To understand the balance of forces currently prevailing in the British Steel Industry, it is first of all necessary to trace the origins of, on the one hand, the level of consciousness and militancy of the workers, and on the other hand, the development and contradictions within the growth and ownership of the steel industry.
It is not considered necessary here to trace back farther than the 1920s, just after the inception of the dominant union, BISAKTA, and a time of acute depression in the industry.
The industry at that time was still fragmented, although signs of the oncoming steel monopolies were emerging. The firms were family firms, some of which had paternal attitudes towards their employees, some of which were harsh and brutal. Here lie the origins of the enormous wage differentials in the steel industry. Another reason is the method of payment which prevailed at the time. This system of payment, the “Butty” system, involved the senior man in a team, roller or furnaceman, being given an amount of money which he distributed at will, giving his subordinates whatever he considered they were worth. Nepotism and family connections were also paramount in job distribution. However, with the increasing effect of the unionisation, the seniority system evolved out of the old nepotism. Hence, today, there exists in the steel industry a seniority system whereby the workers reach the senior jobs via promotion, and huge wage differentials. Wages in the top jobs could be as high as £70 or more per week. Consequently there is a low labour turnover with people aspiring to reach these lucrative jobs. A secondary feature of the above working system is that the furnacemen, etc. were generally the branch officials. This, combined with the nature of the job (very highly skilled in the sense of experience needed to perform the task), concentrated a great deal of power in their hands. In some cases during the productive operation, they were more powerful than lower management, and indeed had a great deal of autonomy in the process of production. A sort of workers’ control without ownership (although the degree of control differed from firm to firm, relative to the particular operation. It can be seen from this that workplace relationships within the steel industry and the system of negotiations are very different from broad sectors of the rest of industry: probably there may be similarities with the printing industry.
The autonomy of steel workers in the process of production was further enhanced after the war, especially during the 1950s, with the stabilisation of capitalism. During that particular decade there was a huge demand for steel, which was needed for post-war reconstruction of industry, armaments, and, in the mid ‘50s, the consumer boom. Given these expanding conditions and the importance of steel to the economy, concessions were made almost immediately at the faintest hint of union pressure. The payment by results system was more or less universal, wages were (and to a large extent still are) geared to the amount of steel produced. Given fixed bonus rates geared to expanding production, and given a high differential in these rates, then even greater differentials result. All these events combined to make the higher-paid steel workers complacent. Not only were the workers complacent, but their union also. At this juncture we need to look at the nature and structure of the union, as another primary factor in the development of forces in the steel industry.
The British Iron, Steel and Kindred Trades Association (founded 1917) is, and always has been, on the extreme right of the trade union movement, It is an autocratic union with very little trade union democracy. There appears to be a self-perpetuating bureaucracy, and any study of the rule book will soon explain why.
(a) Rule 4 allows the Executive Council great power over its members, with wording such as “at the expediency of the council”, etc.
(b) There is no annual delegates conference as in most other unions (including the GMWU).
(c) Rule 19—Shop Dispute (Part 2): “It shall not be permissible for any member or members to strike his or their employment without the authority and sanction of the Executive Council.”
(d) In addition to the above, area officials are “appointed” and have to sit examinations before they are appointed.
The E.C. members are “elected” from each area and represent “work sections”. However, if one asks at random on the shop floor who the E.C. members are, the chances are hardly anyone will know. The importance of having an annual delegates conference can clearly be seen if one analyses the area set-up. One area does not know what another area is doing, and there is very little exchange of information. Such information would be extremely important in steel, given its wages structure.
Also the policy “divide and rule” is very helpful in the perpetuation of the bureaucracy. One of the consequences of the union structure is the extreme reluctance of branch officials to call in full-time officials. The union, then, has the power to, and indeed does, carry out national negotiation with almost complete disregard for the rank and file, and this situation is extremely important to understand when looking at the current situation, However, to fully understand the current relationships in steel, some comment on the development and ownership of the industry is needed.
The Development and Economic Importance of Steel to the U.K. Economy
The steel industry in the U.K., as in other Western countries and Japan within late capitalism, is vital to the perpetuation of the capitalist mode of production. Historically, as pointed out previously, its ownership has been private, with an oligopolistic nature. However, the industry has twice been nationalised since the Second World War(1). The fact that in the U.K. it is nationalised makes its value to the capitalist economy no less important: indeed it is a manifestation of the stage of capitalist development within the U.K.
The steel industry was nationalised so as to facilitate stated integration, rationalisation, and the economies of large-scale production. The arguments for the nationalisation of steel as projected by Pryce (2) and other bourgeois economists were arguments for creating a cheap and efficient source of supply to the steel-using industries, mainly the private sector, e.g. vehicles, engineering, building, ship-building, and consumer durables (washing machines, refrigerators, etc.), Nowhere in the literature of the day was any political motivation projected. Steel nationalisation was introduced at a time when British capitalism was in deep economic crisis, and it is a measure of its internal contradictions that a so-called “socialist” measure has to be carried out in an attempt to rectify the problems of monopoly capitalism. It is interesting to note that the Tories seem to have no plans for de-nationalisation, despite their vociferous opposition to the state take-over in 1966/67 and their promises then.
Nationalisation and Its Impact on the Rank and File
As can be seen above, nationalisation was not political, but purely economic, in its motives. Apart from a few gimmicky experiments (e.g. “worker directors”), the workers are no better off. The worker director “experiment” is a sham and a crude publicity stunt. The “directors” are appointed by the British Steel Corporation (not elected by the shop floor). They have to relinquish all trade union posts, and are in no way accountable to the union or the shop floor, So much for worker directors: fortunately their “status” does not fool many people.
Works councils of management and union officials have been set up under the disguise of common ground (unitary) consultation. Backed up by weekly newspapers which are given free to every employee, the corporation is indeed attempting to create a corporate state, or the Marcusian “one dimensional man”. Originally the works council machinery was designed to create an area of non-sanction bargaining; social services, welfare, etc., and this developed, predictably, into trying to extend this method across the whole area of industrial relations; e.g. T.U. business can now be discussed where it could not be before.
On the other hand, the economic developments within steel have been, or are, creating an embryonic conflict; the opposite of what the Corporation and the Union have been trying to achieve. The steel industry is becoming increasingly capital intensive, which results in redundancy. From this rapidly increasing technological innovation and rationalisation has come a situation in which a great section of the rank and file have become hostile to nationalisation itself, and speak of the good old days of private enterprise and “the firm”, Obviously this is a sad situation, and comrades in the steel industry will have a difficult task to explain during the coming struggles the real reasons behind the coming attack on their living standards,
Thus the development of consciousness, the policy of the steel trade unions and the development of the steel industry are all embodied and can clearly be seen in the latest attack on the steel workers, i.e. the Green Book productivity agreement.
The Green Book Productivity Deal
Origins of Agreement
1. The Corporation submitted to the Steel Committee (made up of union and management) proposals for the deal. Therefore the “deal” is an initiative by the employer.
2. The union appears to have made only one specific proposal: that job evaluation should be introduced immediately after method study—reiterate, the union proposed this.
3. The rank and file appear not to have been consulted. If they have not had access to information pertaining to the agreement, the nature of democracy within the union must be looked at.
Terms of Agreement
1. Typical productivity bargaining technique, i.e. controlling pay rises and fringe benefits (e.g. 5-day guarantee, holidays etc., first), in exchange for ending demarcation lines and shop steward power.
2. An increase of approximately 5% in wages was introduced. This was mainly on datal rates, which had previously been geared to the Index of Retail Prices. (In view of a clause which states that wages cannot be negotiated for at least three years, it needs little elaboration to suggest what will happen to the 5% increase vis-a-vis inflation over that period).
3. An additional one week’s holiday was “conceded”, making four weeks in all. However, payment is now 4 x 5 x 20 days as against the previous 3 x 7 x 21 days, = 1 day less pay! However, it must be noted that the new agreement = full holiday pay, i.e. equal to average shift earnings. This represents an aggregate advance but not nearly as much as one would expect in the light of an increased week’s holiday. (Typical productivity deal con-trick).
4. Guarantee of 5-day week was given—subject to certain codes of conduct which will be discussed later. The guaranteed week is extremely important to steel workers. Its importance is due to the nature of the industry, i.e. business cycle causing fluctuations in a working week, which could be three or four days per week in one period or six days in another period. This obviously gives the workers a feeling of great insecurity (as on the docks and in the car industry), especially in relation to planning future commitments.
In return for above, unions allow:
(a) Method Study.
(b) Time and Motion Study.
(c) Job Evaluation.
(d) Organisation and Method.
Flowing from these comes greater labour mobility and consequently more efficient use of manpower. It must be seen clearly from this that, as with other productivity agreements, the point at issue is one of control (I will assume the reader is conversant with the four previous points, i.e. job evaluation, etc., and will elaborate them to hammer home the point of control).
Other Interesting and Contradictory Features
Redeployment. The myth of the guaranteed week is clearly exposed by this section, e.g.:
(a) The Corporation are willing to pay travel cost to new employment in the event of being redeployed. So much for security!
(b) Compensation: in cases where a man is taken off a job and placed in another which is lower paid, a gradual decrease in money over 60 weeks until new lower rate is paid. So much for security!
And further still, Redundancy. This is a very interesting one, as we have just seen how the Corporation looks after our interests by giving us a guaranteed week. The Corporation are not only willing to pay under the terms of the Redundancy Payments Act 1965, but are willing to pay 25% more! So much for security!
Disagreement Procedure. This fits in beautifully with BISAKTA rule book.
(a) In an instance of disagreement, management proceed with their prerogative until such time as agreement can be reached,
(b) Local procedure to iron out disagreements up to 14 weeks—then placed in hands of external regulation.
(c) Where agreement has been reached over practice changes, but disagreement over payment, previous rates shall prevail until agreement is reached.
As can clearly be seen from a brief analysis of this agreement, it is specifically about control, The traditional role of the shop steward could be quite drastically negated if the steel workers do not react against the measurement of time and motion, etc. The autonomous working arrangements of steelworkers would be drastically altered—this will really be hitting against the “pride” of steelworkers. The agreement will be an effective framework around which the employer can introduce the proposals of the “Benson Report”, 1965, which proposed that by 1975 the steel industry will be producing 35 million ingot tons with a labour force of 200,000, whereas currently it produces 28 million tons with a labour force of 290,000. In 1965 at the time of the Benson Report, the industry produced 26 million tons from 315,000. The 25,000 sacked since 1965 have been casualties of rationalisation. Thus the Benson Report envisaged the labour force being cut by something in excess of one-third of 115,000 men! This is not being phased over a long period as in the coal industry, but over a very short term indeed. The Green Book is very well designed to cope with this. However, the “nasty” part of the agreement is being introduced in September: will the rank and file accept it?
Given the characteristics of the union and its bureaucratic nature, any action will be unofficial. Given the fragmentation of union membership (no delegate conference), it is vitally important to achieve some sort of national shop stewards or militants committee. Already in Wales and at Corly (Northants) there are signs of militancy, A national machinery of militants is vital, or the workers will be smashed.
R. S. Fennick
Footnotes
(1) Believe it or not, with the blessing of BISAKTA!
(2) Why Steel: pamphlet published by Department of Applied Economics, Cambridge.