Chris Harman, a leader of the British Socialist Workers Party has written a major study of the ‘crisis' of the revolutionary left in Europe.(1) Harman points to the organizational decline of some major groupings, particularly the previously powerful Mao-centrist currents in Italy; the significant reduction in the political influence of the far left in nearly every country; the general feeling of frustration and even despair, that seems to pervade the membership of most organizations; the apparent stagnation, and even retreat, of the workers' movement more generally. Harman does point out, correctly, that in a certain sense this crisis is one of growth. Nearly twelve years after May 1968, the revolutionary left has firmly established itself as a real, albeit minority, current of the workers' movement. I would agree with much of Harman's description of this crisis, but his view of its causes and his evaluation of the way the Fourth International and the British SWP have responded to it, are seriously flawed.
The causes of the crisis
The failure of the revolutionary groupings to transform themselves into genuine mass organizations is clearly related to the fact that the mass struggle opened by May 1968 and the ‘hot autumn' in Italy in 1969 has suffered important reverses as well as major successes. The ability of the Spanish bourgeoisie to stabilize a regime of bourgeois democracy after the fall of Franco; the defeat of the Portuguese revolution of 1974-75; the setback suffered by the Union of the Left in France in 1978; the stalemate in Italy; the shift to the right in most of northern Europe — all these indicate that the mass struggle of the working class has been interrupted.
Harman holds that two factors account for this: the disorientation of the movement by the labour bureaucracy and the impact of the economic crisis on the workers. ‘There was', he writes, ‘a change in the attitude of the workers as the economic crisis grew deeper and the reformist leaders started to give open or covert support for government measures. The shift of political discussion to the right affected the wide layers of workers who were not particularly active in the workers' movement and who had only partially ever broken from the “ruling ideas” inculcated into them at school and pumped out by the media. Their “common sense” attitudes shifted to the right. This exercised a powerful pressure on those militants who had previously been prepared to go along with much of what the revolutionary left said.' (2)
This analysis is unobjectionable as far as it goes. Clearly the failure of the mass struggle to rise continuously is rooted in the effects of the crisis; unemployment, austerity, and insecurity have deeply influenced the mood of the workers. And Harman is obviously right about the role of the labour bureaucracy. On the other hand, he maintains that there has not been a ‘new flowering of reformist ideas' and denies that the workers remain strongly committed to the democratic forms of European capitalism. In our view this flies in the face of the facts. Neither the restraining role of the bureaucracy nor its collaboration with the bourgeoisie's austerity measures can be isolated from the reformist illusions of the workers themselves and their continued attachment to the forms of bourgeois democracy.
Harman has seriously underestimated the strength of reformist ideology in the working class, as may be seen by examining the course of events of the past twelve years. The explosion of social struggles in 1968 caught the bureaucrats off guard. They were outflanked on their left, and the revolutionary organizations grew rapidly. But by 1972 the reformists had begun to respond, advancing reformist, class-collaborationist political projects that offered the workers' movement a political focus. These projects seemed more ‘credible' to most workers than those of the revolutionaries, especially in view of the organizational weakness of the revolutionary left.
The ‘grand manoeuvres' of the reformist parties found expression in such projects as the Union of the Left in France and the programme of Historic Compromise in Italy; they even found their pale reflection in the ‘social contract' proposed by the Labour Party in 1973 (3). The various reformist projects were a response to the radicalization of working-class struggle, for large numbers of workers were demanding general political solutions, and without such projects, the bureaucracy could not have kept the masses in check.
Harman views politics exclusively through the narrow lens of the trade unions and the factory floor. He fails to see the connection between the class collaborationism of the union bureaucrats and the reformist political projects that were their essential complement. Séguy could not have operated effectively without the political manoeuvres of Marchais (and Mitterand); and Lama required the overall perspectives offered by Berlinguer, Ingrao, and Amendola. In the light of the massive support the French working class extended the Union of the Left, for example, it is absurd to claim that there was no upswing of reformist illusions. Significant numbers even of militant vanguard workers endorsed the political projects of the workers' parties.
Democratic illusions
Illusions in the reformist parties and their projects are closely related to the attitude of most workers towards the institutions of bourgeois democracy. Granted, cynicism about parliamentarism and bourgeois politics in general is widespread in the working class. But Tony Cliff is wrong to say that “the working class couldn't care less about democracy'. The Eurocommunists, for example, are well aware of this. When the French Communist Party formally deleted the words ‘dictatorship of the proletariat' from its programme, Georges Marchais explained that French workers associated ‘dictatorship' with Hitlerism. This, of course, was a dodge, since no sane person associates French Communism with Hitler. What Marchais really meant was that many workers fear a Russian-style dictatorship, for the anti-bureaucratic current in the working class now commands real strength.
The rise of this current has been quite positive, and offers revolutionaries enhanced opportunities. But it creates problems too. Hundreds of thousands of workers fear that any future upheaval may lead to a dictatorial regime, and that fear has been one of the major obstacles to socialist revolution for decades now. That is why any contempt for workers' democracy in theory — and any violation of it in action — is fatal to revolutionary strategy. That's why the Fourth International has developed its theses on socialist democracy. It isn't a matter, as Harman suggests, of ‘becoming well established on the parliamentary terrain', but of consistently integrating into our strategy the theory and practice of workers' [illegible].
The politics of the Fourth International
Harman alleges that both the Mao-centrists and the Fourth International (FI) have moved to the right in recent years, and have been plunged into crisis by the general drift to the right in the working class itself. His case against the Mao-centrists is well reasoned, but his primary target is the FI. He especially denounces its French section, the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), [illegible] Left. In so doing however, he exposes two of the weakest aspects of his organization: its attitude to the united front and to the demand for a workers' government. According to Harman, when faced with a reformist workers' government, he writes revolutionaries should: ‘on the one hand maintain their own complete independence from the government and urge the class to do the same; on the other hand fight for demands of a limited character....alongside workers who have illusions in that government.' (4) For Harman, it is out of the question to demand that the reformists take state power, even against their own wishes. He argues: ‘At one point, Alain Krivine, one of the LCR leaders, went so far as to argue that the reformist leaders were frightened to form a government because it would threaten the system. This was after the left had done quite well in the 1976 local elections. He wrote, “In such a situation, the workers are right to say to the CP and the SP: we've given you the majority, use it. [illegible]” [illegible] 17.3.76). A few months later, he went on to suggest that if a left Union government were formed, revolutionaries would have to keep quiet about their criticisms of it when it came to mass work.” (5) This opportunism fall within the context of the LCR's ‘mechanical' view of what would happen if a Union of the Left government did come to power. The LCR, Harman writes, ‘developed a fantastical mechanical view of what a Left Union government would mean, transcribing into the 1970s what happened in 1936 when... within a few days a huge wave of factory occupations had followed. Now that scenario was just possible in the 1970s — but more likely was a British-type scenario, with a left-wing government trying to cool down the struggle and getting away with measures a right-wing government never could', (6)
This critique betrays a primitive [illegible] government. When revolutionaries represent a small minority and the masses [illegible], necessary to fight for the workers' parties to take power in order precisely to break the illusions of the masses. In no way would we support or take any responsibility for such a government. But it would be futile simply to maintain the independence of the revolutionary left and advance purely economic demands. Revolutionaries must [illegible] parties are to rule, which is, incidentally, exactly what the British SWP does at every election when it calls for the election of a Labour government. Harman distorts the LCR position when he writes that the French supporters of the FI tried to “tone down' their criticisms of a reformist government. The quotation he produces says nothing of the sort. It simply points out that revolutionaries can call for the overthrow of such a government only if it is genuinely possible to replace it with a revolutionary workers' government. The electoral victory of a left reformist coalition including the Communist Party would be met by mass enthusiasm in any European country, just as it was in Chile. We should not forget that when Allende came to power he took quite a few measures in the interests of the working class. Such measures should be supported by revolutionaries, who would, however, continue to point out that the government would remain incapable of satisfying the most profound demands and aspirations of the masses unless the bourgeois state was destroyed. Revolutionaries would demand that the government meet the demands of the workers, and participate in their mobilizations precisely so as to outflank the reformist leaderships. They would strive to impel the workers' struggles beyond the limits set by the reformists, while defending the government against reactionary sabotage. They would do everything possible to foster the self-organization of the proletariat, in order to prepare for the inevitable confrontation with the bourgeoisie. Nothing in this perspective suggests “tail-ending' the reformists. Krivine's argument that the reformists were afraid to base themselves on the mass struggles of the working class in order to come to power seems evidently correct. The leadership of the French Communist Party was even prepared to sacrifice its own electoral chances in order to maintain its organizational strength against the Socialist Party. Finally, it is ludicrous to suggest, as does Harman, that the victory of the Union of the Left in France would have meant no more than the victory of the Labour Party in Britain. The expectations of the workers in such a government, precisely because of their ‘reformist illusions', would have triggered a mass mobilization, like that which followed the victory of Popular Unity would have been so much greater than the possibility of building a big opposition to a Popular front Labour government.
The tasks of revolutionaries
[illegible] international, the comrades of the SWP repeatedly make the point that particular transitional demands do not solve all political problems. Political programmes have no magical powers. The formulation of programme thus requires the closest attention to the agency of socialist transformation: the working class and its struggles. Here the comrades are knocking at an open door so far as the Fourth International is concerned, it evident that the formulation of a political line of march for the proletariat must be combined with the assembling of the working-class forces to carry out this programme of action. But this combination cannot be brought about simply by arguing for ‘an orientation to the working class', necessary though that is. It is also necessary to assess the relationship of forces accurately, and to formulate political projects and slogans that give the mass struggle a focus. The political situation in Europe cannot be characterized with such simple formulas as ‘shift to the right' and ‘stalling of the mass struggle'. Immense reserves of working class militancy still exist, as shown by the steel strike in Britain, the spate of struggles against austerity in Italy and the fight of building workers and others in Spain against the Moncloa pact. There is a layer of vanguard workers, most of whom have not joined revolutionary organizations, [illegible] leaders prepared to act outside their control. European capitalism is still in a period of grave instability, and the organizational and political strength of the working class remains largely intact. The economic crisis of Western capitalism is getting worse rather than better. We are therefore in a period of prolonged struggles that could rapidly attain explosive proportions if the gains of the workers' movement are put in question. These struggles require a political focus. They must be centralized and directed towards a general strike to impose a workers' government. This slogan, in our view, represents a vital weapon in every country: for a Labour government in Britain, for an SP-CP government in France, Italy, and Spain,