The historic victory of the French left in the polls in 1981 raised many hopes for socialists across Europe. Yet rising unemployment and inflation and setbacks in the municipal elections have proved a not very attractive political model, as Thatcher will no doubt explain in the forthcoming election in Britain. Chris Bertram records two years of the Mitterand government, and shows that the popular notion of 'socialist profligacy' having given way to 'realism' is entirely false.
The Mitterrand government has, in fact pursued a shamefaced austerity programme from the word go. It has given way to a political offensive by the employers' organisations and it has demobilised the working class. It has followed a pro-American foreign policy, and has left intact the Gaullist state apparatus at home and its imperial counterpart in Africa.
Abstentions
The municipal elections of March 1983 were an instructive barometer of the state of mind of the French working class. Despite a partial recovery in the second round of the election, the Socialist and Communist parties were hit by massive abstentions among their traditional electorate. An analysis of the results shows that, although very few left-wing voters deserted their parties for the right, many stayed at home. Conversely, the turnout in the well-to-do districts was higher than in the municipal elections of 1977. In Lille, where Prime Minister Mauroy is Mayor, the turnout was 80 per cent in the traditionally right wing northern districts but only 62 per cent in the leftist southern part of the town.!
Also significant was the comparatively high vote for the far left, with the combined vote of the slates put forward by the Revolutionary Communist League (French Section of the Fourth International) and Lutte Ouvriere on the one hand, and the Parti Communiste Internationaliste on the other, coming to just under 5 per cent.?
It might have been expected that the ruling coalition would conclude from these results that it should pursue economic policies in favour of the working class. In fact the austerity package introduced in the wake of the latest devaluation of the franc is of Tebbitt-like severity. Electricity, gas and telephone bills are up by 8 per cent, along with rail fares. Alcohol and tobacco will be dearer and tourists are restricted to spending 2000 francs abroad. Probably the most extreme measure is the compulsory loan to the government which will add about 10 per cent to most tax bills for that particular month. In the name of monetary stability the French working class is being asked to tighten its belt.
The measures have been coupled with a cabinet reshuffle which reduces its size from thirty-four to fifteen. Perhaps the most significant victim of the changes was the 'CERES' leader Chevenement. Widely described in the British press as 'the French Benn' Chevenement is in fact rather tame. A strong defender of the independent nuclear deterrent, he argued for an alternative strategy involving departure from the European Monetary System, import controls and more state intervention in industry. No great opponent of austerity, Chevenement was the first minister to leap to Finance Minister Delors' defence when a 'pause' was announced in the programme of reforms in December 1981. The Communist Party remains firmly locked into the government, with l'Humanite headlining the new package as '10 Government Measures'.
Austerity policies
Despite the attempt to portray the impasse of March 1983 as the result of the grim workings of economic inevitability, the measures adopted represent both a deepening of already existing policies and a capitulation to a political offensive led by the French employers' organisation, the CNPF. Even before December 1981, when the first 'pause' was announced, the administration was obsessed with restoring business confidence. Central to this was a policy of wage and price restraint which limited wages rather more than prices, The measures introduced on 11 June 1982, while envisaging a total wage freeze, allowed the prices of some fresh foods, petrol and steel to rise. This, together with very ineffective means for enforcing price control, meant that the policy probably led to a 4 per cent drop in purchasing power.'
The political offensive of the ruling class has taken two main forms. The parties of the Right have waged an anti-government propaganda campaign, Gaullist leader Chirac has endorsed Friedmanite economic theories. But the comparative discredit which still hangs over these people, coupled with the poor level of organisation of at least the non-Gaullist Right, means that they are less than perfect instruments for an assault on the government. The CNPF, on the other hand, puts itself across as the impartial voice of business. As their vice-President, Guy Brana, said: 'Our policies are just common sense. They are not the ideas of the Right or the Left, just policies which favour industry'.* Needless to say, these policies are ones which attack the working class, with the CNPF demanding that 5 per cent of purchasing power 'distributed in excess" be taken back by the government' at the same time as calling for the removal of wealth tax levies on capital investment."
One of the great ironies of the current situation is that it has been indirectly precipitated by Mitterrand's enthusiasm for NATO. A firm believer in the need to counter the Soviet threat through the deployment of Cruise missiles, Mitterrand backed Helmut Kohl on this particular issue in the West German parliament during the general election campaign. The Christian Democrat victory caused speculators to buy Deutchsmarks and sell Francs, for a time jeopardising the future of the European Monetary System. It was only by threatening Kohl with protectionist measures and withdrawal from the EMS that Delors was able to force Bonn, which has most to lose from the collapse of the EMS, to bear most of the cost of currency realignment. The very institutions necessary if the European bourgeoisies are to compete successfully with the Americans thus mask real conflicts among themselves.
Mitterrand has been, along with Thatcher, one of the most hawkish of the European leaders. Despite French insistence on formal independence from the military structures of NATO, there is no doubt that the French 'force de frappe' is aimed at Moscow rather than Washington. Not only does Mitterrand support the deployment of Cruise, he has also given the go-ahead for the modernisation of France's own tactical arsenal. The new Hades missile has a range of 400km, enabling it to reach East Germany from within French territory. A decision on the deployment of the French neutron bomb is expected shortly, and Mitterrand has told journalists that, 'it is out of the question that France will withdraw a single one of its missiles'.7
Of course, as Reagan fulminates against the 'empire of evil', it may well be that the French ruling class will, together with its European partners, evolve an independent strategy from the Americans.
Foreign policy
Many on the left have been misled by Mitterrand's policy towards Central America, which has involved recognition of the Salvadorean FDR. But it would be wrong to see the endorsement of a 'third way' between Washington and Havana as more than a recognition that imperialism must find a political solution to the problems of the region. Since the USA is principally a competitor rather than an ally in the area, Mitterrand hopes to benefit from Reagan's discomfiture.
Far more representative of France's policy in the Third World is its presence in Africa. Mitterrand's term of office has not, so far, seen the kind of spectacular operation Giscard carried out in Chad and Zaire. What made these interventions possible however was the massive and permanent French military infrastructure that exists across the continent. France's direct military presence was down to about 6,700 troops in six countries, with advisors in a further twelve states in 1981, Through a series of defence and military agreements, negotiated in 1960 and 1961, France retains the basis for rapid intervention by special forces, including two divisions and one armoured demi-brigade. France and Belguim's ex-colonies are heavily dependent on France as a weapons supplier: France supplies 50 per cent of the weapons used by its former possessions and 68 per cent of those to former Belgian colonies. This compares with a figure of 21 per cent for the arms supplied to former British colonies by Britain. In addition 2000 African soldiers are trained every year in the French metropolis. France's links in Africa are part of a global military communications system that is second only to that of the USA in its geographical reach.8 None of this has been dismantled under Mitterrand and Defence Minister Charles Hernu has gone so far as to justify in advance future interventions in the name of protecting French nationals.
France's militarist policies have had particularly damaging [illegible] This has now been shelved. For some 10,000 'volunteers' it has in fact been extended to between 16 months and three years.'
The maintenance of France's repressive apparatus overseas has been coupled with a strengthening of the police at home. At first, Mitterrand's Justice Minister, Robert Badinter, carried through some extremely progressive measures. An amnesty was declared for many prisoners, the death penalty was abolished and De Gaulle's notorious State Security Court was disbanded, Since then the movement towards greater liberties has gone into reverse. A government commission has recommended legalising certain police practices 'all the better to control them', such as phone-tapping. It is planned to take on an extra 10,000 police and to organise a further 1300 into 127 'light intervention teams'. All this follows in the wake of anti-semitic murders by the extreme Right, but the resources of the strong state can also be used against the workers' movement. The refusal of Interior Minister Gaston Deffere to clean out the upper ranks of the police force further underlines the continuity of the state apparatus from Giscard to Mitterrand.
Renault strike
The politics of austerity have not gone unopposed by the working class, In particular, workers in the car industry have resisted attacks on their living standards. Mauroy wanted to use the nationalised firm of Renault to establish a pay norm of 8 per cent. The extreme combativity of the Renault workers resulted first in the abandonment of a productivity clause by management and ultimately in the winning of an agreement worth about 10 per cent. This was a real victory won under very difficult conditions. In particular the immigrant strike leaders were subjected to victimisation and racist abuse. Prime Minister Mauroy suggested that the real cause of the strikes was Khomeiniite agitation among the predominantly Arab workforce. The Renault workers, having broken through the pay guidelines, will set a standard for other groups of workers.
The ability of mass mobilisation to win concessions from the government has also been illustrated over the issue of abortion. Despite the fact that the Left had long campaigned for the cost of abortion to be met by Social Security, the government at first succumbed to rightist and clerical pressures. In summer 1982 Pierre Beregovoy, the Minister for Social Affairs, spoke of the need to respect the feelings of the religious. It was necessary to amass tens of thousands of signatures for a petition and to call a demonstration of 15,000 people to force the [illegible]
Union movement
Whether the French working class will be successful in halting the government's attacks on its living standards depends, in part, on the response of its trade union leaderships, The omens are not good, The Communist-led CGT is the largest trade union confederation. It has a long record as an instrument for containing social upheaval, notably in May-June 1968. One of the reasons Mitterrand has a governmental alliance with the Communist Party, whose votes he does not need in parliament, is to ensure that the CGT contains rather than organises working class resistance. The CGT described the March 1983 austerity package as indispensable to tackle inflation, to reduce the foreign trade debt and to finance industrial development." Although CGT boss Krasucki later voiced some criticism, it was very subdued in tone. There is discontent inside the CGT, and this has mainly focused against the leadership's craven support for the suppression of Solidarnose. The alliance between rank and file militants and a Socialist Party anxious to build its influence in the CGT was damaged when Krasucki warned the Socialist leadership that its criticisms of the CGT line in Poland might undermine his ability to hold back struggles in France,
The second largest union confederation, the CFDT, has been more open in its criticisms of the new measures, describing them as 'incomprehensible', although Edmond Maire, the CFDT leader, was until recently calling for more austerity measures. As one of Michel Rocard's closest associates, Maire is on the right of the Socialist Party. The other main confederation, Force Ouvriere, has a long history of right wing leadership and low combativity. [illegible] Although the recent car strikes indicate that French workers are prepared to go beyond their leaders in opposition to the government, it is unlikely that a national fightback would primarily take the form of industrial militancy. This is partly because of the low level of unionisation in France and the strong hold of the bureaucratic leaderships, but also the traditional inter-union divisions weaken the working class. A shop stewards' movement of the British type would be difficult to organise, if only because factory delegates are elected on a plant-wide basis.
The Left
It is therefore in the form of a political response to Mitterrand that opposition must come, if it is to come at all. There seem to be three potential sources for this: the revolutionary left, the Communist Party and the left-wing of the Socialist Party.
While broad mobilisations by the working class against the SP and CP leaderships have taken place, this has not yet been translated into a growth of the revolutionary left. Their organisations remain quite strong, but it cannot be said that the working class is ready to leave its traditional organisations in large numbers to join these organisations. The vote for revolutionary candidates in the local elections was impressive, but it seems that many more deserted the traditional parties only to abstain. Nevertheless, the revolutionary organisations, particularly the Revolutionary Communist League, are playing a vital role in the process of political clarification that is necessary if a genuine alternative to Social Democracy and Stalinism is to be built in France.
The Communist Party is unlikely to break with the government. It is locked into a parliamentarist perspective within which it has no prospect of power except in alliance with the Socialist Party. Were it, maybe under pressure from its base, to organise opposition to the regime, that opposition would undoubtedly have a profoundly sectarian character. Whereas it is essential to unite the working class in opposition to the austerity measures of Mauroy - Delors, the CP would stress itself as the alternative, thus excluding many rank and file militants of the Socialist Party, who perceive all too clearly the bureaucratic nature of the CP.
The force normally seen as the 'left' within the Socialist Party is CERES. Violently nationalistic and isolated from the working class, a current that supported every attack on the working class up to March 1983 is unlikely to become a focus for opposition now. But if we have to reject the possibility of existing currents within the Socialist Party forming the basis of an effective opposition, we cannot ignore the many class conscious militants who support the party. Just as the policies of the Wilson - Callaghan government in Britain helped to crystallise a layer of socialists in the Labour Party, it is certain that many SP activists will want to organise against the leadership of their party.
The French left is at a decisive moment in its history. Either the French working class will be led to demoralisation and ruin, or it will build an alternative to the leaderships of Mitterrand and Marchais. It is to this task that the rank and file of the Communist and Socialist Parties must turn their attention,
References
1 Rouge, 11 March 1983.
2 Rouge, 18 March 1983,
3. Critique Communiste, July 1982, and TPDumont, Le Monde, 18 June 1982.
4 Financial Times, 16 March 1983.
5 L'Expansion, 24 December 1982.
6 Financial Times, 16 March 1983.
7 International Viewpoint, 7 February 1983
8 'French Militarism in Africa' by Robin Luckham in the Review of African Political Economy, No 24, 1982.
9 International Viewpoint, 7 February 1983.
10 The Times, 28 March 1983,
CHRIS BERTRAM is an activist in the Labour Party Young Socialists and a member of the International editorial board.