dismoment debpico of the late 1050's. This was a for smaller and loss orcanisod affair than either the Bevanitos or the Socialist League. In 1900 it was estimate that the left wing Victory for Socittle gro had 400 members, while the right wing Campaign for Democratic Socialism claimed 3,01 members in the conctituencles and between. one fifth and one third of the C.L.P. Executive members. (Figures from Tha Newelertor,

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30 Jan. 1980, S. Haesier, "The Gaitskellites') The left having won, on the issue of nuclear disarmament at the 1960 Conference, it then plunged into headlong retreat. First they arranged a compromise with the right, which led to a defeat at the 1961 conference. The left then fell in behind Gaitskell at the 1962 conferance as he spoke of a thousand years of British history" and the necessity to avoid joining the foreigners in the Common Market. The decline of the constituency left was finished off by Wilson. Under the flurry of the nonsense about the "White hot heat of the technological revolution and a series of Wilson swung the Labour "left' speeches, Party even further to the right at a rapid rate. The old emphasis on the welfare state was dropped, opposition to immigration controls was abandoned, even the pathetic promise of the nationalisation of the road haulage industry was given up. The left however ignored every bit of this in a wave of adulation unknown since the heyday of Bevan. Even after the Wilson government had sent military aircraft to South Africa, delayed pension increases, supported the Americans in Vietnam, and done precisely nothing about the economic power of capitalism, Tribune still talked of "the spirit which Harold Wilson has displayed on many previous occasions (Tribune 20th November 1964). Even when it came to the 1966 elections, after Wilson had been in power for a year and a half, the left was still relatively euphoric. Michael Foot wrote in the election issue of Tribune that March 31st (election day) will mark one of the essential days in the forward march". Tribune then went on to declare that the essence of Wilson's prog ramme was "Pensions up, Rent Act Security, Unemployment down, Prescription Charges " After another year of Wilson cuts, off fruzes, red-baiting and union bashing the Lat our laft unk into an embarrassed silence It is this relapse into practical irrelevance and even silence that has to be explained. In the past if the left of the Labour Party has always been unable to really challenge the leadership, nevertheless it has at least been able to put up the pretence of a fight, and thereby create a political focus for the struggles of the working class. Is its apparent inability to do this due to the spinelessness of a few individuals, or to a very temporary situation? Or is it due to deeper causes? To answer that we must analyse more carefully. the reasons why the left' has never been able to mount even a real reformist challenge to the leadership. electoralism The most basic point that unites the Labour left and the Labour leadership is the belief that socialism can be achieved through Parliament. This has fundamental effects for their political practice. Once this Parlia mentary viewpoint is accepted, then politics becomes defined as what occurs at or around The struggle in the factory, not elections. being around elections, is then simply seen to be the 'trade union struggle'. The best that can be hoped for here is that the trad? unions will cast their votes in the right direction at the Labour Party conference, will campaign for their members to vote Labour. and most importantly of all, will give money for the electoral campaigns of the Labour Party. For the Labour Party, including the left, any kind of political action other than that around Parliamentary and other elections is inconceivable. The organisational forms of the Labour Party are then determined by this set of ideas. The most suitable units for organising for elections are obviously geographical ones that correspond to the electoral boundaries: hence the constituency parties However, shreal units are not directly conthese int ot production and would fluence the course of struggle in the factory. This point however, does not worry the Labour left because once politics has been defined as occurring around electigns, then the struggle in the factory is timply the trade union struggle which it is obviously the job of the trade unions to deal with. At most tha constituency Labour left gives passive support to 'trade union' struggles, collects money etc., but in no way intervenes directly to attempt to alter the course of the struggle. This situation of split between the constituency based sections of a Labour or Social Democratic Party, and the struggle within the trade unions has been increased by the whole history of the Labour Party. Firstly. It has been truly said of the Labour Party that of all Parliamentary Socialist Parties, it has always been the most dogmaticnot in its socialism, but in its Parliamentarianism. This has meant that the Labour left has never had any tradition of extra-Parliamentary struggle which would allow it to appeal directly to the men engaged in the factory struggle. Secondly. The particular division between politics and trade unionism which exists within the Labour Party has always been part of an unwritten understanding between the Parliamentary leaders and the trade unions bureaucracy. This understanding has been that the trade unions will use their vote to keep the right wing in control in the Lavour Party, in return for which the Labour/arty will keep out of the affairs of the tr/de unions. The old right wing union cry of "Keep politics out of the trade unions", theret/re has its coun terpart in the Labour Party le dership's cry of "Keep the trade unions out / politics" (i.e., support the right wing). This arrangement within /ie Lebour Party has historically worked to le advantage both of the union bureaucrat and of the Parliamentary leaders. It prents any left challenge to the L.P. leaders/p succoading and it anahles the T.U. leaders to avoid facing any political challenge within thair unions. In the struggles of the 1930's it was always the trade union leaders who used their votes to defeat the Socialist League and its followers. In 1935 the 75 amendments of the Socialist League to the NEC policy document were all defeated by the union vote. In. the strugole against the Bovanites the union bureaucrats never wavered in their support for the right and they never hesitated to use any means they thought necessary. When faced with a hostile audience of Bovanites at the 1952 conference Deakin, head of the TGWU at that time, declared that "You know that you would listen if you wanted to. get money from the trade unions". At the 1954 conference it is probable that Deakin was instrumental in applying pressure to the Woodworkers Union Executive to reverse the derocratically taken decision of its conference to oppose German rearmament by threatening to use the bloc vote to have a representative of the Woodworkers thrown off the NEC. The unions were also instrumental in seeing that in 1954 Gaitskell was elected Party Treasurer against Bevan and from there went on to be Party Leader, The importance of this union bureaucracy wheeling and dealing was fully recognised and appreciated by the Labour Party leadership. Shinwell at the 1952 conference openly declared, *Thank heaven for the trade union movement at this time. Thank heaven for what is called the block vote." Once this situation is understood, then the historical dilemma and powerlessness of the Labour left can be understood. To achieve any real resuits in the Labour Party it would have had to have been able to challenge the positions within the unions of the bureaucrats. That would have meant organising politically directly inside the trade unions. But once the left tried to do that it would have been forand by the logic of its positions to tako up political positions on all the struggles within the factory. It would have had to hava brok very idea that politing is come

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heart of the ideas of the Labour Party. If it had been forced to admit that the extra-par. liamentary struggle could be a political struggle then the door would have been opened for the break up of every idea of a specifically Labour left. It would also have meant that the leadership of any such movement could very easily have passed out of the control of the handful of Parlia mentarians who have always considered it their 'right' to lead the working class. From this prospect the left naturally shied away like the Devil from holy water. From this picture we can now see clearly the reasons for the complete helplessness of any specifically Labour left. The constituency left could never challenge the Labour leadership without first challenging the trade union bureaucracy, and it could not organise to challenge the trade union bureaucracy without breaking with the very ideas of the separation of trade unionism and politics which are at the very heart of the Labour Party. Even the best of the socialist militants of the Labour left were completely trapped in this dilemma and it rendered useless and futile all their activities. It is in this fundamental dilemma that the complete powerlessness of the constituency left must be sought and not in some theory of 'conscious betrayal' on the part of the many deeply committed socialists which the left' has attracted over the years. (With the leaders of course it is another story. Corruption and betrayal were only too frequently conscious and calculated here.) left's dilemma The way in which the Labour left has historically tried to get out of its dilemma of being unable to challenge the trade union bureaucrats is by an alliance with the CP. This however in no way solves its real problems. The 'left" is still faced with the trade union bureaucracy, and in any case the historical twists and turns of the CP perio. dically make collaboration impossible. Unable, because of its situation as a specifically Labour left, to gain a base inside the trade unions the constituency based opposition has only ever been able to count for anything when the political, social and economic situation is such to maintain mass working class involvement in the constituency parties. Once this position is understood, then we can understand both the conditions for the periods of importance of the Labour left, and for its periods of decay and insig- The stability of the old set up we have described is based on the two conditions that the political focus of the life of the wor king class remains within the constituency parties, and that the Labour Party keeps out of the affairs of the trade unions. If either of these two breaks down, then the whole structure becomes completely unstable. If the constituency parties cannot channel the political energies of the working class, then the trade union bureaucrats come under intense pressure from below and are forced for their own self protection, into conflict with the leaders of the Labour Party, thus breaking one of the agreements on which the stability of the political system is based. If, to take the other premise, the Labour Party leadership interferes in the affairs of the trade unions then again the political system breaks down. To defend themselves the trade union bureaucrats are forced to fight politically against the Labour leaders. In so doing however they create an alternative, and in fact far more powerful, focus for the political struggles of the working class than that to be found in the constituency Labour parties. Quite obviously even in terms of the struggle inside the Labour party the weight of the unions is far greater than that of the constituency parties (as the experience of Buvanism showed only too clearly). In addition the trade unions can carry on the struggle in a period which extends outside the ac tivity around elections. Once, however, the political struggle begins to flow through the trade unions then the Labour left finds itseit isolated and helpless precisely because,. as we discussed earlier, it is forced by its whole ideology of Labourism not to organise directly in the trade unions. What in fact characterises the present period is precisely the simultaneous ending for interrelated reasons of both the premises on which the old Labour political order was based Firstly, and most obviously, the crises of British capitalism, with its consequent need to clobber the trade unions, has led the Labour Party to be forced directly to attack the trade unions. This process began on a small scale in the 1945-51 Labour government, and developed into a full scale attack in Wilson's The wage treeze, the attack on government. the seamen, and 'In Place of Strife' anti-union proposals all directly affected the trade union bureaucrats. Slowly but surely, from being the main pillars of support of the Labour leadership, the trade union bureaucrats have been driven, usually against their will, into being the main enemy of the Labour leaders. Secondly, the constituency parties have completely collapsed as a political focus for the political activities of the working class. We have already dealt with the extent of this collapse in a previous article so we do not need to recap again. It is sufficient to note that even according to the official figures one sixth (17 per cent) of the already depleted ranks of individual members of the Labour party left between the years 1965 and 1969. The decline in membership of the largest parties in this period was a staggering 30 per cent. Furthermore, the drop in activities was even more marked, the fall was greatest in working class wards, and the wards in middle class areas increased in size ('The Decline in Working Class Politics' B. Hindess). This collapse is not accidental but is determined by the whole interaction of the decline in British capitalism since 1945 and the position of the labour left. As this point is extremely important we will deal with it separately. reasons for collapse The possible range of politics of the Labour left has always been defined by its acceptance of the division of politics and trade unionism on the basis of where they occur, and therefore by the fact that it has no organised base inside the trade unions. These factors cut out any politics based on the intervention in the factory struggle and the political activity of the 'left' must therefore be concentrated on issues outside the economic struggle. The two most obvious are the welfare state and foreign affirs. The lat ter has however been excluded in the past period because of the Cold War. This prevented the 'left' taking up any real position and when an issue did come along in the shape of Vietnam the skilful intervention of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign took it in far too revolutionary a direction for the Labour left to make any capital out of. In any case the constituencies cannot sustain themselves on moral protest. They need a 'hreat! and butter' welfare issue to sustain their base amongst the working class. Hence the fact that prescription charges, false teet glasses, etc., have always been the great crus ing points and touch stones of the Labour left. However, the way in which British capitalism has declined since 1945 has meant that although it has been able to make som concessions in the field of wages, it has bee completaly unable to make any in the field of social expenditure. (For details see The Red Mole, Vol. 2, No. 4). In fact the whole situation with regard to the welfare state ha deteriorated and got worse. In thirteen years of opposition and six years of govern ment the Labour left was totally unable to prevent the systematic abandonment by La bour of its commitment to welfarism, let alone actually gain anything for the workin class. (The measures of 1945-51 would pro ably have also been introduced by the Tori anyway so we may extend the period if we

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Social Democracy and Capitalist Crisis (Red Weekly 17/8/73,24/8/73, 7/9/73) 1 Roots of the left tumm For the past twenty years the Labour Party has moved, almost without interruption, to the right. The Wilson Government was clearly to the right of even the 1945 Labour Government. The traditional socialist touchstone — nationalisation - disappeared in practice from Labour's prograname, even though Gaitskell's attempt to get it removed from the Party constitution (the famous 'clause 4' battie) was defeated. Thisshift in Labour's policies was in line with a goneral rightward movement of all European Social Democratic Parties. But now an opposite trend is developing - throughout Europe Social Democracy is moving to the left, and once again the Labour Party is following the general pattem. The new Labour Programme drawn up by the National Executive once more places nationalisation in the centre. As a result a struggle is shaping up between the Party executive and the Parliamentary leadership. The source of these changes lies in two things: firstly, the turn of the capitalist class towards a policy of confrontation, which requires the move towards a 'strong state" (the strengthening of the power of the goverment at the expense of 're presentative" bodies like Parlia- • ment, and the reinforcing of the repressive state apparatus: the police, law and the courts); second, the new rise of mass working class struggle. The first real dents in the post war period of capitalist prosperity and class peace came in the early 1960s. In 1960-61 there was a general strike in Belgium. In Italy in the winter of '62- "63 there were important electrical and engineer. ing workers strikes. In Germany a metal workers strike took place in spring 1963. In France a miners strike broke out in late '63. Simultaneously, and in many cases causing the upsurge, some of the most important European economies (notably Britain, Belgium, France and Italy), experienced a decline in economic growth or recession. In every country the ruling class was faced with the problem of how to cope with these new economic and social problems. In eyery case the answer given by the ruling class was to move towards greater state involvement in the economy, This was dictated by two fundamental considerations. First, only the state possessed the colossal economic resources needed to streamline and rationalise the economy in preparation for a period of great economic problems. Second, individual capitalist firms were not strong enough to resist the workers' struggles by the mseives. The representative of the capitalist class as a whole - the capitalist state - had to come to the assistance of the individual employers. In Britain these developments could be seen most clearly in the formation of the National Economic Development Council in 1962-63 by the Tory Government and in the Industrial Re-organisation Corporation created by the 1964 Labour Government. But greater state involvement did not by itself solve the basic problem of capitalist strategy. How was this state power to be used? Two basic options were open. The first was a turn to open repression of the type created in France following the coming to power of de Gaulle in 1958. This involved a massive build-up of the police force, physical intimidation of the working class, openly weakening capitalist democracy - all the characteristics of the 'strong state." But such a step requires a decisive showdown with the working class. De Gaulle had come to office basically because of the threat of the army to take power, In Belgium the passing of repressive 'emergency" laws had led to a general strike. The turn to open repression by the ruling class was a very risky game. The alternative to open repression of the working class was to attempt to got the trade union bureaucracy to do the ruling class's job for it and clamp down on the working class. From the carly i960s on wards the capitalist class began to move decisively towards creating some sort of agreement with the trade union bureaucracy as is main poticy. The aim was to get the bureaucracy to accept a deal with the state whereby thie trade unions" leaders clamped down on militancy. The years from 1963 to 1968 were the heyday of the negotiated incomes policy. It was introduced in Britain by the attempts of the Tories to get such a policy in 1963, and then in the 1964 Labour Government's "Decisation of Intent" and National Flan.* ( In order to carry out this policy the Eurogear ruling casses weie foreed to make important political turns, If it was a case of doing a deal with the trade union bureaucracies then the traditional parties of the ruling class, the Tories and their European counterparts, were not the most suitable parties for the job. On the contrary, their traditions of open hostility to the trade unions positively got in the way. The most suitable vose those having. the closest links with the rade union bureaucracies - that is to say the various social democratic parties of Western Europe. The political resolt of the now capitalist Strategy was therefore growing suppost for coalition governinents involving social democratic parties (Italy and Germany), or even for pure social democratic governments - as in Britain. In 1964 the representatives of the key industrial sectionis of British capitalism, the Economist magazine, Lord Kearton of Courtaulds, Lord Stoles of British Layland, called for the formation of a Labour Government. COLLAPSE OF INTEGRATION For reasons which will be gone into further in the second article in this series, the policy of integration failed completely. it collapsed in the 1968 General Strike in France, the mass strikes of autumn 1969 in Italy, the Belgian Limbourg miners strike of 1970, and the mass British strike wave of 1968-72. Faced with the collapsejof the policy of integration, but needing more than ever the intervention of the state in order to deal with mounting working class opposition the ruling class had no option but to turn to a policy of open repres ion. This meant a major change in political: strategy- At gresent the bourgroitie is not strong enough in Europe to overthrow »parliamentar democracy - which in any case serves as an invaluable ideological camouflage fon capitalist zule. This means that the bourge cannot rule director through the regressive apparatus of the state - as forexample ina military dictatorship. The state apparatus is ded on important questions byra: govern and therefore securing the correct is a key aspect of bourgrois the collagse of integration" what liad

- now became, from the point of viewof the ruling class, their greatest weakness. These links might at some crucial stage, particulariyr ati election time, hold back a social democratic: party from blatant attacks on the working class; The way in which the Labour Government: was: forced to drop its In Place off Strife proposals was a warning of this. The fact that in the lasti analysis social democratic parties will sider with the ruling class was not sufficient in the new situation. Despite valiant efforts at repression by, for example, the Brandt Government in Germany: the ruling class turmed back to its traditional parties in at massive way. These had no organised: links with the working class. The contrewight: coalition in Raly, the first for ten years, ther growing ruling class hostility to the Social- Democrats in Germany, the taking upty ther whole ruling class of the call for a Tory Government all indicated the way in which the wind was blowing. Is every European country the tasks set for these new capitalist governments was the same. Repress the working clas and its organisations, Prepare the way for a strong stute of the reinforcement of an exting one,

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The turn to open repression by the European ruling classes can be seen at every level. In France a private police force shot dead a young militant, Pierre Overney, for distributing leaflets at the Renault factory, at Citroen fascist thugs are allowed to physically attack union delegates with impunity, and the Ligue Communiste has been banned for demonstrating against the fascists. In Switzerland the courts have ruled that even to write about the capitalists 'exploiting' the workers is illegal. In Italy the centre-right government of Andreotti introduced a law permitting the arrest of any person who, by his comportment, may be assumed to be engaged in illegal activities, i.e. for the arbitrary right of arrest on mere suspicion. In Belgium a proposed law will allow employers to use armed guards freely. In Britain examples of such moves are also mounting rapidly. We have seen in recent months the free use by employers of criminal thugs in the Chrysler dispute; the openly racist judgement of the House of Lards on illegal immigrants; the mobilisation of fascists to enforce the House of Lords' decision; the police raids on Irish and socialist militants, the illegal holding of the Belfast 10 without charges, trial or right to see lawyers; the prosecution of the Shrewsbury 24; the systematic training of the police to smash pickets. Within this general situation the "centre leaderships of the European social democratic parties are forced to reconsider their tactics, In the early '60s the centre' had supported the right wing - that section which hoped to come to power with the support of the capitalist class. With the collapse of the 'integration" policy this respectable' road to office is no longer open. On the other hand, the elemental upsurge of the masses threatens to undermine the working class base of the party if an openly right wing line is followed. When they could rely on support this did not worry the social democralic bureaucrats over much. Now lack of a working class base would mean loss of the one force which could compel the ruling class to pormat the socies democrats to come into All these factors fear of being swept aside by a new upsurge of the masses, an inability to come to office any more with the support of the ruling class, necessity to recapture working class votes in order to propel themselves into government - all ine witably push the social democracy to the left. A new period of demagogic 'leftism' is beginning to open for the mass European reformist parties.

Until the mid 1960s the opposition to the rightward shifting policies of the main working class parties in Europe came from inside these organisations. In Britain this was represented first by the Bevanite left of the 1950s, and then by the left-wing currents formed around the question of unilateral nuclear disarmament and within the Young Socialists. From the mid "60s onwards this situation began to change. First a mass youth and student movement grew up which could mobilise tens of thousands on issues such as the Vietnam war. Then, from 1968 onwards, there was a mass upsurge of the working class against the integrationist 'negotiated incomes policies" of the mid 1960s. In many countries this upsurge was directed against the policies of Social Democrats. In Britain there were the strikes against the Labour Party's anti-union laws (In Place of Strife) in 1969. In Germany and Sweden major 'wildcat' strikes took place in the same year. In 1969-70 enormous strikes, involving fifteen million workers, broke out in Italy when the socialists were in the government. In 1973 a general strike erupted in Denmark. In France in May 1968, although the Socialists and the Communists were not in the government, the general strike and factory occupations clearly developed against the wishes of there!

It is only in this context that the new policies of the Labour Party can be understood. They ase part of a pattern that started with the French Socialist Party signing the 'Common Programme with the French Communist Party. and with the emergence of the German Social Democratic Youth ("Jusos'), in Germany. It will almost certainly be reinforced when the

2 New struggles & new alliances since the early 1920s (and in the case of France and Italy the biggest strikes ever seen at any time in any country taking place either outside, or directly against the organisationai control of the mass parties of the working class.

Despite great weaknesses, these massive social upsurges have been showing an increasing - ability to organise themselves outside the bureaucratic apparatuses of the traditional mass parties, In France in 1968 the absence of elected strike and factory committees allowed the French Communist Party to call off the strike wave without organised resistance. Since then however the election of strike and factory committees has been seen on an increasing scale, In the spring 1973 upsurge of school students in France, the whole struggle, involving over half a million, was organised through democratically elected and regionally federated committees. The authority of these committees was so great that the French Communist Party was forced to negotiate officially with them.

Similarly, in the strikes of immigrant workers ! in May 1973, the union leaders were forced to accept that representatives designated by the workers should participate in the negotiations with management.

TWO CHOICES Faced with an upsurge beginning outside their organised control, the forces within the mass arranisations of the working class were fated attemptine to stamp latest 'centre-left' coalition collapses in Italy. Renewed talk of an alliance or government of the Italian social democratic left with the Communist Party is already in the air. Thus the new Labour Party programme is just the beginning of a definite period of development, which has its origins in the changing situation throughout Europe.

Alan Jones

forces involved in them. For the genuinely left forces at the base of these parties, of course, this presented no problems, They were for co-operation. In Britain, sections of the left-wing of the Labour Party participated first in the Vietnam Solidarity Committee marches and then supported the mass strikes well before any shift occurred in the party leadership. Thousands of Labour Party members must have taken part in the strikes against In Place of Strife, thousands more would have supported the one-day strikes in support of US, against the Industrial Relations Act and the May Day strike this year. Big difficulties, however, faced the leaderships of the mass working class organisations. Those who were first to feel the pressure from the base were the trade union leaders. More immediately forced to take a position on the mass struggle than the Parliamentary leaders, the trade union bureaucrats either had to turn to the left or, if they refused, suffer defeats and be replaced with new 'left' bureaucrats. In France, for example, the once Catholic based union federation, the CFDT, began to move sharply to the left. In Italy the union leaderships were forced to launch the huge strikes of 1969 - although the actual deyclopment of the struggle went far furthef than they wished. In Britain the old openly reactionary duo of Deakin and Carron in the TGWU and the AUE were replaced by the left duo of Jack Jones Of mitree these new leader

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in any sense capable of dealing with the problems of the class struggle, but they did represent an important shift. This trend has continued, until now even the 'lefts' are under pressure from their left - the forcing of Scanlon to withdraw from the TUC-government talks being just one example of this. Internationally the left bureaucrats are feeling this pressure. At the recent congress of the Italian metal workers' union the union leadership was more than usually honest. It stated openly that if they did not take up an 'intransigent and leftist stance, forces to the left of the Communist Party would take over the union. These fears were brought to a head at the recent election of union delegates at the enormous Fiat plant in Turin, the largest single factory in Europe, where a majority of the delegates elected supported political organisations to the left of the Communist Party and the Socialist Party. At the recent congress of the CFDT, the second biggest union federation in France, resolutions put forward by the Trotskyists of the now banned Communist League gained 15-20% of the vote. BIG DANGERS Making concessions to forces to their left obviously carries big dangers for the bureaucrats. The dynamic of the struggles which such concessions launch may got completely out of their control. For this reason, the political leaders preferred initially to try and crush the forces to their left. The classic case was the French Communist Party (PCF). After the May 1968 General Strike, sparked off by student demonstrations and strengthened by the May 13th joint demonstration of the Communist Party and the students, the PCF vowed never again to engage in common actions with 'leftists." It systematically attempted to root out their influence, denouncing them as 'student rabble" and 'government agents," After a series of defeats of this line, its policy finally collapsed when a young Maoist worker, Pierre Overney. was shot dead by the private police force of the Renault company. The PCF condemned the left rather than the police for the killing. 01

and urged people/ot to support the demonstration against Me shooting. Yet 200,000 people ignored he call of the PCF and joined the demonstry on, Scared of losing control of the situation and of being outflanked on the left by the Socialist Party, which had, for its own reasos, supported the demonstration, the PCF farned to a new policy of 'tactful relatior/ with forces to its left. It was forced to neg/iate with the strike committees at the time i the student upsurges of this spring and has rotested against the banning of the Connunist League. (Although, of course, it males its tactical turns in its own Stalinist mahner - it refused to allow the Communist Lague to speak at the meeting called to protest against the ban!). Although it still tries o stamp out movements to its lell, in practice the CP is increasingly being forced to make concessions to them. If the immensely well organised PCF could not stamp out the movements to its left, then the chances of any other party doing so, in particular the weakly organised Social Democratic parties, are negligible. Furthermore, as was discussed in the first articlein this series, the ruling class's current strategy of direct confrontation with the working class closes for the social democratic leaders the option of coming to power with the support of any section of the capitalist class. The Social Democratic leaders, if they continued their policy of open alliance with the bourgeoisie, would be in danger of being crushed between the rising struggle on the one hand and the move to a 'strong state' on the other. The reality and acuteness of this danger was brought home in the 1969 Presidential elections in France, when the Socialist Party, running on an openly right-wing ticket, obtained a tiny 5% of the vote - the smallest percentage it had ever obtained in its history. NEW ALLIANCES In this crisis of perspective for the Social Democratic parties, of course, some sections of the leadership (the Jenkins of this world) are for continued alliance with the capitalist class - indeed they want to move still further to the right to somehow try to get back capitalist support. Eventually these elements may break with the mass working class organis ations altogether. Other sections have always been against the open seeking of support in the ruling class and were for collaboration with the left forces. Up to the end of the '60s, and particularly when in government, the top leadership of the, Social Democratic parties (Wilson and his European equivalents) had decisively sided with the right. In the new situation they begin to allow the left to present the 'image' to the party and even to engage themselves in left rhetoric - Wedgwood Benn marching with the UCS workers, Wilson condemning Caetano's visit, ete. Of course any real break with the bourgeoisie is avoided - Wilson threatened to veto the nationalisation proposals of the Labour Party executive, Mitterrand of the French Socialist Party will allow no tinkering with France's commitments to NATO - but a definite change in the basis of Social Democracy's political appeal

In an organisational form this move shows itself in two ways, Firstly in an alliance with the Communist Parties. Secondly in some joint actions with the 'independent' left, including often the revolutionaries. This shift in the alliances of the Social Democratic parties from parties of the ruling class - Liberals, Conservatives, etc. - to the Communist Party has gone furthest so far in France where the Socialist Party and the PCF put forward a common programme and stood as the 'Union of the Left' in the elections. A similar shift has also begun in Italy. Here. the Socialist Party has since 1969 been shifting back to collaboration with the CP at a local level, and has officially proposed a policy of "more advanced equilibrium' i.e, accepting CP support and collaboration. While the party is participating in the latest Centre-Left government, the left-wing has strenuously opposed In Britain, with a far smaller CP, and with the Labour Party being able to form a government by itself, this shift is not so pronounced. Nevertheless, at the base, collaboration between the Communist Party and Labour Party members is increasing, made easier by the TUC's recent ruling ending the ban on the Communist Party in the Trades Councils, To the extent that the Labour Party takes an increasingly left position on industrial struggles more unofficial collaboration can be expected Wedgwood Benn marching arm in arm with Jimmy Reid is just the beginning. Joint activity with the 'independent', and in particular the revolutionary, left is very dangerous for the Social Democratic parties. Nevertheless, even this is developing to some extent - particularly in countries such as France where the SP and CP are in a contest to see who can put on the most left face. Thus, for example, when the Communist League was banned in France, Mitterrand was careful to be photographed shaking hands with one of its former leading members - Alain Krivine. In Britain Eric Heffer's articles on 'Unity of the Left' in Tribune are an indication of things to come.

Alan Jones

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cond sion Thate are sent three main forces in favor of the Labour Party moving to the left. Lowere left wing of the party. Second is nuip of the party, which hopera left help propel Labow hack into office. 21% Third ion section of the trade union bureaucracy which wants to avoid leading massive Industrial struggles in the coming period and Hope instead to turn people's thoughts to ideas of an election. But the thing which will determine the signficance of Labour's left shift will not be the aims of anybody but the actual objective effect which this shift will have on the class struggle. This will be determined by the attitude of the ruling class to the new Labour programme and by the questions and expectarions that such a programine raises in the working class. 'LEFT PROGRAMMES The new left programmes being adopted by the social democratie parties all have roughly the same form. They includ/ increased social secunt services, a national minimum wage, and actar prowsons for worker putticipatton in marie ment of industry- L this is to be nanted by increased econonus growth.

This growth is to be achieved by two main methods: Inercascs tu working class income and demand are to be stimulated by redistributing income away trom the rich to the working class and the lower paid: and an increase in investment will result from increased state intervention in the including a propramme of economy natonalisations. Chest programmes are completely contradictory and unrealistic. Increasing money income for the working cho will samply produce inflation, not a higher standard of living. ou put of goods is a creased. This could thine unused economic rosources tung investment. Pie 141900 perils ol economi Between two stools ployment (the Allende Government in Chile. for example, cut unemployment dramatically in its tirst year in office), The crunch comes when all unused resources have been put to work: if investment does not then increase dramatically there can only be a rapid rise in inflation. in Chile the rate of inflation now rins at over 100% a year. The left programmes of social democracy are quite incapable of overcoming this problem. The capitalist class will not invest while wage increases are cutting into their profits and they are permanently afraid of being nationalised by a left wing government. The left programmes of social democracy do not propose that sufficient firms be nationalised to end the domination of the economy by private industry and investment. In France, the proposed nationalisation of 13 industrial groups, and in Britain the proposed nationalisation of 25 companies would still leave decisive sections of the economy in private hands. Under a 'left' government, investment by these private firms would inevitably collapse, even if conscious sabotag: were not carried out, and the economy would be thrown into chaos. In short, the 'left" proposals of the social democracy for the cconomy are totally unrealistic because they fail to take the economy totally out of the hands of the capitalists. On the political plane they are equally utopian because they do not tackle the question of the bourgeois state. However the fact that the new programmes of social democracy are unrealistic, will not achieve the goals they set themselves, and certainly will not achieve socialism, does not mean that these programmes are in the direct interest of the ruling class. It is not at all in the interests of the ruling class for the capitalist economy to be plunged into crisis by an attempt to cary out a left Labour programmie, The 1945 Labout programine objectively Sranitened the capilslist class and was thorecompled by tient But the implementation of the type of programme now being proposed would not at all strengthen the position of the British ruling class. For this reason the polarisation around this progreme is not a fake polarisation. When Wilson vetoes the nationalisation proposals, for example, he acts in the direct interests of the ruling class. When the Labour left attacks his veto they act against the interests of the ruling class even though the actual measures they propose would not achieve socialism.

REVOLUTIONARY RESPONSE Even more crucial than the objective effects of Labour's programme is the impact such a proramme can have on the working class even y t were not actually carried out. When The Labour party talks of nationalising 25 companies, the question is raised in the minds of the working class as to why only 25? When the Labour Party talks of some workers control (by which it really means worker participation) the obvious question is raised as to why not real workers control? The effect of this turn by the Labour and Social Democratic parties will therefore be to raise a whole series of questions in the consciousness of the working class. Furthermore, revolutionaries can use individual points in the programmes in order to take the struggle of the working class forward and go far beyond the aims of the social democrats. A leading member of the former Communist League explained how revolutionaries in France could take advantage of the left' programme of the Communist Party-Socialist Party.

Gaining support around | our| demands and utilising, by going beyond them, certain aspects of the common programme of the 'Union of the Left, revolutionaries will press agitation for workers control. The common programme projeets a certain number of measures aimed af limiting the employers absolute power, It says *The factory and work place committees and the personnel delegates including delegates from the shops and departments wherever these generally all working conditions tation of these Wet tons shall be held in abeyance until apterment is teached among concerned parties" # We have stressed the ambiguities of these forinebations Supposs is inevitable, that the partie: concerned f to "reach agreement". Then who takes di decision? The common programme miptici. concedes that the employer will deckie li parties can t teach agreement, it says ice *the employees representatives can apicei the Inbour courts".

Starting from the co of these equivocating tormulations: 20g conscious of the workers democratic tions revolutionaries will press for work controi with reto power over firings, him transfers, distribution of occupational po the way wages are paid, the work rate, he and security conditions in shott, all work conditions This control must be exercise control committees composed of delepates the shops, the assembly lines, or the depart ments, democratically elected by their tell workers, responsible to them, and recallab! any time. Their functioning must involve opening the companies" books and manager. records, as the common programme itself.. for. The control committees must be acco, • sufficient time during cach work day to c sult with the workers and to discharge their duties. In Britain in the coming period revolutionar can do exactly the same type of thing. Taki example the TUC proposal on industrial d.

These are completely ambiguous or wrong on all central quastions. One one pa they say that it will be the workers and the company (in the last analysis the company) who will decide the question of sackings, sp up and so on. However only six pages befo: that they suggest that it should be represen tives of the workers alone who should maki the deciston - although even here they do t propose thant in bi made by the mass of the workers. But this raises in the conscious

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the working class an idea of unilateral decisionmaking by the workers - of real workers control. Another example is prices. The Labour Party calls for price controls. But who is to police and enforce them? The industrialists themselves or a "prices board'? The experience of Phase 2 has already shown this is uscless. Any call by Labour for control of prices immediately raises the question of the orgunisations of the working class taking up the regulation of prices. In the coming period these questions will be raised in the consciousness of the working class by the working class bureaucracies themselves, far more powerfully than the revolutionaries could ever do by themselves. LABOUR IN OFFICE The adoption of a 'left' programme by Labour will arouse expectations and questions throughout the working class which will result in political ideas well to the left of Labour, whether Labour in office actually tries to carry out that programme or not. If it comes to office on a programme which goes against the objective interests of the capitalist class, Labour has only two basic choices. The first would be not to implement the programme, and function more or less openly as a government acting in the interests of the capitalist class. That would be to repeat the experience of the 1964-70 Labour Government. However the effects of this experience would be qualitatively greater than 1964-70 in terms of working class resistance. The attacks the Govern mept would have to carry out on the working class would be much greater, and the expectations dashed far greater. The ties between the Labour Party and large sections of the working •class would be threatened and an entirely new period in British political history would open up. The growth of the revolutionary left under such circumstances would be extraordinarily rapid. The other choice would be to attempt to implement the programme. This world be met with resistance from the ruling class through economic sabotage and so on. Economic crisis. sky rocketing inflation, and massive working class mobilisations would be the inevitable outcome of such a government. Demands for workers control, for stopping capitalist sabo tage, for resistance to the attacks of the capitalist state, would find rapidly growing support in the working class. It is as yet too early to say which of these courses would be adopted by a new Labour Government, A Government formed in the wake of a massive working class upsurge would be in a very different position than one which came into office through an ordinary election. We can be certain of one thing. It is the revolutionaries and not social democracy who will, in the long run, gain from social democracy's new left turn. sibil atto 31, 07.

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