From the beginning, the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign has been confronted with the question of whether or not it should be a single-issue organisation, primarily concerned with the Vietnam War, or a multi-issue movement; that is, should the VSC campaign on the different political [illegible].
This theme was discussed at some length at the last national VSC conference in May, and it seems to me that the delegates overwhelmingly came down in favour of maintaining the VSC as a single-issue organisation, committed to campaigning on Vietnam. One paper, adopted almost unanimously by the conference, stated: "The VSC has been able to unite organisations and individuals with the most diverse analyses of British society within its ranks. It has done this because it has been non-exclusive and because it is essentially a single-issue campaign." The question was raised again recently when the Czech crisis erupted. Immediately VSC was under pressure to make its position known, especially by reporters of the national press. On Sunday, August 25th, a massive demonstration of over 10,000 was organised outside the Russian Embassy in London by a quickly constituted ad-hoc committee comprised of representatives of most of the left groups, in which a VSC representative participated. Although by a mistake it was announced that VSC was organising the demonstration, the question was raised whether or not, in fact, VSC nationally should initiate such actions, and whether or not it [should] campaign on any other question than Vietnam.
It should be noted that certain local VSC groups tend to be used for many purposes and get involved in other questions. In this they have [illegible]. The [question] is: whether VSC should [nationally] [illegible].
The first thing to understand is, that VSC is a minimum-programme type organisation built on a bloc of about four distinct political groupings. VSC has a very limited aim and analysis. Its position is very simple as stated in its declaration of aims. This is not to say that individuals inside VSC do not have a particular analysis, having the full right to put it forward in VSC, but no-one has the right to [say] that the position of their group is VSC's analysis on any particular question.
Of course, it is sometimes necessary for VSC to issue statements on other topics, but these should always be issued from the viewpoint of the primacy of our concern with Vietnam. For instance, when we issued a statement about the attempt to assassinate Rudi Dutschke, it was from the point of view of our close collaboration with him in international activity against the war.
The reason for caution in these matters is very easy to understand. VSC exists because of the incapacity of any of the existing revolutionary or socialist groups to carry out, in their own name, the effective campaign that is necessary in Britain to defend the Vietnamese people against American aggression. It therefore became necessary that some of the existing groups push into the background their important differences in analysis and even programme, in order to [illegible].
[illegible] the founding conference of the VSC came with the opinion that urgent action was necessary in Britain. VSC's strength was quickly seen in its ability to win people who were not members of any of the existing groups.
In my opinion, that urgent situation still exists. The war continues and escalates despite all the talk about "peace" and the Paris negotiations. The VSC is still confronted with the huge task of making good its original aims. There is still no group on the left which is in the position to say in its own name that it can speak for the left as a whole and begin to do the job that the VSC has been doing until now. VSC has by no means exhausted its potential for expansion within the framework of its own terms of reference.
It has always been difficult to put this idea [illegible] and it required a lot of practical experience and working together before the [illegible] in VSC, would argue and demand that VSC carry [on] the tasks and functions which their respective [groups] [illegible] be remembered [illegible] they say [illegible] tenants' struggles or racism, it weakens the VSC because it tends to cut across the unity that has been built up on the Vietnam question, and introduces the potentiality of divisions.
In my opinion this was the danger in the case of Czechoslovakia and the Russian invasion. There is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of VSC members were opposed to the invasion: but it must be stressed that this would, in many instances, be for different reasons because of the differing analyses they have. It should not be assumed that all members of VSC have the same analyses. It is quite possible for VSC people or local groups to even support the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, in fact some do, and still remain effective and loyal members of VSC.
If it is proposed that VSC should campaign on this issue, for example, then the shift can become open-ended with all kinds of possibilities. Where should the limit be? Why not campaign on Cuba, on rents, on the wage freeze? We would all agree that these are burning issues, but once VSC begins to act this way, then it begins more and more to approximate to a political party. Participation in VSC will require greater and greater common agreement, and instead of strengthening VSC, these other issues will weaken it. No single individual or group has the right to say a priori which issue will or will not become divisive.
VSC can't pretend it is one thing and act in a contrary way without accepting the consequences of that change. If it changes in this way, the first thing it has to do is to explain to the other groupings in Britain why it exists separate and apart from them, and why people should join it, and not any one of the other groups. It begins to compete in an already crowded field. If some people feel that such a change should take place, this must have the widest discussion and a new conference. It is totally wrong for such a change to "creep in" by gradual moves by individuals in VSC who feel frustrated by its limitations.
VSC's success in drawing in unorganised people who feel the need for an organisation is the basic reason for this question coming up. If people feel that we should now turn this success on Vietnam in the direction of launching a multi-issue organisation, an avowedly, but as yet unspecified political party, they must realise the extreme importance of what they are suggesting. To do this without all members of VSC being able to express their opinions about it, would be very undemocratic and would severely damage the organisation.
It is my firm conviction that the VSC experience has strengthened the left as a whole; but it has only done so by being successful at what it set out to achieve. I am further convinced that if VSC is even more successful in the future, then the trends in this country towards regeneration of the left and revolutionary regroupment will strengthen.
If the left in Britain is able to live up to its responsibility to the Vietnamese revolution, then it itself will become revolutionised and it will have taken a giant step in the construction of a revolutionary instrument capable of overthrowing capitalism. Let us not be too impatient - there are no short-cuts through the very real difficulties that are before us.