[page 1]
INTERNATIONAL ! oo a, FOR GROUP | ‘axae 1973 P RE-CONFSREN G E DISCUSSION BULLSTIN RESOLUTION ON PERSPECTIVES - 1973 VOTING ON RESOLUPION AT N.C. 141th Feb, CARRIED 10-4-7.
FOR: Jones, Smith, Clynes, Pope, Ball, Tettadoro, Marshall, Wilcox,,. Sykes, Jonstone.
AGAINST; Peterson, BJoseph, Williams, Scott.
SBSTENTIONS :Klein, Jenkins, Howard, Watts, Reed,McGovern, Surgit.
ALPERNTE VOTES:
FOR: Monzano, Jackman.
AGAINST: J,Blanca, Peters.
ABSTENTIONS: Harney, Jennings. | ?
NUMBER:1 a | PRICE: ° 5p
[page 2]
[page 3]
RESOLUTION ON P2RSPSCTIVES FOR 1973 PART ONE: BASIC CORRELATES.
I) INTERNATIONAL TABKS OF THE iMG. 4.) INDOCHINA: .
The most important development on a world scale in the last year has been the 1972 NLF offensive in Vietnam, the massive escalation carried out by the United States to attempt to contain that offensive, and the abject co-operation in the plans of US Imperialism by the Chinese: a Soviet bureaucracies, and the eventual ceasefire agreement. ' 7 This has had a twofold effect. i) On an international scale they have weakened the attractive power of the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracies for the political vanguard. ji) In Vietnam itself the actions of the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracies have prevented the NLF, from winning the clear cut victory which was possible. Instead, there exists a delicate ‘situation of dual power, While the ending of American bombing represents a big step forward and the ..
Vietnamese military organis:tions are still strong, nevertheless it is clear thet a difficult struggle lies «head, The threat of US reinvolvement in the wat is still posed.
In this situation the number one international task of world revolutionaries is the maintainance of solidarity strugeles with Vietnam. f most important step in antiaimperialist activity for the ING during the eoming year is therefore the extension and deepening activity on the question +. of Indochina. Such solidarity cannot be based on any position of 'Sign Now'.. or 'Prevent US Imperialism breaking. the Treaty', These slogans are false in that they both accept the right of US imperialism to neg gotiate over the future © of Vietnam, and they disarm the movement before the reality that the treaty is not going to solve anything fundamental.
The slogans ‘of the IM IMG remain. "Solidarity Till Final Victory! ° '*11 US Forces Out of §.E.Asiatt 'A1] Power to the PRG! 'for a United Socialist Vietnam! ' Victory to the Indochinese Revolution! _ B) IRELAND The other area in which the IMG has | a particular international responsibility. . is that of Ireland. This special responsibility exists because it is. Jour’ See “ bourgeoisie which is involved in Ireland.
Soldarity with the Irish struggle is therefore’ the other main a priority: ‘for the IMG in the coming years Le oa Of these two main taks, Vietnam mast remain “tne MBbBeaty for the FI in general but for ,::‘the img this is not. always the.correct order, Because of the nexus: nature of the Irish problem for the British bourgeoisie. and 'special responsibility occuring to the IMG because ‘our! bourgeoisie is involved, the general inter- _ national priority between these two tasks will not apply for us at.all times, — The question of priority between these . two tasks can only be decided at each given conjunéture., ; Apart from these major tasks we have also to continue the cempaign work, limited beeause of our resources, on the question of i.#urppe, of repression in Yeylon and of the development of the revéLution in S.jisia, Latin smerica and Africa,
[page 4]
IT) CONDITIONS FOR RiVOLUTION RY VICTORY. is the destruction The historical task of the proletariat in the sphere of the économy/of the capitalist mode of production and its replacement with new planned relations of production. The necessary condition for achieving this 1s the smashing of the bourgeois state apparatus, the instmument which defends the capitalist — relations of production, and the substitution of a proletarian state apparatus. ” The creation of this new proletaifian state apoaratus is the key task of thé working class in the struggle for power. As the bourgeois state apparatus will not dissapear of its own accord there will be a stage in every revo-™ lution in which the bourgeods state apparatus will be confronted with the embryonic state apparatus of the proletariat. Such a situation is one of dual power.
From the practical point of view the key task of revolutionariies in prep». aring for periods of mass upsurge is propaganda for creation of organssof dual power, . : in order to create, and: secure the woctory of such institutfons, it is not. sufficient that the working class itself be organised... necessary condition — for victory is that the proletariat unite under its Leadership all strata | of the oppressed . and exploited. -_ The only organisational form which has been shown by histroy to be capable of uniting.all the oppressed and exploited e and of confrohting the bourgeois state are bodies of a soviet type.
SIT) BiSIC ECONOMIC Z2ND SOCLL CO~ORDIN: whit IN EURODE - The present crisis in Europe is not simply a crisis of capitalist relations of production , but of all relations which are based on and whieh defend the capitalistmode of production.
This crisis which has ‘been much intensified by the economic expansion since 1945, itself testifies to the re revolutionary sharacter of the present period. oo -. in political terms this crisis greatly intensifies the problems of the bourgeoisie rendering far more difficult the organisation of the nonproletarian strata against the working class.
To the proletairat the crisis of shcial relations offers the possibility = ~ ( and imperative heccessity, of placing itself at the head of the oppressed ‘ and exploited in the struggle against capitalism - the destruction of whieh constitutes and necessary precondition for the resolution of one problems eonfronting all oppressed and exploited layers.” ' Within the context of Britain this general crisis of sé¢ial relations has shown. itself most clearly in three spheres. i) In education and among students, ii) Around the oppression of women, idij] In white collar workers in the state apparatus and in similar layers dn 'ideological' roles in journalism, the media, in industry ete, Work on andin these three areas - to show the working class that it must, _in -order to solve its own problems and destroy capitalism, lead these oppressed strata, and to show the various oppressed strata that it is © ohly by linking themselves to the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie that they can find the first hecessary steps to end their own oppréssion.- is therefore the mest immediate task in preparing demands and organisational forms by which the working class can lead all the oppressed against capitalism.
[page 5]
a3 The deepening « economic crisis of” imperial lism, which now interacts with and reinforces the general Social crisis, ‘has its immediate origins in ‘the erosision of the economic gains made by’ the bourgeoisie in the period of fascism and _counter-revolution of the 1930? s and early 1940's, This crisis isa “qualitative one ie it cannot be overcome without a similar profound shift in the relation of class forces such as occured in this previous period of capitalist offensive.
The working class is. however decisively stronger than iin the pre-war period. It is not possible for the bourgeoisie in the short term to bring about a complete change in the relation of forces.
There is therefore no pessibility of the bourgeoisie overcomeing in the immediate future the economic crisis of its system. This does not indigate a 1929 style slump in prospect but a continuing oscillation around a declining economic curve, Within this general framvork the economic crisis of british imperialism is on of particular severity. It cannot be overcome by technical adjustments but only by a profound alterstion of the relation of class forces.The British . bourgeoisie is however decisively sociallly weak. Thereis no peasantry large petit-bourgeoisie, or strong military caste on which it can draw for support.
The ruleof the bourgecisie is therefore almost entirley based gn its ideo~ logical domination 9 direct or indirect of the working class. “his ideological domination conceals a greater material weakness than probably in any other Major capitalist country. in this situation there is no possibility of the bourgeoisie inflicting in a short period a decisive historical defeat on the working class(such as would put back the strugsle for many years.).At the same time the working class at present neither has the leadership nor the politic.1 consciousness to overthrow the bourgeoisie. The prospect is therefore of a period of years ofintense class strugsle, amt amid worse7ing econmic situation, before the conditions frr = tame shits in class forces in either direction will have matured, IV) The general ahalysis of the sitvetion in Europe given above leads to the following conclusion. ‘The i fo si >of : rev ‘olutionary dimensions, a and the eae ol j is. not_ simply one ofthe epoch 2 hd is “goes 1 not mean that such developments can be expected in every country in Burope, on the contrary, but what it docs mean is that the social tension in Europe has now reached the pointwhere outbreaks on the scale of France (68) or Is sally (69) or even gre ter , are to be expected in some countires during coming years.
Exact prddictions on timing, country etc cannot be made as these rely too much on very conjunctural phenomena ~ a sudden governmental crisis, some outrageous act of repression, a strike which goes far beyond its original aims, etc. For example it was clearly impossible to yredict that in France a studrt revolt would have hed the -ffset it did. However all inideat ors show the extreme development of social tensions which suddent conjunctural features may cause to escalate.
It will be thesehigh points which will be the decisive ones in shaping the course of events and building the party. It will be these struggles that the decisive break thrus will be made and the desici:se Lessons drawn.
The enormous por" ice) problet is that bohnt the working class vanguard and the revaluticrryy ovo t i Ste wtorius fu o thes: upsurges ina situation ewe eine eitetahErinsninnsnlseng NNR AE Pe ltd
[page 6]
me in which Virtually none of their members have direct experience of revolutionary or near revolutionary struggle. Whole political generations of cadres have _been formed who have experience only of the day to day struggle of the periods of relative quiescence, Ideas of revolutionary struggle has been confined to books and vague slognising. Ability to grasp the concrete prcblems of revolutionary upsurge is practically non-existant, Overcomeing this problems and showing the vanguard how to pose the question of mass revolutionary struggle not as rhetoric but as a practical question. is the decisive task of the next years, coN
[page 7]
PART TWO 2 THE PRaSENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN BRITAIN, I) The present political situation in Britain is fundamentally produced | by the success of the working class in defeating two bourgeois attacks, the integrationist one of Wilson and the open confrontationist one of the early period of the Heath government,but the same working class not having the political leadership to consolidate those defeats of the ru~ ling class into permanent steps forwards along the path to socialism. In — this situation, the Heath government has made a tactical retreat, designed to safeguard such strategic goals of the ruling class as entry into Europe and, in the present period, maintaining the Tory government in office, The problem for the bourgeoisie is that this present tactic can only be a temporary manouver and cannot constitute a long term line, The crisis © of British imperialism is a qualitative one, it cannot be solved by technical readjustments but only by a decisive change in the relationship of forces, Furthermore, given the existing relationship of forces in society — ’ as a whola, reflected in the relationship of forces between the rank and file and. the bureaucracy, a policy of integration of the bureaucracy can not bring about the desired effect because the. bureaucracy cannot keep the » rank-and file under control . While this does not rule out short term tace tical manouvers, a workable arrangement between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy. could only be achieved once the entire trade union movement hid been-weakened and thereby the relation of forces between bureaucracy and rank and file organisation had been shifted decisively in favour of the for mer, This period of manouver by the ruling class can therefore only be the preparation for a new confrontation, and any integrationist woes S would itself Qnty Lead-to new confrontations, iilthough the ruling class has been engaged in a tactical retreat, it has because of the extreme political weakness of the working class leadership been able to carry this retreat out in relatively good order and even been able to pass on to some localised tactical offensives “{ e.g. versus the AUEW ). In particular, the bourgeoisie has gained two important successes .3 at the end of the dock strike, the de facto leadership of the masses. suffere ed a relatively severe defeat at the hands of the bureaucracy. This defeat had precisely been prepared by-the manouver carried out between government and the TGWU lerdership. The wages freeze initiative is the second success.
This idealogically outflanked the bureaucracy and decisively took any ini-. tiative away from them, It also overcame temporarily the incipient split in the bourgeoisie between those who were for tactical rétreat and compromise and those who were for immediate confrontation.
While the bourgeoisie has thus regained the initiative in the politieal domain, nevertheless its economic situation remains exceptionally weak.
If the bourgeoisie.cannot hold the line oh phase two and latYer installments of the incomes’ policy, it is faced with an economic situation of truly crisis proportions, Therefore, although an understanding of its weak, cconoe mic’ and social position leads the bourgeoisie to understand that along drawn out ideological and political struggle, on the basis of whieh it can go for a fiquick kill" confrontation, offers the best hope of victory, nev¢rs theless the economic situation and the militancy cf the. proletariat proe pel the bourgeoisie towards rapid atcempts at decisive clashes, This latter tactic is given extra weight by the desesperation of small capital faced with annihilation from the trade unions, from inflation, and from the Common Market.ill- these factors tend towards producing a severe crisis in the Tory party. The two basic tendencies operating ont the bourgeoisie are therefore an understanding of its weak economic, social and materia] situs ation and therefore fear of a clash with the organised working class, and on the other hand economic necessity pushing it in the direction of a trtal of strength, Given this complic ted correlation of forces it is impossible to predict tr» exact development of the events. The fundamentals of the situation, on whi 1 it is nece it is necessary to orientate, are however clear. At some point, the bourgeoie es ie Pe ee, ee , | cs os Ss an i fe eae ent sanyreniennes stint tedenmunns Pena neinuetnannranintdeaMnAatsfimnanson emaneee eee nner
[page 8]
Given this compliccted correlation of forces, it is. impossible to predict . the exact t_ development of events, The fundamentals of the situation, on which it: is, ne ge ssary, . to, orientate, are. however clear,. Atigeme point, the): -:5 bourgeoisie will’ have to return. to confrontetion ~ei ther because of its Jy own choice or becatise the working Class will leunch em offensive which, if not defeated, would be econo;ically ruinous for British capitalism. “The working class, however, is still enormously strong, The bourgeoisie will not be able to decisively defeat it in a short period of time. The only possibility of defeating the working class is to grind it-down-over a pericd of years, This, in turn, is only possible if the core sections of the working class can be separated from the rest of the masses:. If this is not done, then all that will occur is the bourgeoisie, by launching confrontations, will actually drive the organised working class andthe other sece-. tisns’of the oppressed towards each other. poe BOD In this conjuncture therefore the bourgeoisie has to pursue a dual stras tegy. On.the one hand it has to strengthen the executive a,paratus of the state for use against the working class. On the other hand it has to carry out an ideological attack to seperate the core séctidons of the working class from:.the broader masses. This strategy opens up a prospect full of risks: forthe ruling. class. This. situation is made still-more: > _ dangerous by the fact that the bourgeoisie has no real alternative 7 government available should the present one suffer defeat in the present =o bueuton of confrontation.
The Labour party ‘has too many links with, the workdlae class for ‘the bourgeoisie to rely on it as a steeled. instrument of struggle. While, in the final crunch, a social democratic party will side even with extreme reaction against the working class, nevertheless outside such situations a social. democratic party. has to continually.keep oneness. + eye. on maintaining its electoral base. A party Like the Labour party is - 0+ therefore of use to the bourgeisie as a last resort when the working class is moving to overthrow capitalism, or as a party: to integrate - "the working class in peacefull periods.
In the’ present situation however, and unlike in 1964, the removal of the Tory govt from office would be a severe blow to the strategy of the rul ing class and would be seen by the working cless as a sympton of a big change in ‘the ‘relation of forces, For this. reason centralisation of ‘struggle © against: the Tory govt. is the key task of the Day. a So { II) In order to find an adequate response to the present crisis the working class has to solve two immediate questions.
Firstly it has to unite in the fight against the bourgeoisie and secondly it has to develop, policies which can unite itself under its leadership ._ and. in a struggle against capitalism all the oppressed. In respect to relati ons witai. the working class tuis means a decisive struggle. against ekectoralism. With regard to the relations between the working class. and other strata. it means the working class developing a social programme of demands and-organisational steps b,; which it can offer alternative Solutions, to the problems of oppressed laye s than the ilusory ones presented the bourgeo. § state, . Loe None of the. traditional organisations of the working class can offer any way to solve these probmelems at all..The right wing trade union bureaucracy in. general. does not even rise, to the height. of seeing the class as a: whole and, instead, sees -only: the interests -of-.the railwayment, engineers, -boiler-. makess etc, The 'left' wing rises periodically above this sectoralism but.still remains totally corporate in relation. to the ruling class. This is clearly shown in the response ofthe traditional leaderships ofthe working class
[page 9]
to the freexes ThtS shows perfectly the totally Gorporate vature-of ‘the. response of the working class What is involved in the freeze /is an attempt by the bourgeoisie to hide its real concern, about profits, behind an issue 1 ‘inflation, on which it feels it is in a -strong:ideologi¢al position, ....” On the’ question of rising prices ‘the bourgeoisie has an:is ue which confronis :
R11 the oppress and exploited ‘layers of society. It- says that inflation, can be solved by-acting against the trade uhions. The ruling class therefore 7 proposes as thé solution to the problems. of the whole of society to smash the trade unions . The task of the worki g class in this situation isto advance a counter programme for all layers of the expbointed and oppressed. what in fact its traditional organ. sations do is not. to advance.‘such a programme but instead merely: to'ad¥ance one for the organised core of the working. class. The reply of the’ CP etc to the ruling class’is:'Smash theFreeze!'.
This how8ver is no prograinie whatsover for those layers,. the vast majority of the oppressed and exploited, who’ do not have the power.to break the.
Freeze. Therefore while the b ourgeoisie puts forward a programme for the whole of society, the workers organisations merely put forward a programme for small strata. In this situatuation the bourgeoisie has the decisive strategic advangate in that it has a programme to organise wide layers than ‘the’ working: class. oo ha os The Aine® of the CP and averace trade unionist militant, and: ‘such organisations ‘such . as. ‘the IS, therefore results “in giving deciwive weapons. to the ruling os clhss. “In” ‘counterposition | to this revolutionaries have to put forward a programme whereby , basing itself on its central organisations, the “working class can advarice’ a 2 programme for uniting a 1 sedtions of the oppressed against: the bourgeoisie. 7 a N.B. THE LAST PART OFTHE RsSOLUTION WILL BE DISTRIBUTED AT THz NC MEETING.
THIS IS DUZ TO THS FACT THAT THE TsCHNICAL FACILITIZs FOR ISsUSING IT | WITH THE ABOUVE FIVE SECTIONS FAILED US.
TS eee Eee
[page 10]
Part THREE: STRATEGY FOR ORGANISING THE VANGUARD AND BUILDING PARTY.
The .fortis of intervetnion of. the IMG have to be determined in the Light. of the situation in the new working class vangm rd which has emereged on a mass scale since. 1968. This in turn has to be analsed in tersm of , at least , its relations to the mass strug:le, its relations to the mass workers organisations, and its relations to the revolutionary left.
The first mass manifestation of the new.era of class relatons in Europe came in May 68 in France and in autummin Italy 1969.
Since this point the European struggle: has deepened but developed in an uneven manner.. In some coutntires the working class is still in its first stage. In countries where the upsurge went furthest , Francé and Italy, the working class has passed thru the first "elemental' period of gmpaxxe upsurge and the class strusgée has begun to assume slightly new forms, Phe realisation by advanced layers of the working class that simple unorganised upsurge is not sufficietn to break the grip of the ree formist bureacracies and overthrow capitalism has led to a slightly more ‘caution in the struggle.The bureaucracy attempts to use this situation in order to attempt to regain control of the movement , These manouvres, such as for example the Union of the Left in France have a contradictory effect. On the one hadn they give a greater prestige and credibility to the bureacracy. On the other hand by 6ffering an apparent perspective for the masses, they arouse expectation and new outbursts of struggle.
Within this general situation the British class stmugzle combines in an uneven and combinedway the features of the first and second phases of the general “uropea an strug: le. ; After a qulititive increase in breadth of the layers in struggle in 68 the hardness and dimensions of individual struggles escalated rapidly. New forms of struggle, notably o¢cupations | and flying pickets, were taken up by the masses. An elemental' development of working class upsurge took place.
Politically however .. advance was far slower and no section of the leadership of the class possessed the political line to carry the class forward aganistthe bourgeiosies political strength.
This weakness of the working class with its present leadership becomes most obvious in times of the greatest upsurge. Twice this year, at the time of the miners strike and at the time of the freeing of the five, theworking class has had the bourgeoisie retreating in confusion. On both occasisons the working class had not the political leadership necessary to overcome its scctoralism and labourist consciousness #0 proceed to deal decisively with the capitalists.
In short the elemental struggle of the class , even under its present leadership, has succeeded ona many occasions in destroying the capitalist plans and efforts.
However the decisive political weakness of the working class will be used by the bourgeioisie, as it clearly was at the time of the dockers strike, inorder to isolate advanced sections from the masses so that the advanced layers can be smashed individually, and gradually grind dewn the militancy of the class.
[page 11]
At present this political weakness of the class shows itself in important tatical weaknesses shown by the masses leadership in relations with the bureaucrecy. Fhe increased scope and fierceness of the struggleis widely recognised as demanding. wider orga~ nisation and concerns than the 6x tremely Localised. strugsies of the 50s and 60s. At present however the rank and file leader ship does not have a phkoliticel line to take the struggle forward independenly of the boureaucracy and insteadd, aided by the political of the CP, this need for breaking down Llocalist preoccupations shows itself mainly in attem ts to pressurise the bureaucracy into firmer endeavours which can then be utilised at. the local level. While demanding that the bureaucracy acts,. is correct, it only prepents a real step forward if it accompanied by a political land organisational thrust which independently orsanises the working class.
The limitations. of the present strateg tics are shown clearly by the most consistent.exponenet of the 'oressure' line 6 the CP. “By turning the struggle against the IRA in under the wing.of — the bureaucracy it succeeded in dem¥ishing the potential which’ had been orignially built up by an organisation such as the LopIu inthe firs. period of the strugcle againt the Act. a The mass strug:le of the Buropean working class isbegining to produce a forma tion of a new politicised layer on a scale not seen sicne the period leading up to and immediatly after the First World Ware However while this earl es vanguard was formed in a period when the working class was in the process of creating its mass organis# ations, this new vanguard of politicised layers emerges in a working class whieh is strongly sturdbured by parties and trade unions, This had decisive consequences for the forms, strengths and limitations of this new political layers, . fhe formation in the early part of the 20th century, of the ‘existing mass organ sations of the working class took place in a period of almost uninterupted rise of mass strug:le and workings class power. The most advanced elements, in both a political and an vrganisational sense, were attracted into the newly formed organisations. In this situation it was the same cadres who both organised and struetured the class and who formed its most advanced political elements.This was seen most clerly when the CPs we.e formed. These were created in very major case thru a regroupment of the core @adre of the old S=+D parti es and organ~-0 isations.
However from the mid 20s onwards profound sceeial porocesses began to operate in tuis cadre. Twen ty years of defeat under Stlinism followed by twenty years of boom acted against every advanced political concept, every class wide initative and every séept outside the confines of the bureaucratic straight jacket. » Every tendency to manipulations, manouvre, sectoralism and bure aucratism was correspondingly accented. An immense degeneration of the central cadre of the working class, reflecting a retreat of the class before the defeatsinflicted by Stalinism and S-D and latcr of the apparent capitalism stability, tockplace,. it was on these tendencies that Stalinsim and bureaucratism fed.
[page 12]
Now, with the new x upsurge of strug; le, the objective base of these developments are undermined, However the efBects of the past furty years have profoundly affected the organising core of the working class. These effects are not overcime -at once even when the objective conditions change. The subjective ‘factor lags behind the objective conditions of change. The new political vanguard of the class therefore appears not prémarily within the oldorra an.ove cadra but outside it. A perspective of builiing the initial basis of the party on the same model as the CPs and original Tortskyist nuclei were formed is primarily by regrouping the existing orsanisin cadrs of the class.
At lest the initial working class nuclei of the party are going: to be built out of nob primarily the existing organisng cadres. but the new layers. The great objective problem is thet without the revolutionaries winning over the key cadre of the class to their positions, the revolution cannot be made. It is not possible simply to go around the established leadership of the class.
This cadre must be. either won to revolutionary politics regrouped or replaced. re a ( The key strategic task for building the party is therefore how, thru organisng: the new political vanguard , to conquer pol¥tical Leadership of the organiss cadre of the class.
In confronting this task two main strategies have to be combined, First. is the hong term steady work in the trade unions and facm tories, This alone is not sufficient. ‘Thw working class cannot, be broken from reformist mx factory by factory or unicn by union in a propaganda battle by us against the bureaucracies, The vanguard of the working class will unly be won over in action - not simply by. propaganda.
The second stratesy for organisng the vanguard and building the. party. therefore has to be based on the ability of the revolutionaries to actually lead in activity sections of the class or the vanguard . The tactics for doing this have to be dtermined by the nature of.the vanguard itself and its relation to the masses, t@ ( traditional organasations of the cless and to the revolutionaris.
In terms of members, even more in terms of active members, the traditional organisations have undergone aprecipitate de¢line. of the class in the last period. 7 Considered purely at the level of organ.sed numbers the rev. left end the layers they influence are relatively stronger in comparisison to the traditional organisations. However _caleulations in terms of active members a e superficial. In terms of social weight the traditional organisations are massively stronger than the rev. left. In most situations it is this decicive social wkekk weight which is the key to the response of the masses and of the basis for the rev. to lead or to organise under their direction the new political vanguard , let alone the masses.
This renders impossible as a prima y axis of organis g¢ the the new vanguard, the old VSC type tactics. ie. Long term united front around specially created Signie 3 issue organisations. To use this as a primary form of intérvetnion in the class would. be to believe, falsely , that it was possible. permanently to ‘outflank' the bureaucracy and the traditional workers organsations Lt. would lead to an opportunist and disasterous practice of bualding the organisation soley in layers peripheral to the main
[page 13]
organising cadres and organisations of the class. At the same time however neither is it possible to subordinate the rythm of activity of the revoluti:naries to the tempo of developments Within the traditional organisations and existing organisng cadres of the class. Given that the process of politicisation wee has not yet reached great proportions in the core organisations of the class , if action were always made-dependent on the agreement at the traditional organisations it would be impossible to raise the may political issues which are needed in order to develop. the consciousness of the working class in the present period, It would result in taillendist political practice.
Therefore, apart from sustained and patient work inside the TUs and the d:y to day strug le, the revs. have consciously to seek those issues and situations in which , because of eonjunctural relations of forces between the revs ahd the new political vanguard on the one hand and the traditioml organisations of the w/e on the other, it si possible fxom the Marxists to pull elements of the traditional orpranising cadre ana organi-~ sations to a political terrain dict-ted not by social democracy or by Stalinist political practice but by revolutionaries.
As regards the decisive area of intervention this is the shop stewards organisations, This isfor two reasuns.
Firstly the shop stewards organsations being half integrated into the bureaucratic union structured but half direct represen+ tatives of the masses represent the essential potential focuses for mass orfanisations towards bodies of a Soviet type in a period of mass working class upsurge. They therefore have a general structuaral significance. secondly wherea 1S the peakxkieak Laoour left , the CP and to a lesser extent the ‘official’ trade union structures have all shown a failure to drew in new politicised layers and have stagnated or declined the period since the war has seen unparalled growth in shop stewards organisations. Whobe new layers far more open to political vanguard and therefore onnstitute the decisive link by which the politicised elements may influence and win over the core cadres of the class.
As regards the conjunctural situation in the organised rev. vanguerd, it has to be noted that the effects of the ending of the Yeipst wind' of the class struc. le in France and Italy, and the beginning of some elements of the same phenomena in Britain, has led to a tendancy to capitulation to the bureaucricies appearing as the main danger within the “revolutionary vanguard The elemental upsurzie of 1968/69 produced simple minded econ, Omism & spontaneism -~ ebelief that in one wave of simple .. , militancy the working classcan sweep away the bureaucrasies and capitalism . When this failed , and in particular the working cless baurveaucenciosn wire even able to take important . .. “VD tactical initiatives, this econumism was replaced by a feeling that the bureaucracies were ell pewerful, that nothing could be achieved witnout them etc. This hos led to the pronounced rightwoed swing of groups such «os f1 Manifesto, Lotta Continua most Maoist sroups , The IS etc. siconomism has beonh replaced Ss the dominant danger within the vancuerd by « tendancy to eupi tulate to the bureaucracies under the guise of theories SFE texpenure', united front as a principles. ete.
In Britain these tendancies manifest themselves in an cccomnodation to social democracy “ia Tory bashing; i.e. blaming the problems | of the working class not on the capitalist “ ee wt an ott vag? -
[page 14]
system but on a particular geverriment --ond open enemy of the working class within the system . This inevitably leads to profoundly reformist conclusions and practices | AS recards whether this new political vanguard. will remain out side the traditional parties , this remains to be. seen . It dep encas on complex conjunctures which cannot be forcasted: at this steksa. Certoinly at least partial returns to the trcoditional parties cannot be ruled out. The experience of the union of the left in Praneé, where the traditional parties are engaged in va rather far reaching manouvres, may give important jaformation on this. For the present however the decisive task remains to utilise the present stren:th of the new left political vanguar in order to attempt to develop the revolutionary forces Por Yoo. whatever developments may occur in the future ° Se ae
[page 15]
PERT FOUR ~ MAIN ANTI~IMPERE LIST TskS OF Tis IMG.
The analysis ‘nadé ‘in Part Three of. the correlates. of. the-new political vanguard indicates the neces- ity of maljing an: important change in the way’ we concieve of carrying out all our political activty. This applies, to all anti-imperialist andinternitional | activity as to all other fields.
Therefore in taking ‘up the ta skeof solidarity with the Indochinese revolution and sup,ort for the struggle in Ireland, the IMG has to bé guided , as far. as organisat on xmx of interven ion is concerened by the analysis of the . new vanguard given above.
In the case of solidarity with the Indochinese revolution the IMG has already helped to establish the Indochina “olidarity Committee. At present however, due, to the’ complete desertion of their international responsibilities and’ their chauvinist political practice organisations such as the IS and SLL are not prepared to co-operate in the establiéshment of any permanent. activity on the Is-ue of Vietham. This. makes the. task of esthlishing of .local groups in solidarity with the Indochinese revolution a more difficult one. ‘It would be futile to establish such organisat ons without a firm base and our tactics in the coming period therefore have to be directed to bringing theissue into new layers of the vanguard.
The organisathhn of national actions, confs, and demos, togethe# with Local confs. etc is the task cf the coming months.
On the issue of Ireland there alreagy exists aay nati ona struztured campaign The AIL. The specific weight of the rev. oan LEEES POR ghee, make up this campaign is Sufficient to maintain a semi-permantnet mobilisation of student and Irish exile Layers.
However for a variety of reasons - general chauvism on the Irish question and the fact that the British army is not a conseript one being the two most important: - activity on the Irish issue has not so far had much sucess in penetrating the British working class.Continual propaganda work has of course been kept up, but it hasnot be-n objectively possible to pass beyond this stage.
The ability to raise theissue of Irelend on a large scale in the working ¢lass demands two things, i) The corfect issue to agitste on. il) finding the right organisational from of intervention.
As regards the correct political is ue, several elements combine to indicate th:t the question of british troops is the key at resent. Firstyy a profound erisis of morale is rocking the army. Secondly the development of ‘wer weariness’ in the British working class due to an ap.arent situation of long drawn out struggle for a bad cause and to which there seems to be no end in sight. Thridly, because ofthe openbrutality ofthe army and for demagogic electoralist reasons, a move towards and end to bipartisanship with the govt, by significant secthons of theLP . 411 these lements ere acting to produce that link up between domestic political strug.le and Irish repression which the govt. has so far managed to avoid. *f such a major political crisis begins to develop a qualitative change in the ability of revolutionaries to raise the Irish is:ue withing the working class Can be expected and all initistives msut be moved ih this direction. saepspcnneres i
[page 16]
While therefore initiative around the question of the troops hare indicated — nevertheless certain impirtant dangers must be noted i) While even a united front may be created on the question of troops this poses the’ danger of an accomodation to pacificist and liberal forces.
Within any activy on this is ue is therefore the IMG must vigoroulsy push as independant line which takes a clearel position on the aremd struggle » on the TRA and so on. jmong our slogans still remains. ‘Solidarity with the IRA' ii) There still remains an important question as to whettier any UF could actually be stable wit out taking a positon on the IRA -certainly this would nott have been the case in the past period. This question can Jowever.be only. given a concrete answer by an examination, at the ppropriate point in tine... ofthe forces involved, the” dynamics of the struggle mmmianiae etc.
Within these constraints the IMG must: begin systematically to attempt to raise (% in ana agitational fasions in. the working class. the question of Brigsish troops)
[page 17]
PRE FIVE - THE COMMON MARKT.
The -key structure] change in the last year in the international position - of British imperialism has been its entry itno the #HC.
Inthe past the IMG has had a position of opposition to entry. This: was incorrect and should be changed.
The reasons for this are not the subjective ones advocated by most “of the left ie the campaign against entry is kk being carried out under chauvinist banners with which we must not become entangled. Such arguemtns. are strictily speaking irrelevant. The task of Marxists is to analyse what is and what is not the historic intersets of the working class’ and then to develop the proletarian consciousness to an understanding of this, | not to teke positions on the basis of subjective moods let alone the arguemnts used by other people to justify their positions. ‘AS regards the EEC we of course rejet any analysis besed on antional s@lf determination. Self determination plays a progressive role in states in the process of formation dominated by imperialism. It plays no Buck role in an advanced imperialist country such ‘as Britain.
As regards the conjunctural effects of entry, there is no t&ack which will be carried out on the working class as a resultof entry which would Rx not be done so muai=x anyway. It is complete mystificzation to say that food prices and so on aré a ‘result of the ESc.! in this situation we call for the defense of working class interests. inside our outside the EEC and call fro the counterposition of the cohcept of Socialsist States of Europe to the £2C.We dont rasie any slogan for Britain to leave. the HEC.
These ppoints have been made however it has to be noted that this positinn on. the EEC is a conjunctural one, not oné/principle. Also in any refrendum election or vote which tock place on the questionof the HEC owr positon _ would not be determined by simply the single is ue ofthe market.:It is a question of the total issues end conjuncture in which such an event _ took place.It might be that the real issue at stack was notat all the EEC, It might for example, be that in the unlikely event of a referendum what was real .y at stake was not the. HEC-but some manouver designed to imporve its situation carrried out by the bourgeoisie. In that case we would not cail for ebstention, de spite what 1 was nominally at stake , but for a vote against. : mG
[page 18]
PART SIX: TASKS IN RELATION TO THE PRESSNT CONJUNCTURE IN BRITAIN, As an inevitable by product of the extremely theoretcial discussio: at the last confthere has be n a tendancy in the IMG in the last year to rather abstnmact discussion and left sectarian moods. This must be corrected et this conf by cancentration of defining oir key positions: on the keyissues of the day.
The material in section eight abow concluded tha the centralisation of struggle against the Tory govt. was a correct axis in the present situation. However the demands raksed along this axis by both the masses and most of the vanguard are within a bourgeo:s political freamwork and within the political demain defined by the bourgeois state. The task of revolutionaries in th.is _ situation is to develop political lines and organisational forms which take the vanguard and the masses outside this framework.
The first political task that flows from this is rigourlousby. combatting any tendencies which pose the end resultof the strug le against the govt. as the return of a Labour govt. This means clearly defini. g our theoretical positionon the question of the Tory Bovis and any Labour govt.xmfxxx or tother go t of a working: class party. .
The general question of govt. constittutes a sub-division of the question of the state apparatus . As regards the question of a govt. f the party of the bourgeoisie eg the Tory party, our position is simply that we are for the destruction of that govt. It s removal is a necessary step in te stru gle regyrdeless of whether it is replaced by another govt. within the bourgeo..s state ar wtherd the bourgeois:state is overthrewn and ga proletrarian state apparatus suistituted. Our slognas on the Tory govt. is therefore ; . ; "Bring down the Tory Govt." II) As regards the LP the situation is different. In general-we are in favour of z party of the working class forining the govt. as th s is seen x by the mass of the oworking class as an indication of a move in their direction of the relationd forces and therefore increases the confidnece and combativity of the class. In adcition kkexefauxexixexzusxs, in the present situation the existence cf a govt. of a party of the working class would severely dislocate the strategy of the bourgeoisie. However simply to be in © favour of a party of the workicg classbeing in govt. does not solve the question as to which party , at any concrete point in time we consider shoud from the gov. This latter question can ohly b e fetermined by an examination of the relation of forces at the time such a question ‘is posed.
The postion of a revolutionary organisation is that it ismly prepared to enter a govt. within the bourgeois state if the nextconcrete step in the struggle is the overthrow of that state. Such an overthroew is in general only possible if the revolutionaries command the support of the majority of the working class. Given therefore that the revs. are in aminordty that they favour , for reasons already given , thet a party of the working calss should form the govt., they therefore advocate the formation of a govt}. by those oarties of the working class whic do command the support of the Majority of the working class. This means also struggling with such axguxk. perties against any bourgeois attempts to overthrow such a govt.
If s ch qa puxkx govt of a party of the working class,xmxaxgm for example a LP gOvt. is actualfuy in office then we do not, as long as the revoluionaries remala a minority and therefore the only alternative to the govt. of a party of the working class is a govt. of the party of the bourgeoisie.,raise the slogna of "Down with theLP govt.! it is only correct in general to use such a sh@ogan when therevolutionaries can concretel pose themselves as alternatives to the labour govt. ie when they command the support of the majority of the working class.
[page 19]
We however do not as Lenin exphained and Tmotsky also, support any such govt, we mprely f ght with it against a com.on enemy. We would vote against its budgets for the maintainance of the bourgeois state if we had reps in parliament. etc, The fundamental difference in tactics and positions dealing with qa govt. of a party of the bourgeoisie and: one of.the working class also become clear when considering their relation to the embryonic organis of a proltarian ste ‘te apparatus eg Soviets. :
A party of the bourgeoisie could not be part of organisetions of a proletarian state a .paratus. A party of the working ‘class however, such as the OP is perfectly capable in theory of participating in organisations of a Soviet type and indeed might well have a majority in them .In this situation | our general slogan concerning the state would be for the tansefer of power from the bo.:rgeioos state apparatus to the embryonic proletaran state apparatus.
AS regards the question of who should form the govt. within the new state apparatus. that would depend on the relation fmx of forces. If a party such as the -LP cammanded the support of the majority of the class then we would have to be for it Zorming & govt. , bt one based on the Soviet type organisation not on the bourgeois state. {Il) The above analysis constitutes the basic theoretical framework for dealing with the question of govt. the analysis of the slogens and intepventions in the conjuncture then has to be made so as to concretise this analysis...
On the question of /PBGtt°EE nes alre-dy been analysed that this is a key _ question of the day and. the slogan of "Bring Down the Tory Govt.'! must be raised. We should however not issue any general slogan calling for a Labour govt. Thereasons for this are as follows:
Theoverthrow of theTory govt. constitutes a structurally necessa y step Wkkex whether the relationship of forces merely allows it to be replaced. ba another govt. within the .bo rgeois state apparatus or whether the bourgeois state apparatus is overthrown. Ih that sense it is a slogan which is corre¢gt relatively. regardless of the relation of forces within the working class, The czll for the formation of a LP govt. howefer is somet.ing which is entirely BXRLEKaWE , depending on the conjuncturel relation of forces within the working. class. We can therefore only give an answer in terms of a particualr relation of forces. Furthermore the-slogan for a LP govt. is one based on an unfavourable relation of forces ie one in which the re volutionaries are in-a minority. The task of revs is however not to accpet the relation of forces’aS given , but precisely to attempt to alter the relation of forces in their favour so that they can enforce a different outcome to the struggle than a s tiply new mwexk.. govt. within the bourgeois state.
To advance a general slogan of ' for a Labour govt.' is therefore to acdept.. in advance. that the relatibn of forces will not develop beyond a certain point. This strategy in prectice consists of drawing the line in front of of the masses and declairing that it is impossible. to advance bgyond that - point. Suéh a politye precisely becomes most conunter revolutionary in periods of mass upsurge when the relafihbon of forces chanives rapidly. In this situation the task of revolutionaries is to develop the relation of forces to the furthest possible point, not to errect brick walls in front of the masses, On the question of a Labour govt. therefore we do not issue any general | orientation or slogan. om rv position is that, given the existing relationship of forces whereby the wvolutionaries are a minority of the class, then we are in favour of the Lp which has the sup;ortof the mass of the class.
[page 20]
forming the govt.. This however is a purely conjunctural estimate and position and not a general orientation or slogan.
Our general position on govt are therefore i) Bring down the Tory govt. a ii) Support for and calling for all means nedessary to achieve this, at present this means slongas Bakkkuxyxfar eround the question of a General strike. iii) In the existing relation of forces calling on workers to vote Labour in any election on the ground s that a govt. of a party of the working class would increase the confidaace and combativity of the masses and would disrupt the strategy of the rulingclass, and, in the existing relation of forces, the LP is the only party ws which could form such a govt.. This however is a purely conjunctural postion and we do not advacne any general slogna for & a Labour Govt.
IV) Simly to decide general questions of slogans does not constitute a strategy.
It is also necessary to determine organisational forms and precise concrete steps. AS regards the most advanned organisational form we can project this isof course the Soviet type organisation or what bodies along this axis have traditionally been called in Britain, Councils of Action.
As a central orientation, something we aitemp st to bring about, this is something we continually project. Hobevee%also to be understood that it’is unlikely in the present situation taat any. significant such bodies, unitng all sections of the class and the oppressed, wll come into existence , The reasons for this are twofold.
Firgtly because the relation of forces between the IM’ and other organisations is such that we can not setp up such bodies.
Secondly becuase it is only in periods of the greatest upsurge thatit is objectively possible to unite ail strsta of the masses around one or two demands and around one organ sational form. Given this situation the key task is to develop this general orientation actually within the struggles of the masses. aro:nd the central issues which c nfront them. What this entails is developing the organ sational forms and the demandsby which the working class can unite all strata of the oppressed and expldited against capitalism.
Vv) As rega ds organisational forms directly on the question of govt. the following initiatives can 6 taken. i) In certgin areas the relationship of forces may be sufficient even in this ‘period to set up structures on an axis against .thegovt. ii) In: the case of a General Election we would have to concretely consider the question of approaching other forces to create a UF for activity against the present govt. This can also be done on a local basis in bye lections or local elections. This is particularly the case where notoriousr right wing elements are active. iii) At the time ofimportant national and local strikes we must continually raise the question of forming alliances with the CP, LP, trade union organisations, student , tenants womens organisations ete in support of the strugsle.We must demand labour councils to put facilities at the disposal of strikess, levy special rates on employers etc. All this must be projected as part of a unified struggle against the govt. iv) Within all national and local meetings involving the LP-CP-TUs we must project a general line that all forces must beunited ageinst the govt. and its policies, that the traditional electoralist approach of the LP and the CP is not adequate and that the existence of a UF struggle against the govtiis the dest mag weapon that the working class can have to continue the sturggle
[page 21]
if the Conservative Ss are removed and a Labour govt. is returned. It m ay be possible to take some national initiatives along these lines ourselves.
VI) As regards actually welding all the strata of the oppressed and espboited into a bloc under the leadership of the working class and countsrposed to the capital.st state, this depends on creating a precise programme, incorporating both demands and organisational Xxeax. forms , for the masses. The first probelm in relat on to this which has to be done is the freeze.
The first task which exists here is to convince the masses that the struggle against the freeze must be seen within a general axis of struggle carried on outside the bourgeois political domain, to smash the govt.
Our central orienting slogan is ; SMASH THE FPReaze ~ FIRoT STEP TO SMASHING THE TORY GOVERNMENT.
The most immediate focus round which spontaneous struggle of the masses is going to break out is in a series of wages confrontations. Here we have two tasks.
Firstly to combat any tendencies to present claims as special cases and itsstead to put forward the slogans on the freeze and the govt. which will allow the sectors in struggle to unite around them other layers and to develop their own stru gle. This includes equal money rises for all national minumum wage, equal pay for women, Im order to concretise this however appropriate organisational forms have to be projected. Key ones here are 1) Election of strike committess ii) Committees of action and local confs iii) National confs iv)Support committees Action on wages is not at all sufficient to combat the freeze. It is only objectively possible to present as a perspective to relatively well organised sections of the proletse iat thet to break the freeze on the wages front will compensate for inflatdon. For levge sections of the prole-+ tariat, and even more for non-proletarien strata,it fooffers no way forward at ail to say 'smash the wages ceilings'. They are directly affected by prices but are not strong enough to break wages cettt ceiling. If therefore the response to the freeze is simply on the wages front thn all these tother layers will be hadned as potential aliies in this situat.on to the bourgeoisie.
IN order to combate in particular the political attack of the bourgeoisie and in order to win the other layers of theoppressed and exploited to the side of the proletariat , the working class leadership has to advance a polifcon prices in counter position to that of the bourgeoisie and one who se essential point is that it is based on the organ sations of the working class and not on the capitalist class. At present period this means demands such as "ACTION COMMITTsaS ON PRICHS " formed by trades councils or similar bodies of the labour movement. These act tonote price increases, organise boycotts, strikes , pickets etc. ouch committess to drwa in particular on howuswives and shop workers and also studehts, tenants etc. Thru such committees , or other bodies we should demend the TUC prepares a cost of ‘living index to act as the basis for all union wege demands and also for state benefits student grants etc. Aslo in order to carry out such functiions we should raise the demand that the books of all food, in particular, wholesales, retail chain markets ete be opened. As regards adjustments in wages for price ‘increases we propose MONTHLY COST OF LIVING INCRS;se#S ON sLL STATE BENEFITS, AND NOMTHLY COST OF LIVING INCR#ASSS ON WAGES.
Ais regards the organisntion of the struggle we of course support and call for the recall of the TUC, call for rejection of any incomes policy under capitalism, reject any negotiations with the govt. on incomes policy, We furthermore ‘MYPAL Ahan bnnvurtn mace nsininnetartt scanner te Raley RAHN PA tntnrtiefene ntact seen Eicon
[page 22]
advance all our general politics on the Tory govt. on the General strike, on Councils of Action, on action committees on prices etc. However to have a main strategy of calling for a recall of the TUC would be to completely disar the masses. Our main tesk is to organise independient action via initiatives for local confs., for national action organised by represent: tives of the masses, for the establsishement of action committees etc.
As regards the LP our position is simply that we point out that if they were really serisus about fighting inflation they would carry out the type of policy outlined above while preparing to expropriate the capitalists.
As regards the agreement between the LP and the TUC we call for the rejection of this as it is a fraud to declare that the capitalist state will hold down prices and also because we reject any policy on incomes under capitalism.
We counterpose the idea that action should be taken b the masses on prices not by the bourgeois state. , Vil) Apart from the wholesale attack on the working class thru the freeze there will undoubtedly be an increase in repression of all froms , both directed against sections of the working class and against left wing political organisations in the coming period. Action on this front therefore constitutes another priority with in particular emphasis on defence of pickets both physical and political and defence of victims of legal repression.
VIII) A key axis of the bourgeoisie will be also racism. Our general position on this have Slready been spelt out but the maintainance of the type of activity undertaken around the time of the Ugandan Asians must constitute a continual thrust in the coming year. The use of the UF organisations and ad hoc mobilising cttees and other types of organisational forms described earlier are very relévant to such types of activity.
IX) The general crisis of social relations has had a particularly significant effect on the situation of women in the sense that ib has called into the question the whole role of the family, of the oppression of women in institutions in their super-_ exploitation at work etc. It is therefore not merely desirable but possible to carry out. such work both amongst women and on the question of womens oppression. In order / tc :, in the present situation, take these opprotunities the following steps have to be taken. a): Fighting for the formation of womens rank and file committees or strong womens organisations with existing renk and file organisations, in theunions. b)Our cdes should work directly in the WLM. Socialist soman should be turned into a journel for intervention in this milieu. c) Attempts should be made to involve WLM groups in all our general political activities.
X) Our day to day work in the ‘trade unions in the past period has been hampered by two errors.
Firstly our grasp of the concept of workers control was inadequate while the demands were posed correctly, they were too limited by a failure to situate workers control not ohly within the correlates of the economic nature of capitalism but also firmly within the stote structure wf expit-lism and the developments necessary to overthrow it.
The second was an over estimation of the relation of forces between the mvolutio aries and the traditional organis tions of the workingclass. Thisticd'to a view thst it was in general pos.ible on a semi-permanent basis to outflank the bureaucracy end build real rank and file movements.
[page 23]
2 we This has to be corrected in the light of the general estimation of the rehation of forces we make, Wwe sup ort the formation of renk and file groups but we do not estimete , in general , that they constitute the main way in which the masses and the mass vanguard cen be influenced or organised by the revolutionaries. This can “x best be done round more conjunctursl struggles, demands or initiatives The exception to this general point is in while collar unions in, in particular the state sectores. Here the acuteness cf the crisis ofsocial relations and of social expenditute and the relatively less weight than in most sectors of the bureaucracy mekes a semi-permanent mess organis.tioh independently ofthe bureaucracy possible. feJOnes.