".. We must carry the war to where the enemy carries it - to his house, to his recreation centres. We must make it total war." - Slogan on a wall in Montevideo.
One of the most fundamental problems facing all guerrilla struggles throughout Latin America is the relationship between the guerrilla vanguard and the masses. How can support of the masses be assured for the guerrilla column, so that it can be the vanguard of all the exploited, not just its own vanguard? How can guerrilla fronts, capable of resisting imperialist aggression be concretely organised? An analysis of social classes, of specific problems, and of the demands of concrete groups is essential to the elaboration of revolutionary strategy. Armed propaganda cannot be the universal formula to win the masses. To stress only the political effect of military operations submerges political problems in the military struggle. The problem is not to shoot but to do so in a way that the revolutionary classes will understand that the shots are fired by their vanguard and that those classes will participate in the campaign the vanguard has unleashed. Guerrilla warfare must prepare itself as the war of the people. It is, therefore, up to the revolutionary vanguard to organise itself in such a way as to polarize the revolutionary [energy] of the masses. A correct elaboration of revolutionary strategy [involves] not only the military characteristics of the guerrilla unit but also a determination of the nature of the class struggle in the present historic stage and of the general character of guerrilla war as a people's war, of which the guerrilla column is the principal and direct form but neither the exclusive nor sufficient one.
In Uruguay, the (NLM) National Liberation Movement — known as 'TUPAMAROS' - has been the most effective guerrilla movement to come to real terms with this problem. One of [the] most developed forms of urban guerrilla struggle in Latin America, NLM has taken this summer the first elementary steps in the widening of the political struggle in Uruguay.
The Tupamaros, sprang to world headlines with the kidnappings of the CIA agent, Dan Mitrione, and the Brazilian Consul, Aloysio Dias Gomide on July 31st this year. They demanded the release of all political prisoners in Uruguay (calculated to be some 180 at least) as the price of the freedom of the two men. Seven days later they kidnapped another CIA agent, Claude Fly. On August 8th the Tupamaros tried and executed Mitrione in response to the government's refusal to meet their demands. From the beginning of August, Montevideo has been completely transformed. The [government] attempted to discover the men and destroy the NLM by intensive repression. The army and the police completely occupied Montevideo, the capital of Uruguay. On August 11th all constitutional rights were suspended, and thousands of police searches of hospitals, schools, churches even cemeteries, as well as house-to-house searches became part of daily life for Montevideanos. With repression there was a [sharpening] of class divisions in the city. Workers on strike for higher wages [and] university and secondary school students have become involved in serious clashes with the police. The public and private secondary schools in the city remain closed. Despite continuous [army] and police vigilance, NLM attacks have continued against reactionary radio and T.V. stations, the bourgeois press and North American corporations. The situation has created serious splits within the government. The opposition to the majority of Pacheco Areco has become increasingly critical of the [pres]ident's repressive policy.
[In their] Manifesto to [the people], for [the fi]rst [time they] challenged [the] government on [the condi]tions which must be fulfilled in order to avoid continued war with [the] Tupamaros:
"We [propose] the ceasing of hostilities, [to be] agreed upon, on the basis of the following:
1. Freedom for all political prisoners.
2. Reemployment of all those dismissed from their jobs, and payment of all wages deducted from workers through union sanctions.
3. Repeal of all wage freeze laws and decrees.
4. Lifting of all government intervention, especially in educational [institutions].
5. Restoration of all constitutional rights.
6. Ending of all the reactionary, repressive measures taken by the present government. In no circumstances will we accept discussions on the [surrender] of arms, nor the existence of our organisation. We consider both as the only guarantee of the people in the last instance. We are publicly taking the initiative.
Now it's up to the government. If they [agree] we will discuss, assume [and] fulfill the promises. [Otherwise], we'll have to [get ready] for war. If there's no Fatherland for all, [there's] no Fatherland for anybody. That's our word."
In effect, for the first time, they have put forward a basic political program for the people of Uruguay. [They] have been able to create a crisis situation in which they are able to challenge the government and elaborate an alternative. That they have been able to do so is firmly based on certain fundamental aspects of NLM strategy and the historical development of Uruguay.
"THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE URUGUAY ..."
Uruguay seemed to be one of the most Europeanised, most modern, most stable, most developed, most reformist and most democratic of all Latin American countries. 'Como el Uruguay no hay' - there's no place like Uruguay - was the title of a Uruguayan film made in 1957. But Uruguay was really an integral part of Latin America; its similarity with the rest of the continent was simply obscured. The idyllic image was incompatible with the reality of underdevelopment and economic dependence within the world capitalist system. Gradually a complex crisis of economic stagnation and repression developed, accompanied by a crisis of ideologies and values. During decades a model for the rest [of] Latin America, Uruguay is today the source of a new form of [struggle].
Uruguay, with its 183,926 square kilometers (little bigger than Cuba) and three million inhabitants (Cuba has eight million) suffers the general law of [illegible] underdevelopment and dependence which characterizes the whole continent. Sandwiched between two powerful giants, Brazil and Argentina, the terrain is an extension of the pampas of Argentina. The fertile land is suitable for agriculture and pasture but is little populated and little exploited. The only port is the capital, Montevideo, which is concentrated on 4 percent of the land area and has over [50] percent of the total [popul]ation.
The economy is based almost exclusively on cattle and farming around Montevideo. The city became the centre for industrial processing and packing of meat, wool and hides for export. It was also the centre for the imports of industrial machinery and consumer goods for the expanding urban market. From 1900-1925 Montevideo grew tremendously with the livestock industry for an expanding foreign market. Meat processing [was] improved and expanded with the installation of four large 'frigorificos' (refrigerated plants). Increased capacity in turn created the demand for extensive railway and transport services, more electricity and public services and light consumer industries for the urban population of Montevideo.
From 1911, the second Batlle government carried out large scale social reforms: the secret vote, separation of the Church and State, the nationalisation of public services and various industries, control of banks and credit, and an advanced system of social security. In 1912, the State Electricity Company, UEE (Usinas Eléctricas del Estado) was formed; in 1914 the State Telegraph Company; in 1915 the State tram and railway companies. Scientific services and educational institutes under state control were created as an integral part of development policy. This formed the basis of several decades of prosperity and social peace.
Like all Latin American countries, Uruguay was hard hit by the 1929 Depression. But new State policies in the 1930's boosted recovery. Monopoly sectors were consolidated - the most important were SOYF (fisheries), the incorporation of telephones into UEE to form UTE (Usinas Eléctricas y Teléfonos del Estado) in 1931, and later, in 1945, the railway monopoly. World War Two, with the increased demand for meat products for Europe and the United States, together with a temporary cutting off of imports from Europe, gave a boost to a process of import substitution, the growth of new home industries and advances in technology and agriculture. The standard of living and consumption almost reached European standards, creating unprecedented urban comfort. Post-war prosperity allowed further expansion of the existing Welfare State. Life [expectancy for] Uruguayans was calculated to be 65-58 years in 1956-60 - one of [the] highest in Latin America. The net birth rate was 22.5 per thousand inhabitants, and the death rate 7.8 per thousand. The annual increase of the population was one of the lowest in the continent - 1.4 percent. Uruguay also had the most notable educational development and the least illiteracy. In 1965 the census revealed that 9 percent were illiterate, and 20 percent partially illiterate.
But development was not balanced. Despite the fact that Uruguay was an agricultural country, 82 percent of the population was in the cities. The middle class - the enormous number of public officials, executives, professionals, and technocrates - developed as an active, even decisive element in politics, culture and public opinion. In Uruguay, 'todo el mundo es clase media' - everyone is middle class: in 1956 it was calculated that in Montevideo there were 15,000 bank employees, 38,000 commercial employees, and 11,000 professional employees in private industry alone.
The active population of Uruguay was estimated in 1963 as some 1,031,300 persons (40 percent of the population). Twenty-eight percent of the workers were agricultural labourers and 18 percent industrial workers. If the middle class and sectors of the working class lived well, others did not. Concentration of land and capital in the hands of latifundists meant that the rural population was small and the number of unemployed high. In 1946, there was a discussion in the House of Deputies on the fact that rural salaries had remained the same for twenty years. In that period (1926-46) wool prices had risen 50 percent while the wages of sheep shearers stayed the same. These workers still worked a 12-15 hour day in unhealthy conditions. No shearer keeps his job for more than ten years and on average he works only 45 days of the year. Rural workers and marginal and casual labour in the cities live in appalling conditions without stable [conditions].
Moreover the prosperity for favoured sectors was short lived. The late 50's came to remind Uruguayans that they remained part of the underdeveloped two-thirds of the world. The economy depended on [ex]ports of cattle and [sheep] farming products. Expansion in other sectors in the 30's and 40's was limited, and depended directly or indirectly on the fate of livestock. When the markets and prices for these exports fell, the effects were felt throughout the economy. In the 50's came the endemic crisis which other Latin American countries had been facing for some years. For, like other Latin American economies, the Uruguayan economy depended one a product for North American and European markets. For all her higher level of development, Uruguay remained trapped in the structure of relations of the world imperialist system, - producer of raw agricultural materials, importer of industrial [goods]. The Depression of 1929-33 destroyed the fundamental basis of these markets. From the 30's onwards all Latin American governments have been attempting to keep an economy going which no longer corresponds to the changing world situation. In Uruguay the effects of this fundamental change were not evident until 1955, when the temporary stimulating effect of the Second World War ended, and trade relations became normal again. Uruguayan exports have fallen drastically, causing cuts in production. From 1955-61, 22,000 agricultural workers were left without work. Two of the largest 'frigorificos' - Swift and Artigas, both American owned - closed down, throwing large numbers of men out of work.
Technically backward in other sectors, Uruguay was [ensnared] in MONOPRODUCTION. In her attempts to stave off total crisis she was forced to rely more and more on [foreign] loans. Early economic development from the late 19C to the 1930's had been promoted by British investment. Later this was [replaced] by US [investment]. In 1912 British investment amounted to £46,145,393 [—] 25,552,548 in government bonds and £20,592,845 in private enterprise, (of the last 5,552,548 was invested in rail[ways]). The bonds paid 4.7 interest. By the 1920's returns were so high that Uruguay was considered the second most attractive country in Latin America for investment (Argentina came first). Transport, electricity and the meat industry [dr]aw off particularly high profits to foreign interests. The drain from Uruguay in profits was so great by the 1930's that the press was constantly denouncing the extent to which the country was captive in the hands of foreign capital. However, as a consequence of the World War, by 1949 British Investment had dropped to £26,624,198 (although still with [an] interest rate of 4.7 percent). Since then, the pattern of investments has changed. U.S. investments have [replaced] British and go far less to public services and far more directly to commercial and industrial enterprises. U.S. capital was heavily invested in North American subsidiary corporations, for example, in Swift and Armour in Montevideo and Anglo, in the city of Fray Bentos companies which together dominated the Uruguayan market. Trade and export of wool, the greatest source of wealth, in the 1950's was 90 percent in the hands of six international trusts.
Attempting to compete on a world market which had changed, Uruguayan prosperity came to an end. At the end of the 1950's, the United States imposed through the International Monetary Fund, IMF, a policy of loans and monetary devaluation, which produced a fall in the standard of living of workers and numerous middle class. As the economic crisis began to be felt, the extended bureaucracy of public and welfare services was seen to be one of the main factors of official expenditure which the economy could not support and substantial cuts were made in benefits and services. In the 1960's the situation worsened. In 1965 the only bank crisis in the whole history of Uruguay almost paralysed the country. In June 1965, the [exchange rate] was at 24 per dollar. The external debt on May 31st 1965 was 580,000,000 U.S. dollars. State reserves in May 1965 were estimated at 211,000,000 U.S. dollars - 171,000,000 in gold and 40,000,000 in currency. Direct U.S. investment amounted to $7,000,000 U.S. dollars in 1963 - 45 percent of this was in the manufacturing industry. In 1964 exports were valued at 179,000,000 U.S. dollars against imports of 190,000,000 U.S. dollars - that is, with a deficit of [11,000,000] U.S. dollars. By 1970 the Uruguayan peso was at 250 per dollar. As the value of the peso fell, with successive devaluations and the national debt increased the government began to make more concessions and to mortgage gold reserves to the U.S.
With the increased cost of living, public officials and workers in industrial sectors [were hardest] hit. [They struggled to raise their] wages to [meet] higher prices. [There were] stoppages [in] textiles, banks[,] metallurgy[,] frigorificos, [gas,] UTE and [public] health services. By 1967 the national debt [had] risen to 5,000,000 U.S. dollars with government promises of partial repayment within the next few years. [Ri]ches were increasingly concentrated in the hands of 200-500 families, owners of land, banks and large enterprises, linked to foreign capital. Financial collapse and [dependen]ce on foreign capital [gave] rise to widespread administrative corruption and political [ins]tability.
the Electoral College [ballot power]
every four Novembers we're free
the [illegible] will build the future
and the [society] will get well
only one problem we have to [worry]
[it] won't wait
vote vote before everything goes to hell
to Chase Manhattan [wages]
- Voting Instructions, in the book of poems Prison Diary, by Carlos Maria Gutierrez (Uruguay).
From the 19th century Uruguay had been a model of political stability - of peaceful elections and a stable two party system - as well as of economic expansion. In 1830 Uruguay won independence. A Constitution was drawn up and the Republic declared. From the civil war which followed independence, between the Blancos - Whites - identified with rural sectors and the Colorados - Reds - representing city interests, [came] the two dominant political parties, Blanco and Colorado. The civil war ended with dominance of the Colorado, although internal struggles continued. It was not until 1958, however, that Blancos came to power for the first time, ending 90 years of [Colorado dominance].
In 1951 a new Constitution was drawn up which established a collegiate system. The executive and the legislature were elected every four years, with the compulsory secret vote of all over 18 who can read and write. The legislature comprises [a] Senate of four members and a House of Commons of 99 members, which together form the General Assembly. The Presidential council rotates every year between the four first councillors of the majority party. The Executive National [Council] is made up of nine members. Six of the majority party and three of the next. This form of sharing the government between two [parties] is reproduced in almost all administrative posts, [espec]ially those in State Corporations with their own administration. These thus become a political instrument. The system is completed by the [m]echanisms of the electoral process which ensures the electoral monopoly of the two traditional parties. Because of this the force and [s]ize of the popular [movements] isn't reflected in the equilibrium of [the] electoral force. In 1966 the presidential system was introduced.
The majority party is the Colorado party which represents an amalgam of tendencies from the reactionary big bourgeoisie to the nationalist bourgeoisie, and small liberal petty bourgeoisie groups. The main opposition party is the Blanco party. The Christian Democrat Party has some support in the masses and some parliamentary representation but its reform pro[gramme] has had little success. The Communist Party, the [largest left] grouping, is firmly rooted in the working class in Montevideo, and has a small, but growing base in the interior. In 1962 the Left Liberation Front (Frente de Izquierda de Liberacion - FIDEL) was formed, which included the [Eastern] Revolution Movement. The Socialist Party, with its traditional anti-imperialist stand, has declined in electoral importance since 1962.
The union movement is firmly controlled by the Communist Party. The majority of the labour unions and increasingly the white collar unions, are grouped in the CTU = Central de trabajadores de [Uruguay]. On the basis of this in 1964, the National Convention of [Workers] - CNT - was formed, integrating more than 90 percent of the union movement in the country. The union movement in the interior is recent. UTAA - the union of sugar workers in Artigas, in the north-east is one of the most important.
In the 1960's this tenuous 'harmony' of social forces broke down. In 1967 Pacheco Areco, the current president of Uruguay came to power not through direct election, but through the death of the then President [illegible]. [In] his three years [in] office his 'hard-line' policy of wage [freezes and] cut backs in public and welfare expenditure has directly [served] the interests of the bankers, traders, industrialists and [l]andowners, and has struck hard on the workers. To meet growing social discontent [a]rising from the economic crisis and government policy, the regime has been building up its repressive machinery. In the face of social and economic crisis, democracy degenerated into open dictatorship. Closer associ[ation with the] military regimes of Argentina and Brazil, and more open US imperialist intervention. The armed forces of Uruguay are small and poorly equipped, without a repressive tradition. The Army, Navy and Airforce total only 10,000 men. The police force is stronger especially in Montevideo, where the police are well-equipped for political repression with US material and training.
Left opposition parties have been dissolved, opposition press has been closed down. Workers and students have met police brutality. Union leaders have been imprisoned.
In 1964 three leaders of the sugar workers' union, UTAA - Vigue, Santana and Castillo were imprisoned following an abortive assault on a bank to [raise] money for the sugar workers. [The] history of the sugar workers which led up to the attempted bank robbery was an important step in the political development of Uruguay.
In the 50's industrialisation had led the traditional left to concentrate on urban problems. But with the first [signs] of the crisis, it was [the isolated] rural workers who began to radicalise their demands. One of the most important of these groups was the cañeros - sugar cane workers. Without land, they and their families were forced to rely for their livelihood on seasonal labour on the sugar plantations of the State enterprises, CAINSA and AZUCARLITO in Artigas. Unorganised, cut-off from the rest of the [country] by the Central Government in Montevideo, they had never [been] given even the minimum labour rights which were legally theirs. Raul Sendic, one law student in Montevideo, in that period a militant of the Socialist Party, became a 'peludo' - long-haired or [hairy] one - as the cane workers called themselves. He lived and laboured with the workers and their families. Through UTAA, radicalised by the long patient work of Sendic, the peludos fought for and gained the enforcement of social legislation with which the Company had never complied. For the first time, the Union gained basic labour conditions, an eight hour day, a weekly rest, a minimum wage, etc. In 1962, under [Sendic], the Cañeros marched to Montevideo to [bring] attention to their problems. For the first time they saw the [city].
The [most] political step forward was when UTAA demanded 'tierra para [el que la trabaja]', the [cry] grimly of land for the cañeros. UTAA identified 30,000 hectares of land whose owners were either widows or [absentees] and who lived in the city. The land was left abandoned. In 1963-64 the workers came up against an outright refusal - there was no land for the cañeros, the government said. But the workers knew different. They came up against the bourgeois system with its indifference to their problems. The very struggle began to teach the workers that they were fighting not for economic demands but against the whole exploitative system in which they were forced to live. [They] marched to Montevideo to demand legislation and land reform. [This] time, they went back defeated, but much clearer and more politically conscious. It was this that led the three leaders to attempt the bank robbery. They were beginning to act in a different way. They [were] beginning to attack. But they lacked the technique and organisation.
In the city, the reaction to economic hardship and government [pol]icy also hardened. There were strikes in textiles, metallurgy, frigorificos and government [services that para]lysed key sectors of the economy. Long organised by reformist [le]aders the workers only demanded increased wages, but in the critical situation in Uruguay this was a lot. Strikes were repressed. Workers were jailed. In the University of the [Republic] in Montevideo, the Federation of University Students demanded [un]iversity autonomy. Especially militant were the Faculties of Medicine (the oldest), law and agronomy. In demonstrations many students were hurt, many arrested. In August 1968 a student, Liber Arcé, was killed. In September, two more were killed. In August 1970 demonstrations in Commemoration met heavy repression. Pacheco Areco closed all secondary schools and the University. In September, on the 16th workers of the [Coca]-Cola company, already on strike for a few months marched with [students]. The same day the medical union was involved in clashes with the police. On September 18th, the National Convention of Workers assembled for an act of solidarity with the imprisoned strikers from [Coca]-Cola. Textile, metallurgy, chemical and brewery and soft-drink wo[rke]rs, together with students, teachers and pensioners participated in the meeting, applauding speeches [and slogans] 'The strike will not be destroyed', 'Students and workers unite', 'Uruguayans are not sheep', and 'Solidarity Strengthens'.
The [se]quence of repression faced by an open defenceless movement speaks for itself. A new type of movement began to emerge - NLM, TUPAMAROS. They take their name from Tupac Amaru, a cacique of the Incas, who led an early uprising from Peru against Spanish domination. Years later, after the defeat of Artigas, the great independence leader of Uruguay, at the beginning of the 19th century, the oligarchy attributed continuing incidents in rural areas to groups of so-called Tupamaros, robbing and assaulting landowners and landed property. In reality they were the last attempts of resistance of decimated [remnants] of Artigas' gauchos. The name Tupamaro is, thus, rooted in the ori[ginal] indo-american rebellion and in the revolutionary tradition of [Uru]guay.
The first signs of the movement came in 1963 when a group, including Raul Sendic, assaulted a shooting club of the interior, carried off the arms of the club and went underground. From that date urban guerrilla groups have coolly carried out spectacular underground attacks on Montevideo. Their early [operat]ions included attacks on Radio Carve and Voz del Aire for de[format]ion of the Cuban Revolution, on the City Bank and other North American firms, the explosion of bombs [illegible] at government [illegible] when [illegible] private firms attempted to put up [fares], [the] capture of [illegible] used lorries to distribute food to families of strikers, the explosion of a bomb in the house of [the] Chief of Police, Colonel Aguerrondo, in reply to an attack ordered on frigorifico workers on strike, and an assault on the Bayer Company when it was revealed that they produced Napalm for the US war against Vietnam.
From 1968 their operations have been openly directed against [pri]sons and enterprises in the economy. On August 8th 1968, [they] kidnapped the President of UTE, and held him prisoner for five days. In September 1969 eight men arrived by taxi at the offices of the two largest newspapers, Mañana, and El Diario, and carried off with them the [owner], Gaetano Pelle Giampietre. Giampietre was also the principal owner of a [chain] of banks, whose intransigence before his workers had led to a 70 day strike. He was freed for 3,000 dollars deposited in a health clinic for workers.
In 1969, [the] Tupamaros carried out a spectacular attack in commemoration of the death of El Ché, on October 8th. [The] Tupamaros entered Pando, on the outskirts of the capital, as a funeral cortege. [They] then split up into three action groups. The first took the local police station. The second occupied the fire station and destroyed the electricity and telephone centre, stopping communications from the town. The third assaulted three banks, [taking] 40,000 dollars. The whole operation was carried out in ten minutes.
[The Tupamaros] have no respect for a totally corrupt and exploitative system which robs the people. There exists in Uruguay commissions to investigate fraud, commissions such as the Comisión de ilicitos, tribunal de cuentas, and Comisiones con funciones fiscalizadoras. But [the] Tupamaros protect public funds far more efficiently. In February 1968, NLM confiscated thousands of dollars and confidential papers from the Monty Co. exchange offices. Within days they had placed copies of the documents in the hands of the courts denouncing the fraudulent dealings of the firm. The investigations on the case produced the dismissal of the Minister of Livestock and Agriculture, Frick Davies, and caused a great financial scandal. In December 1969, they took documents from the central safe of the French and Italian Bank; these documents revealed illegal operations of the foreign bank designed to manipulate the financial market and national credit with the aid of leading figures. In January 1970, they pulled off 'Operation Pounds Sterling'. A commando group of Tupamaros entered the house of Luis Eduardo Mailhos Queirolo, 75 year old owner of a huge tobacco empire, dismantled a heavy safe, loaded it into a van and drove off - [taking] with them a lump sum of £25,000 Sterling in gold. Mailhos had systematically kept money since the beginning of the Second World War to [be able] to communicate with his estates. They left no trace except that written on a wall by an ex-worker of Mailhos, Robert [Barheito]: "Hasta la Victoria siempre, Roberto'. The government was forced to jail [Mailhos] for fraud. His fine was the largest recorded in the history of Uruguay - 578,000,000 pesos (2,300,000 dollars).
From March 1970 attacks have been stepped up. On March 8th [they] freed thirteen women accused of belonging to NLM from the jail where they were being held.
On May 17th they carried out eight attempts with fire bombs against banks, laboratories, and industrial and commercial enterprises.
[The] Tupamaros are quite clear who the enemy is. The Oligarchs, the politicians, foreign diplomats, OAS officials, foreign advisers and their repressive forces are all responsible for the present situation. They are all answerable to the people. None will be respected. In May this year, a perfect attack was carried out on a centre for naval instruction. All apparently began with a dispute outside the centre. Two uniformed men arrived in a car, apparently a police car, and intervened in the dispute. Without success, they then went over to the guard on the gates, Fernando Garin, who let them through. The rest was easy. Forty to fifty persons surrounded the centre and entered the building. They found [those] inside, including the captain, sleeping and forced them to lead them to the arsenal. There they appropriated over 700 arms, radio equi[pment] and munitions. Among the arms were 300 M-1 guns, heavy mach[ine] guns and gas grenades. The guard left with them.
At the beginning of July the Special Repressive Commando Unit was formed. On July 12th [the] Tupamaros assaulted the houses of four police. They appropriated eight cars (some taxis) from their drivers during the afternoon. The drivers were held till late afternoon by [the] Tupamaros, then they were told where they could find their cars and released. The taxi drivers were given the full amount of fare corresponding to the time during which the cars had been used. Meantime, during the afternoon, four groups, each including one girl, simultaneously searched the houses. In each case they explained that they [w]ere not against the police but against the regime, and that these searches were "just like the ones the police carry out against the rest of us and the workers".
On July 13th they freed two political prisoners from the jail where they were being held.
On July 28th they kidnapped Judge Daniel Pereira Manelli and on the 31st, Dan Mitrione and Aloysio Dias Gomide. On August 8th they kidnapped Claude Fly. Both Mitrione and Fly worked for AID - Agency for International Development, but both were important CIA agents. Mitrione was adviser to the Uruguayan police and was largely responsible for new torture methods used. Fly posed as agricultural specialist, but, as Mitrione declared in an interview by [the] Tupamaros before his death, Fly was one of the chief CIA agents in South America. When the Uruguayan government refused to free political prisoners in exchange for the detained men, [the] Tupamaros tried and executed Mitrione. On [August] 11th in 'Comunicado No. 10', they made quite clear why; "The oliga[rchy] of the Pacheco government, the repressive forces, and North American advisers will answer for our detained compañeros".
The Pacheco Areco regime replied with intensive searches throughout Montevideo - hospitals, churches, schools, and cemeteries were not spared. Parliament suspended all constitutional rights for a period of 20 days (12th - 31st August) to help the forces of 'law and order'. Many innocent people were arrested. In the jails police attempted to get information from prisoners by torture. On August 4th, the [Montevideo] paper, Marcha, published an interview with two of the political prisoners, Felix Bentin, a sugar worker, and José Alberto Mercado, ex-student of the Bar. Both were victims of brutal treatment and of manifest sadism on the part of the prison guards. Felix Bentin, after a month in jail, arrived for the interview, supporting one leg, unable to move his hands for bandages, his back bent low, his left eye closed already useless. Moreover, last month the Uruguayan police began to apply drugs to prisoners to obtain information. In at least two cases [th]e drug used was Penthotal, a poisonous barbiturate, which has the properties of releasing the subconscious of a person just before losing consciousness. No doctor administers this drug without taking the necessary precautions, one of which is that the patient is hospitalised. Uninterrupted police interrogations and Penthotal didn't produce results. It was decided that the courts should finally decide the fate of the prisoners. Hence, on August 31st, when constitutional rights were reintroduced, the political prisoners were brought under civil jurisdiction.
In the face of this reaction from the government, the [Tupamaros] started the attacks they had promised on the reactionary media, and North American corporations. On August 22nd they took over local radio stations. On August 26th bombs were planted in radio stations and papers of the extreme right. The [Tupamaros] declared: "The fascist press, allied to the dictatorship, sold out to the oligarchy, is entrusted [with] lies and playing down the truth of the facts before the people".
In September, the [Tup]amaros intensified their attacks. On the 4th they carried out 15 commando attacks on North American marines, on bank magnates, (one of the banks attacked was the Mercantile Bank of Uruguay, directly linked to Chase Manhattan), on the office of Eastern Publicity (which [runs] publicity for the ultra-right-wing group, Adelante) on OAS officials, on agents in government and political police, and on an official radio commentator.
On the 8th they robbed 40 pounds of dynamite. On the 9th two [Tupamaros] assaulted the offices of a textile company, La Medial, and carried [off] 4,000,000 pesos (16,000 dollars). On the 10th [three] NLM commando groups of five or six (one of which was a girl) posing as police, got into [the] Coca Cola bottling plant. Rounding up the workers, they said, "This isn't with you. It's with [the gringos]", adding, "We don't want anything [to happen] to you." Taking the [explosives] away from the plant, they [detonated them]. Part of the factory was destroyed. The group was immediately picked up by a Mercedes Benz. The same day [an]other group arrived in two cars at the North American Standard Oil Company offices. In a 10 minute operation they locked employees in the bathrooms, [forced] the cashier to open the safe, and took 1,400,000 pesos in cheques (5,000 dollars) and 350,000 pesos in cash (1,000 dollars). They also [illegible].
On September 13th [a group of] six assaulted the house of secondary school teacher, Carlos Maria Trianon, known for his extreme rightist activities.
On September 14th, two operations were carried out. A group of 15 arrived at the [offices of the] North American [tex]tile firm, Sudamtex. They entered a small [door] opened unsuspect[ed] by the night watchman. The whole of the stock of material for all [of] next year's spring and summer production went up in flames, causing [an] estimated 4,000,000 dollars damages. Once again, [the] Tupamaros were careful to explain to the workers that this wasn't against them: "Don't be worried or afraid, this won't go against you but against the owners of the factory." It was the most spectacular fire since the General Motors' fire in 1969 during Rockefeller's visit. Meanwhile, three Tupamaros posed as fishermen [and] got permission to fish in a small lake in San José which was alongside the North American Press Wireless. The three arrived at the transmission station, quickly surprised the only person present, a German operator, took him away from the plant and left a bomb. The explosion came out over the air.
On September 16th a fire was started in the North American machine [mak]ing firm, International Harvester. The same day, they robbed 4,[000] dollars from the National Chalk Factory.
On September 29th [the] Tupamaros blew up the Carrasco Bowling Club and the restaurant Rochelle, completely destroying the former and causing serious damages to the latter. The three NLM militants explained to the proprietor, cleaner and breadman present in the Bowling Club that they were going to blow the building, "not because of the firm, nor the proprietor, but because it was North Americans, almost exclusively, who met there".
On September 30th attacks were carried out on the property of two pro-government members of Parliament. The first was on a private health clinic of Senator and ex-minister Justino Carrera [illegible], the second on the private home of Deputy Wilson Graviotto. Both were known for their campaigning for the re-election of Pacheco Areco.
"... insurrection is an art quite as much as [war] or any other, and subject to certain rules of procedure which, when neglected, will produce the ruin of the party neglecting them ..." "never play with insurrection unless you are prepared to face the consequences of your play ..." - Marx and Engels. Revolution and Counter Revolution.
As part of its repressive policy, the government prohibited the use of certain words - such as Tupamaros and National Liberation Movement by the media. They are to be referred to as 'common delinquents'. On September 17th, in their Manifesto to the People, [the] Tupamaros replied:
"The present situation of the country demands political, social and economic solutions. Repression is of no use at all. We hope that now they have us, they understand once and for all that the National Liberation Movement isn't a band of delinquents. NLM is no more, no less than the armed political organisations of students, workers, public employees, agricultural labourers, intellectuals, and the unemployed - all the sectors exploited by your (the government's) injustices. Our militants come from those sectors and we organise, help, and fight in the defence of the interests of those sectors."
In August 1968, after kidnapping Ulyses Pereira Reverbel, President of [UTE], [the] Tupamaros spelt this out more clearly:
"In the face of the flagrant attack that six or seven bankers, speculators, latifundistas and traders set up as ministers and governors, are carrying out against the fundamental rights and liberties of our people;
In the face of the fascist attack on the true organisations of the people, workers and students, manifest in the union laws, beatings, militarisation and arrests;
In the face of the immorality of freezing wages and incomes of the poorest sectors, [leaving] intact the interests of those who have caused the crisis which the country is suffering, and fraudulent devaluations which fill the pockets of speculators who are in government positions;
In the face of the farce of justice which doesn't touch those who have swindled millions from the country, but imprisons and persecutes social fighters like Vique, Santana, Castillo and others;
In the face of handing over our country to North American capital through the international monetary field and the increasing interference of neighbouring dictatorships in our affairs;
In the face of all this, what [we] need is to organise the defence of the people, to continue organising the struggle enough to reply to reactionary violence with the revolutionary struggle."
During this period, the article, 30 Questions to a Tupamaro, [appeared] in Punto Final, a Chilean periodical (reproduced in Juventud [Rebelde], Cuba, September 16, 1968). The answer to key questions on [the following scan page is largely unrecoverable from the OCR:]
[illegible] organisations seem to put more faith in [illegible] giving [illegible]. Referring to the Revolution, to prepare militants and revolutionary [cadres] without [illegible] it [illegible] actions which precipitate [revolutionary] conditions, [illegible] revolutionary conditions? - Cuba [illegible] of a mass Party, [illegible] and this [illegible] nonetheless, etc.? - Of course. But [illegible] example of the principle that [illegible] action generates [illegible] example. Instead of [illegible] a revolutionary movement needs platforms, documents, [illegible]. We shouldn't get confused. You don't make a revolution polishing [illegible] platforms and principles of a [illegible]. It's enough [illegible] the path of [illegible] itself for [illegible]. Yes, for two [illegible]. Do you believe that a revol[ution illegible] armed [illegible]? - The basic [illegible] Revolution, are given and [illegible] like Cuba [illegible] tried out [illegible]. And there's no need to disguise it more, [illegible] to [illegible] to those [illegible] principles, and show - by deeds - [illegible] insurrection to achieve that [illegible]? [illegible] revolutionary movement should [illegible] at any stage, even when the conditions for armed struggle are [illegible]. [illegible]? - [For two] reasons at least. Because an armed left-wing [illegible] be attacked by repression at [illegible] in its development and must be [illegible] [illegible] spirit imbued [illegible] other things will develop: 1. [illegible] mere movement which [illegible] the [illegible] will make - for example [illegible] movement [illegible] itself. [illegible] Prepared to defend its existence ... And because, if from the [illegible] [there] is no combative[ness] in each militant, [he is] not a revolutionary, [illegible] carry the union to more radical struggles and to more [advanced] stages in the class struggle.
- What are the main [general objectives of the movement at this] stage?
- To have an armed group, the most prepared and equipped possible, proved in action. To have good relations with other popular movements which help the class struggle. To create organs of propaganda to radicalise the struggle and create consciousness. To have an efficient mechanism for recruitment of militants with possibilities of theoretical and [growth] in the mass movement which carry out the tasks we have [already] mentioned.
- Does the importance which the movement gives to preparation for armed struggle imply the affirmation that a combatant cannot improvise?
- Armed struggle is a technique which requires knowledge, training, materials, and a combatant psychology. Improvisation in this field will be paid for dearly in lives and failures. The [illegible] spontaneity put forward by those who vaguely talk about the 'revolution the masses will make' is merely to [illegible] or to improvise, precisely the culminating stage of the class struggle. [illegible] technically know how to channel popular violence against [illegible] way that the object is achieved with the least sacrifices possible."
NLM stresses that the movement has no detailed strategy, but general lines which are themselves subject to modification with a change of circumstances. Strategy is worked out according to real contexts:
- "On what real basic facts had the organisation based its general lines of strategy during this period?
- The conviction that the crisis, far from getting better, will get worse every day... This means that we have a few years ahead in which the people will have to keep on [tightening] their belts. A second basic fact for strategy is the high [level] of unionisation of the Uruguayan workers. Even if not all the unions are [illegible] in itself a very positive fact without comparison in America ... It isn't the same, for example, to attack a State in [illegible] have a huge city, with more than 300 square kilometers of buildings, which allows the development of urban struggle ... this means [we] have to develop our own strategy ---
Moreover in a strategic study we must always take into account [the] forces of repression. Our armed forces, some 12,000 [men], weakly armed and trained are one of the weakest repressive apparatus in Latin America. Another important strategic factor is the level of preparation of the revolutionary armed group."
The international character of [imperialist] repression makes a policy of international solidarity essential [to] the national liberation struggles of Latin America. [The] Tupamaros stress that liberation movements must act [regardless] of the frontiers dictated by colonialism and imperialism. [As] yet, the struggle cannot achieve a global scale but it must be on a continental scale. The first formal indication that this solidarity is being achieved came with the Declaration of Solidarity with NLM by [the] National Liberation Army of Bolivia on July 31st 1970. [This] is beginning to constitute an integration on an international [level], goals which will allow us to destroy imperialism more easily. Moreover, it is an indication that not only the enemy is capable of uniting. Revolutionaries can also [break down] artificial [barriers] so that the ideas of Bolivar and El Ché begin to bear [fruit]. Equally important in terms of growing [solidarity between Latin] American revolutionaries, is the tremendous increase of urban commando tactics in neighbouring Brazil and Argentina. September 27th the Argentine Forces of Liberation assaulted a train and carried off almost 14,000 dollars. At the time another [commando] group assaulted a subsidiary of the North American Ford motor company, in Cordoba province.
Action in Argentina and Brazil clearly [makes the repression of] these countries in Uruguay more difficult. The US and Brazilian [gover]nment clearly put pressure on Pacheco Areco [to] help liberate the [detained] men. [B]ut there is no doubt they did not pressurize for the exchange proposed by the [T]upamaros. [The detained men are, and] still are, less [impo]rtant to the United States and Brazil than the freedom of 180 political prisoners. What the [Tupamaros] are trying [to] show is that the enemy is a continental enemy, [the] struggle is a continental struggle.
"A REVOLUTION IS NOT MADE, IT IS ORGANISED." NLM
It is quite evident that the Pacheco Areco regime is faced with a highly technical military organization. [The] Tupamaros are trained combatants, with a considerable proportion of women. The cadres are, [on] the whole, between twenty and thirty years old. They are experts in the handling of automatic weapons, explosives, and electronic systems of communications, in the driving of all types of vehicles and commando tactics in urban zones. Appropriations of arms, munitions and finances in many of their commando attacks have kept them equipped with the latest of weapons and resources.
On May 10th 1969, the Chief of Police, Raul Berger, admitted the strengthening of the National Liberation Movement. He said, "In the whole country we have only 20,000 men and not all of them can be after [the] Tupamaros. Moreover, one of them is worth twenty of our men."
The cost of the kidnapping operations was dear to [the] Tupamaros. Over 20 of the know[n] militants fell into the hands of the police, including Raul Sendic, who has been underground since 1963 and whom police believe to be leader of the movement. But recent events have shown the NLM has suffered no serious setback. Periodically over the past three years, Pacheco Areco's police have arrested, tortured, or simply killed certain militants whom they declared to be leaders, proclaiming at the same time that the movement has been destroyed. Invariably, after suffering losses, [the] Tupamaros have struck back with more force than ever.
Secrecy is essential to any revolutionary movement facing the modern repressive system which exists in urban Uruguay. It is evident that the very structure of the movement prevents its disintegration. Anonymity is the weapon of the Tupamaros to maintain security. In March 1969, in reply to twelve questions put to [them] in [the] Uruguayan periodical, Al rojo vivo, NLM declared:
"We want to reaffirm our certainty that at this moment [the movement] is indestructible. The separation of different cells, whose members do not even know each other, gives us the complete certainty that although leaders, middle cadres or militants at the base may fail, the movement will carry on."
What is more, the movement has no 'leaders' as such. In the recorded interview which the Tupamaros did with Mitrione, the kidnapped CIA agent, there is the following dialogue:
Mitrione: "You (Tupamaros) do a good job. You are well organized. You must have good leaders."
Tupamaro: "Well - I ought to tell you - and I hope you believe me: We have no leaders. There are some who are more or less important, but nothing like leaders. We discuss everything. We aren't important, at least I'm not, but there are others who are. We are all compañeros."
The nucleus of NLM is formed of militants who are completely underground. But there obviously also exists a large network of [people] who lead normal lives but provide help for the movement in many different ways. These peripheral helpers are considered very important [by] NLM:
"The one who gets materials necessary for operations, the one who deals with financial matters, the one who loans his car for operations, who loans his house, is [running] a risk as great as, or greater than, the members of the action group. You must realise that revolutionaries have spent most of their time in small practical things without which there is no revolution."
- 30 Questions to a Tupamaro.
[The exper]ts in the movement include lawyers, doctors, economis[ts] and electronics experts. On various occasions they have [taken] documents they have taken, and within days have placed them in the hands of commissions and courts, together with thorough economic and financial studies. Electronics experts have given NLM the capacity [to] interrupt radio and T.V. broadcasts to transmit their declarations to the people. The mobile underground transmitter which they have been operating since 1969, has not been discovered even by US experts sent to Uruguay for that purpose.
Invisible to the people by the very nature of their [movement], [the] Tupamaros depend on the understanding of the masses that NLM is act[ing] in their interests to [gain popular] support. For this reason, all operations have been specifically directed against the interests of [the] Pacheco Areco regime. NLM declarations and proclamations explain in simple terms the real nature of the present crisis in Uruguay, and [illegible]. [The] Tupamaros have, over the past [illegible] [provoked serious] ministerial crises and splits in the government. In 1968, in 30 Questions to a [Tupamaro, asked], "In what way does [the] crisis and popular discontent [enter into strategy?]", the answer was quite clear:
"[In] the objective and the subjective conditions for revolution [enter] class divisions [and] crises and splits in the [government]. It is [illegible] that the majority of the population, although not for insurrection, at least is not prepared either to kill itself for a regime against the people. This, among other things, reduces the strategic calculations [aga]inst the enemy practically to its armed forces, and allows a climate favourable to the first measures of a revolutionary government."
Highly organised, trained and equipped to challenge the forces of repression, [the Tupamaros] have succeeded in creating the polarization of revolutionary energy and the political crisis which at this moment challenge the whole basis of the Pacheco Areco regime.
Jean Stubbs
This article was originally sent in to the Red Mole. It was too long for that paper. The editor of the Red Mole felt that he would not like to shorten it because of the large amount of factual material of interest to British Revolutionaries it contained. He therefore [suggested] that the INTERNATIONAL should print it. We readily agreed although we are not in full agreement with its entire political line and its author may not be with ours. Nevertheless, we felt it was a valuable contribution to an important debate and needed to be printed in full - The Editors.