(continued from the last issue)
The second trend argued that the issue of LSE was the proper concern of the student movement as a whole since the confrontation was the first real test of the 'hard line' national policy of the Vice Chancellors. From this it followed that the struggle should be extended, with as wide as possible representation on the political committees. The result was that ULU was occupied for 24 hours without any real sense of purpose.
I do not wish to minimise the very real problems entailed in the occupation of ULU; however, I do not believe they justify the decision to vacate the building. The decision to leave ULU was a turning point in that it marked the transition from offensive to defensive tactics. The actual decision was not made in a general meeting, but in an LSE Soc. Soc. meeting. In the discussion of the question in a general meeting later, it became clear that most of the LSE students present (not very many) intended to leave the building. Under these circumstances, without LSE's blessing, the other occupants decided they had no choice but to leave.
The decision was a mistake because it was seen as a defeat by militant students in the provinces, and as a victory by right-wing "moderate" students. The DAILY TELEGRAPH had called in its editorial for the mobilisation of "sensible" students to restore order and discipline. This theme was later taken up by the NUS in agreement with the Committee of Vice-Chancellors. The evacuation of ULU took place at a time when the first of these groups materialised at ULU with the intention of throwing the militants out. As it happened there was no need, the building was voluntarily given up, but nevertheless for the Television, the press, ULU presidents and NUS, the organisation of "moderates" to defeat the left seemed to have paid off. Right-wing students rallied to oppose militants throughout the country. What had been a left initiative, now passed to the right.
In these circumstances hopes for a common front with moderate students at LSE did not materialise. The negotiations the following day at ULU were not successful. It is significant that not until Soc. Soc. took an aggressive line in the Union meeting did the moderates swing substantially leftward. The decision to vacate ULU, which was in effect a decision to internalise the issue of LSE to seek common ground with the moderates, disorientated the solidarity movement, and this opportunity was seized by the right.
There are certain positive aspects of the right backlash, in that it shattered very decisively the consensus within university politics. In many places an important polarisation took place which was actually fought out in meaningful political terms. LSE raised the issues of student power, direct action, etc, and brought them before the attention of the entire student population; the offensive of the left meant that the students were forced to choose which side they were on. Though the results were often a formal victory to the right, important gains were made by the left.
The NUS has tried to capitalise on the reaction of the right and organise it around a common programme. NUS proposed the reopening of the school on the basis of "agreement with the principle of discipline supported by students throughout the country". The GUARDIAN of February 5th described it: "In effect, students are being asked to underwrite the NUS code of conduct agreed with the vice-chancellors, which recognises the need for discipline in any college or community, but insists that it should be fairly administered." SENNET, the ULU newspaper, which has consistently supported NUS policy (except when briefly captured by the left) went further, urging students to organise to discipline rebels themselves, and in one editorial advised Adams to sack Blackburn.
In conclusion, I would say that given the central role of LSE within British capitalism and its importance to the student movement as the key area of struggle, the LSE authorities are likely to be far more determined to defeat the militants than were their counterparts in the peripheral institutions of Hornsey and Guildford. We must remember that at both these colleges students' support for the struggle inside the college was complete, but on the other hand they were openly hostile to the idea of extending the struggle. In both instances, defeats were accompanied by massive victimisation and repression. Though it is pointless to speculate on the course of events which might have occurred had a more aggressive policy been adopted consistently in the LSE situation, a case can be made for saying that in the presence of a national strategy by the Vice Chancellors, a generally offensive national strategy was in order.