With world attention focussed on El Salvador, Megan Martin highlights US imperialism's destabilisation campaign against revolutionary Nicaragua.
In September 1981, the Government of National Reconstruction in Nicaragua enacted Measures of Economic and Social Emergency. These measures included cuts in government spending, a campaign for efficiency and austerity in state government ministries and institutions, controls on the parallel currency market, and new measures against hoarding and speculation. They also included a ban on strikes, workplace takeovers, and land occupation.
In October, four leaders of COSEP (the Superior Council of Private Enterprise) were arrested on charges of violating these emergency decrees. Leaders of the Communist Party of Nicaragua (PCN) and the PCN-controlled Confederation of Trade Union Action (CAUS) were detained at the same time. The international bourgeois press characterised these actions as a further indication of the drift towards a 'totalitarian' regime in Nicaragua. The reflex reaction of the sectarian currents on the left was about the same.
On 15 March 1982, a new State of Emergency was decreed which supercedes the September decisions. This Law of National Emergency suspends the Statute on the Rights and Guarantees of Nicaraguans which was adopted in August 1979. Taken together, these measures illustrate the acceleration in US imperialism's attempts to overthrow the Nicaraguan revolution.
The September decree was, primarily, the FSLN's response to the campaign of destabilisation waged by the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie for the previous two years. The March declaration was the response to increased military threats against the revolution — Nicaraguans are mobilising in thousands, throughout their country, against the threat of US intervention. Meanwhile in Britain, where some sections of the left have only recently discovered El Salvador, there has been no real understanding of the continuing need for solidarity with the Nicaraguan revolution.
US imperialism backs Nicaraguan bourgeoisie
In the weeks leading up to 19 July 1979, when it was beginning to become clear that the FSLN might be able to sustain their final offensive against Somoza's National Guard, an inter-agency working group was established within the National Security Council in Washington. In the CIA, a Nicaraguan task force was no doubt formed within the Directorate of Operations.
These people had to predict the likely military developments, the political consequences of a Sandinista victory, and the chances of success of various possible American diplomatic and political initiatives. With the victory of the FSLN, these 'Nicaragua-watchers' had the additional task of preparing for clandestine intervention to influence the course of the Nicaraguan revolution. The obvious place to start was with the bourgeois figures in the new government and with the remaining capitalist sector in Nicaragua. At first sight, this could even seem quite hopeful.
The Government of National Reconstruction and the staff of the various ministries included a number of potential US allies. FSLN representatives held only three of the eighteen ministerial posts, and the agreements made in Costa Rica in June 1979, just prior to the victory, between the various opposition groups envisaged that the FSLN would also be a small minority in the future Council of State.
Of course, real executive power lay with the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction which had an FSLN majority. But even here the bourgeoisie was present through Violetta Chamorro, widow of the murdered newspaper editor, [illegible] Democratic Movement. They had important economic strongholds since nationalisations were initially restricted largely [illegible] — as the State Department would describe them — to assist them to campaign around such issues as 'free elections'. This is precisely the line that was followed. An important section of the bourgeoisie focussed its energies on launching the MDN as its main political formation. The MDN manifesto included resonant phrases from Sandino, and Robelo signed the preface with Sandino's own seal of Patria y Libertad. Whenever Robelo spoke in public he deliberately confused his two roles as MDN leader and Junta member. The cry was 'Sandinismo yes, Communismo no'.
Robelo led the campaign for the calling of 'free elections' and demanded the convocation of the Council of State, arguing that the composition of this body should allow the non-FSLN forces to make themselves felt. The old opposition newspaper from the Somoza days, La Prensa, became the mouthpiece of this campaign. (La Prensa's continuing role recalls that of El Mercurio in the period leading up to the Chilean coup or the Jamaican Daily Gleaner in the months leading up to Michael Manley's election defeat.)
The FSLN set a date for the convocation of the Council of State but put forward proposals about its composition which would allow representation of the new mass organisations developed since July 1979. The changed composition which the FSLN proposed gave itself and the mass organisations a majority. When this composition was announced officially, Robelo resigned from the Junta. Violetta Chamorro had resigned three days earlier. (She explained her resignation on the basis of poor health). Archbishop Obando y Bravo joined the fray and demanded that all priests who held official posts should resign them.
Robelo thought that his departure from the Junta would place him at the head of a powerful backlash against the FSLN. In his brief letter of resignation he accused the FSLN of 'deviation from the goals of the revolution'. But the resignation rebounded badly. The MDN itself was far from being a united force and the other bourgeois groups failed to rally round. COSEP closeted itself away for discussions with the US embassy and the Democratic Conservatives held heated internal debates on party tactics. In the end none of them boycotted the Council of State, although some of them delayed taking up their seats. Much to COSEP's indignation, the FSLN itself designated the replacements for Robelo and Chamorro in the Junta.
Nonetheless, the MDN relaunched its campaign for free elections and a constituent assembly. The FSLN rejected these calls. It insisted that the reconstruction of the country and the development of the mass organisations — the embryos of the new power — must take precedence over elections.
When Robelo withdrew from the Junta a mass demonstration in the Plaza de la Revolucion brought a sea of banners denouncing him as a 'traitor', a 'Somocista'. Some read: 'Robelo — made in USA'. He was down, but not out. In autumn 1980, with Ronald Reagan President-elect of the United States, he called a huge national rally in protest against the drift towards 'totalitarianism'. La Prensa, the church hierarchy, and COSEP took up the call. The groups of ex-National Guard, conducting raids into Nicaragua from camps in Honduras, intensified their activity.
The FSLN banned the demonstration, and Sandinista mass organisations, especially the youth organisation, spontaneously organised counter-demonstrations in front of MDN offices. In Managua the MDN headquarters was sacked. In protest against the anti-MDN violence, representatives of the four bourgeois parties, COSEP, and the CTN and CUS trade unions (both right-wing unions: the former allied to the Social Christians and the latter encouraged by Somoza for its virulent anti-Communism) walked out of the Council of State. Unfortunately for the bourgeoisie, this gesture was undercut five days later when Jorge Salazar, landowner and vice-chairman of COSEP, was killed in an exchange of gunfire with a police patrol near Managua. Six M-16 sub-machine guns were found in his van and it was revealed that Salazar had been busy gathering funds, weapons and political backing for a coup-d'état against the government.
The bourgeoisie was once more thrown into disarray. It became increasingly clear that its hopes for reestablishing its positions relied heavily on aid from imperialism and on a defeat of the revolutionary forces in El Salvador which would isolate the Sandinista government.
Economic destabilisation tactics
Robelo's political challenge to the FSLN leadership might have been predicted to fail considering the enormous prestige which the FSLN had won as the actual leadership of the revolutionary army in the struggle against Somoza. But it was also a challenge to the National Unity project of the Sandinistas, and the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie was not restricted to challenging this on the political front. Economic destabilisation is an important tactic in fomenting political instability, in creating a climate where the legitimate complaints of people regarding the rising cost of living can be manipulated to weaken support for the government. While Robelo was making a private visit to the USA, lobbying for the speedy release of the Carter administration's $75 million aid package to bolster the private sector, others were taking the road of obstruction, sabotage and decapitalisation.
Thus, at the beginning of 1980, only 296 out of a total of 663 enterprises in the industrial sector had resumed operation, and of the 63 most important textile plants, an even higher proportion were not functioning. Those companies that did function generally did so at only 50 per cent capacity. In agriculture there were also many large and medium-sized property owners who hesitated to get involved in the reconstruction process.
This campaign of decapitalisation gave rise to a watchful and suspicious attitude among the workers. Many occupied factories as soon as they suspected the slightest moves towards decapitalisation. Agricultural workers began to occupy lands and, in a series of mobilisations, called for the deepening of the agrarian reform. The FSLN responded in March 1980 with decrees calling for penalties against merchants, industrialists, and landlords in order to halt decapitalisation and sabotage of all kinds. Workers were encouraged to oppose sabotage and to take measures of workers' control. Land occupations by poor peasants and agricultural workers were formalised. Against speculation, the FSLN encouraged popular control over prices.
But the law passed in March proved ineffective in the following months. It did not cover some of the most common forms of decapitalisation, its implementation procedure was cumbersome and complicated, and it required forms of proof that were almost impossible to provide. Decapitalisation continued and, in the United States, Reagan came to office.
The impact of Reagan's election
A couple of weeks after Reagan won the presidential elections the bodies of two young people were found in the streets of San Salvador. One bore a sign around its neck: 'With Reagan we will eliminate the miscreants and subversives in El Salvador and Central America'.
The change in presidency had immediate effects in Nicaragua. The Republican platform had declared: 'We deplore the Marxist Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua ... We do not support United States assistance to any Marxist government in this hemisphere and we oppose the Carter administration aid program for the government of Nicaragua. However, we will support the efforts of the Nicaraguan people to establish a free and independent government.' The undisbursed balance of the $75 million in US bilateral aid was suspended. This was followed in April 1981 with the cancellation of $9.6 million worth of PL-480 food aid for the purchase of US wheat. Threats were made to prohibit the import of Nicaraguan beef and the sale of PVC resin to Nicaragua if it continued to increase its trade with Cuba.
In November 1981 the US used its influence to block a $30 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank. The impact of such moves in Nicaragua is rapid and dramatic. In November 1981 a shortage of foreign exchange forced a large shrimp and lobster plant at the Pacific seaport of San Juan del Sur to close, throwing 1100 people out of work. The results on the troubled Atlantic Coast, as the Reagan administration well knows, will also be severe. This region is the centre of the national fishing and seafood-freezing industries, and will be worst hit by the refusal of the IDB loan.
The Reagan administration has not lost sight of the forces within Nicaragua that it wants to assist — it has specifically named La Prensa, the church hierarchy, and the so-called Free Trade Unions as the three key factors in the opposition within Nicaragua. But some of its strategists feel that 'it will not be possible to dislodge the actual communist government of Nicaragua, regardless of the level of discontent, except through military action.' (Cleto Di Giovanni, private advisor to the State Department). The former National Guardsmen slopping around the Everglades come into focus now.
Military attacks on the Revolution
The threat of armed counter-revolution has been there from the very beginning. With the collapse of the National Guard, 7000 of Somoza's troops were taken prisoner. But another 5000 [illegible] persist [illegible] patrols within the first weeks of the revolution. [illegible] Somoza began to shuttle between Miami and Guatemala City, reassembling the remnants of the Guard into an effective fighting force. The 2000 housed in temporary refugee camps across the Honduran border began to [illegible] their [illegible] demoralisation and launch systematic strikes into Nicaraguan territory. Brigadistas returning home from the Literacy Crusade in August 1980 had lost seven of their number in right-wing sniper attacks.
The aim of the attacks is not random terrorism, but is part of a concerted effort to destabilise the country, provoke border incidents, provide pretexts for military intervention, and even perhaps to prepare for a full-scale invasion at the right time. The gangs operating out of camps in Honduras have active support from some sections of the Honduran army and these are reinforced by others openly training in Florida and California — a new training camp for Nicaraguan and Cuban exiles seeking to overthrow their governments was opened with a public celebration in Florida on 27 December 1981.
Many observers feel that the ex-Guard as the military instrument for a hostile bourgeoisie unable to rid itself of Sandinismo by any other means is a long shot — it would involve projecting a new identity for the National Guard which breaks with 45 years of historical association with the hated Somoza dynasty. Yet convergence is not impossible as the class polarisation deepens. In any case, these armed bands do not of themselves provide a sufficient alternative power base, militarily or politically, to challenge the FSLN. Their effectiveness depends on the place they occupy within the strategy of destabilisation of the Reagan administration.
The Miskito Indians
The FSLN's claim that some sections of the Honduran army were collaborating with the counter-revolutionaries was vividly demonstrated on 29 December 1981 when a Honduran army plane crashed at Puerto Lempira, just outside Nicaragua on the Atlantic Coast of Honduras. Among those on board with the Honduran soldiers was Steadman Fagoth, a former leader of Nicaragua's Miskito population and now a counter-revolutionary exile. There are an estimated 3000 Miskitos now in Honduras, many of whom are involved with the armed bands. This has added to the problems that already existed for the Sandinistas on the Atlantic Coast.
The Miskitos are one of three Indian groups which, along with black, English-speaking descendants of slaves make up the majority of the population of Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. Although the Coast comprises the entire eastern 56 per cent of the country it has only 9 per cent of the population. It is a totally separate reality, linguistically, politically, historically. The struggle against Somoza barely touched the Coast and the new revolutionary government was faced with a population with little political consciousness.
In an effort to respect the various cultural traditions on the Coast, the FSLN assisted in the creation of an indigenous organisation, MISURASATA (Miskito, Rama, Sumo and Sandinista all together). Steadman Fagoth was named as its representative to the Council of State and through this action the FSLN helped to make Fagoth a hero and saviour to the Miskito people. Then in February 1981 Fagoth and other leaders of MISURASATA were arrested. Fagoth was identified as fostering counterrevolutionary plans and also identified as having been an informer for Somoza's Security Force. A few days after his release Fagoth crossed over into Honduras and in collaboration with the Somocistas there continued to influence his people, particularly through the radio station, Radio 15 de Septiembre, operated by the counter revolutionaries out of Honduras.
Serious efforts have been made by the FSLN to improve relationships with the Miskito population and efforts to build hospitals and extend the literacy campaign to the Coast in the local languages. But the raids have dramatically grown recently and this increases the need for military presence and heightens the very real dangers for the people there. The military [illegible] around the Miskitos, [illegible] Nicaragua internationally. Jeanne Kirkpatrick even declared that the Sandinistas' treatment of its indigenous population gave it the worst record on human rights of any country in Latin America!
The September 1981 Emergency Decree took account of the training camps in the USA and Honduras, of the Miskitos who had crossed into Honduras, and of the campaign being led by Archbishop Obando y Bravo against the progressive sector of the church in Nicaragua. Its principal emphasis, though, was on the economic situation in the country. The official communique stated:
'To the inherited difficulties, we should add other factors that have weakened the means of production and investment, such as the decapitalisation practices of some businessmen that have moved their business activities outside the country; the lack of state control in the parallel market of foreign exchange, which has grown to intolerable levels; fraud in payments of fiscal and customs taxes; growth of public expenditure and excessive state bureaucracy; and on the other hand, seizures of factories, labour stoppages, and lack of work discipline which has reduced the means of national production.'
The PCN and the CAUS attacked the economic measures and threatened to call strikes in all the workplaces where they had influence. This confrontationist approach to the leadership of the revolution had been demonstrated in a number of previous strikes. The PCN define the FSLN as having a 'bourgeois nationalist ideology'. According to them, the FSLN is therefore only capable of leading the first stage of the Nicaraguan revolution, the bourgeois democratic phase, and when that phase is over, the PCN itself will move in as the authentic vanguard of the Revolution's 'proletarian' phase.
The severe economic difficulties led some of the workers to look to the PCN and the CAUS because these organisations oppose the FSLN's calls for efficiency, discipline and sacrifice. The Sandinistas also have a shortage of experienced trade union cadres. Thus, the ban on strikes and the arrest of the PCN and CAUS leaders was taken from a position of weakness. The FSLN have resorted to administrative measures against a sector of the workers whom they have not yet been able to win over politically.
A general ban on strikes and the arrest of opponents within the workers' movement clearly involve dangers for the revolution. These should be assessed in the light of the proven record of the FSLN leadership and the trajectory of the Nicaraguan revolution. They cannot, however, be separated from the very real threat to the revolution from US imperialism. In a time of national crisis, the organisation and discipline needed to mobilise the population leaves less and less room for discussion, debate and differences. Since the September decrees the crisis has deepened.
Sabotage is stepped up
In November 1981 the State Department admitted for the first time that the US was not winning the war in El Salvador. Back onto the screen came the advice of Di Giovanni: 'The security of El Salvador requires the acceleration of the removal of the government in Managua.'
A $19 million CIA plan for the destabilisation of Nicaragua was approved. The plan included provisions for the training of 500 persons (in the first instance) who would 'eventually attempt to destroy essential Nicaraguan targets like electrical plants and bridges in an effort to affect the economy and deviate the attention and resources of the government.' Money was also allocated for individuals and groups within Nicaragua.
In December a plot to destroy the nationalised cement factory and the Esso oil refinery was discovered. Hundreds, or even thousands, of people might have died in an explosion at the refinery. The majority of the country would have been without electricity. Immediate fuel shortages would have forced factories to close, halted public transport, and caused the loss of much of the cotton and sugar harvest. Destruction of the cement plant would have brought many public works projects to a standstill, throwing thousands out of work.
In the same month the 'Red Christmas' plot was uncovered on the Atlantic Coast. Through this project the counter-revolutionaries aimed to gain control of the northern section of Zelaya province and to set up a provisional government which would ask for help from sympathetic governments, chief of which was the United States. Raids across the Rio Coco in December also brought the death toll from border incidents to over 100. This is the context in which the government has taken the decision to move residents out of the area.
On 19 February 1982 a plan to blow up several bridges and to sabotage an electric plant was discovered. On 20 February, the day before the scheduled arrival of Mexican President Lopez Portillo, an explosion in the Sandino airport in Managua caused the deaths of 4 workers. On 13 March two bridges were blown up.
The increasing number of US military exercises in the Caribbean should also be taken as an indicator that the US has not ruled out direct military intervention. Between 7 and 9 October 1981, the United States and Honduran governments carried out operation 'Halcon Vista' which consisted of joint manoeuvres off the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua. Further manoeuvres were carried out in the Caribbean at the end of November. Between 9 and 18 March, a major NATO manoeuvre 'Operation Safepass' was held in the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida. On 27 April another massive show of military strength (Ocean Venture 82) began in the Caribbean. It will include mock invasion of Cuba by marines, at the US base at Guantanamo. These manoeuvres come at a time when the US administration has repeatedly refused to rule out the use of American troops in the region.
The US has tried to provide a cover for its aggression against Nicaragua through the international propaganda campaign around the Miskitos and through a campaign against Nicaragua's alleged involvement with the Salvadorean guerillas and its military build-up supposedly beyond defensive needs.
The events which provoked the March declaration of a State of National Emergency are numerous. Nicaraguans are again a people in arms. Emergency networks of defence, production, food distribution, price control, information, health and sanitation, and construction are being set in place. It is this mobilisation of the population that differentiates the State of Emergency decreed in Nicaragua from the emergencies and States of Siege which have existed on the Latin American continent for many years.
The Latin American dictatorships have used exceptional laws [illegible] popular rebellion. They have made the 'exception' into the essential elements of their government. In Nicaragua, the State of National Emergency has arisen as a response to external factors, the threats and interventions of the Reagan administration and their allies on the continent. This mobilisation is the [illegible] antithesis of Allende's response to US imperialism's destabilisation of Chile. Socialists throughout the world should take their cue from Nicaragua; we must mobilise to prevent the isolation of the revolution. The pressures brought by the United States on the direction and future of the Nicaraguan revolution must be [illegible] by [illegible] of solidarity. This is part of the campaign in solidarity with the people of [illegible]; the future of these two revolutions [illegible].
MEGAN MARTIN is co-author of [illegible] and an activist in the El Salvador and Nicaragua solidarity campaign.