ECONOMIC CONTEXT
Since 1945 Britain has been in a period of long-term relative economic decline. Despite the expansion of capitalism on a world scale the backwardness of British capitalism has given rise to a series of currency crises and a slower rate of growth than in any other industrial capitalist country. Any down turn in world trade, even a slowing down in the rate of expansion, would brutally expose all the accumulated weaknesses of British capitalism.
But Britain is not the "sick man" in an otherwise [illegible] international - essentially a reflection of the contradiction between the productive forces and the private ownership of the means of production in economically outmoded national states - as reflected in the devaluation of the pound, the two-tier gold pricing and the round of devaluations threatened for the near future. Britain is the country where the contradictions are especially exposed and developed. Thus it is that we never reach the corner which the Wilson Government keep wanting to turn.
Indeed, the cutbacks by the U.S. administration point towards the laying of the ground for a full scale trade war, a war in which the British capitalists will have their backs to the wall. It is in this situation that the monopolists have rationalised and integrated into the state the trade union leaders through promises of "participation" in management, and seats on such bodies as the C.I.R., and the rank and file under threat of financial and penal penalties.
[illegible] fight by the rank and file for better pay and conditions. There is another side to the problem - how to increase productivity and lower cost per unit of production to compete with foreign competitors. This is the role of the Department of Employment and Productivity and the Prices and [illegible] are the only way of getting pay increases.
Thus the employers, hiding behind the Labour Government, launched a national attack on the working class. In every major industry the men were faced with a productivity package; from Measured Day Work in the car and engineering industries, Devlin on the docks, to One Man Operated buses in [illegible] transport and pit closures unlimited for [illegible].
But productivity deals are real. The extra productivity comes out of extra exploitation; it means worse conditions for the men who work it. To the car worker it means rubbing down the cars [illegible] there's no skin left on his fingers, to the docker it means the destruction of a way of life known since he was a lad, for the busman it means physical assaults and beatings up from a public unable to stand the frustration of a "public" transport system, for the miner it means unemployment and a zombie like existence in a village condemned to death. Productivity deals mean, to the worker, the debasement of the whole quality of his life.
But the British working class is the best organised in the world. How then do the employers manage to force these cuts in working conditions [illegible] leadership of the trade union movement. Built in the bonanza days when the mere threat of a strike won claims, it is completely unable to cope with a situation where every wage claim becomes a struggle between the Government and the working class.
In particular, it is those who, seemingly, stand on the left, that play the most diabolical role in selling productivity to the men. Understanding, as they do, the crucial role of productivity but having no policy of breaking with the capitalist [illegible] forced to trade on their history of militancy to persuade men to accept package deals.
All the lessons to be learnt concerning productivity is superbly illustrated by the recent negotiations leading up to the signing of the latest productivity deal for London busmen.
BACKGROUND TO THE DEAL
To fully understand the deal, and see it in a perspective, it is necessary to give a brief run down of the recent history of London Transport. In the early years after the war the changing habits of the public (growing number of cars, television, etc.) meant that fewer people were travelling by bus. The London Transport Board replied by cutting services "to bring them into line with public demand" - always with the assurances that such cuts were in the interests of [illegible]. [illegible] passengers have been carried in fewer buses by a smaller staff.
Superficially, the argument that if fewer people travel, then fewer buses are needed to carry them is logical. However, the complete fallacy of this argument soon becomes obvious: the vast majority of passengers travel one mile or less, thus when the time between buses exceeds 10 minutes it is no longer a question of "have we time to walk or shall we take a bus?" but rather one of "have we time to wait for a bus, or shall we walk?".
The Board's reflex action is to increase fares, to stop the decline in revenue, and further cuts in services "to bring them into line with public demand".
Thus the situation is exacerbated. Between 1946 and 1967 services were slashed to the extent of some 20,000 drivers and conductors - 40% of the staff.
Yet for years the Board was able to get away with this policy since its massive fares increases brought sufficient extra revenue in to mask the decline in passengers. But today such an approach is no longer possible - the point of diminishing returns has been reached. Since 1963, whatever the percentage increase in fares there has been the same drop in passengers. Thus the Board has slid from a surplus of over £2 million per annum to a deficit of £10 million last year.
It was against this background of failure (to provide an efficient service, to provide an adequate service, to get London Transport to pay its way) that the Board in late 1966 put forward the panacea for all its ills - the Reshaping Plan - which would introduce One Man Operation (a) on London's buses, eliminating virtually half the work force and drastically changing bus design and routes.
As a nationalised industry there can be little doubt that this Reshaping Plan was part and parcel of the Wilson Government's national drive for "productivity" through modernisation and the PIB. Regarding public transport a three-pronged attack was to be made. Firstly, the regroupment of all transport (bus, rail, ferries, etc.) into Public [illegible] of local authorities - who would run them in the interests of "efficiency" and "elimination of waste".
Secondly, financial inducements to the employers - a 29% grant towards the cost of OMO buses of approved design, a 73% grant for such projects as the development of "one-man" buses.
Not only on a general level - the wage freeze, SET, etc. - but also specific [illegible] such as limiting the drivers' day to 9½ hours (with the staff shortage what it is the PTAs would be forced [illegible] to introduce PRODUCTIVITY SCHEMES [illegible] assume crucial importance. The largest single [illegible] settlement [illegible] the tone for [illegible]. And [illegible] it was essential for any deal with them to be within the terms of the Government's policies [illegible].
THE ROLE OF THE UNION AND THE "LEFTS"
However, since the end of the war the status of the bus worker in London has been declining. Today, London busmen earn less (in real terms) than he did in 1936, and in many ways his conditions are worse! But in immediate terms, price rises, increased rents, etc., proved a spur for the Central Bus Conference to call for their union (the Transport and General Workers Union) to live up to its verbal opposition to the PIB and press for a straightforward £1 on the basic.
Here London busmen were in a position of unique strength. The Board needed to introduce the Plan in a hurry, so that it could be completed before London Transport was handed over to the Greater London Council (to be the country's first PTA). Thus, all the men had to do was to sit tight, refuse to accept the Plan until their demands were met - and no need to lose money through strike action?
Thus by early 1967 the scene was set. On the one hand the Board — to escape its social and economic impasse - was pushing the Government sponsored Reshaping Plan. On the other, the men, from a position of strength, were challenging the Government's economic policy by demanding a straightforward, no strings attached, £1 on the basic.
It was in this situation - a potential head-on clash between a militant section of workers, with a history of struggle, and the Government - that the union leaders, both official and unofficial, played their crucial role.
Separately, the Board and the union pushed two tactics to divert the men from open confrontation and channel their fight into paths acceptable to Barbara Castle and the LTB. The chairman of the London Busmen's Negotiating Committee was J.W. (Bill) Jones. In that capacity he represented the interests of all busmen in negotiations with the LTB. Bill Jones is also a member of the [illegible], President of the TGWU, a member of Finance and General Purposes Committee, and on the General Council of the TUC. He is widely accepted by press and public as a leading advocate and exponent of the union's declared policy of opposition to the Government's wage freeze and interference in trade union affairs.
How far was this policy expressed by Bill Jones on behalf of London busmen? [illegible] possibility of tabling a wage claim. The official minutes of the meeting states "The chairman (Bill Jones) spoke of the difficulties of making a straightforward wage application at this moment of time and he believed that the only way to overcome this problem would be to put forward a PRODUCTIVITY SCHEME that would prove ACCEPTABLE [illegible] GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT WAGE POLICY".
[illegible] fight to the death against the Government's policy of wage freeze - provided that London busmen restrict their claims within the terms of the Government's policy - of WAGE FREEZE!
This then was the first prong of the union's campaign to channel the busmen's fight into harmless paths - to push for the £1 as PART OF A PRODUCTIVITY DEAL.
The second prong was to frighten the men into a "compromise" deal with the Board by stressing that the fight would be against the [illegible], and at the same time stressing the monetary "gains" which would accrue from productivity. This was done primarily through the columns of the journal [illegible].
Once [illegible], as a means of increasing the basic rate, was accepted IN PRINCIPLE, then the Board was able to tie together the two separate demands - the old [illegible] the Plan, and the men's for £1 - under the one general heading of a productivity package.
As far as productivity proposals for crew operated buses were concerned the Board put forward no proposals at all? They left that to the Negotiating Committee. All the proposals which have led to cuts in working conditions [illegible] put forward by the union's side.
By September, 1967, the Negotiating Committee had cooked up a hash which they thought would prove palatable to the men, and a deal was put to the branches. Out of 100 branches, 94 rejected it. But were the Negotiating Committee downhearted? - not on your life. They decided to press ahead, completely ignoring the branches' rejection of the deal. By March, 1968, the Committee had prepared a rehash of their former proposals which - they hoped - would prove acceptable to the membership. For a 20/- bonus, and another 10/- bonus to go on the basic in October and 20% for all OMO drivers - the men were too [illegible] freedom to proceed with the Reshaping Plan; cuts in running and [illegible].
However, [illegible] now [illegible] in their armoury. Aubrey Jones's PIB report on the pay and conditions of busmen - published in December, 1967, stated that 10/- was sufficient for introducing OMO. The direct intervention of Marsh (then Minister of Transport), and later Castle, who claimed that the two 10/- bonuses were TOO MUCH for the productivity items offered! Union officials could now talk about the [illegible] shillings separating the two "sides" - and then the discussions had nothing to do with the conditions the men were asked to concede. The negotiations had now been going on for over a year, and the men were fed up with waiting, many were now voicing the opinion that ANY decision was better than the endless uncertainty.
At this crucial psychological moment, Jack Jones (Secretary elect, Transport and General Workers Union) and Alan Thompson (TGWU National [illegible] Secretary) met the chairman of the LTB in one session. As a result of this meeting a "new formula" was offered to the Negotiating Committee. Instead of the 20% all OMO men would get a payment of £4.10 per week, but all bonuses would be lost, [illegible] a further productivity item was added - [illegible], i.e., all new drivers would have [illegible] to serve as both drivers and conductors as needed.
Behind the huge carrot of £4.10 was hidden a deal which in fact put the OMO man worse off than [illegible] the Board's offer of 20% plus [illegible] a driver of a 73 passenger bus would now be 16/- worse off than under the proposals of the previous month!) The Negotiating Committee accepted these new proposals by [illegible] to 4, the [illegible] vote carrying the day.
[illegible] edited. By the [illegible], the deal was again put to the men, sufficient branches had [illegible] through threats, cajoling and promises of "big money" for the deal to be accepted by 56 votes to 45.
LESSONS FOR SOCIALISTS
Now, after the implementation of the deal, it is possible to detail what its results have been, for busmen, and what lessons can be learnt by revolutionaries who might be faced by a similar situation in other industries.
As soon as the Board began to [illegible] the cuts in [illegible] time, etc., individual garages all over the fleet struck until the schedules were withdrawn on a more acceptable basis. [illegible] realised that schedules are the life blood of the industry, and that they were going to be [illegible] to death operating them. The more militant [illegible] screamed for the blood of the Negotiating Committee and those representatives who had supported the deal, the more passive walked about with a dejected air, and hundreds more "voted with their feet" by walking right off the job.
The strategy revolutionary socialists must follow when faced with such a deal, must be determined by their ultimate aim of building a revolutionary Marxist leadership within the trade union movement. Their tactics will be determined by the most effective way of doing this, bearing in mind their extreme numerical weakness and present political isolation in the trade unions.
General lessons to be learnt from the particular case of London busmen's productivity deal are: that in condemning any productivity deal we must not be afraid of apparent isolation - especially where the traditional "lefts" and leaders are supporting it and only individual militants are in opposition. We must have the courage to be unpopular, to call a sell-out a sell-out, to tell the men: "you are being conned", "you are being betrayed". We must explain on every suitable occasion how the deal is tied up with Government policies. A consistent fight, in alliance with other forces with whom we are in agreement, during the lead up to the deal will attract the militants to us.
Whether the best elements will be capable of guiding the particular section of the working class to a victory depends upon many factors which will vary from section to section within the working class - combativity, level of general consciousness, etc. Even if the deal goes through the most conscious elements will say: "we were warned by these people, they are worth listening to." Even though we cannot hope, in the short term, to establish control of the organisations, there will be little doubt that we will have established political hegemony.