The Reagan administration is marching steadily towards putting combat troops on the ground in Central America. A decisive move in this direction was taken [illegible] Nicaragua [illegible] Somocista counter-revolutionaries ('contras') based in Honduras. The 'contras' have been active for more than two years in attacking Sandinista posts, strategic points, as well as [illegible] in the isolated Atlantic Coast region. The difference now is not only that the attacks are in the centre and east of the country and that the number of 'contras' involved is larger but more importantly, that the Honduran army is directly involved. Washington is clearly using Honduras as the cat's paw to engineer a war between Nicaragua and Honduras that would provide the pretext for the United States to intervene directly. [illegible] logistical support, Honduran forces being engaged in joint operations with the Somocistas. For example, in a major 'contra' [illegible] the town and a nearby state tobacco farm [illegible] Somocista ground troops. Although the farm was virtually destroyed, the 'contras' were driven back. This has been the result in all the fighting since March. Militarily, the 'contras' cannot possibly overthrow the Nicaraguan government since the Nicaraguan leadership bases itself on the mobilised and armed popular masses. The problem for the Sandinistas in the 4 June attack — and ever since the invasion began — was that a counter-attack [illegible] to declare war against Nicaragua.
The Pentagon has laid out its scenario for the border war. Reagan has warned that a 'Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan war machine' is being created to impose communism by force throughout the whole of Central America; when Honduras is 'attacked by Nicaragua', the US preferably with some representative of the OAS, will send troops to 're-establish the borders'. Of course, the 'borders' are those of the US's backyard, so re-establishing them will involve not simply defence of Honduras' border but overthrowing the Sandinista government.
The US has been steadily pushing forward its militarisation of the region. Honduras has received the greatest attention as the major staging area for war moves in the region. At the beginning of June the Pentagon announced that 100 more Green Berets would leave shortly for Honduras to start a new training programme for the Salvadorean army. This is in addition to the 62 who are already training Hondurans. Other US military personnel are involved in modernising various military installations in Honduras.
But there are several other strings to the [illegible] bow. Increased numbers of Salvadorean soldiers are being trained in counter-insurgency at the US Army School of the Americas at Fort Gulick in Panama and the Howard Air Base in Panama is swarming with US aircraft hauling weapons and ammunition to Honduras and El Salvador. Among the planes based at Howard are reconnaissance aircraft that have been modified to conduct electronic intelligence gathering as well as to transport troops. They are also equipped with [illegible]. A pilot stationed at Howard was reported in the New York Times in May as saying that the four planes 'took off almost every night and did not return until shortly before dawn. He said the Air Force crews that flew the planes did not wear any unit insignias or other forms of identification. He said a mechanic who worked on the planes had asserted that the guns on the planes were [illegible] almost every day, a sign that they were being heavily used.' A Pentagon official admitted these facts but explained them as a result of nightly 'training exercises'.
In mid-April the US government announced [illegible] the [illegible] growing military capability' and the 'Soviet-Cuban growing presence in Grenada'. Meanwhile Colombia has been building a military base on the island of San Andres off Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. Colombia says it needs the base to 'better defend itself against Cuban and Nicaraguan communism'. The [illegible] of San Andres and other small islands off Nicaragua's coast is formally disputed by Nicaragua and Colombia.
The direction of US policy has been [illegible] personnel of the Reagan administration. Thomas Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, was given the boot in May and shortly afterwards, Deane Hinton, US Ambassador to El Salvador, was also given his notice. Enders had begun to show a willingness to follow the path of negotiations, in parallel with increased military aid. This 'twin-track' policy was aimed at winning support for the US in Venezuela, Mexico and Spain and was essentially an attempt to buy time for the Salvadorean regime and the US government to pursue their military solution. Hinton's mistake also was his failure to rule out the possibility of dialogue with the Salvadorean opposition.
The Salvadorean regime responded angrily to Enders' proposals, and the National Security Council in Washington, led by Jeanne Kirkpatrick and William Clark, rejected it. Kirkpatrick visited El Salvador early in the year and on her return presented Reagan with an assessment of the political-military situation which concluded that if the war continued its present trend then the Salvadorean army would be defeated, and as the war deteriorated Magana's Government of National Unity would collapse through its own internal contradictions. She recommended a large-scale political and military effort to reverse this trend. From that point the Pentagon effectively took over military control in El Salvador. Military leaders who resisted the US advice on the conduct of the war were transferred and the US stepped up its training of the army.
At the same time a concerted propaganda effort was launched to disguise this reinforcement of the 'hard line' approach. A series of declarations by top members of the administration culminated in Reagan's address to the special joint session of Congress at the end of April. Reagan's speech announced that the administration would now 'support dialogue and negotiations'. The clue to what he meant by this was given in a National Security Council document leaked in April. This document outlined the need to 'co-opt the negotiations issue to avoid Congressionally-mandated negotiations'. In other words, 'dialogue' would be tied to acceptance of the Salvadorean government's own 'peace plan' which involves participation in the election scheduled for the end of the year. The terms and conditions of participation in elections are negotiable. Nothing else.
The FDR-FMLN reject the elections. Their approach to negotiations is directly counterposed to US imperialism's elections. [illegible] isolate the US's interventionist policy internationally. The FDR-FMLN call for negotiations while pursuing the military offensive inside El Salvador. The Nicaraguan leadership likewise calls for bilateral talks with Honduras and the United States while arming the masses to defend their revolution. Both leaderships know that in a military confrontation with US imperialism directly they could not win. They can only successfully defend their revolutions by isolating Reagan internationally and making the price of direct US intervention too high.
The FDR-FMLN and the Sandinista leadership request supporters of the Central American revolution to actively build a broad anti-intervention movement by assisting their political-diplomatic initiatives. In Britain this means a campaign which focusses on stopping Thatcher's support for Reagan's Central American policy. As more and more European and Latin American governments begin to doubt the efficacy of Reagan's policy Thatcher's government becomes his only real cover. We have to 'take out' this cover: no [illegible] task. [illegible] take a step in this direction on 11 September, the tenth anniversary of the coup in Chile. We can mobilise for 11 September around the slogans of 'No more Chile's: US hands off Central America' and 'End British support for Reagan's war in Central America'.
*The next issue of International will devote substantial space to the tenth anniversary of the Chilean coup and the revolutions in Central America.