In the sense that a further period of social democrat Government carrying out anti-trade union legislation would have created more favourable conditions for the destruction of the grip of Labour on the organised working class. Their defeat in the British General Election was a set-back for the left. Already in the last year of Labour rule there were two one-day strikes by hundreds of thousands of workers against the Government. Wilson retreated in face of this resistance but would have been forced to attack the unions again because of British imperialism's economic position.
The election result came as a surprise to most political observers who, in light of numerous public opinion polls and the municipal election results in April and May, had expected Labour to win. Indeed, among sectors of the serious bourgeois press, alarm had been expressed about the dire consequences of a third victory for Labour because this would have put big strains on the traditional two-party structure. The Economist in the week previous to the election had called for all-out effort by the Conservatives to prevent a Labour land-slide. These astute bourgeois thinkers realised that a defeat for the Tories (especially a massive one) would have created a grave crisis in the Tory Party and have facilitated the appearance of tendencies to the left of the Labour Party.
The Wilson leadership concentrated all its efforts on proving that it alone had been able to solve British imperialism's economic problems; citing the spectacular improvement of the Balance of Payment's position in the year ending April 1970. However, the news in the very week of the election showed how hollow this claim was: firstly, the May trade figures revealed the largest gap for any month since April 1969; then it was disclosed that the price of British exports had increased in the first three months of 1970 to the extent that at least half the advantage gained by devaluation had been lost; next news came through that there had been a dramatic decline in Britain's invisible earnings in the same three months; and finally the figures of unemployment revealed the highest April unemployment for 30 years. The capitalist press made great play of these facts, and sections of the working class, remembering the sacrifices Labour had inflicted upon them in the past when there had been a Balance of Payments crisis, said, 'We have had enough.' Thus Wilson's strategy boomeranged.
But this was only a small contributing factor. Whilst big sections of the organised working class remained extremely loyal to Labour, many hundreds of thousands abstained. Direct comparisons with the 1966 General Election are difficult because of the lowering of the voting age, but one fact is extremely important: the total percentage poll was the lowest in any election since before the war. It seems likely that two distinct strata of workers abstained: large sectors of youth and unorganised workers who normally only vote when there is some feeling and elan in the labour movement.
The massive abstentions are a reflection of the feeling widespread in the working class that there is no real difference between a Labour and Tory Government. Indeed, how could people think otherwise when a Labour Government had taken the initiative in attacking the trade unions, introduced a wage freeze, and cut Government expenditure on social services; advanced and organised workers knew that the Wilson Government had done all in its power to facilitate the growth of monopolies, with consequent massive redundancies. On the other hand, there is considerable evidence to show that large sections of Irish and immigrant workers voted massively for Labour. This is explained by Wilson's demagogic attacks on Powellism and Paisleyism. But whilst the immigrant workers and liberal middle-class elements voted Labour in fear of Tory policies and the Tory Party's Powellite wing, everyone knows that it was Wilson who brought in the most racialist legislation ever passed in Britain.
The Liberal Party received a blow to its pretensions of forming a third force in British politics; losing seven of its 13 seats. The election was even more disastrous for the Communist Party. Contesting 58 seats, its votes were in nearly every case less than half, or even a third, of its 1966 figures. For a party so committed to the Parliamentary road to socialism, this is demoralising in the extreme. It has no foreseeable prospect whatsoever of even winning a single seat, let alone the number necessary to appear as a serious political force in Parliament. The C.P. concentrated on warning workers against the danger of a Tory victory and had an identical political line with that of the Labour left. Thus they got the worst of both worlds—those not yet ready to vote for a "communist" party naturally voted Labour, because of its greater prospects; whilst more advanced workers who were influenced by the C.P.'s arguments about the danger of a Tory return thought a vote for Labour would be the most effective way of fighting the Conservatives. This result is bound to deepen the crisis in the C.P. and will give a boost to the pro-Moscow wing which had argued that the Party was devoting too much attention to election work as opposed to industrial activity.
A very important indication of this crisis in the C.P. is the resignation of one of its leading trade union figures: Dave Bowman of the NUR. He left, according to a statement by the leadership of the Party, because of differences over the composition of the Political Committee. Whatever might be the truth of that, he has applied to join the Labour Party—thus King Street reaps the harvest of its right-wing policies. However, the leadership shows no sign of drawing any intelligent conclusions: at the first E.C. after the election, Gollan concluded that the Party's election work had failed because its day-to-day work was not geared to electioneering.
Northern Ireland's election results indicated a growing polarisation and the break-up of the Unionist Party. Bernadette Devlin was returned to Parliament in a poll which was by far the highest anywhere; Paisley's victory, the Republican Labour Party's seat and the winning of a seat by the new moderate bourgeois party, the Unity Movement, were other blows to the Unionists.
Scotland had a much smaller swing to the Tories. Surprisingly enough this was also the general pattern in areas of high unemployment and economic under-development; no doubt reflecting a traditional hatred of Toryism.
Contradictory evidence exists on the impact of Powellism and right-wing radicalism on the election. In constituencies side by side entirely different swings were observed. Labour retained Smethwick but on the other hand Jennie Lee lost her constituency, Cannock, in the biggest swing of the whole election. Again: Rugby (also in the heartland of the Midland Powellite area) actually witnessed a swing to Labour in contradiction to the rest of the country. One thing is clear: it would be simplistic to talk of a move towards Powellism by big sections of the working class. There is some evidence that where Labour candidates made concessions to racialism they lost votes (e.g. Renee Short) and where they gave the appearance of being vigorous opponents of racialism they had smaller than national swings against them (e.g. Andrew Faulds, Smethwick; and Sid Bidwell, Southall).
The election was, of course, a very big personal success for Heath, and this fact, plus the Conservative's small majority will assist him to control the dissident, right-wing, anti-Common Market, members of his Party. On the other side of the House, the fact that the Conservatives have a small majority will be used to try to stop any revolt in Labour's ranks because of the prospect of overturning it fairly easily.
Heath's Cabinet indicates that he is trying to project a "liberal" image and that he does not want to provoke a fight with the unions immediately. However, he is not master of his fate and the economic problems of British imperialism will impel him to settle accounts with the militant sections of the working class. There is every sign that as Heath attacks the working class, the Labour Party and the trade union leadership ("left" and right) will do all in their power to dampen struggle, whilst making loud noises. In his first speech after conceding defeat, Wilson said that Labour in opposition would not behave irresponsibly in relation to the economy and sterling; whilst Jack Jones, leader of the "left" T&GWU, made a speech three days after the election which, whilst talking tough, made it clear that he was anxious to have an understanding with the new Government (so much so that the Sunday Telegraph expressed surprise at his moderation).
It is clear that the emergence of a radical right around Powell is a new and dangerous feature of British politics. It will be used to push the whole British political scene to the right. Any left revolt in the Labour Party will be threatened with the dangers of Powellism by Wilson, who will also seek to justify making common ground with the so-called 'liberals' in the Tory Party. It is therefore important for British Marxists to have a proper appreciation of Powellism and how to fight it. The hysteria exhibited by some left groups is a barrier to such clear thinking and analysis. In particular the importance of self-defence units amongst immigrant workers must be stressed and supported.
It is difficult to work out what effect the election result will have upon the internal life of the Labour Party. There is no indication that the defeat will give rise immediately to the emergence of left currents: on the contrary Wilson was re-elected leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party unopposed, and Tribune's "inquest" on the election was largely taken up by the editor arguing that the election could have been won had it been held in October. The long-term prospects of a left arising in the Labour Party will depend, in the main, upon the strength of the mass movement aside.
On the trade union front revolutionaries should seek to revitalise the trade union defence committees. Broad committees bringing in all tendencies and sections of the trade union movement on an offensive transitional programme on a vital need to prepare for the inevitable attacks by the Tories. These committees must be clear about the likely role of the trade union bureaucrats and all attempts by the C.P. and others to build them exclusively around the trade union "lefts" like Jones and Scanlon must be fought.
Probably the most dynamic sector in British politics will be the Irish question. Labour succeeded in temporarily quietening the struggle of the Catholic oppressed minority in Northern Ireland. Because of the traditional hatred of the Tories in Ireland (the very word Tory in Irish means "a robber"), and Tory links with the Unionist Party, this struggle is likely to break out anew, but on a higher level. It will be combined with a much less stable set-up in the south because of the exposure of the Fianna Fail Government as British stooges, over the gun-running affair. The Tories will respond with fierce repression, as they have always done in Ireland. A very important job for socialists in Britain will be the organising of a mass solidarity movement with the Irish in face of this repression.
To sum up: the Tory victory made no decisive change in British politics; it is to be regretted because it makes marginally harder the job of destroying the grip of the Labour leaders over the working class. However, all the essential tasks remain the same; the building of a revolutionary vanguard with the immediate aim of leading the fight against anti-trade union legislation, against racialism and Powellism, for solidarity with the Irish struggle etc., is the major task facing revolutionaries in Britain.