No! We Haven't Got All the Time in the World (NC Perspectives Document)

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INT2RNATIONAL MARAIST GROUP.

FOR “ ONLY.

Noi We Haven't Got sll the Time in the world.

NC Perspectives Locument. « PRE-CONPF ex uNCe DLSCUss ION DOCUMANT.

NUMBiR 8.

April 1971 Price: 6p.

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7 . ~ 4- 7 “ 7 nat rd { } AL 1 Pa ~ * .° ‘5 “4, am 1 7—T t mt t ’ ' "Totyve sot all the time in the “orla™ - vneme yong, eng ® Boul 4 win “ er ae t!

Lrermutrong, of § 'gs Secret service .« The filnu ondy with the wurder of the he phelr % Co their honeymoon, Tt is not Eknewn Wace title o Sone wag mercnt to be iron hha ¢emey Bond FP i Top Ma -esty She €oemes Bond Pilims "On ser ca geut) 5 | — bh, ey el ai | o, O ch k& C3 q t e + G rie , F PIN oe 7 SS + pt ty 235 sees ae Mio have not cternity before us. Ve are too generous Veva OUD vu hun, e 1 - . Crs ’ ; } A whicn ty very 2Fec LOUS | cond wwe iat a - - | i | a! ar 4 - . e a -. Je sh wie VL H ao a a a “st Al} T ~ Tr ” , a 1 L } u! } lin ak v ij 5 “ C r nar a im oo a 7 ae Pay Vfee qb rs i OA we 4 . " ra uo ™~ 4 % i : ~— 1536, contained in trotuky's UELb, Sing i ee ro! t try TT VF ne pe _ meh A iF 4 Ett L i: sy ine TSS Our te conierence phe inten Britcin one om uw world be Nay ee de. ae LS70 there vere more a.ys Love vorougn vipikey (yo ce £4 444100) son in wav year vinee 1926 —- tne yeor of the genvpai wurine. ii tne fipet turee months of this year more ceys will Auve been than in the wuole of Lloeut year. On Peoruery OPlet tne Lleorgeeyvt Worecks te : at ie wie ee : a ne an . J. dA A GCemonetration this century took place. Im Forvacrn Ireland, te vtruge +¢ hes reached « stage where bombings ana even killings at pecoiwe ‘on c™ al i> sommon occurrence = Heath tains o4 "urban gucrrills WOE 3 teking place, not in Latin Jucriea Dut wits: he conPlucs Sf the go-cailed United Ringdome Rolly Royce, the very swymool o1 % rtevility and vtrengta of Er itish capitalism carame.t ices lily collapyes (it used to be, ana still ily to a erect ex O every pourgeols and arist :

Rovee car). Now the seco end no-one Enows who will Orders for waenuine tools - one of the most relicsdle gulces vO | investment inventions vluissved by avout 504 in 12703; in $rerr.ony den days this vould have means thoy s 1929-4y 2c sluny vey isainent.(note*) ~ ™ Ty} i ln ~, sempythe i= j- - os i , Accorcing to PTAC cae. TODAY, journal of bre Tuyeltutc oO: Dircotors, 6 recess lon iy ineviteole and nothing bh. Governuent Sen CO 7TAS avoid. Unemployment Lea os one iv cx cetcd to BeeeA one BILE AOD oY the end of the year. Tue Tory Goverhecnt inuyodMecs base PG Lon legislation wulen, oy be once es of pasriats, Ls Byec hE CRA a (3 O oa oe . © id : ; . * to ot . Jt. ~ - Tae, -. tl on Me Sus t . a oF tat Poeo FT met Song Ls cbuc.l 0 LM: Oey Wage HOA eae a bo , f « . _ a “t * oo > vo - ) sea ‘ - om down o bevel whict SLi cnyurc — Cub AN s4AVIn§ venta Les Lenght» em ~_—— Ne ; . ~ _ “a * ceo tem an : . . +. bey cart : : ia ~~ 7" -" ; -~ to ine Veet Ge YY aC G QO 0 SS OFC — fat LRP Ge gt Coy & Cuet ce Vii fa veld PLLbse O i Aviad Lous Ne we 4 +. 10n to wordnve,in boo. cdocun!t take into , ue a ee Se 4. Shes hie DY ES Sem in Lavine Vu be poe siceolkle the unions one ore Nov Averye % ac 4 5 ALO. Me C62 ty. TP DT Fo otek nf L™MCG 40 U bow Usl LO: ts 9 CeGey ¥ peo Dar eetdonen]l ehnorcenine of . . . | “ ” wick ov apt in i.

Sill this tenes Loew in es context or an Unt. . . 5 * ; io . -- a o) * ~ : : olibpicel and vocial crisis O cele anc continuous ceonoule, ty nesply all megor capitalist COUNRTL AIC . haalieee : 4A 4 4 - _ oo ba fs . : ~4 a ae 1 (7 YY N “cr aa os. 4) TIP YT OS q > ae % “yr es bie ods ec of pulling out of Victnom Saxon Goce iuen furtucr then —te - -_ — _ ~ “t “ * q - - ‘ wd - ble ad 4. - . ; * 7. 3. wae oe, 4 te ey we - an ° a ‘ Om tii t a oN eoLLe&: Pa ee ek Tsotnecon vered by cxtending the wor to boOd ena Garudpocla Ena Peabody ac Forth AM ioeye liae been open talk of tae L Fizmon'ts forte the C PG if u on the U.S. of the Leo in avsion «end Lon 1 ms ton “nu.

C the poimviang of % Sevesion of Forth Yictneam. et Trco-thincse people are inflicting ¢ + aotate rr on ba Taic cdefec ys ond tncir yi 2. oS Ae Gebres re Cc C) i -) c)

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- In Italy we ore witnessing the continuction of the muvy LVeO uti mov cment ~ vith general ety dikes naving been a common occulren O C QO 6) << 7) LY a period of years - eglmost unporaiicled in tac ad. bory OL Gare Ci, bos «list world, (2 WN Pranee the vpectre of hay [68 walks as oe fot ulve student movement agein cmerges end the grip of . Cont slin it ( CT over the works eS ft movement erodes ‘ In Spain the move movencnt forecs the fascists to think cesin avout the Burgos ccth ventences. In Germany the long passivity of the German vor.iug © last, ,»roduct of the mevsyive 1533 defect when Eitler come to power, ences In a crameatie menner ov vildecoat vtrikey vpreade 1. os ae a “| 7 4. rom — ~y ‘ “7 7 ~~ . : es => 7 4 7 7 -- 1 \ ~yo va 7, 7. : r In the United States the vocizsl crisis Bay ve read From tae b blo] "4 ™ * 7 wel u | rl my I. ut 7. * ~.. : + ww £ . Votan : j =" yop~ulation end vbtudentvy to vac Cliijeanos and “IO pen, ana nev: ans dcmonyutrete a "red pover" Wa ich brings back tue memor oe yawn, Mtarawy hace dooney dae. : r es er 19 Ccromino, Pixon has demonstratively fe. ile G to vwolve ony o Ae eressuiing orobleomu facing the snerican ruling clave = ale F = ys 4 he _ = *, - ey +8 + ; oe oe Ser een a vie o™ tm a .

Tn betin Ameries militery Ciletitoryshi ps ore soreca CO YO bUre os i ef -'. os x “ oe om at om ~. ao i -. ~~ “ay hee ~y ") | + ry a eae ar my - C evolutionary regimes, oven vo the extent of giving . faucaue of 7 7 - de uy air cm ~~ - 4 oo . sed -, wy el ™> voy bing, 2) ce ib & fb a Like.

C; c Pid Gcwoe pcey Which gives the revolutionury force: poaec, Rlecithere wiltvidary vegiiacs rule wita the w movt orutuilsvy Dut are uneble to extinguish the flames of revolt. Im Cniic a opeler front" Governicnt foore a growing Movs moveomene Sabon Lvs own vic ory ercetly stimulatcd, And in Uruguay vuc node the strength of the revoly tbionary upsurge thet the ruling -v les os hay to cons lecr s "povular front" oxyorimcnt.

On the Indian sub-continent both regimey face decomypoy it lon, i EM Gandits cleetion victory Aas brougay her og Gcuporary xveulive o -- 1 ay , % ra ; f “ "ok 1 o. % a C “0 rant) 1 .% the Indien ruling class hes nowhere to go. Tv cy.-ov 7 ; ~ 4 IT 44 "3 , ie ‘ . ; ~ “ v - ™~ . “ , “1 a -* 7 2 iw ) 7 * 7 ~* " or + out prctendins: to be "socdolivt",. The oreaicvea eysoyton dn Paokie ra a n ries et c: “fe any a ry ~ Ty .5 ry on arin Sa he Nm 47: - de ayes “ lay OCcuUurrca — To metver wnhab the ouvcone of me |6weu nt 3 CUS Stan glo v m 4 too fe abey Ke f Bact Bengal vecowing a scoone Victnam, OFtshor, in other "“socinlist" eovernitnt, vith tac pearticiy tion c i rot “ BAY ists, iv forecd to use Wideu pic “gu Lon ag ¥ Id So pewwb) Le finivihea rorever one Lt ay no {~ ee Ow J + «+ oF har neg ee a am ip ai ee 4 “yon in Auctrelasics the flemes o dine ont cab are ev orveading - in ‘ 1. > My et be] -. wt. t ". 5 Panel tend -*. ‘ . 1 . * -) 4 * " a ™ ~ oy TF “es F “UF €¢° at o AUewy oa Lie WoO veo Girne SLO bill of « LUZ oe omg b-SLeotnam Wer moveme 4G end ~ the grovwta or incustrial etyrugile. “Phe CP is forecd to -outure as veing cnti-Stalinist to the cxtcne of vocogniving Protykyivin ay a Logd it in -te eurrent in the workers movement, In Few Scaiona, OP s backwoter par ecxecilcnee, tac whole fabvrie of vocial vt.oility is varcowsnee oy rataints ero poucd cntry into the Common DOG § mere foo fn laorec movement againyt the war in Victnenm aas aGevelopca.

Tn the Wiedle Bavt the combined cfforty of the sovicu burceucracys the renctionary Ar.bd reretiics and Tvra.l have inflicted a big c.reas ~ 1 nyon the mucerille movements but the effcet of all this on the Vaneuard gives the nope taot tar civil wor in Gordan may have vevn its i> ss L905, Despite this ce Pee the revolut lonary opeusure is vo 2b... thet regincu have to OEE © as beine revolutionary and antvie-in,.rejalist, To yurvive ail fred regis nav © to aprcar to be tiling a tougher line wish the imvoericlist oil monopolicy = Renee tar Obs uous oil Le ae Ys Bren the Sheh of Tren trics to wear Sac iL O e ontieineericlist want iel

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Only in Africae has the mass movement utagneted. South Africa ona Portugal act as the policemen for all ca. pielismls investments, 110-.- Ten Smith acting cs their junior yortners Belkenivction combined with «a Succession of cnginecred cougs hes prougnat reletive gtepility for neowcoloninlist exploitation, Bur acre, ~00, there are vigns of fone .

MoT. coming and continuing gtrugeles: tne fieht of tuo na a aa \ o@ wy ~, a, = 7 wine 4 a + - ~ ~ i ~, | ™ ‘ _ Pits ee _—e . —, —— * en! “- J 74 é. f ~ movement in the Porvuluere colonics cont inuds ona nerve ond ta .re (Cees “yt ge ° on Ss oo. 3 Ln - rp - ie att 4 myo t.) Le verte Wa ae "Ur Chad) we see portenty of ~. future. Intcornational vocial-cemocracy, heedcd by (Lilly Brendt, O22 Ime ond the Finnish SPD, is tiking out -n invurence policy for in, popigliesm by giving leorge vuu of money bo Livercetion movements bac Goon “einoie ona PonZzan Le South Africa now ‘Ooh will cud across the V 4 f a Onn Oar, Ghee oe CinNnines oO t on ceononic CYTES Ls YWal sm. + ad a Oe nan Se wie oO a) -coeticol aivistonys mn voci ty syoly nei. gay soUugul vO Cheoaule spove all, the crioa of continving cconomic poom = Unerees “Gengeca in a -1te lisnly hi.tory ~ has come to an end pnd neuwrly evi gywucre in ‘ a oitelist vorlé there ix ceonomic unecertcinty. Tne USA 229 oN (fieiel reeecvvion and eeey ucemployment rockct. Tn nearly every country the “achilles mecl" of Keynesian policics - infigtion wT an turcetens to become more wicnacing then the vlump thoue policies are deviegned to ward off. . b> | Uhilst e suececsyion of crises cruptgin the capitalist vrorla the voters ebteates give cont inulng ovidenee of thre deoyening dec ou jos ive ~liniym, Before the new regduc in Czechoslovakia can ion of vorld St r stabilise iteycif huge mays styruczles break out in “Ooland. Le pureguercacy iv f : fice the "hero" of the Yolish Octobcr, Gomulka, tO appeare the masves But that 1% not enoughs tac Soviet purceucracy sins i jith huge Llougeterea orcaits to cnavle Poland's new bureaucratic Llenccrs ve annul the vory "eysecntial™ price e the trouble. No one = least of all the eg =— knows where the nexv ex loyion vill lendts revolt show. d thet the sUrkers could | come, The e¢ C ‘ O09 oe c _t he hish ond iw thiy is cg leysuon whaien vi li nob oe 1 0 c . rn C .

Lent. ~ll by neighvsouring Ukradiec Whose voy; neole pin yr of the CPSUts horc-Lincrs. jinerecases which sparKke verious buresucratic cl ‘3 a) a wt ~“4 I Ty ig Lliterelly truce that Stalinism coty now as the main pro, a itadist on the intexnetional seene. In th. apitalinut wor yionc ers Noooular front" tepdincs whose pur our jis to hecod-ofr vocial + whilst only tac oervery Lons of Stalinism .Peve nt the cxmivtence oOo nonecapitelivt third of the woriaia Gingas a pole of attravtt strugsl las Mo wgesR Civen the vankruptey of the oe vit lis Go vorld tac Pe ot a | i ta: =e w+ of one important healthy and visble yvorkurys state yould L O existe Y1e is a ome 4, . a ft CVedl tbne Wo) C C roavidly dccouwpore end disintcerate the rev powerful impericlivt powers. 7 Meyer before have the vords of the Trenvitional rrograinc becn so apts "The yorld voliticsl situation as a whole iv echisfly charact risecd py a historical crivis of the lescervhip of the prolet.riat. Tuc economic pre-re wuisite for the oro leer ian yr ovolution hays «already in Vv @ecneral achicveda the highest poins of fruition that can be achicved under ceapitelism, Alrcaay new Snyentions and improvements fail to —« raieo the level of mativrial wealth. Conjunctural criscs una congitions of vocial crisis of the whole capitalist vy. tem a ed ever heavier dc orecatvions end sufferings on _bne meyues,. Groving . : n ; re ee i re k oa. unemoloyment, in its turn, Geepens the fineneicl crivis of the yt.uu% + “1 a . . . “ _ ns : - +. oy mae _ . os : we id ; oa « re i and undermines the unvtabdle moncvary Syebe MY /eMoeCPHvAG Ce Geers

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ag well as fascist, stagger on from one bankruptcy vo UHLO% re The objfcetive orere uivites for the rol. tarion povole weve DOS “athout Oo, cre only Nod ocned" they hove begun to g.v voucwnit LOUD t Ct, 8 = t ! ---. PF fone = and ° 4 cr eocinlist revolution, in the next hivvoriess .~rioa ia cotasytrovne threatens the wnole culturs ; now to the proleterisat, i.c., cnicvfly to ity revoluti The historical erivisy of maniiind is reduced to the er revolutionury Lleecerunivs. es" » “4 bt © ra Sob } c, G bw , Surat ry We }-— a kK i i ~~ is ® 4 [- K eg ty yoneuaré. othe - + LD “) O U. oe = fete £9 0 OE ck rf Never before could the Fourth Inve rnet Lone, LL fece the furvure with 2Y2uch conflaecnee, Th clone of the extablished tendcueles in tae workers movement hos builv an int rnetional OV : lg Jro= gremiec whien hav relevanee, sjlone is able % ¢ this compiex and pulsating »slbvuation wee hows fear ALL over teonden S o- Rgode..

Stalinisu, vocial denocracy, centri isn, onmereniviun, ultre tae svoecalled "new Left" und bhe Verious oO; oportunis it the Fourth Tntorneationnl: Povadirt 5 oll reflect the twin spines of envitelism and Stclini their own ranks and structure; SGomc of toem Givyintegra our very cyes3: vuillet otners eed bo the right es Foust os tneir Sf marxivt rhetoric will qlow them (3). By contrat, the Fourth Ins ot ional is flourishing. “het is uore, in newrly cll the linvortens eountricys of the vorld thousands - yometines sony of thousands - Lo 2G more and more of the bdevic wrinecof youns pcople are coming vo © ivgles of harxism, Trotykyis © O. oe, ‘ be wa f+ Hovever, the whole conjuncture contiiny « terr ible dacdectic; the very ae ugele of the novees, the Voility of tats etrusgede to inilict defesty ene vevirecs upon cavitelivym mcons tan 4% Toilure to Forze a novolut i jonery leadvrvhip vill exact a monverous price. Une _uost- -tion at the need of this dvcurccnt from Proteky typiticd bis feclings aoe: .

Ly another per ioc of riving classy yutvuggic in the mid-tairvics Gree MMhe Now Revolutionary Upsurge ond the @oeky of the Fourton Int wrne tional" ~ Trotusyts eitings, 1935236). Tac 1 ccrehiy of tes working clevs, however, foiled to live up ty ity res vous iboilities end the result cas wordie: of enteastrophic caefoutye Today, there is a very aifferent yoelatdiunship wf classy Forges: onc : third of the vorld has seen on wibelia nm deextroyed, the workinsy clos in the ceveuecd capitalist countries is mucu vtronger evel ivetiveiy . nd vantitetively, the colonial revoluvion hay Gevtroyed circes apcrialict cule 6M enothcr third of the vorld'ts vurface, . ne tae 4 inc, 42 Cw tolinisn: and yoeial denocracy - are in a state of LOT rtedl crisis. 7 ~~ “7 7 ° : “ ~ yo 4 cen 1 on oer a! ‘4 C fie cm | 4. 7 i “ -° 1 cowever, there wiil oe no sutbometice collapyve cf capitalivia - vans rc o, , Lia pc cL tyro mein pestions of vourscolis Ldacology in the working closu- SS) oy + G ih i C Di.

Ss th. theory of Sophisticated refornisn oo la Aoutaky ond ocucr.

Sxoeutioncers are necded = in v Lit¢ countries tac cxceutioners can only by the in¢urtrial rol tartar Lod by COLLAR Ys Boluhevik dLty.e. Lenin once remarkva thet Sacre 1s no 3 the vorking elas : Seis is wndless a Lr. ys puilt., The price nuaan: tainly net pe Less taan tv: r Lu roy in vorcan cs 1 « f <i X [J a <4 Le pt c- Ly Ccvele ob GFrcre OE unte 1 j j cr] | a jonury leaders al, will aeve to vay in thet cave willoce i Lowe 0 a ' t re pe! oo Clu _ a cr a ? a ring olyesdy). A terrible urls:

XR oe rhe ary, ; aa by r oe viel Ory Eo 4 a (ucstion of "Foysism areuna vie or bhe pent few years vill ocoviously . of voolities for o whole perisd. Signit ieee Dw 17

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tefents nov could drive the working clece into « prolsugeea iivod ¥ athay wailet viovories could vem g cuclibutive leo). in Sie Sk > influence of the revolutionery cit. Such a hogy div required if we ere to play a act ernining role in the coiling cventy, © <3 With all the succervucs rousine oc L O gmoll foree conp.red wit 1 n C an oe Je . ee A. vir . _— bh the sigentic tasyky 2 : Oo gchicve mq here b} wi pa whe ony oti. wenn ~-F RT Cue Bee’ “1s Ghee i ia Ws here is no visen that sny otucr Porce Wi chicrgeo in the wWor.:ing i clays wr oan? cuegery leadervnip - on the contrary, aed boost, ultroekleftism end »tvuc- -thoroOh.culd-bpe vanguaordists a.ve reveenled their imputcney at a ore nth-toaking rote. The most urgent tesk feeing mankind, therefore, iv the puilding of the Fourth Intcrnc¢ional, which must become Lhe nucleus of mevy rovolutionary parvic cavable of decling death blows $0 cavitalism in the adve wnoed Cn itale ist countries, Correct prosraicie and vevolutiouarvy yvlibuctionys are not enough -— the udze of the voneuerd forecy ond tucir spility te ccenond to situetiony are key feo tors, Buileéing the Pourta Inteore netionel iy not, therefore, just « guession of eleboret ing a regranne ~ it is exlso » cucstion of builcing up our esdrve force and Pevourcess ene all the lstest additions (cupeci ent payed new lcftists) to the pi * Te do not in any wey $e Daelk on our boeviec pro voeyivicn bnoaw Movs revolutionary oarticy will ouly be DULlt ay a result of fuylous, reppoupments nad the structural break-up of tr. Jcitdouet one Geogencte gue a WOPheors orgs Nive t Lony. On the contrary, -recesvecs of Tied kind. can only take zlece if the uize, iuflucnee ond resources of the Pourth Into netional are vuch thet it avsty ay yole of attractivn on the one hand and « Gigint Grav ing forec on th. other. Building the Fourta Internetionel is inextricably woven into end 2 neeccusery pre-condition for the meyeive regroupment of re volutionary Forccse Novhere iy oll this more truc tucn in Britain. Indecd, one iigat almoyt say thet Britein is an eleout labor.tory-pure specimen illustrcting this process, In Britein we hac to etort anew Luilding the whe Trotskyist movencnt after the conplete degencretion of the previous Pourth Internc.tional scction, the Shi, over the voriod 1953-63.

Other ettcugty to do this (¢-ge, the RPSL) were vtill-born or proces nutetions. The genersl tasky facing the Fourth International cre hug rurther coi: lice tcds In Britain, ofter confronting Che Lncupous and yuccunus °F Stolinism and vocial acnocracys we are Faced by tv r nonsSteliniet Left formetions, ol_ger end comicnding tore Tes surees than ourecives - the SLL ona Ib.

Tf we heve busze op pportunitics in Britcin we ulso heve a viry «ifficult struggle onc «a terriole responsibility. Defeat For tac working oli. ce in the prevent Tory oficnsive would heve both long-b.rm and revercuyviongs, Fovhvwre in sight ie thore og force walich ele mee + | o ae we 4a ——e a oa Pe ee . % 45 a _ hog oa vbtretcey for preventing vel ceFeat ana our on viae wud Lack ft ca en qy*> ™ «i ,m SO ar fe + 4? a) ft 7? “ ria ” és “- i = moyen Ov my ro j sy “ a i: ti.

VO Ten vUWVo Cy yok CV OTL OG ‘ss ne roid dd 1 sae b gL Qos je Vc rS JL) bile edhe eye oO “roo KN tees pile BCEOTC ee ouey on Le : “at re COUN Lty “iLoOVaueca OY UY fhe , > 3 -~ 7 aA: t t ory ay 7 cuuryve OF tae elas ule. Trier ren | ae ye 7 -y . .* | . ” a 44? a — i. a a a set Indus tx Lol Re Lat tons “Bail Sb GS ON a LD dé ; waiecy Slow by thesia “ , 7 + ye Qe wie ea isan by ge, oe yn by ns Tes an are ee Te et a a 3 ar vpolicy in the poutul sorie Tire t chey 1 vrerpe prepared to sinayn unions > sO - ay mata) - rr Pn ‘?. -!. = 5 we ONAN “vom rt ge HE { ao in the process of the oOrtensive (ohe Ge union leaders ~ "Lert . * * yo oAawe coy oe F eo 2 + ~ "=F cae Sen end rignt ered to vit back and woteh thems nob even wae ~ ao — at Se yy A ra cle ey -— |e - 7 Ror ee we OL & GORE LIC GOO al: ceo bile O re. i itn Se hat 7 ™ BUCTIEG pre ret i) |? he ~ a Do ‘™ ‘ oe rae. | «.* we “ve ,"aS UC 4 _" a ts ° rn be 7 . Ls an a L218 % inet of se ~ Lf ow yreycrv rot ton Wos vt Ulics CTLOUE t UO GdOEe them reotion in su,port of +t ne pow v iver They Geechica ConsuUuslea Sob og econ

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viish), Perhaps oy the tine this docuiient avpears a Siniler avvack Will ve teking place againyt the rail unions, bgainut the Tory offensive and TUC /Labour Party connivance there is arrayed tne Loncereful inetinctive militancy of the vorking class, But ve cannot ex »ect this ailitancy to last indefinitely - expecially when the voecatllec lefts betray it (Joney'and Scanlonts deyogicaote role in the "or dy strike, for instance). Ve have, therefore, serhe ys 18 months or two years to make a decisive change in the relationship of forces.

Tt is with thie general background thet lest yearty conference decicay a C5 © u very Larce Ra gor thy Fo edo .t the orientation of soine: trom a vropaganda group to a league for vevolutioneary action, The first cuestion which muzt ve examined i9:; how has the passage of tine treated our general a ,oreciation? (2) TUR PURDA BYTAL OREOCTSNS OF OUR L570 ORLTUE AT TION 4a) eat ant Pes T5it Tek TA bie. TS IP a CURONTG GATS i TS TOE BAS iO British tm pcre isi continues to fall behind its wuin vivais. for 9 cousle of decades it hay a groutn rive only half of that of most of ity rivals “and Levy than one-third or one- vuartver of ta its mout denccrouys treding rivals (West Germany and Japan). The Labour Government fa led to volve this problem and vo far the ft have not tackled it. For example, tnere vas a ere 1. 2 (grovth in industrial production between December, 1569, and December, LOTTO, ~ much less than what is "normal" boecause of rationalisation, incre= age in labour force, cte. (2%). It is interesting to note that productivity over the same veriod rove by 4.5%, the difrerence peing cxplained by a decline in employment of 2.9% ‘What is more, inveytfent has sont inue to lag and Britain hays now drop led to fourta lace in the table of world trade. The FINAMCTAL Tl. BS scenes to accept thot Britain will drop to fifth or Sixth in the next year or 06 The whole Tory strategy is designed to Geal with this oroblen, Its main strategy is to try and eiffcect a mauyvive shift of reyources fron consumotion to profits thus giving funds for an investment boom, Tac - YDUGLCE Was comolctoly yuoordinated to taivy cna. LLOWS over, apart from overegomings vorkere! revivtance the Tories nave sot to convines the employers that it 18 worth investing, Vhilst tne budget cuused . a2 one-day boum on the ytock excuange it vengine in doubt vac tvacr al + Fas "rapturous welcome! vale ve "re veated in in®usvrial pogrdroomsy' wu 4:

Pe ee On the military-ypolitical plane we nave hac further evidence of tae cecline of British imperialivym, Tae Beitivh Ambayvode to Uruguay kidnapped and only a muted protest follows = gone are tae uays men a gunboat would have "vsorved out tae natives". AY the heligh of its pover British imperialism sould eve Made more noive Aad one of its minor clerks been insulted in®oar prawl. pevpite tre brave vords of the Tories, British imperialism is, after wll, to pull out of the Gulf, Meany more examples could be jiven. bs Qu ee at ea yis of ‘British cavitelae vb tremendous c th new of the cop,lets —_ je Cf anything ve tended to underestimate the c ‘om end thorefore did not sufficiently ap yr b 4 O ar O Pp. t—" 3 C UC Pvine « on the government of the cay to atva

[page 8]

vo) THAT Br Ey Tok VOR TA LOTSLS” BE On Oe IG y POUT I Ah AND 900 “As to LED PRAT OW THE sa0noIe Bast POR PEMD trot TRUE LOns TS OCPoODS TURY ARE THROWN INTO A DEEP STMUCTURAL CRid ts.

The tendeneics noted in last yearty document nave coutinued., Tac Torics are now cngaged in a fer-reacning ettack on social scrvices.

They have "suceccdcd"™ in pursing uy, unem vloyuent to such an extent thet telk of one million unemployed by the cna of the year doos nov geen wiloe Thuy the tyvo essential aypcets of "affluent" Sritvains the uelfere state and full employment are being va aorificed. PLO eho vould seek to explain the Tory policy in ovycnological or ideological terms have to explain the difference Sebyecn the prevent Tory Covernuent and the 1951 one; also it should be notes that the vegine ning of the a-tack on full employment and social vervices took place under Tilson, Ao far ag the crisis of policy in the wajor parties is concerned, so far the Tories wave not had « wajor revolt vince taking office oven the Uisecd Unio nists eventually came to heel. Hnoch vove 1 waits on the sidelines anxious to use any opportunity to cmbarray® the Neath administration. Hig combined campaign on imaigration, tic Tvish and ovpoysition to entry into the Comeon Larket hay vo far reeeived only a modest Tey Ouse. However, ay Gis. ontent grows this rear because of rising price inereased coyt of nousing, y,»resvure on the social services, nav ing unemployment, cte., tue oogcetive bose will be laoid for bhe cmmrenec of a vadical right Phisc radical right gould almovt certainly find ity firs oxoreyvion witnin the Tory varty. Its exact navure and leadership, iso impoyvysible to erecict at hit stage but we can de abs olutely certain thet it will emerge.

The Lepour Party hay not recovered from the haemorrhage of its six yoors in office. Nearly one=third of the constituencies did not sence Gelezatey to lavt year's ecnval conference of the Lavour Party ie decply comaitted is Wilson 40 making capitalism wors thet he is unact. to make a demasyogic social yervices and ary Labour Party to viel Relations Bill even oe reformist the Bill not one vig forvard phe slogan o including the bureau they oricinally crea invstrunent of strug:

They prefer to rely geemy likely to last industrial virength, e~ ) cL Liberal Party has advantage of pees pect.

The GO take vertics nowy ne politics. f . ‘ . a A most vignificant «a curtailment of the A.

U Ve of normal pourgeols AT UC x on oe 1 Lame ily 5 —_ Tout = Mieft" shift in the trade unio The failure une wivocably pledge ityclf to ig a sign of the Lebdour Party's party. No wonder that during ~ificent yeetion of the working f celling for Lepour Governiicnt. crats — do not Labour Party, ted to defend political le union ulo0on while Yor or regvonve to wvhe * SS cy ce tne them in the Tory entietride strongth, This vorlkers ore con 4 nv oe v ft J failed with the Guo Papliawent and in British clecto more of a foke: 1% -d Gisgillusionme nt half its seat in Mouira peeome even the widevyre at, it Llovt of becoming w? } S3 a Fore om ~ Aa eg gece ptance Mocret rignts. the “he th Oz 4 Qe be S} on evelopment wd ©

[page 9]

would, as hav been pointed out many times, interfere vith freedom of exvrestion, Papery Like the RED NOLE could easily de avtucked under its termy for merely supporting «a strike, lct advocating ite extension, Other features of the IRB are e vally unaenocratic. But tnis is not all: according to Reicase the Governnicut's new Drug Bill atteck one of the moxt cherished principles oF British Gemocracy the necesysity of police to prove guilt ratner than the suypecot to prove their innoccnee (Mivuse of Drugs Bill, Clause 23), Teken in conjunction t:ith ex ‘trenc ly bac Lectures of the Government's new imnigration yoliciey (whereby deportation could de used a thre.t againet militant trade unionists) wo sce a significant crovion of ) the veneotilty of pourgcols democracy. * should not forgct that whe. dctention ibhout trial For IRA sus pects vas discussed in the House of Comunons, oypovrition to it was on th. grounds of ineficetiveness rothvr than principle (this gocs for the vpeahers fron ell purtics) It would be wrong to cxaggeret<> these tTondcneles gust now and serean wboutb fascivm og la ultra icfts. 2 c iv a vignie © ovever, what we do se ficant vhift ~ a thin cnd of the wedge to vay the least. This has ail kinds of conse ucnecs for the building of a vingurmd orgenivation which we must face. Politicelly we vnouléd be eloar thet Bacve trends (because that is all they are at prevent) reflect the weakness and state of crisis of Britisn duygecrialisn rather then ity. vbr cnet ox Qalevolcnece, (oc) THAT THE ATTEMPT TO SOLVE BRITISH TLituURIALISM'S BCoOroiiIe AND POLITICAL CRISIS BY A LABOUR GOVERNMENT Panag. 3D TO ees SR EL ATH GOING" BY IFTEGRATIVG THE TRADE U.TOns IFTO NEO-CAPITALIST PLANNING VIA AN INC OPES POLICY “AS AN AL OST COlCLETS FPLILURE, Thiv has been dramatically confirmed =~ fur from tuming the trade unions the Labour Governiicnt stimulated «a huge weve of vages militaney. Far fron sn begaat ng the unions into its plans the Lebour Government was compelled wo withdraw its incomes policy provdovals, This disyolay of vorkers vtre neath enboldened the rank ana file to fo orvard and demand really lerce Wage Inereayves., We perhavs underestinated the Leavour Government's "vsuccers" (gcined ot the expense of the ordinary people) in inproving Britivh co pitalivufs balance of payments povition, The litter situ.tion hay given the Toric: nore room for nmeanoceuvre than we thousat soseyibdle (for lnutence, vo far they have not been congelled to freecac Wages) § 1 hovever, having temporarily evaded the deep olue sew of « dulince payments crisis, the Tories are now faced with the devil of infleavic with low growth (verhapye next year they will faces both ct the vime tincs., The legacy Labour left the Tories demonstrated the bankruptyy ~ from a ca italist point of view «aos well as a workers « of Vilson' gix years of "dynamic rule" we i r C (d) THAT THE TORIES VERE HO TORE LIZELY To stecuup IF [O SOLVE THE SRPMS TATE iD C’ISTIS OF BRITISH Dive RITALIss, Prom a historical point of vicw, of course, there is no urerument oat all about thiv propoyvition, os: Povey We meant 1t in a shorter and more dLiiicadLlate sense, It is too early to write off complctely the Tories! efforts, As noted in last yeoar'ts soe unent tie Tories find it much casier for ideological reavons to make massive attacks on Ee

[page 10]

woe Lal WePvices The Yaviangyy tPot oat LS cbtack BUCO Ub aiChl FUNG Vo e use to bribe sceyions of the mic su, ete, This makey the failat ae _ . __ 1 - - - +. oS ure, vo far, of E/PCS DONS bo theye ettecks «a very vorious political netter -« we should susport tne 3s c@ainst the cuts. However, even they have efrectcd through these pol to their wcin vroblen - tht of auvt omen ously develo sing can :aigns er of funds waich ia 3 Loueake Lattice Gare cmenes Much more imvortant is the general avtack ana e98, eoduily the attack on trade unions throvgh the IRR. In the cvent of the Toriey succeeds ing in gectting the lejivlation through, of reaucling Wage Lic >» lover level than prices rises due vo inflition and them ini 4 1. at “3 or -* “~ v a nici Te rh Sirs oat ~~ Oy ens ™ ot + 7 ~, i mak yy 7 5 defeats on the trode union movenent, bhey ore still exvrenely uuilk ly 7 ~ nf | 7 M ~ * ' _ - a — te her ~", 3 io 4 “‘ 4 ;* + * t. 1 "yy 4 1 “ ' to remove the imiediate prevsures on Britivsa imperiolisu. Mor a I LL -L 7 a u) 7 4 and ey 4- re _ “~ * ‘ ” ~, -. 2 start, thiv whole attack has a Clalecti & e phey are uncermining one of the oillare of bourgeois rule via bar snenteary democracy: tne illusion thet the gvtate is nevtral, This dn tern lays the obgeetive pasis for the politicalivation of bayer rs of the vorking clusyy ones4, indecd, for the reecmergence of revolutionary currents in the Worcing oxtending far beyond the opeoevent venguard Groupe To is clcar to all now ~ notvithbetanding the TUG lea lerg «= thot every industricl pstrugsie anc every strike is a poll nis in and of ite self is oa donjcrous thing for capitatlis Govern ment behaves in thie wey is a mecuure of ite cris Loe vyoning masvively in wage negovilations, —; |- = * by es" co, Hi, @ > (") cr pu > cf ct be tr Cc In conpeting on the vorld narket Brivivna ca, aiteliem is confrontesa with vivels which ere also capable of attacking the ir won working elesses, Foreover, the Tories are trying to induce « Mavvsive investment in « period of general economic uncertainty in the ena vticolist world and recesvion in Britain (4). Ta ody the most conducive bacsie cloth for cn isveetucnt boom, Yet without this investucnt) poom G q British reavey of growth end henee efficiency sill lug oenina,. t ‘oin the Common Pearsev oD Again with Britivyh cup ialin S ottcupty to in general one can vay that ¢ gy cerocin vs 38 too lute. The tine for Brivis & naxinun pene rit fron joining the EEC was wnen vnhere Was oe Geiere boon and cx banding markets. Now entry woul take place in a mer iod of ine ition and «ould have the effect of renoving protection industry from yone of itv most dangerous rivels. This i thet British big ous ines ig not very keen to goin the EMG - iv will ey 19d ite efforts to concentroete production end Link up wit All in ell it harcly seems neces vary to revive » Ct ” Na the Tories will be unnble to yolve this orooiem even a, = J Cy O cf fr ey o) cr Naw a fi : }-—? j+« oe Ss . for British O Buropecan no pole the econecyst taat in the thort term, (9) THAT TER NAVE A CHRSPUCTIVE OF COIPINUING CRAB IS - BCONO TO, SOCTAL feb POLTEIGAL “ITT NO BOURCROTS LULDBRSNID AOLSLS OF VRIGNMEING 2 pReIsty: POLICY TOR SOMvIrG TR IN THD NAISDAT. PSR TOD We cucalified this propovition with the stetement thet no bourgeois Leadershino nor its. ageneles seemed likely to wont or to ve ca ldable of an outright confrontation wita tac vorking clases. The veotion of test yeerts docunent which orgucd this olso cast dount on the opinion & LO --o* She Tories vould imicdiately ocgin an atbeecek on the trade Unicon. = * am) Clim ole od emt og elearly wrong ond it is necessary to chal

[page 11]

why. The main point to note iv thet the Tories ere trying to eliub-= orrte « decisive bourgeois policy. This is why bie Tory Governuent is cngaged in a battle of willy with the unions. vuring the yor ted strike "Left" trade union leider Jackuon cot on nis knecs gseverel fires and becged the Tories to give hin a feceeesva.ving foruula for calling off the vtrike. Tnutead, the Torics demeonded and eventually a got unconditional surpcender, VThetbhor they can stick to this poy ite ton i: depatcent upon many footors. The Fords strikers have been able to force a clinb-down by the omployers; but it iust be noted thiut 2 the deol arranged behind the geeney by Jones “nd Scanlon (aecin demon= strating the particularly verniciouy role of MLToPft" trade union puresucrats) is dcvgiened to tic the hends of the vnop vyever Oy for necvely two youryve Ne vortheleys, this plus the clec beicd ty cuployers! offer of 24% hav made the Tory Qoverniicnt angrys There iy no doubt that were they faced py c determined TUC tne Tories vould not dare their policy of confrontation, However, the way tne . trede union lenders sat back and “tched the pout office woracrs joxe sled to death encouraged the Torics to set tough. It vey ABC thot mes n defeat for the poutal workers sould be a medor defe.nt for troac . unionisn in general - one does not have to be a revolutionary bo JCC thet. Yet vo mevucrived are the Lleccéer: of the TUC by c conytitutionsLlisu thet they refused to take theo noyt elementory vtepy to wore off defeat for tne post@hporkcrs. No wovee were mudc to stop the tole phones; the engine.rs were not called outs; the whole time the gtrike went on de “facto wyoaboing took place on the rails and LoOLidy ete, The novt Ghe TUC cia wes to ceive token suas of sioney to the * t ws ra" es -* tos wt at Tye. yy A ft postal TOrECEs Noras aig fund.

Instead of callings on other sections tbo aus ist the pout office workers ond cnyuring a quie: deecivive struggle (stop sing the t clephones would have sdecnnt everything veula have been Over in a fev days) we had a protrcectcd and devilitc.ting strike, Goan We Won 1d er eer: circumstances Like these, the Tories sot vith a boldness tnicn bolies their weak social position, Thiy ig the nejor part of the anyver of why our estinete wos Wronge Di The Tories are cneournged "to bane the unions on" preeively by the Tyucts weaknevs and timidity. In eGdition, the Tories kno. taet they fFeee no real political challenge from the levour Puorty. That evorty Coey not even discipline tyo of ity members —- Gunter and fayaew who abstcined on the ontietvede union legisi:tion in the Houve Comions, The ovher feotor which made our ayversmente wrong du, as noted before, the innacdicte erigiy of British capitalise iy ue ht Wore eepious then aJspeared last yeor. Tt is not only a exnse of galloping inflation ond the collapse of Rolls Royce; a whole yerics of Fir have meee registered greatly reduced profits or cven loses gvo Petvoloua, £72: million,.nd P & QO, e2 willion, to name guet tio,» T he ore evsure iy doiiense on any capitalist eovernucnt of the duy Go make big attacks on the vorking clase ond the standard of living o:

Ho seo ple in gcncrul. ‘hen, on top of that, tne governrncnt foels thet it vill meet with only token revi isvtenee ity way is cleide In passing we must note thot it is unfortuncte thot it is not a Labour Covernment which is making there ettceks, One can doubt that head d a ae “4lson been victorious his course of action vould have been bayicclly a he teme at that of Heath. Thuy conditions would nove been such more

[page 12]

meester for destroying the last remaining iypect ratic illuyions in the working clays and it is doubt Labour Party could, in ity present form, hove survived ysueh an experience, “Te could heave vcen one of the structural bestions of the promotion of bourgeois ideology in the Working class rveeeive a death blow. Only when social de wiocracy in Britain follows the course of deconposition mapped out by ite Italian and Freneh accon ,lices can we bo sure that it will not agein yvtultify the claves consciousness of the British working class, 3 (f) THAT THIS CRISIS TOULD BE INTENSIFIED BY A NUMBER OF FACTORS.

Wo Listed a renewed balance of payments criviy among theve, This his not come to pass, However, we wust note that one of the main renavony for this is that inflation is «a world wide phenomena ond thet Britis capitalisu's treading partners clyo foee cost push inflitions ry orevie ure on the price of their exports, However, Britain stands alone cuong the importent capitalist countries in combining thia inflation with a stagnant cconony ond a shouryp inveytucnt duvneturn, icenee long-tern fiuctors favour a balance of payuenty crisis beeauve Britis. induytry will become more and more backward, itioreover, the utinulus given to the econo y by the rceent budget - taking th. form of oa growth of conyunption = is expected to put up the imoort bill, Hove ever we should reisain cgutious about this question beenuve of the conplexity of the factory involved, The cuestion is by no means a purely acadcnic one, The Torics' entire stratcgy 1s affcoetod, If the Torics can be confident thet they will not face a balance of paynents crisis it givey thei more ronm for nanooguvre in their confrontction with the working clays. Take, for instance, the nuch floated idea of a legolly enforced wage freeze.

If a balance of paynents crisis Was in the offing the Tories would jluost certainly be forced to introduce this with oll the convequences that vould follow, The latest trends arc for the figures to vorsen - worcover, the recent up ing of roy.lties oy the OPEC and Ticditerrenean oil producery is expected to add £150 millions to the im sort pill, It would yveen likely thet there will ype oc Whance of pevucnts crivis next yeor or 1973 at the Latest, Another factor that we noted was th.t of ystructural problems, ve nentioned in porticular regional imbalance, Northern Ireland, the | inability to absorb the black population and th. contracictionys in all eohery of education. Certainly we have been vindicated in this rey pect.

Regional imbalance will be intensified by reecent Tory policics., We have to note a nuance in the policies of Labour and Tory, whereas the Labour Party has sonething to lose in electoral terns should Scotland and wales become clionnated (as was vividy denuonstrated by nationalivu in the nid-yeors of Labour term in office), the Tories have preciouyg little, Both thevc countries are, by and large, very strong Labour bestions, Indeed « Lebour Governnent is virtually ruled out in Englend clone on prevcnt eleetora.l trends (even in the most favourable yeors for Labour). GThis is why the Labour Governuent made a conscious effort via investnont grants, ete., - as pitifully inade ecuate av they were =» to prevent unenploynent from rising in these countries as much ay it did nationally. Henee, wnilvt the Leoour Cc Governnent naw to its ercdit the foct that it mon.ged to double

[page 13]

unemployment during its terme of offices the effect in Seot nd was not vo severe, Already the Torics nave made it clear tht they rejeet this ap oroach and it seems almost certain thet unemployment Vill inereave ravidly ond dis proportionately in Seotland (the picture in Vales ie not so clear). Thus the busis for a renewal of nationalist fe ling will be evtcbdlished,.

Bntry into the Cotton Market would grewtly intensify this tendency.

Production would tend to be more and more concentrated in the south Boast corngr of Britein, Even nov, before cntry, the EEC has become Britain's PLeagshy - trading partner, supplanting the com.onvealth lust year, This, ev pecially under neooecapitalisn where profit morgins are so Ffinoly calculated, will yuck activity and even more yo jobs awoy fron the periphcrel areas. Even Were the Toricy to consider doing such about this they could do little = the type of Investnent ~ they coul@ encourige would be capital intcnyive ruther than Labour intensive (witness Northern Ireland). In Britain the peripheral areas Coane Lee Co a @reat extent with national boundarics (even ; Cornwall ais Colt ic!) henee there will be an incre.vsing objective besis for « vise of nationalism and seperatiynm, Becauye the petitbourgzceois parties have tended to become discredited this could easily become a leftward noving current, :

The Tory Hanigray Lon Bill which, in the words of THs MCONOMIST "ontrenches oll the worst features of current Britivh policy, including the rocicl oney introduced by Labour in 1968, and addy some more" ig bound to increase racial tensions, It, in cffect, legalives rice talism ond gives official government oacking to the backward yectors which blame the immigrants for Biitein'y ills. But here ugein, economic fi.ctors will be decisive, Rising unemployment, ynortiuge of housing, increaved competition for ever-declining. yocial ve rvioes erene the activitics of cenagogues will make this whole issue oxplvoive.

The persvceetive for a whole series of large industrial towns in Britain iy cmulation of the American scene, It is only og notter of time before the voeial explosiveness is also EXPORT CG aerous the Atlantic. The centres of the towns ere dovuned to become real ghetioes with ever-dcceline housing vwtaundards and decreasing social anenities, Reactionary civil suthoritics - Labour and Tory # will be nee ond lees able and willing to do anything about the vsitucvion. With high. unconploynent anong the wellecducated black youth the whole yot-up will be charged with Oleetricity. No capitelist regime which can be enviseged could begin to tackle this problem - only a social revole ution vould be cavable of it. “Wo will epeck more extensively of Ireland clevenvere but here ve need to note that British imperivlisn has failed conpletely to meake any progreys in solving tbe probleme in Ireland. Our SE GESTALTG Which wo have held right from the utert of the recent ytrug sles in the late sixties, this the problem of Northern Irecline iy involudle under ce vitalism rewcins completely vinelca.ted, Denoeretisetion and/or eventual Seceration retain « pipecrcam, Four fron imnoroving matters the aGntervention of the Brivash stite - unoer Libour and Tory Governments = has volved nothing and lea to q renewil of the linksys between the IRA ond the urben masses. Whilst it is extrenucly ons of the IRA have come vo the goint fo» 0% te regrettable hat the tio fTacti of sarned struj; cle “Ba enyt cach other it renmcwinys « Fuct that the British inperialisty ave succecded in reviving rather than devtroyicy

[page 14]

the Republican movenent,. Tired old British imperialism will find it more difficult to deal with the Ivish question then at its heilg ate what is more the national bourgeois yolution hes been disercdite by the obviously puppet nature of the tro mejor pourgeois pe wh ies in the South, The pressure of the coloniel revolution exerts 2 continuouv influcnes on site Trish revo lutiona arles vpbhesyisging with their own tracitions »O fur as the educational system is concerned, We huve seen a dovwne turn in struggles in the univeryities, Hovever, the basic tension coriging fron the contradiction between the needy of nodern cayitalisn ~ huge nunbers of cualified technicians —- and its inability to invest the vuny of money recuired to acnieve those objgeetives rencins ey sharp as ever, The recent turning down of the teachers pay clain ; (tcachers are now worse off in terns of real Wages than they were A years ago) despite the cowardly response of the NUP lecaershio ~ and the aVaV istic attempt by the Torics to halt the growth of ° cotiprehensive education are bound to lead to a nuuber of strugeles. frais vector will retiain crisis ridden, We also spoke of the growing alienstion of th. young. In the poric: under review thore has been a downturn in youth rodicaliseation. In particular, in «addition to the already-noted decline of univ.irsity struggle, the anti-inpericlist novenent has also ceclined, One of the principal reavyons for this is the coming to the centre of the stage of the workors strugcsle. Thais hay, yo to speak, token avay the autonony of the youth radicalisation, However, the long-tcrn yocial fuctors making for the wlienution of the young remain in force, Indeed, the long term offect of the Lucuytrial strugele will be to heighten it: vchool-chilcren Whove PFubacry ona bothers are resorting to induytrial action will heave a readyemede uvodel of action to take when they fFrel the oppression of the school, AS the present industrial strugzles cither trensccend their econonisna or go into decline the youth radicalisation Will be able to relate more clearly to then, In addition, cach industrial struggle brings on to the veene nunbers of young vorkery., Oving to their lack of domestic revponsipility and general conservatism, the young vorkers will tend to react in « different way to the nanocuvres of the trade union bureaucrats, The evtablishment of young vorkcrs comrittveccs is a promising cevelopment but. the nonepolitical approach of the YCL ~ which h.is the initiative in this ficlid - threatens to Yrurtrate this novenent, Our intervention in this vyehnere could de decivive.

A viable young workers movernent based uygon these comnlittees could be a key factor in vutinvleting further youth redicelivution, Women's Lliberwtion hes becone much more significant since last conference and there hays been a Flourivhing of comiittees, Linking tris novenicent to the struczele of Women workers can save it from the deadend of middleeclays introypection, Indecd, the vonen's liber..tion movement can help to stinuleate and asvist struggles by women workers As unemployment grows woien vorkers vill tend to be hit horder thon " men Vorkersy ond they will leorn thet the "e ual poy" Legislation is o swindle unless is under the control of the workers. <Anvther a i factor to be noted is thet in a yeriod of riving unen loyuent wot to ters to protest sents jobs wore than vouents, ll mew.rs to unenploryront (last in, fairvt cut, cuidoling

[page 15]

A over rates of compensation, confining redundancics to "natural" vaste age, ctec.) will tend to discrininate against Women Workers, The | transitional demand of "no sgackings with sliding sccile of hours" will be one which will counter this bins. Governiuent ins vired atten ty to hold down weoeges always hit the least well-orgzanived the vorst. <All in all the factory meking for dixvcontecnt CHONg st women will continue ~ one will-esenidc: the effect of ever-inereaving food prices. “ (g) THAT SUCH A SITUATION IS NOP NOW; BRITISH CAvTPLIS. HAS PAC RD MANY DIFFICULT SITUATIONS IN THN PAST, HOUNY"R, IN BLOCH AND ern YOR OF THESE TTS LUADERSEHIPS OF THE TRADTPIONAL VOREGRS O° GANISAT IONS RIGHT AND "LUPP" | TAVE 2UCVAYS CODE TO THE RUSCUE OF CACITALISN BY DIVRTING AND HEADING OFF STCUGGLES, THE WE THING IN THD SIPUTIor , —_ IS THAT PHUSE LEADERSHIPS SBEM LESS AND LESS CAPABLE OF DoOIrG THIS NOW. sD 8 Nothing hay happened to make us change this aysevysnent. One of the key fectory in the lost few months has been the high level of rank and Pile wilita cy which, despite weak and covardly leadership, has been a driving force. “Ve shall speak of this more liter. However, we necd to note at this con uncture two things; firstly how the policy of the TUG in fornulcting an alternative capitilisn solution (ci.lling for growth) is playing the Tories! sane — Heath can now say to them "welve done what you asked ~ now you do vhet vo ask". Secondly, the role of the 'lefts'is becoming clearer -~ only Jones ond Seanlion could coll off the Fords strike t- (h) THAT THE COMBINATION OF A SRII-PERILANSNT CRISIS SITUATION VITH THE INABILITY OF ANY BOURGEOIS LEADERSHIP T° SOLVE If AND THS PA THAT THE LEADERSTIIPS OF THE TRADITIONAL VORENRS ORGANISATIONS ARE LESS AND LESS ABLE TO DIVUERT THD STRUGGLE OPENS UP THE PROS ECT FOR A “HOLE PERIOD OF POLITICAL, BooMmonic, INDUSTRIAL AND BOC ALL VIiRUGG LES. or not this o.urticular orediceave to discuss later is Tt is hourdcly neces:

Lf i y of yvtrugg@le iv Likely to cont~ ~Glon hes been fu. whether or not the ores ont high “Le inue in the next twelve mnonteh. (i) THAT THIS STATE OF CONTINUOUS C™ISIS, WITH UPSURGE LAND =YEN BX OLOS IONS, CAN CONTINUE FOR A PROTRJCT ED VERIOD BUT NOT Ivporirips. .

SOONER OR LATIR A SHIPT ONE WAY OR THE OTHER WIL HAVE TO COME.

Again we will discuss this later but it must be noted thet this the. is being acecptcd by wider and wider layers - from cithner a lcft or riehnt point of viev, The most respite ve can expect is an Malian type situation but note well the trends towards « decisive yvolution. there, The growth of Italian fascism, the coupeplot and the events in Southern Italian cre incvitebdle developments in such a Situction, Radical right wing forces have a base in tae United Kingdom: Ulster Protestantism, ond already this foree has Linked up eee eae Notionzl Front, “@hilst et this vetuge there ere coinice opera features of all -—\ oo! hig we vghould recognise thet decpegving social processes cre involved. rp BR PRESTMT CRISIS WOULD RE VIRE & HOF TIE BLISTING ORGANISATIONS ii) (3) THAT A VORKERS SOLUTION TO TH COSC TOUS LELDERSHIP AND THT NON ANYEPUING LILE APPROACHING THIS, FURTHYREORE, THAT THER ts HO '_ + =_— © + OF SUCH A LEADERSHIP “SMERGING SPONTANNOUSLY PROe. THE PRU aN? srau

[page 16]

15 1S indecd again van@scct ec The Labour Party is virtuc lly This j OO, irrelevant in the present ytruggles. Long-tcrm perspectives will be Giscussed later, The TUG is likewise inporent. IN hasntt, os noted previously, cven o strong instinct of scelf-orcucrvetion. “only Four out its 30 inembers voted for one-day stoppages against the bill end this after the second biggest union had called tyvo one-doy strikes, The cmergency TUC o tol Croydon made it clear thet thet body will only moeke gestures in its Opposition to the Tory offensive. It is by no meens clear thet cvan modest proposals passed at Croydon will be covricd out Calthoush this vhould not lead to wbandon a real fight und gust ealil for the curryeing out of TUC decisions og lea SoCty LIst “ORKER).

The "Left" trade union buresucrats have tended to decoiupore as a tendency. Daly now behaves Like on ordinary right wing trade union bureaucrat, aespite the attenpts by the OP to preserve his leftewinus iImagee Jones vacillated on the onesday strikes, whilst Seunlon tricd tO appear to be noving to the left, However, the latter's true cole. ours became clewr av he piecdyed hinsclf to carry out wagority cecise Lonsy (knowing: full well whet those decisions would pe)e We made a nunber of very nilitant speeches whilst he was ereduring to reploce Cannon on Neddy (under c« Tory Governnent!). All this is PYM py ONC Lo of the preosvures on a bpureagucrat Like Seanlon, On the one hound he is part of a tear which regularly faces election ond on the other ibe soclsl povition is essentially conservbive We should, of courve, welcome and criticelly utilive his lcft gestures, However, oll the time we vhould vern of the Likely evolution of such veodle, The Communist Puorty, whilst svtill counmunding the supyport of «a very large nunbder of polit iced lncuvirieal uilitenty, ds shoving no sign of overcouing its cvsentially seocicl democratic cvolution ovir the hast period, We cannot rule out a "Left" turn by this earty but the question is poved ot this stage: dy it even capv.ole of meking yuch & turn even verbally? Its criticism of the TUC is mild ond that of "Left" trade union lccaders virtually non-existent. It shows no sign of discarding its vyoe-culled "unity of the left" strutegy, i.ce, unity with those to its right - tie Tribunitcys ond "Left" trade union bureaverc.t8. “We shall return to the CP liter.

The sLL continucs ity conecntration upon tecehnic:.l innowbions ane cnphasis on paper selling, There is no doubt thet « dceily vaver is an extrenely useful weapon in a period of mass struggle. The Alexaneder Palace rolly of 4 , 000 Was Llnupressive but a teehniccl ruther then a political achieves ant Having said this there is no sign thet the SLL is capable of, as we put it last year, "Jjurnping out of its sccte arilan skint', This I aniount of work phe besic reason why the huge done by ity nilitan ry All Trade Union Alidance necting no bigser now then when this Sar Te know Froi the way one of our cont.acty way prevyurised to s .eck at Ally Polly h ow des perately the SLL attenu vty to weet trode union ) Zé <7, cr fs ce } i o; iw U Y tends to be %t] wreerted e Tt binges P OFPanleation Was junehed ond ccorte Shly no noke representctive of work rs sorugeles. rv activists to porticlpste in such cvents, fiore inportent, the SLE has been ¢uite uncble TO influence the course of | single inmportanv strugsle ~ although to be objective we must note its iainflucnec in a sector of the motor cir industry,

[page 17]

an ) Int.rnetionsg] Socialism hos tried by wight ond main to overcone stagnation noted in our lost your's docuuncnt. ts wuch-vuunted reeruiting campaign ves curiously unsuccessful - IS only eiciny to have made 400 vwecerulb, Vhen we consider the extent to which acy went - and asain our contacts have told us yome Anteresytins things ~ ct this is a small figure. It is true thot they have ceeunulated a nunoer of worker militent uenubcrs,., But they have also accunulcted oc reld&ively large nunber of inactive menbers on « non-Boluhevik beavis. fiore Significantly, dey pite two yeurys of ISts turn tv induytry the srou, has been unable to intervene decisively in uny inport..nt verus~ gle, I5 veens to be engaged in classicc.l "teil-encign" cond has giwined a re luteation fur ond Wide of operating the Mrepas sho veer" Cect Zo ~ gunping frou strugele to another in a Cou pletely Lil Poss lonivtic vianner, After the Harch LEth yupecial TUC their piper 50¢ TALIST ; WORKER carried an curticle Which exhorted militants to campiwlign for the carrying out of TUC decisions, Thisg evokced an angry res pouse fron sone of the group's branches, IU renawines to be seen Wnether a. coherent. eerie will enerze = “ORKERS FIGHT secns to be in disse array ond dee lin Other tendene les, notably the li,oists, have remained invignificaunt in their inpact on any inportont struggle. The CPB (i/L) has oinoined ity induytericl base in «a nunber of creas but, again es ve not<: ast year, it hay not been able to cinerge as a distinctive political formation, Neither iv this likely - the glanour of the Chinese reovoisution und even financilal wssistanee cannot coltvensate for veiling ,olitcally dependent upon the Iiatest whimsy of the Chinese bureaucracy.

We will return to sone of these tendcneies latcr but we ore Vite justified in vaying that none of thei sho ‘ gn of naoking contribution to the crisis of lewdership whict eg the British tro working class movenent, | (ck) THAT THE SITUATION ON TH? LEPT OULD BU SXEREURLY Ghocuy IF I VERE NOT POR THE CONIFG INTO BBIFG OF THE YOUTI ViYGULRD.

We have already spoken of the Levelling off of youth ri.diccalivation but we need to reiterite Winat ve suid last yeurs noiicly aad the British youth vanguard has been suall and backvard, so fea conparisoin that in uany other countricy., However, the oF forces making for its ouergenee erc still with us (end su with us until we have a revolution); thet it will tend t C on autoimonous force is nede inevitable by the couplete ad Cc Gide with the traditional workers organsiations and by tne Lack of a reve olutetionary party which will attrceet sucn youth directly.

Whilst we have conyidere a the effects of the rise in vorkors struryel-: on the youtn movenent, it iv vorth saying a little cbout the effect of youth struggle on the workers novement., There iv no duubt that the vicious press campaign against students, esvdveecinslly, hes « wide | echo in the Work ing Clauss. Hovever, once Vorkerys themselves got involved in struggles they tend to take up many of the techniciues of protest dcnonv tat ons » fsMons vanzuard vorkers vhis tendency is more noticeables: end with young workers there is even great deal of ra cultural offs nity wath etudecnts, «te, Phe procevys is by no mecns one Wow onlr rh ag = ~ @ , am —

[page 18]

al (2; FRC? Lion TED JSl07E TLATURES “Ll DRL Tous Core uve for Dealt THT CEYTR VISE OF TEE 26 Tis Po LAXT TRE LELS Ris. 2 28 Grl.Sivbl GROULC TO a DoLGUE FOR ROVOLUPIOCOVLARY J0T 2On I Toe > AOPT UST CSS 23LE TLE, ee conyldered tact it wes oa tctter of urvency to nake this tronsforne ction = « ricntword evolution in Britain vould be an inevitable oute Of C aefeats for he Vorking © oGUS« Moreover, wW rhe co:i.c of oc verles e ourselves are in o viciouy circles we ecnnnot intervene ard ively in the struggles of the day (ovace ic vily industrial ones ) because of our small sizes; yet we cannot attract vsufficicnt ntiitanty (cee ,in, espeelally industricl ones) until we can intervene.

We proposed to break this vicious circle by: (a) the re vid crestion of a.cadre youth organivations (b) the develoyment of our preys into ao natlonally-known political weekly with a large circuletions and (c ) by ecconpdanying this with a continuous campaign to recruit scople to the fiiG with the creation of new oreanches, ie solid that we head, av most,a few years to do this becuuve of the likelinood of a rightward development and the growth of other organisationy which vould make , the long-term job of building o revolutionary leadership herder (c.g, thouxands of vrouns; people are being niveduciwted in a sect@lan or centrist manner by the SLL end IS).

The correctness of our turn towards forming «a youth orgunilvation is shown by the growth of the S sarbcous League (notwvithstonding its organisational and political weaknesses) as demonstrated by the Fobruary 20/21 confcrence). We have vooen in the period of sone 9 nonths the winning of about 200 youth militents to the banner of the Fourth International and the crection of several completely new SL brenches -~ no mean achicvemcent, The development of our press has been encoure aging; we . e gq long woy fron the weekly but the RED MCLE is well» ostablis hed and known by wider and wider layers of the left (now ine Luding cect dons of yorker militants) Blyewhere we will discuss the conercte steps towards uaking it a weekly. All in cll, we cain say thet sgonething has been achieved: we are nov «2 real alternative. to the SLL and IS «nd people from thoye or . av such, Mivations recognise us rs. a c> + But we are still for from hoving really begun the transform.tion of i ao 1 ue For revo lut lonury action, iforeover, tuere are MVOCUN indications (di sed celgawhere) thet our time scale was too senere ous, Certainly we are intervening in a _ro bagenaist Woy in tue Massy gtrugelesy of the day in — more effeetive ond vigorous manner tha ever before;s.but the vicious circle, in essence, retains unbroken, How concretely do we move in the next year towards overe owing Gals lnpayse, Before exemining this uestion in detail lt ls nece vary to look at three factors which will have an important bdeurins on the development of the venguord. (3) A CLOSER LOOK 27 SOME FRATURES OF THE DEVELOZ NT OP THU VANGUARD. (a) WILL THE PRESENT VAVE OF INDUSTRIAL NILITANcY coiTinunt There is no easy answer to this problem bet us reiterate the main forces making for this high level of militancy: (1) a Foeling of confidence in their own pover which wide leyers of Tao working clazs have, sparked off by their odility vo Fores The 17

[page 19]

%, Labour Governicnt to withdrew " ced vy the winning of very lirg (2) the inability of the trade Bie sboney end bac (existence oa Le inl strike, cubes Deo ouber Bt gener ally high level (3) the of discontent, In Place of Strifc" end then reinfer- C WAG Licrengaas cover a wide fislde union bureaucrats toa control this a Sizeable sector of voneucrd vorkers of thoveaundy of workers out on unoffh)s and cont Anuous ty fed by the rising cost of living, ctc., which leads to an ¢tmoysncore vacre mile itent strugele seens to be part of every-day life (she dircet imoset one other vanguard ¢lenents on the advenceed workers).

Ve have noted many timer before that an ecyvential part of Tory ytrit~ egy is to remove factor (1) from the yveone by inflicting a decivive defeat upon a vector of the working class, In otacr WOLPas , to make yworkery feel weak ond impotent rother thon de 078 cond exfeetive, IT the Tories achieve this the other factors noted will only operute on shall sectors of the vorking claus, | From this point of view we can see the Post Office etrike as both a aefeat and important pert of the Tory strategy. Phe way the Post Office Workers were left to fight alone end eventually forced to fo back to vork heaving Gained nothing nas had a debilitating effect on Cc There end the 13 seetory stir lke thie othe hers!

Towever, workers in ony Way minimise the noting this) and the other Sy or factors, Of perticuler importance stronzs resentnme me ees Will feel concession given by the trede ustry in terms of conditions, they compare Wage packets, ah have, however, to Look at mployment, The PINAFC isturbines occurrence at Rolls nnd been Sacked by the moanageme: the most militant in Scotland, protest, Furthermore, eae arawn their £5 a week Wag Rolls Royee collap to etrik une Fo On [edz Multiply this wmany times on a thet there will be ~7 wv ey even in the absence of a caer ment increased, ilorcove ~, this union bduresucreats - vrivht and " Saying that the rank end file Thiy vitus.tion also sects up Varlant which we should not ignore: for instance, railway workers have by no moans the won much more than they were treachero awards won by motor cur vorkers union offici ote another fe:

LAL GT": paper reported that clain "24 hours Note, March 18th by Rolls poucrfui counter Vill not ao backround fovourcble Lit:ethood of a teacs | been much more circwis pect. whole story; the fact thet the Fords originally offered (we do not role of Jones and SCanlon by are counte euploythe Little be | Us Peet "untae tnat public fairly" trested ols in the motor cer indwill meon Little to them when iy the ab being nt ° 3 ture: the threat of growing WS of 25/2/71 reported an cxbyenely Royee, Hillingdon, Four vhoyp vt.wards nt, «nd the vorkers, normally cuongst turne -d down propoyval to strike in the vorkers had .ithster the news of the the large-scale refu Royce Vorkerse \ br rY iv @ -* af furthermore, tw) Div ana one ean predict ; against workergy milit at iona 1 geale —feetor ry 3 Cutt ™ eat of the working class as unenploy~ Situation uncerpins movee by trade Left" — to gu vort justify their ineection by them in vtrugzle. oSnother cnot ional for the povsibdility of «an appeal by the Torics _° save the notion", Should the flexible wing of the Tory party gain asecndancy a ecll could very vell be meee re the trade union bULecucrets to'eet round the table in order to vork 1 a

[page 20]

out, with "sood will" on both yides, a foruula for "saving Britain from mass unemployment ant economic ruin", "Conceysions" could even be offercd,. Already, the oureaucrats of the Sonauant3 Union have beo given the closed shop = the Tories are not all thet Ideological! Is thore any doupot at all that this initiative vould evoke a power ful and enthusiastic response from the TUC? And the Labour Party leaderyvhip? snd that, morcover, big section: of the vorking elass could de won over for a purely clasze-collaboat ion nolicy: say on the basis of a "voluntory" vage freeze?

This wholecuestion is closely related vith the fight against the Tory anti-trade union proposals: (>) PERSPECTIVES OF THE FIGHT AGAINST THE ANTI-TRADE UNION BILD.

The April 24th conference of the Lisivon Conn tee for the Defenee of Trade Unions will give us evidenec of the aintcantiony of the Cv in this respect cnd the extent towhich the ap is sable to control tie militents under its influence, Unfortunately, oving to the > redominance of the CP in this field the cwction of that porty'ys militants ean be decisive for « waolce period in this vtrusgle., Ve have novea thet the CP places unity with the trode wnion bureaucrats at the entre of its strategy ~ now these people wont to call orf the svruge ele there is the danger that CP militants will follow suit. Tne ambivatent behaviour of the CP, HORN INC STLR ond CP militants in ction tothe Pords betrayal by Jonesy and Scanlon ensured that no isive denunciation of their roic bool: place, iUwovever, the CP must be uncer poveful pressurc from ite: rank and file to continue the struge¢le and we will not know the balonce of forees until April oath lMokes it cloorcr, | a C The position of the CP will help to determine the lmrcdiate Bers pociti~ ives of « strugiule - if it completely capitulates we will clmost ortainly seo a tremendous downeturn, no Matter what We and other left Groupy ao, So far as the TUC is concerned, the Bill de as Good a sous es one the members of that illustrious body ere datvting thenmsclves on the ovack for having wade the record. It is clesr thet not even vhe mode est propovale agreed to at Croydon will actuaily be carried out. Cx Lpril 8, Feother was reported os yaylug that the TUC v0Uuld ‘colicbor ve “FA a the Government in bringing in en incomes policy. | would The passing of the Bill without massive registance/repreyent an extrcnely serious defeat for the vorkin; clays and a step towards ao svrar stotee Of course, the key is not what is on pileces of payer but the clavs relationship of force: that this decision represents, However, we should regjeet completely the idea that the real struggle ill be@iln only once the Torics apply the woe This i8 to n33UMeC tact am the Toriey will play our GENO. Certain any application of a Bill will, in the first stages, be divisive. “There could even be a cooling off perlod to convince deovle thav they had nothing to fear fron tic Bill, Then « seetion of vorkers could be etteeked who were "unpopue ar" or extremely isoleted. Then there is Likcly to be a seneral escaltion of action,

[page 21]

7 . * a . a ee a ee ble iy Cee Oe ied hg thet te NN al oa + ad oo wh, Ab A, deg, - Nd whe of the noyaibilities oven to them of de ling with “brouble Semi rs" » This could get "out of hand" and combined with the more circus Ject approach of the Government lead to a speedy confrontation between the workers movement and the Government, Ay matters ytend nov, the moyt likely outcome of such o conflict would be a severe defeat for the working clays, Although the strength of the working classy is Such that an indecisive Italian-like situction is calyo yossible. A Labour Governnont could conic to of fiec in such a situ.tion which could embody the wishes of a yection of the bourgeoisie which prefe erred a temporary compronise,. The latter would be the best outcone for the development of the vanguard in time for a later confrontate Once we pose these questions we sce the absolute neceysity of doing alloin our power to assist in keeping the prev ent mood of militancy in being, A1l the above indicatey the great necessity of a high : level of struggle now, The continuation of the wages militaney and the fight against the Bill creates favourable circumstances for building the vanguard in the working class here and now. The ones and twos gained for the vanguard today will be the nucleii for revclutionary scctors of the class toworrov, On the other hand the ceescalation of the sbrugele, with the conse, uenticl demoralisation anc isolation of the vanguard vorkers, vill make it all thet much harder to start the real proces: of winning big sections of the working elass for revolutionary politics when more decisive struggles are taking place. | How do ve intervene in general? Two things are extremely in vortant to note: (1) that the povitions taken by trade union leaders, cypee~ inlly the "lefts", are powerful objcetive factors in the equation; © (2) that above all we need to do what we can lessen the relicnee of the tempo of struggle upon the bureaucrats.

On point (1) we agree vith Ken Contes andthe IWC but cone to exactly oppovite conclusions: It is precisely because ofthis that our crite» icism of "lefts" has to be strong, We heave to make it difficult for the "Lefts" to betray. <Any keeping quict, in the "interests of unity" would turn us into their eccomplices, Of course we do not indulge in yvtrident nameecalling which iy incouprehensible to the | ass of the vorkers but we will not under any circuistances foil to point out their treacherous behaviour, Point (2) uncerlines the extreme inportence of continually propagandising the idea of action committees and helping to establish brocdl;y based gnes wherever there is the besis, @ vnould also popularive and support to the fullall in&pendent iny¥ative of the renkand file, The answer to these tyvo cuestions iy not easy nor is it simple, In the main it can said to be dependent upon factory which are not yet fully known nor decided. We can say, how Over, thet the present state of affairs cannot continues for long, Hither the struggle wilt. decpen or on erosion of the militency will stort (since the pout office debac Le ond March loth there has been, ind:sed, a downturn but at present it can be @efined as conjuncturel and not decisive).

Lastly, we heave to note the long-term end molecular effect of groving NAS “YaYI IOLA‘, OO

[page 22]

GL ap Dy Ue THD a a Oa a ae we. out a trans itional progvramme acainst unenployucnt so that the effects of it cannot be used by the Government and TUC to dilute workers militancy. (c) ONCE MORE ON THE PERSPECTIVES FOR YOUTH RADICALISAT IOV We have touched on this thome several tines befores the youth docunont will, of course, make an extensive exanination of this cue eto.

But to give us yvome guidance in fornulating our general pers p.ctive we need to see what factors are involved and what are the like ly developmente in this ficld, F + | Agein the problem is oa complex One. . main factors operating to reduce the level of youth r-dic have beens (1) a number of demoreliving defeats which heave been inflieted upon ae ~ ~ ™ ans yoe% tl. ry + 7 In general one can Yay tnat tue eiiertion te . the vtudents, In particular they he We DEE en vhoved to be inca able, in many jn tenees, of defending themyclves ageinst avtack, The latest example of this being the smell res ponuc to the ex vuslion of Rudi Dutschke and other forcign nilitanty, (2) the vhifting of the main focus of struggle to the induvtricl front, evypecially the fight egainst Bill, This nas reinforced tae hor} cords t" tendencies amonest students ond made wide layers fcrel that their strugele in centred of education is irvelevent: (3) the de scline of the enti-inperialist movencnat, pert teuls wely of YSC. fn importent clement here has been the irresponsibility anda sccetars lanism of other toncencies, which have abancone > their duties on tris front. However, this is by no means the whole story: the rise of the lnaustrial struggle, the conscious policy of tne Nixon ~dministret ion of defusing the antievar movcncnt, he Wey the en igelist eeeus has Olayed down anti-imocrialist strugeles, otc., iv all woven into th prog COO ¢ (a) the. inability of youth radicelivation to create any visodle organ sation of its own as typificd by the decline and degeneration of the . aSSP. Vhat is more no cxisting youth orpenisation has been adle to Fill the gaps the LeYS is divereditteds the KLYS functiony a8 a Dupri selling organisations; the YOL is impotent and the Young Liberals are " « joke. The SL has not, so far, «mergzeca as an eltcrnative but a orcemying vtart has been made. ~ (a5) » “That emerges from the itcration of cll these factors is that to an important extent the future of the youtn redioalivet ion ae pends upon whet we do through the SL, In other vords, our cetion: are part of he obgective sibuct jon deteruining whether or not the youth racicalisetion will cont inuc to decline, liorcover, our Ypecific welgnt in his ficld is very much highcr then on the industrial front.

To give an example: the relationship of fore e3 is such thet we can probably help to determine whether or not youth trade union committees decline or flourish, Left to the cdevices of the "Ch « which 5 p09 08 them being political because that will herm relations with the "left" trade union bureaucrats - tneve counsebess will become Lifeless, mere pressure sroups on the trade union burenucracy and not very effective on@wat thate Phe way the promising Nowell pay" movenent declined uncer CP hegemony is a Worninge it WO, On the oOthcr hand, insert

[page 23]

into these connittees in a gensitive manner « fightings PLOSLOMMeC this movement coulc flourish . snd become en importent pole of eattrage tion for vide layers of young workers, Similarly, only we, through the SL, can give a strategy for strusele inthe fields of cducction. And certainly, only our tendeney can reverse the trend on the ant in ingrialist frout.e (4) HOW TEEN, DO VE PROCEED ALONG THE NEXT STEPS TOWARDS CRE av Ine A LEAGUE FOR R? VOLUT 103 TARY ACTION? ~ Noturally, on imucdiate enuywer is thet we must recruit more pcople, gell more papers, becone more officient and help in a more vigorous nanner to build the SL. But as we noted last year, this in itself is not an orioentcetion nor a basic stx Pal eEye The working out of a bavie strotcey for going from where we are today to osccoming a league for revolutionary action (see "From a Propeganda Group to a League for Revolutionary Action to yeo what exactly is meant by this e ne involves giving fairly precise ansvers to how co we rayidly increase , our size and TCVOULC ES» Of course, any of our answers at this stage can only be .¢c onerctis ations ~ wo are clenrly unable to precict in detail all the vicissitudes of coning events, However, We cannot ve content, to "sec Whet happens", The general answer to this cuestion is two-fold; (a) we need a method for the rapid gaining of a large number of nev forees - which at this vtage will be uainly from the youth - vo that We CATs | (db) elaborate « strategy for dealing «ith other tendencies. The Sige and resources of our forees being an evvcential factor in that gtrategy.e (a) THT ING AND THE SPARTACUS LEiGUE Clearly the main yource for rapidly building our forces is v a SLs what is more the existonce of the SL helps to make uy mo tres ctive to adult militants, The building of the SL, is then, a number. one priority. This should not be scen a8 a simple process of indi idual accumulation of cadres put the combination of thet aspect anu he use of strotecric methods, The SL is working out the way of atii- ¥ acting to it wide layers of young peoplo by vigorous activisn (large contingents on denonstrations, eae gressive campaigning avpealing directly to youns people and the taking of the lead in student, antiimperialist and general youth ebrugeles). In addition, 1¢ is yveeking the way to form links with young vorkers via the previously mentioned youth trade union committees and by going directly GO workery engaged in strugslee An aypect which iss now being conzsidered iy how to utile ise the favoureadvie relationship of forces between the SL and other left youth rroups with the cin of winning over whole scctory from thoye groups. A unity in action offensive gaint the YOL and locel LPYS branches is an ovvious neans,. The conning Lp oril 24th demonstrate ion will give o means of putting suci a policy into action. > Such policies contsin a danger: that of the dilution of the political level of the SL. It is the “pesponvibility of the [NG tnrough Lts educational activity to ayvysist the SL in repidly raising the polite» ical | level of new members and speedily intercratings the new forces 22 rn EE EE EEO

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huncrca it wine (es ,ccially thove from other tendencics). This bei: it is clear thet there is the pervepeective of having yeverc members in the SL py the end of this year rH The existence of a severalehuncred stron: SL, uncer the banner of the Fourth International and engaged in a wide variety of political aciivities would highelight a problem we have not satisfactorily disgec~ usyved, let alone solveds that of the exact relationyhip between the SL and the TNG. Vhen we took the decision to work for the Launching of the SL last year a Lot of cuestion: were left uncecided, This nac tO be 8$ozg: we had discussed the project for many months and further progress could only be made upon the basis of practice, To have waited until every detail was worked out vould have meant the contin-~ uation of an abstract cdiscussion, Let us reeall the basic festures of the decision we took to launch the SLs - we reeognised thet we vere procecding in a yvomewhat artificial manner: the usual way for o Trotykyist youth organization to come into existence is via organic developments within existing tracitione el youth organizations, This gives bhe new group «a traditional of strugele end a political cones 20ns as well es an organiyeaetional | framevork. Ve started by bringing borether the snoll youth forces of the IMG. “ We recognisved thet we were building g youth org enivation of a specs Lal kind (Pablo would undoubtedly coll it a sui generis youth organs isationt) insofar ays it was to be a cadre organisation, | - we Cha ractAsed it as being, in a cortain sense, a devier for ntcre ing" the. existing youth redicaliveation, These yvpecical feetures heave Led to difficulties which we knew would occur, They heave their source in the fact that tne precise division of labour, uncer they e circumstances, between the SL and the Ime is very difficult to define, Moreover, we have the unnatural vituation of tyvo denocratic contralist orzank ations existing side by side vita an overlapping memoership. The voncer is that ve have not had more " problems with this, But one thing is clear: this cannot be a deormanent state of affairs. pours e for a comreacc to counterpovte nmembership of the SL to that of the [IiG: for comrades to argue "whet could | {do aif I joined the IG that I ceninot do now as a member of the oLt"s For conrade: to regard menourship of the IG as just involving another meetings; end for couradey to get tied in knots trying to work out whet to do if the local IDG branch takes one position «and the local SL branch anothcr, These problems erise because the politicel level and orcanisatlionel commitment of the two orgoanivations is yo close (which in turn makes a preeise division of labour virtually impousible).

At present it is quite ak In general one cen say thet there are tvo long term pers pecctivey Yor the Spartecus League as presently conutituted:

CL) it can brocdon out into a more open youth organisation, in which the ING comrades are a minority ond work unueer the direction of the geroupts leadership in a very sensitive and nonenmenipulative wanner;or (2) it cen move towards fusion with the IG as fiificd yection of the Fourth International, 23 a

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The objections to the first varicnt are that it would take more revources in tcrms oF caarer bhan vie oot yresent possess, anc that the oroblen of dealing with other tendencies! influcnee would become n of co trecitional type neute, This model is not ayiunming the orent io of social democrat or Stcalinist youth organivet ion (av indeed the SUL has constructcd), Hovever, one can envisego a youth organisation on the general line of the Fourth International but with a lower level of conmitment end politicel education then the present SL. The Yess model comes to mind, fo become vorthwhile it srould have to be abo to recruit loevge numbers of young people in their firvt stuges of politicaliszation, Servicing vuch an organisation vould invpose a really yvevere strain on our resources, Whereas now, people goin 8% invtond of | IS, the OF or the SLL, in thiy broader grouping tacy would join, in Generel, | efore they had enough political knowledge to make up their minds, “Phe presvure fron other tconcencics (ineluce A. ing the possibility of raid or entry) would be very ytronge The second option will evoke a two-fold objection; (1) wouldn't this prevent us from making all the gainy we can in the youth field; ane (2) wouldn't it bring the danger of o diluting of our political level The first objection it a very real one and the following conulicerati.. would apply: - fusion could not be envisaged until the SL hed exhausted the wain potential of its oresent set-up; coneretcly before it had both had -« chance to become c netional entity and operated strategically cguinthe other left youth orgenivetions, Neithr of theve procevyey 15 as yet very for advanced, However, unleys ve ect vneer the whip of time thove proceyvees vaich ought to be oncewand-for-all operations could pecome permancnt tactics, The vecond objection elsyo has some valicity but we must face the fact that any fornula for rapid growth of the IMG contains such a danger. Indecd, a fusion process with an intense ond thoroughkgoing discussion invhich- cll the basic cuestion of organisation and progeee ere exemnined in detail is gust such a way of educating a lot of cadres in a short tine, lloreover, the very fusion proceys; that is the creation of a new organ isation, with a new progranme and name, coulda be a very abbractive focus for many at prevent unattached pee ents The whole affair vould be a process rather than a single step. ‘Hovever, if this ro» oys is to teke place it immediately poses the problem of the present oricntation end development of the SL. If we are thinking of fusion then the nature of the SL will be entirely different than 1P at wore a braoder youth organisation. Beeause of thiv, these altcrantives ar¢ not ones that esn be left to chance, "to sec how things turn out", While our povition must be flexible it will also be necevsary for ali TG comredcs in the SL to argue for the develo, ment of the SU whica would make fusion posvible ancto help in the intenvive cducetion proces within the SL which will glgyo be necoyvysary, (this is not to cer the cutononmy of the SL which will ultimbely aecide if it vents fusion or not) This persepetive also necessitates the necd for sone tinetable to be vorked out if both organisations arc not to become dig» orientated during whet would become a difficult porliod of «adgustiuent. (6) 24 rr ———————————_—__—____ uu

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vould Another objcetion to the fusion pers ective is that this/do danage to our youth work and would teke away our principal metnod of interes vening in this ficld. This objection neccds to be Amnediately cualified by the fect thet exverience shows that the youth redicalisation at ite prevent sutaze tends to have no mourked preference betvecn joining a youth organivation end an adult one. Ve are the people who have Hegg ib easier to join SL than IG; it is not a cave that it is much/likely poople vould join SL than ING as a rule. This having been said, there is a case to asnuvr on this critvicisn, cf, 4 uF, Indeed, no process of fuyion would be vortuwhile unlesy it incor )ore ted oroeive plane for the continustion of the youth work. There arc many possible variations to do this. sn obvious one vould be to launch a youth vaper, orientated espyocially to young workers sixth formers and possibly unemployed youth, whicn shoule oe ished before fusion, Immediately fusion tool place the youth pever could then become the focus for organising youth work with t ‘ syeetive of oe broscer youth organivation at a later c.te (as soon as feasible). | One can argue thet if tanis perspoctive were viLt of the fusion one whet ivy the point of fugion:why not gust broaden the SLma try to reeruit as many of its lea ing cadres to the DIG as possible? This argumcnt misses the esvonee of « fusion process: Ghot it is a very intense political oenperience, cuite different from the routine and fragmentary procers of reerviting peoyle in ones and twos (no matter how “energetically the latter iy undertaken).

How would one proceed with such an operation? Firstly «a correct tine perspective vould have to be worked out. Too e.v.rly steps towe~ ras fusion would disorient the SL and prevent it fron functisning a ao youth organi:ation, ne Spartacus League has not has, vo Por,the Oppoisunity to ceal with the other youth O71 gcnivat ions politically nor has it had the time to make a big impact on the voudent mileu. ot. e Vhilst it has sterted work in the youth trade union committecs thi activity is in its first stages only. Until these two orocesses hed T ma u 8 been completed we could not say that the potential of the SL as orige inally constituted had anything like been consunmncted, It would seem that ct least a yenr of intense cectivity would be re uired to do this, peretion troule make -creypective of a In the mean time commitment to the fusion-tyve 1 a me whien 198 ao difference to day-toeday practices ay vould proader youth orgcnivation., The fuyion peryuc most in harmony vith the idea of doing a strates ical Opcrate~ ion on other youth tendencies ~- for that kinc of work one needs a nighter level of wemoer, It is alzyo probably more in kee pins with contending for hegenony in the student field ~ arain a high level is re. uired.

Regular joint meetings of the Ivederships of both organisations v08Uld have to be held. A much more precise civision of labour would have to be worked out - with the Spartacus League concentrating more and more on opembing politvicaliy in reletion to other youth orgenivations end the IMG concentrating on implanting itself in industry end the trade unions, ‘There activity was done in common vas division of labour would continue: in the ficld of anti-inperialisyt vork, women's

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activities, black work, etce., the-thrust of the DG snould be to get support from the workers movement; whilst the main effort of the SL should be to foree the other orgenivationy to take a position whilst alyo going directly to unaffiliated youth. The ING vhould be concentrating on getting trade union branches, tredey councils, shop steve ards committecs, ete., to goin in such campaigns. The SL vhould force the LPYS, YOL, YCMoO, YL, etc., to goin it in united front activities whilst ecnpaig ning vip -orouy lyin the unis .rsities, colleges, coffee bars, youth employment queues, ctc., for young people to come on cdcmonstrnae tions, ete. In this wey the CiMpoigns would assist InG to get a trade union and vorkers base and auvist the SL to put preyvsure on the other youth groups and recruit young people cirecily.

A further point crises: why should young people join TG in this tr... -~ sition period? This must be veriously conyvidered. In a certain sen... thiy will be a good thing becauve we will not be faced with the »sroblem of immediately recruiting people, Instead, we can have on orran~ igational relationship with people whilst they receive political education, Howe. rer, very difficult problems would arise if the young people vtoyvsed joining the IG beecuye of the fusion pers peetive end invtead were entircly cetive through the SL. This would be bad for their develooment and create the posyib3 hg po of tensionys developing between vae two orgoenisations Decay of ering politicel cxpereionces of the majority of the tro orgonisdhione ' cadres. The only yolution to this oeoble oa is to really teckle the -ucytion of repiciy devdoping the politicel education of the I'G, Coursdes of the SL fill then want to join because of the benefit of political Givcuysion.

These types of problems will remain thorny until Vill have revolved the ,uevtions poscd avove, The balance seemy to incicate overwheln~ orig ingly thet the fusion perspective is the best, Tt ‘re us the chanec of building fairly cuickly oan organisation of Yeveradi huncred on a high political level, However, such an oycrevion coulic only oe suceesv ful if it were deeply HEreed | to by the vast majority of eRe organisations! cadres, Those who have aoubts avout such a peryzpocte ive muvt articulate them tog ether With an alternetive which mete GO erips with the Llongs-tern orob lem « | | (b>) OPERATING STRATEGICALLY TO DEAL ITH OTHER TENDENCIES Ve have three main opponent tendencies to consicer in this respects: ~ the Communist Party; ~ International Socialism; and Q 3 - the Socialist Lebour League, The Communivt Party is of interest to us mainly because of the largo number of industrial militants it influences. This sector of milite ants is by for the most important potential for « revolutionary party's industrial base, Ve have argued elsewhere that the current situation is one in which there ere bound to pe poverful prevyuures and tensions building up in the CP and esveeially botveen its industriel wing and its avparatus. The dominance of the Comuunict Party in the ficld of industrial militecnts was shown by the Novenbder léth conference of the Licison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions last yeour, This 2,000-vtrong meeting of activists from call over the country end re yreventing every lnportant union ond industry Was con ple telly under the 26 -

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control of the CP's industrial wing. Tre rest of the tendencies combined did not have a look in and pleyed no role whatsocver in deciding the outcome of the divcussiony, nor even their form, The svccial relationship betveen the CP and the industricl militants will, of cource, come under strain because of the party's links with the trede union bureaucrats, However, only « vigorous and vudtle campaign can prevent the CP from riding this out. Another factor will be the intra=bureaucratic virugzle in the CP, The pro-=lovyco wing will, no doubt, try as they cid in 1969 to povture as being more niliteant. | Exerting pressure on the CP can be done incirectly vie the YCL.

Whilst extromely useful this opexrfion will not prise loose many of the industrial militents from the CP. The me .jority of induytricl reflain with the CP for very pragmatic reasongs it gives them a net» work of contacts up and cown tiie country ond they can opcrate in ; national caucuses in verious unions and industrics., We are caughy in the previously-=nentioned vicious circle, The rapid growth of the IMG vie forces gained through the SL would, of course, bring us «a sood numbor of young trade unionists but this would not solve the DNayie problem, Young trade unionists tend to be isolated and uninte onrated into the union structures ~- cven at rank and file level.

Whilst it varies fron industry to industry, according to the nevure of the labour force, it generally tekes a nuwoer of years to develop a vase in incustry. Young workers tend for the first several years of working to move from job to job ~ nence it is not only their youtn Which preventy them from having a bave,.

The main way of breaking this barricr at this wtagwe 1s via the voc gusenent of ones and trios in the industrial field on a firm polite al basis, Onee we heve some forces ve vhould then concentrate the: so that we cen do vone strategic trade union vork. Where do we beyin -~ how ¢o we Start? Apart frou our general policy of taking pert in all important struggles as they occur we need to do two things in au cnergeotic and consistent manner: (1) exert a continuous presyure on CP trade unionists vie ; , political issues - those of Poland and South Hast Avia, in their cdiffer ent Ways, cone to mind inmediately; and | (2 ) nake a limnitved oricntation tovards the Coumunist Party as a whole in the next period, At the end of Novemver the CPGB will be holding its biennial Coneress,. We should seck to intervene in the discuysy~ ions which take place in the period lexscing up to that conference, We should procced in a combined manner; seeking out CP militenty and proposing united activity with them (perticularly on South East Ayia) end at the same tine devote provagenda to raiving such questions a3 Poland (and, in par ticular, « socisl explane tion of events there).

It iy likely that the pro-Tlosycow wing of the CP will reewemerge in . the pre-conference discussion, Already there is en ante -llectua 1 opposition (the Smith Group) which is not unfriendly towards us, In all areas our comrades should yveck out CP menbders and orsantiuctions with a vicw to propoyving united action, They should also organis political discussions via rea circles, cte., Whicn will give us the opportunity to criticise Stalinism and the prevent yocial-denocrati orientation of the CPGB in a sensitive monner.e. <ALL important ce ity of the CP Should be covered with the appropricte propagzanda a7 a e oe Za te

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material and we shouldsea whet yeccinl publications are necessary.

After the CPGB congress a balance sheet should be Grawn up a activity and orientstion exawined, | INT URNAT TONAL SOCIALIST AS 18 well-known we did diyvcuss, after IS meade its four-point unity propovals, entering that orgeaniyation as a faction, This would be the tra adit ione .l manner of dealing with a centrist formation. This proposal was rejected because of the smallness of our forces; the need to evtablish oan identity (especially in view of the SLLU's virtual monopoly to the clain to be Trotykyist) and our lack of ex ence in carrying through such an operation, Thilet We vreceognis: esvential sectarianisu of the YORESRS FIGHT tendency we must «also yee that group's experionce in IS as a confirmation of our asvesunent, IS has made some progress in certain areas in the and its exivtenee and the way it overates (especially iG perveredon of Bolshevik principles) our powerful obstacles ¢% the building of « revolutionary vanguard. The cuesti ion. of ‘denling with IS is one we cannot dodge nor hope to tackle via the odé article in INTERNATIONAL orthe RED MOLE, However, cntry would be extremely undesirable for a whole period. Such ao move would thwart our endesves ours Vila Spartacus League. Morever, the relationship of forces ig still unfovoureble and the prevent atmosphere in IS is not conducive to an cducational discussion, It 18 clear that the most favourable time to xutert the process of really dealing vith ip would be after we head augimilated en influx of comrades gained via the Spartacus League ond ofter we hed wede other big gains in our resources, With an enlargec cadre forec, organised nationally (without this entry could mean that/very lo rege parts of the country there was no Fourth International prevence) and more revources we could then take the initiative in «a unity-in-:ction offensive, Vhether this vould be taken ss fe 8 G& unity proposal is impossible to say now, It would seem likely thet the leadervhi, of Is would be cool to such an approach (even now they try to Keep us out of "their" action comuiittecs) because this would no longer be seen by them ay a device to abyvorb and diitferenticte us. In this case a tension would develop between the IS leadership and yvections of its rank and file, especially the uninteg ented industrial wilitents, This could be an important secondary yource of breaking our impasse inthis field, cr “ +.

It goes without saying thet yuch an operection - the ain of which would be to eliminate IS as a contender and the winning over to the Fourth International of huncredy of militants trepped in that organs L3ation ~ would not be feasidle until we had grown and achieved sone guccess in building an industrial base. “We should continue to keep an eye on IS's evolution — and make a thoroughegoing criti ue of its political practice fron.time to bind. Ve sghould ain through this to help to create tendencies in that orranisation which would reject Che centrist end economist concepts of its leadership. Tune gcnercel obehaviour of I5 is such that it will tend to be pulled to the right oy its lowelevel membership end its opportunist politiccl practice, We Should make regular critiueys of this and ex lain how ysuen _ress- * ures aerise, There is alvays whe xe rons posysvipility of sone stron:

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rightward cvolution, c.f.) a return to entry (oartisl or full) ghould Lebour's cleetorcl fortunes vastly improve. We should be ready to intervene in such cases, THE SOC TALIST LABOUR LEAGUE Our task of winning hegecnmony on the revolutionury lcft will remain cuite inc onplete ant il ve have tackled the probdlen of che SLL. iv is still by far the neagor foree in this country which powwuees a3 Trotukyist = a fact which gives us Many proble CAS y not the leat of which is the extent to which Trotekyisnu is being discredited. iHorce over, Many hundreds of potential revolutionarics are porns misyeduce ated and usually burnt out by this organisation = the vaste of such evolutionary potential cannot be offorded.

Tackling the SLL is a much more serious proposition than thet of either the IS or CP, Ite cadres are much harcer anc much more intecrated, Its leaders, moreover, train ity militants in o thomughly comprehensive manner “bn a spirit of hostility toverds us and the Fourth International, In one senso, everything we do to build the Tig and the SL is a blow against the SLL, To reach a certain level of effectivencss: is a necessary preere uivite for dealing vitn this organization on any bovis, After having grown much larger, after having taken uteps toverdsy building an industrial bese end after having tackled IS we would TT . ima much better poxyition to recelly deal with the SLL. We must take cognisea nc é of the fact thet members of the KLYS and SLL feel a trenm- ; — | 5 cn dous ense of achisrement because of their orgeanivctions! technical Succesvey, Only when we can, in their cyes, be secon as a real altere native can we hope to get a response fron then other than winning » the odd individual here and there, One thing should con that any success in t wL Mey nave will lead: to the basis for tendencies (not necesvari h 1 3 L yY orsonised and/or ort ie 10 eG oa continuous culate) foriing within it, xert 3 go that any disvidentsy pressure on the SLL via special pudlica know of our critisue and can con are it wi ; We should follow the SLL's mejor activitics and ensure thet our mate orial is available at them, “le should concentrete on a political critvicue which lecds to organivationeal conclusions end not reverse Tae procesy as there has been a tendency to do, Vhen we are much larger and have more resources, more cynoule policles can be entctvained, but it is important, here end nov, to Kk.ep these bperspeetives in mind, (5) SOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL CUSSTION FACING US (a) A MUCH HIGHER BDUCATIONAL LEVEL - AM URGUN? POLITICAL TASE le 4 4 1 4 5 £ T hd ) ~ + - . t “~ + - - It is always neccvvyary for ea Leninist organisation to pay careful _—_ iL * Ji 7 Lg 1 | i a -_— * — = -~ ag a ~ +. J a ernas - — “fuse any LONE Ba ideo Os ie ol we wl — - - — a ~ fat ao ec Df 0 Lite itive t.tlan.i l.r. it oi. enn ml lc, 7 tl oin ~y -_ eer — ~ — ~ . - > - —_ ee —: . hie = a ~§ = We me Ne te ~~ ‘ew wee —_-2 ~ - ~~ al — — ww 2 = ~ — ~-7. > om - -~ - —_— ——_— -_ — _— — _ = _——_ ih -_— -_ - -_ -_

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Oople coming into the orgsanivetion via the Spartacus League, but PCO, this is by no means the whole story. In the re idly chenging vitue ation, in a period when we take on an AGEL evs ive utenec tovardy other tendencies and i . period when oll kinds of vharop sb rug Ge oreck out before we ha hod the chance to thoroughly divcusyy, heM) it4ical Solf-reliance Dy cvery mombper of the orgenivat Lon DecoMes absolutely esysenticol, It is «a parody of denocratic centralivm to think in termy of all the members of an organisation carrying out orcers from above in oa blind obedient foxyhion, The cyvence of Gemocratic centralism ty that the members of an organivat ton vill, pecause of the traditions nd training of thet orge Ava Lon, Bone to act av one pervon in cris is 4 = Syituations (uhere in many caves there vill be no opportunity to contact the centre before dee iv tons have to be taken), This is why it is necevsary to insist upon certain HOLS NOW, even when e revolutioncry vituation does not exist - ve must behave as though it doey to establish a Bree aon ond train our cadres (this ig all the more the ca8e because in actual crisviy situations the presse. sures not to act as one arc nuch greater, therefore training nov is easier and osvential)., These norms can only be based upon hoyaity to the organisation (the acceptance of majority deciviony, eypecialis) and = conpletely interwoven = q high level of political undervboncin To carry out any of the strategic tasks outlined eaboves a Limited ans gengitive orientation to the C?3; a unity in action o:fengive against the IS; exerting a continuous pressure on the SiL; and especially c regroupnent with hundreds of cadres fron the Spartacus Leagues all roecuire a high level of uncertteanding, # Therefore educational work must no lonzer be veoen as something ccuirable but something which is done after other activity. It must be to the forefront of our thinking. dJuyt as we plan our intervention in various fields, just ay we plan the Sareea ona vole of our journals, - step by step, vo we must give the vame ceteiled attention to our educational vork,. The proposition of the cetablisiuent of an cducational centre, mooted in last year's document, but not yet a oles implemented, must be veen as an urgent task.

The centre must organise a ser attention to the educational n branches and working groups ius dominate. Ve must end the pitua’ ey of schools nationally cond give close edv of all units, Discussion in the be re=structured so thet politics ion where propositions for activity are mnotivated in purely organisational terms, Every step we teke even the most mundane, CeBe; sel ings papers and particiveting in denone strations — must be examined from a volitical point of viow, For instance, when we organise participation in oa denonytreatvion, how Many times do we discuss this politically? How many times do vwe go through the likely composition of the cCemonstivation, examine clovely Wheat 3 logans we should chant and why, what the content of those sloge ans snould be and now ve aim to change the volivice of the demonstration by using particulcr yvlogens. Only by this kind of method can branch discussions becowe educational procesves, To enable the mectings to have a basleally political character big changes have to be nade. iluch of the organisational ciscuyyion (making arrangenenty to meet, ctce.) can be done outside the fremevork of a formal meeting, It is mental Laz inesys anc lack of birnniisc one 39

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foresight which leads to orgenisers relying upon the "hands-up" method of arrenging sales and othe activities, All tht should be sorted out prior to the meetings or infornelly cfter then, Another extremely importent aspect of political education and trainee ing is that gained through the Var lous campaigns we porticipatec in.

Here we are put to the test by working with other tencencies or unaffiliated militants Our ability 50. put ecrosy a certain line, to judge tactical uituat ions end even to understend what we are sbout ig empirically tried out, This process is, of course, closely relate ed to discusvion, prior and after, in our units, We need to create the kind of structures end agendas in these organisetionys waich © enable us to have meaningful examinations: of our experiences in the campaigns, In too many casey, these by oe of discussions have to be held informally because they do not correspond to the Vay meetings ale Oresan isc . 2d. (bo) THE NEED FOR 42 NORE S™RIOUS ATT ITUDT TOVARDS SECURITY.

Comredes coming from other sections are nearly alveys struck by the Sloppy attitude British Trotskyists (not Juut tue Tia ) have tovrerds security. The main factor oprrating 19 that We hove Pitt le reason to tighten up on this uestion, Unlike the rest of the Vest Burope ean sect ions Wo never experienced the Nazi occupation and the need to build an underground organisation, Unlike the SWP we do not face bombings end nachine-guuningy of our heodquartecrs. —_ However, as noted olsewhere in thiy document, the sanctity of pourgeois frecedomy in Britain is being croded, Yiolence is becoming more a part of political life and the Induytrial Relations Bill, in particular, open. up the real possibility of repression, This is to yay nothing of Ireland there the violence of the struggle is bound to spill over into Britain « a violence both of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces, “oe face tho povsibility within the next yeor or so of being faced up to such probdlens as being prosecuted for "unfeir industrial" oction (all our articles on industrial disputes would literally be tllegal under the TRB.) Under these circurnstancesy our oress could be in jeopardy. (5) | The growing violcnee of struggle in Britain will lead to the cevelopement of radicalright forces (either yoontancously or ine, oired) hich will use strong ection agcinvt left groups Te will become port icular targets because of our cactivitics on Trelond and imumigsrents (the UVF blow up buildings and kill peodle here and now, recialist forces will also use 3s imilar methods), The police have stee eily become more end more arrogant = gust now they ore ensaged in hunt ing cown hunc~ reas of "illegal immigrants"; the one o te lock knock in the morning hays become part of the British scene, Ve must nob accept tacse attacks as inevitable nor exagg. rate them, The first azo of the resvonye of the Left inust be to Light within the frouevork of the defenec.... of bourgeois freedoms against every incursion, There is the potential for a big strugele here, 31 SOO),

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But we would be less than gcericus if we did not note the drzstic need for education in our ranks on this cuestion., Comrades have the grea-= test difficulty in understanding the need to lock doors; for example, even after half a paving stone had been thrown through the window of Pentonville Rd., it is still common to find the front coor unlocked during the evening when there is no one in the printeshop., It only reguires 2 little imagination to see that the paving vtono could heave been thrown at our printing press had the throwers found on open door, Comrades continuously lose keys, tnue creating all kinds of organixational problems and completely cewtroying the security of tne acads quarters. Fortunately for this type of comrac ve are not engagec in armed vtruggle - there is no gunrantce that they vould point he. oun in the right direction! | In a more general sense, moyvt comrades are carclevys about wheat Is aid over our tapped phones and about who is in the organisation, V cannot, of coursc, be conypletely pereanoic about such matters nor ca we be 8$o security-conycious that the orgenisetion really su:fers, Hove, over, we must face up to the possibility of repressvion and violence being used against us and instil « spirit of voriouvne:s on Buch matters, Otherwise we could be caught completely unavare and totally » C off balance, We will have to cons ider very ce refully «=~ at ell levels =m how we resoond to the new gituation csausec py bane Tory legisszatione We will be teken much more seriously by militent (part ieuls weily tlose ab gy ‘aed! * ‘ ; ; f who have expericnee of reoreysion) onee ve os lish new normy. (5) — | cm ) ‘ a or wa (c) THE NEED FOR A TRANS TPIONAL PROGRAW-E $ ° The present level of the class strugecle eries out for the inyertion i> .2> of a trensitional programme into all diveugsdons. puci provlcnms as dealing with the growing unemploynent, the Common itarket, a strategy for defeating the IRB, wast governnental slogan to put forward, ctc.;, oll demand the elaboration of « tranyitional programe Of course it is very easy to end cach article oin the RED NOLE with o rubric "this menns the vorkers in Rolls Royce, etc., muvyt struggle for nationalivation uncer workers control", If left at that this amounts to tie vitualivation of trensitional demands or aq process of just making the reeord, It misses the evvential features of a troan~ ae Cit gilttonal dcenands thet it ais part of a totality and itl embvoujies a method. We necd to teke the urgent cucstions of the cay one by one and ensure that detailed attention is given to elaborating tranyitions el demands, In this way the method of the trensitional p,rogroamme can be popularised and ele borated and 2 total progranne built up, * Becausve of the lack of an economic base for refornisn in the present period we are nided in this process. For now it is a fect that the imagens of the bra nyitional bvrogranmnme id the mort effective vay in actice of combatt ir ¢e capitalism, ax well as being the one which eived partial struggles 3 an antil-ca pitelic 36 perspective and oricntation, Be se dcal yy | this is not « completely new situation: reformist advances —- politica: ane cs2ininie = have necrly siweys been the result of rsvolut ione CY of Very Lblitan: .tles lei... Feb ine. tincri oiv-ery is perte ~~~ Mehotory frorohnive in this country vay gcirli fb -t 2 C70 i . 7 Tie MoT wt titolty oth ttnrcetion betyveen the stteyl-s tf ot... ett 32

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vy One EX pie ~ end the grenting of votes to women iv only \ “ / oyers and the capitadict “atete | alvoys give much Less th 7 fy gadisats at vwact one 1 r f t origme iaally asked for. PUSTIFOR Cs pO vet one they can grant is to/ask for one-tenth of that. In th the eapitelists erc virtucelly incavable of eronting reforus at all, Vien on the contrary, acy are trying to teke back whet nas been von in the past it iy Llunetic sratersy to ask for tere reforms Tne only nove of staving off th. a nae of geectting enything at all is tO cemand as much as is foavib given the relationship of class forcos, x ct 6 t & Ze are the only tendency wh ie ia ig conmitted to the method of the transitional vrorsramne, Other groups pay Lip service to it dut in oract icc cither cngeare in trying to outevhout the CP (the SLL) or toilecond workers conse lousne se (the IS) thus showing their cvvsenti-~ adly vofanist nethodolory, C2 _ td aT an Ci (a) UNDERSTANDING THE PATURE OF TRAPS TPIONAL SLOc.

The ongoing discussion ve heaving in the field of vomen's vork cacnon~ a ! stratos thet there is utmoyt confusion in tiome conredes mings cpoprt ) vane? transitional slogans are end their relationship vo democratic onoands There iy cleo confusion between wheat dceiiends we sgnould yup mort and thove which we should initietc,. This confusion must be cleared up or else it will come up tine and time agein in every field seh Fic or our netivity, Of course, cac!

O ‘le of vork re vires a particular digeustiion about epderopricte el db ut the foiloving pened pointy j-mS) rap <j }-c ct }- © p- "> nH ( ies ore duty-bound to vupport cll the vtrug les of the Masvcy - Lew bite their limited mature and reformist or act ionelist leeaderships, We, therefore, support all cemocratic ond refornist domands providing they have the function of stimulating mass gtrugglo. We will always join yvuch stru,,;les ourselves. (2) We, on the other hand, co nov oursedves intervene vy advancing ag orogranie of democratic or reformist denands. In vhat ever ficld wo are operating (ay distinet fron giving general support fron the outside) ve utrueele for a transitional prosreamie, In the course of doing thiy we sill, naturally, Say thet ve support or even adopt the democratic or reformist demands of others, But theve latter demands will not be the kernel of our intervention, (3) Ve need, at ony given stage, to distinguish between agitational ond political zlogeans and cemendsy a nolitienl demand or slogan 1 desyiened to explain in an edueat ional manner a part of our progrann to a relatively small number of advenceed vorkers. Tt 128 aes sgnee ‘ give thoir gencral struggle an oricntetion. An agitatio on the otner he nd ivy cevigned to cxplain a single ide people and give them a guide for liamediate setvion, ¢ propagandise for action comuittces, a workers governiitcont, crmed yvolre~ defence yeuads for oppressed Trish minority in Northern Ireland, for Cefence scuady to protect vtrike DJickets and inuigronts, cte., But. _ Lew) c O these only bdecone agsitetional vlogens vinen their fluplementsction 1s on the orcer of the cay by a vcctor ongaged in ytruggle. (4) The esvential difference between a democratic and refornist denry ae and end a trensitional demand is that the former opeoraves witnin the acceptance of the stats cuo, whilst the latter challenges the found at iony of bourgeois pover. <A tranyitional slogen snould siw de diste Foor tus? Seen 2 full or revolutionary deuand (the voecalled full

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ey a yvarticular problem facing the vorkers and instead of ex plaining that a social revolution iy nee solve it mokes ec call for something which can secn " “oir! to the workers conecrned, In other words a red roatic demand is one which argucs cbdout the onere of the cake uncer capitalism, a full demand seys thet the capitelist is not entitled to any eake at all and « trenysitioneal evelogan insists thet the yvuuring of the eake should be under tne control of the workers. (5) An esventiel feature of e trensitional vlogan is, therefore, that é fa b it should involve vome erovion of vourgeolys porver, Tey inner cvenece iy not that it is wunachicevanle uncer capita -ligm (this is the case, of course, av Trotsky noted) otuervise all Eines of ceneands would automatically become treanyitionsl, Would we soy, for invtonec, tha eo demand for higher wages becomes « transitional demand if the emple oyer ig unable (through bankruyptey, for inutence) to grant it? IDbyade ously not, the deneand for higher vages in yvuch a case needy ev. fining with a demand for ovening th booky yo that the workers con avcertain thenyelveys whether what ‘bae enployers says is truc or not. should it be true —- in movt cases the employer will not agree to the vanring of business scerety with hig omvoloyecs eos this involves wh € Loy ; Lon a0 of iris power end social position -— then the cemancd is developed vy gaying thet if the enployer is go inefficient then he ovviously needs to be expro.riated (for his own sake es Vell = the Vorkers are too humanitarian to allow hin to suffer by continuing to love money ) uncer vorkers control, This is the dyncinic wethod of the transite ional programme which has nothing in comaon vith the theory of "revolutionary reforns" (thoyve reforms which cannot be granted under capitelisn), (6) Applying this netbhod we yonot ines naaee tuat whet appears to de en elementary slogan can become a tranvitionel one in certain cirecun vteneos. For instance the slogea "the Postvorkery must win" hed suc. o character during the postal vtrike, the key thing being that it countervoycd the pover of the bourgeois state machine to workers pover,. Of course such « vlogean vould heve to explained and be part of og vider »~». ofranme, (7) The transitional slogan is evs ent ic workers rather than the mays of the ror venee indirectly through the medium oe fore, our sloguns are not diutermined feel as feasible. (8) The fect that a transitional BOGE hes to link the conyciousness - of the masses with « revolutioncry Serspective coes not : wey thet one only puts forvard what iv acecytavole to t workers. Rather the stating point of a tranyitional + the objective needs of the classy vtruggle. (9) The transitionel slogan has not only to arm uy in strugele but slsgo ayvist us to dovelop revolutiommy convclousnoyy Lts revolut ion -y content cannot, therefore, be purcly or even mainly "inplicit".

The »yroduction of revo lut ionar ry conyvciousness iy a scicnee not «4 cnpiricel, vpontancous process, The esvenec of the Leninist concept of the revolutionary parey is thet the party has to be an instrunent for nonnufacturing yocialist consclousnoysys in « hovtile environrcnt aominated by bourgeois Sanolony, (Sce Hancel "On the Leninist Theory of the Party"). This has to be fought for all the tine, To linit ourvelves to cclling for other: to be "consistent" netionalists, 54 — dy directed at the acvanced ker Te <im to win our infle~ the edvend cd Worisors \ i

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cnt" refornists or "convisvtent" democrots ig to revion from t the duty of cons cious ly fighting bourgvois ideol fF A programe of sch out to develop ad uve of tranyitiona oOls, publiection and discusyiony muyt be vorkea cep understending of the whole (vestion of the L slogens. (7) ws (eo) FORMULATING A TRAYS TEIONAL SLOGAN FOR THE FOR] OF GOVERIT DHT, We have adopted in our publicetiony: the vegsan 9 of ew for a vorkers Governuen ypayed upon the democratic control of tre ,ade unions by the rankand file. This is neccessary because ve can no longer just cali for a Labour Governnent - even with oa socialist programme, But Ghig general vlogan presents many difficulties and must be elaborated eother than being tacked on the end of articles, In cvsence it is an aileebraic formula which ean be filled with different contents, It is o vlogan which, ay Trotsky put it, "expresses the object ive tasks of the working elaus rother than the packwarcness of worke TS Tt ls o slogan designed to cevelop consciousness and ec ons idence enone t working class militsents, tts esvontieal motivation is thet if the workers are strong cnough to defeat the Tories and kick them out of office they will also be strong cnough to form «a sovernucnt “baved upon those organs of power thet defeated the Tories - the trade unions. clause "under cGemocratic control" is neccyvvary vecause The cualifying othervise a government of FPoathersy could be vorse tian that of TilsoOte It can hove larferent aoplicetvions in different situations: just now the way w Visage ib is as an caducational slogan siving an orient-= U f C ation in a situetion where the demand is being uade for 2 senercl strike to kick out the Tories, A sceneral strike involves auscets of dual power, ecnuoocicd in sucn orgens as action comulttees, fJfor a general 2t to take vlace which forced out the governicnt end then oe be folloved by a Lepour Governuent would be a step pack. Prom a pos~ iu ton of partinol cual pover we would go to a Yoxition of bourzcois overnnment, To put foiward the slogan of ca ailing for a ecneral strike Uhich leads to a Labour Governnent under present cirevisteances is confused at best and right Wing at worst, Sibher we really wean wheat We sey about «a general strike or we vhould not >ut it forverd.

In a different situction the yvlogan of governiaecnt based upon the dacno-= eratic control of the trade uniony could indecd be coll for the unions to teke over the Labour Party conpletcly oy kicking out the bourgeois politicains who at present control it (such en cvent of courve vould lend to a split). Hovrever, we would not envisage thet toking place uncer prevent circunytanees., “May be in the period leading up to the election we could cnVi8age the vlogen having thet content but certeinly not when the main thrust of the workers! ectivities is in trade union struggles which are completely by-pavsing the Lebour Party (which are indecd denounced by the leaders of the Labour Party).

C3 Those who wish to give the orientation of calling for the return of ao Lavour Governine ont are = Vhether they realise it or not -— secking to impove parliamentary forms of strugygle upon the working class at a time when lorgse sections of the clavys think these irrelevant to their needs, Such a policy in conperablo in minicture with the French CP which made 2 call for an election at the tine of liany, 1968, That 43) Trotskyists should make this nistake is regrettable in the extreme, 8 vO

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(f) OTHER ITNPORTANT POLITICAL SUEST IONS While our central gtrateg ‘ic task is to build a strong Trotskyist cadre within the induytx ‘inl working elasys this yhould in no way ve geen as in conpetition with our vork in the anti-imperialist movenents, black defenee comnittecs, wonen's Liberation movement, ctc., On the contrary, it is essential thet an increased connitucni to industrial work be complenented by stepping uy our intervention in theye fields. There sive . number of reasons for thiss (1) Our interneationalist and revolutionary duty to support the vtrug~ gles of all oppresscod peoples. This is not a cueytion of the occase tonal demonstration to clear our consciences but of hard and consist» ent work to promote. the notion of clase yolidarity within the. notoriously isolationist end chauviniest British labour movement. (2) If we are seeking to recruit numbers of industrial nilitants ve have to ensure thet we project our total political analysis into the labour movement vo that such comrades are brought in on the strongth of an understanding of our general line, To do othorwise and follow the IS which recruits any industrial militant who will sell SOCTALIST VORKUR is potentially disastrous for the functioning of the organisation. | | (3) One of the nost effective means of being recognised a8 a ¥erious tendency in the movement is the pursuit of such campaigns, inde ed they may prove to be in the first pleee our most effective way of goining the best industrial militants to our ranks, ev: Seo del ly fron the YOL and CP.

Tt is cuite vrong to pose an artificial dichotomy betwoen "Campaign" politics and "industrial" work. As well as one supplementing the other as described above, the development of, for instance, an efieciive antieinperialis ‘ canpaign as a serious force within the movement is not essentially different in berms of the serious and consistent work which it requires to the do industrial vork. [9) NOLIDARITY VItH THE IFDO-CHIVESE REVOLUTION The Indo~Chincse vevolution renains the highest point of the cntiinperialist struggles; and it is clear that Nixon a sll his weffling hes escent inlly a Stratery of winning the var. The postion reucins ; in essonee, a8 it was at our last year's conference. We heve to deve ote enerzey and resources to this cauvalgn and ensure that the Ysc continues to act as a propaganda foree and a nucleus for united front action, There hays been go snall shift in the reaction of the vanguard to the campaign, We should be able to build on a modestly successful April 24th action with the especial task of putting pressure on other tendencies to live up to their intcrnationalist revpongibilities.

The Tig should use the continuing campaign to raise the level of political consciousneys of trade unionists who ere being racicelised by the industrial struggle. The SL should seek bo become a Dasy movilising foree in the youth vanguard, There should ve/S lind down wactso~ over on our goveeifically yolidarity position. Ail otner formulas are less effective apart from their intrinsic opportunism —- the lotest "name the date" ginmick looky sick now as clements in the American administration take up the slogan. Despite its weakness the Vso remoins the only orreanivat ion trying to orgzanise public activity on the cuestion of the Indo-Chinesye revolution = other organivations!

Weloxibility' has not exactly been successful,

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IRELAND There Will be other discuvvion material both on the Iri and our tasks in this country. Uowever, it is necevysary t« Little about the reletionship of Ireland to our main pers 2 Birstly, a confession of failure; we have been unable s break down the traditionel beckwardness of the British working class on the question of Ireland, Scarcely a ripple vas raised vy the fact that Wilson gave Heath 100% support on his Trivh policy when it was discussed in the House of Commons in Herch, The ccntral importance of this question can scarcely be overoutinated: Ireland is today a country where to use the immortal words of our Prine a a iinister there is "urban guemilla ware are’, The Long-term social effects of such a gyituation on a crisis-ridden impcrinlist notion like Britain arc deep-going and extrenoly profound, One has only to think of the inter-relationship between Freneh politics and the Algerian struggle to sce the pow sibilities. All the esvential ingr- 1 enti ce een’s are there in miniature: “or the pied-noirs we have the prote stents, for the paratroopers we nave the Ulster regiment an poue Ability of a semi-pormanent stone ing army in Northern Ireland, ana $8o one No tendency in Britein can be scrious unless it has a ,7~ long-tern perspective of intervening at every stage of the strugecle. n relation to the Ipish vanguard hay been comnuendto make the ISC oven as viable as V8C, The appe wr (but not necestarily too-frequent) journal for 18¢ Ls “vital, aS is an orientation to the vorkers movement in Britain, Vhen an orcanivat ds nm in not able to mobilise large nunbers of people in net ion 13 propaganda aspect has to be that much more empnavised if it is to survive. Because of the disarray caused in big yvections of the Irish vanguard by the split between the Officials and Prove igionals links with sections of the British Iabour noverment becone all the more important to counter denorcelis ction, Whilet our ‘ro ope we have 9 HoH }4 2 a 0"; pt s, The relavionship betveen our work on Ireland ena our attempts to puild an indyutrial base is culite inportant. The Irish vopulation Ln Briton is overwhelming proleterian and is voll-intcgrated into the trade union movement. . nq BLACK TORK Again there will be yveparate material on this question, Hovever, 70) wee of this work need to be emphasised in our generel peorse (1) work “in this fiela of a dynamic and effective charactcr iy neccssary for wider political reasons. Racialism will, without a doubt, become an increasing weapon in the hands of reaction in Britain as the erisis gharpens, Our solidarity, political and educational work in this field will, therefore, bo of utnoxt dmporte mee in building up a countere-veight to racialisn. (2) the relationship between thiv work and industriel work is again influenced by the fact that movt lnmigreants are proletarians. But very aifficult problems are going to cnerge cs unemployment develops ~ trade union leaders are bound, in their craven opportunist way, to Soke be ad pos sitions on this question, We could be feeed with strikes | Tliscamres to. eeseb Ligh trade unions catoring o = - - - - “ = a " " . ue 7 - —™- = - —_™ - ™ 17 — oe — ~ 4 ~ ” ati ow i —_ — - _— ml Po ~ _ ~ —_ —_ —_— a Yi os me . a al —

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WOMEN'S ‘ORK This is adequately documented elsewhere but some more words will be in pleece here, A rather well-known writer has exoressed the opinion that the best place to concentrate one's forces is where the relate jonzhip of foreces is most Tevouraole. This truism is: es eceicily cot for « ymoall revolutionary group. When it comes to 2 comparison of forces = extant and potential - in tue generat ficld of trade unions igm owe are exeessvively veak. When the sane cileouletion is done in geak but as hundcrec times eC the fielea of wonen cacres we are still « stronger relatively. Noreover wo heve a political line and a journal thet can extend our influence fur beyond our fiemberynip, Another factor which is extremely lnvoortant is thet women ore becone ing an increasingly inporteant proportion of trede unionistswhilet «tt the tine being far levs integrated into burcaucratic structures, Tine ~ increave in total trace union menmvership over the last decade or JO is entricly explained oy the inerease in the number of Women menvoers, Thiv tendency is increasing, For instance, the Fational Union of Public Enployeces regist ered a 20 ° incresye in nenmvervhin last year according to its annual report alnost ell this increcsse Was due to the recruitment of women manual workers, In the vhopwork erg union, the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Yorkers, women have vec ole an absolute majority of the membership for the firyt time, heaving provided the vavt magority of its 13,000 nev members last year. “In this field we can make dimnenve progress: whereay there are innumerebic Pavers oricntcc toverds trade unionists in general there is only one revolutionn yy journal directed sounrds women unionists wentabed, our work in thivs field will open mony doors for uy: strikers will respond much ovenly to our paper than left cr gener ral, In the general field of trade unionisn, our activity in this field gains us inmediete revpeet end credivility. By its very nature vrork of this: kind tends to be antiebureaucretics; the ourcsuce reats, their minds blinkered by pragmatic eonyiderct ions usually tend to regard organising in this field as a poor inve utuent. aren ; r na tw The whole organisvetion must sce it as an urgent priority to nelp to establish Socialist Women's Comuittees Ther e muyt ve « Par more Vigorous attempt to get the campaigns we axe involved in more broadly based in the trade union movenent (for instence, how many branches have sent someone round to sec the local tradexv council seerectery to ask aysistance for the clenners! campaign? ). -” At the same time ve must ask the whole labour movement to support the demands of the women's liberation movement. There is no contraciction in these two aypects Tho best women in the liberation movenent will want to ally thenselves with the industrial ytrugegles: whilst thove in the trade union isovenent who are opposed to Liveration demands will, in the long run, clnoy st cortainly pe Yhown to have nany other react~ lonary traits as well.

POLITICAL PRISONERS CAMPAIGNS AS the political weight of the Fourth Tnternetional grows it will be subject to increaving re prevs ion. Alrcady we have political prisone ers, menbers of,or asyociated with, the Fourth International in over 38. | EEE EEE EEE EEE

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cg dozen eas serene countricys, In most casey the United Sceerctcriat MS tLaunenca solidarity canpaiens. The cfficacy of thiove canvaigns cannot be disputed = the case of Hugo Bisnco Gewonvt rates this very clearly. Comrade Hugo is adamant thet tne international campaign saved his lifes now he is free Ye muyt be very frank on this «uestion: our performance in these campaliens has been extrencecly poor, This is not gust a «uestion of lack of yvoliderity - it is elso «a very big politicesl weeknese. We would, of course, be dutyebound to wage such caulnigns even if there no political eins for us in them, But the reality is thut we vill sain acavily - PARTICULARLY IN THE BRITISH COFRTEXT - from well- © organised solidarity campaigns. One of our mein proovlens in dealing With other tcndencies to Geilonystrete the reclity of the Fourth. ont vrnat ional, in termy of activity, political liportencc, etc. at better vay of cenuonstrating this than ao series of solidarity campaigns? | | | Taere are two other aspects worth nentioning: one, we allow our political opponents to get aveay with murder through our weaknesy in thiy field, For instance, the SLL has on several occasions maae propaganda on behalf of Trotskyists in prisons; noturclly peopic think thet they are supporters of the Internntional Counittce, In most casey they are not, Sinilarly, we heave hed certain tendencies raise in a very arereesive vay the question of the murccr of the Vietnanecve Trotukyivts. This matter hes been ured to gustity a sectarian attitude townrds the Victneiese revolution, Yet the same people keep complotely quiet ebout Trotyvkyists, members of the Fourth International, who are being prrsecuted here and now. We can argue with complete vincerity and very cffeetively: if volicituce for pervecuted Trotykyists is their reason for incectivity on the veeenan guevstion, surely they should here and nov belug active in cefenee of living Trotyukyiets, in geol, whose Lives couia be saved.

The sccond aspect is that we nave tended not go for ge vt ing notables (Ps, leading intellectuals, ete) to sign protests ond have left % this to the Bertrand Russell Pee ce Foundation, Talis iv en irreso- Ongible attitude and nes gome sectarian under-tones,. That organe ivation, owing to ity extreme opportunism, cannot pe trusted to cdo this type of activity on behelf of Trotskyists, Uhilst we should work with it and utilise its connections, cte., to leave it control of aspects of solicerity work is vory danmerous.e £ 2cted leadership should set up a orgzanise tnis kind of. work, Tt should be sg DA have t n cee ary exverlence and nropilitics, comnisgion shoulc arrenge for regular material in our press and, where appropriate, give guidance on demonystretions, speetal coimiittees and appeals. a fe ea }-~ isl commission to vy eorredes who (6) TWO IMPORTANT ORGAFISATIONAL CONS IDSRAT IONS Lan Te are now involved in « vast number of activities and heve organ i:ationsl resvonsibilities f erester than ever before. lf this yy ar fact is seen in reletion to the etal ive of rayidly build/*t te organs ivation certain organisational problei pecome political ones. Ve intend to vrite a general orgonivsat tonal document but there tvo things bo lookedat ‘hera 5

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(2) THE PROBLEM OF A PUNCTIONING DIVISION OF LABOUR.

Because we are involved in 80 many different ficlds, a precise divise jon of labour becomes a key probdlen. Otherwise, our wmenudersy will be pulled hither and thither, going to meetings every nignt of the week, doings a bit here and bit there vithout «ny focus for their vork. This in why preeive allocation of responsibility iv essential, Morcover, this has to be constantly checked and be ysubjgect to review. Every member yhould be coumitted not only to a particular brancn or vorke ing but also to one or more caucuses, there the cctailed vork is organised. But more than this, such a division of labour has to be integrated into «a total plan which considers the stage of cevelopnent of the TiiG unit and ity inmediate requirencnts as an organivation in amd of itself. For instance, ea new greup will go through nany stages ~ learning how to function 28 a unit, creating « mileu within which to operate, evteblivhing itself as a public contender for left anegemony, dealing with the challenge of other tendencies, ete. Lines uf action which are appropriate to one stage woulda be dangerouy ot ane . other. For Instance, it would be stupid to try to contend for public. hegemony before the new group had learnt how to organise regular mectingys and educational activity, This general factor hays to be related to tvo others; the needs of the members theuselves in terms of their own development anc, of course, the needs of the campaign itself, The vhole metrix amounts to a huge algebraic cquation,the solving of which is the art of internal * e a v rsroup leacershipe However, there are yome guidelines; 3 i> (lL) in ge neral, to onsure an alleround development conrades should have at least two group rosponsidilitiey; one in the field of mass ad the other in terms of internal group administration; (2) the esvonce of controlling the whole process iv a rational way of checking up decisions: (3) most recruits should be tinde via t and/or educational activity; the probl of work, thereforc, is not one of star (4) in each unit the organizer ghould problem, Each new campaign should be seen in terms of ceveloping the capabilities of the membership. heir participation in caucuses em of allocating them to fields ting fron syceretchs and i ry (b) THE NEED TO OVERCOME CONSURVZTISI! IN BUILDING THY ORGANT3aT ION.

In its history the IMG hes weode three verilous wistakes resu conservatism in building the orgenivation, In these case C takes clso hed important cunsecuenees for the courve of the clara struggle and the building of the workers vanguard. It is worth looking at these mistakes osypeeially as any wistcke in the present period of this type could thwart our whole progreys,. (1) The first mivtake we made along these Lines was vhen we took the initiative in launening the Young Socialists! pews paper YOUNG GUARD.

Overeating on a purcly strategic level we holy to unite RALLY (the paper of the RSL) and REBEL (which had been utarted by the SCCIALIST REVIEVT group - now INTERHATIONAL SOCTALIS?1) by creating our own NOTTINGHAM RALLY and then proposing fusion, The policy was correct in principle but in practice resulted in us giving the state enaps a

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i narional freanework within which to operate - osreviourly they head be been virtually a purely London groups. We made this mistelke beecuse we did not combine this strategic step vith cfforts to reeruit pcople ~ having a general approce® thet it Wes not neccesvtary to spcnd much time on reerultment "vbeeanuye poople vould aut vient ieally goin us because of our correct ideas", Ve thought, in particular, thet our politicel succeys in getting the new national paper going would make is them want to join us 3s pontancous Ly. Tnutecad they goined IS because it wes more agcesreysysive and vecued mere televent in terms of ecctivity. (2) The second case vay in the building of the workers control uovee ment, At that time we vere an cntry GY OUP ond suffered from a fete ishivsm about vecurity in relation to Trenyyort Housc., A sector of the leadership was even opposed to trying reeruit people to the orgonivat lon except under the most stringcnt circumstances, The excuse Wes that our entry work vould suffer if the existence of our organis ation ways widely knovwne The irony of the vituction wes that ceventuea wily bhe movt sceurity conscious leader of the organisation Wes e pores from the Labour Party and the most "open" members of the leadership were left alone, This over=c out ion Led to.a situation where virtually no attempt was made to draw the worker militants we were in contact with FChrough the von ecre control movement closer to the TG, New comredes may not realise that the TMG, mainly throveh its peper THE WEEK, built up the vorke 2x3 control movement and proviced the cadres and turners of duplicator handles for it.

We orgenised all the big conferences of the campaign vith hundreds of militents in attcndence Yet we did orectically no contact work - our comrades, avert fron anything else, vere toc busy doing office Work, arranging accommodation, etc, “hat was the ‘conve rucnce of all this? When the Leading light in the vorkcrys control movement decided to break with us oveecanuse we ine giuted upon criticising Jack Jones, when he betrayed the duckers!

Strike in October, 1967, we were left with preeticelly nothing. The colurade concerned had by then found an elternative method of service ing the vorkers control movement, Ve were then virtually excluced, If we had recruited only a tiny number of the yorker contercts the Situation vould have been entirely cifferent. Head we been able to remain in the netvork in an organived way we vould heave had « whole mileu for intervening in induytrial vtruecles., (It should be explnined thet one of the factors operating is that the leaders of the Te consciously oppos c the structuring of the campaign, leaving only annual conferences ~ we could heve fought thet tendency if we head had some worker nilite nts to carry our line), Just now the Ic is mainly functioning as a left cover for the Jones end Scanlons and a | Dlnys no vole (which it could have quite casily) in ecting as 2 local Tofu Tor yslicarity ection and committecs, . 625 72 -F lt 22 t Cit. 7 aT Asugh not yo scrious,was in the Victnen | . ; 7 22 7 lt tte kh sve pe id gome co" ten at ton le rt vane Woihet ivi ll.t 2 oe. lee

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vd bed consecuences and not gust for IG, but for the unti- — _ This he Vietnam war movement as a whole. Once the I deciced, for syectiureian reasons, to pull out of VSC activity the campaign ways ainoxt reduced to a shell. Hed we devoted more tine to recruiting the 4 VSC activists it iy likely; (2) thet IS would not have | pulled out so cayily; ong (b) that anyway we would heve been in a far better poyition to keep the organisation going at a higher level. (4) We od to exanine very closely these experiences so that ve can Lete srmine how we cane to make yuch mistakes (it must be noted that we made them in common with other ons of the Fourth Intere» national), We made two bayic theoretica (a) we sew only the question of programme and opportunity as making up the equation. Hence ve thought that once our argumenty in theo © - Labour Party vere shown to be true then we would cutonatically become the leadership of a sector wanting to move to the left. Ve lert out of the equation the fact that it is necessary to be « pole. of attrection before one can win leadership of big sectors, Ict alone win them ideologically - this is especially so in entry vork where we are dealing with people who are used to being members of Very larg C orgcnisnt ions and vho, therefore, find small groups irre ode nity (1) We underes stimated the gigantic task of producing yocialist consc~ Lousne ous, which requires continuous ideological work. &ntry Work or submersion in a mileu like VSC, without a constant struggic on the ideologiecal front ~ which reviuires journals and resources = be | brings big dengors of adaption, yc "I C3 roct ct & These tvo nistakes led us to devalue building the organisation anc ineressed our Gdifficulties in recruiting people, sm (5) The perspective laid out in this document which insists constantly on the need to build the IMG and SL as a prerequisite for effective intervention in the Britivh class struggle lays us open to the grave danger of organisational sectarianism, What the latter means in vractice is thet more importance is given to the building | of our own organisation than to the development of the antiecapital-~ ist struggle as a whole, If yueh a tendency were to apvear in our renks it would eventually oxpress itself through making adaptions to the prevailing mood in those mileu in which we worked, In the industrial ficld it would be likely to express iteelf in an o,portunist adaption to the deep-rooted econonism of sectors of fhe workin class; in the youth milcu in an evolution towards spontan{eSarkecrisgn end ultra-leftism.,. And generolly it woulc lead to a tendency towarcs the yvort of hysteriecl denunciations of other tendencies which is cheracteristic of the SLL. | Such a development would ha a totally disintegrating cffect on our own organisation and spell the end of our attenots to build a viable section of the Fourth International in Britein for « whole period, For this reason it has to be carefully eucrded against.

The IMG/SL will not become an inportant force in any area in which ée yeon to be parasitical, ceternining our connite ding to the yvize of the seine we hope to mate to 42 we operate if we ar ment, like IS, accor

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our own organivation, leeching off the movenent,. On the contrary, our whole method in every field of work hes to be dasec on our ability to provide the best answers to the uexstions of how to build the novenent and take it forvard in a successful direction, Portunctely we have certain advanteces in pursuing this tasks (a) our monbership of an international orsanivation which attempts: to work out an overall view of the class strugele on a world seele Anposes upon us certain priorities, ¢«.g., solidarity with the deci- Sive struggle of the Indo-Chinese people against US inperialism upholding the right of the Irish people to self-determination, cte., which if coment ly interpreted conmit uy to building united fronts on these questions In these united fronts we aim to mobilise the largest numbcrs of people around principlec actiony cn theve and other cuestions., In doing this we are automatically prevented with the question of unity in action with other tendencies -a poverful ceterrent to organisationsel secterianisn. (b) this process itsclf helps us to get over our view of the wey the oe eeen nnae porty of the working class will be built in Britain.

We have constantly to educate our own comrcedes, especially those nowly recruited to the SL, in our conception of this proceys; not oy the neeretion of individual cadres by Tic /SL and our gradual development into the Leadership of the cork ine class, but as a dynanic proe# ceys of yplits, regroupnents and fusions, involving at the decisive moment the transfer of whole sections of the organised Working class from reformist to revolutionary politics, The dialectical relationship of the development of the Fourth Intcrnotional with the growth of the movement itself hes to be carefully expounded so tnha.t we show how the development of a qualitatively ane quantitatively strong section is enpable of actually decisively affecting the course of this process, <At the end of the day we will be judged oy the movenent as a wholo not by the number of abstractly correct political statements we are able to make but by the success of the political Lines of action which we propose and the dediection of our cadrey in carrying thes e into effect = tnis alone will bring us the urgently necded inereaye in our numbers. (9) a S n (6) It follows from the above that we svhould not see the yolution to our urgent need to incrercse the size of the organisetion in terms of dropping membership standards or by enulating IS'y craged nehaviour,.

Whet is necesary is a new attitude towards reeruitment and contact work, An atitude which is filled with a sense of urgency and a burne ing devire to move quickly, Everything we heave writtne in this docunent indicates that tine is not on our side, Building the IliG and giving the utmost attention in the most dynamic and efficicnt we nd possible to re soruit ing people is en urgent nec cousity of the cla strug cle. ‘Te gphould also have priorities in this field. Co.urades will renenver the oftequoted Trotsky proposition that members of the SUP who did not recruit at least one vorker in six months should be reduced to Synpa athis ers, It is monstrous that sectarians should use this renark In a general Way =- without placing it in a given tine gnd context, The becke jround was the faction fight over the neture of the Soviet.

Union and the petitsbourgeois donitnmnce of the party's organisation an kev York, This arose out of the winning of a large section of 49

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youth through the cntry into the sae jioalist Party ena the oreovious merger with the iu Lute orgenivetion (thas. go hoy Rurnhaw wor eoined)., | Nevertheless, Droteky's advice reflected the exsvential fact that an orgenivation's urioritics in the field of ricruitment must be gubordineted to its general political tesks and pgrovlems. In our case the situation is clear: our propaganda, our contact vork, our red circley dis cusyvions, ghould all be emphatically biased to try to get an increase in our working clayy compoyition in the shortest povyible time. Where we have trade union caucuses whica arc vinble we should open these to clop worker sympathivers yo that we can rapidly integrate then, Never, never should we be taray © ebout following worker and trade union leaus or OnE GOTO s even if they are on eg lover political level than other contacts This process of builcing our vorking: class base Will be mace much cayvier vy « political factor: the policy of the Tory Governiicnt is having the effect of politicising a sector of the working class, | There is now much greator interest in politicel ideas anc even the political groups anongst a small but widely distributed leyer of workers = and not gust young workers, The huge tales of all Left wing publications on the February 2lst cenonstration is a gover. ful indication of this, Just a3 we pay (or shoulc vey) meticulous attention to dctaile of other more "pressing" work we must do the same with building the organivetion, “We must throw aside the "teke or Lleeve it" attitude + recruiting and new members. <A Cynoamic approach corbinec with intensified educctional activity will lift the level of the organisation other then lover it. AS an esvential yart of our political »erspectives each unit must appoint someone in charge of contact work and arrenge regular anc careful cdivcuyysiony on vas whole cueytion of puilding the orgeniseation. Hach unit snoulc have oa "short list" of people it is cnceavouring to recruit at any onanbicular Gane, Just os we would think thet there vas something bayically wrong with a unit which was not yelling our papers, vo we inust have the sane approach withany unit which is not recruiting. (10) cf (7) AN ALTURNATIVE STRATEGY - ENTRY INTO THE LABOUR PLRTY Many of the arguments in fevour of entry still apply. The Labour Party still hav the electoral support of the overvheduing majority of the organived working class and there hay been no move to sever the links between the unions and the Labour ace Moreover, whilst ve raise the transitional slogan of a workers government bayed uvon the trece unions uncer denocratic renk end file control, in the min. s of the masses a Labour government is the only viable elternative to the Torics, Hovever, oll these arguments fall to the ground in face of one overt racing factor: the urgent task of today is to build a revolutionary Vanguard and there is now no internal life of im ,ortence inside the Labour Party. Wovever, vome thingy can change very rajidcly ane should the unions suffer oan industrial aefeat there is the poysibility of yvectiony of the working class seeing in the next general olection the main volution for meeting the Tory offensive.

LL EEE

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ould we then have to re-convider eabry? “fo ust pe concrete on ~uch a question. We can no longer argue in the abstract way of the vest that a period of Lebour f¢overnne nt Ves necevsary for the vorkers to lase vheir iliusions in the Labour Porty,., The Workers have hed nearly six years of Labour government in which it systematically ~ttacked the working class anc attempted to shackle the unions ay no overnment had tried for over 60 yeers., The old argument of "Lebour vO power to expose social denocracy" opviouvly is incomplete. The 1issing factor is that in the absence of o revolutionary vinguard with masy influence the expose of social cemocracy will not take place ina horough-going | MANNY » | F(A; JB “hnilyt it is correct that the best circumstences for the exposure of social democracy is «vthen it is in pover this is neither ean argument for entry nor for vaying that the main problem iv to urge vorkery to vote Labour, Clearly rae main problem is to build the vanguard end it is to this end the guestion of entry or noneentry must be suboranated. Coneretely now we have to conyider this question from the point of view of chether or not it helps to build the vangucra.

Even if large yectionys of the working class dic vee an the elec of a Labour government the ansver to the Tory of: e S re-empnavised that this is not the case now, the vorke rs have mo confidence in their own endeavours through industric , entry would not be on the order of the day. Only when a sizeable seetion of advanced workers became active in the Labour Party and calpalgsned hare for the reevitealisetion of the party so thet it could win the next election would 2 deagisive change take place in its | internal life. How likely is this eventuality? There are, of course, as noted in Peat Jordan's articles in the old INTOREATIONAL (numbers land 2) besic utructural reasons for a tencency for the rejationship between the Labour Party anc the vorking clays to be renevwec. But these molecular tendencies vork over qo long time=-seele end are easily counter=balenced for a whole period by experiences such as the 1964—~ 70 Lebour adminivtretion, That would be recuired for « sizeadle number of vanguard vorkersys to go intothe Labour Party? Firstly, the ledership would heave at lecst to appear to be cavable of Wogang a struggle against the Tories. But as we have noted before Tilvon scems to be incavyadle of even making a verbal Ge Magogic gesture in this cespect, He denouncec the : aren l8th strike almost es vigorously as cid Heath. Secondly, in the absence of that variant, there would have to apvear to be the perspective of transforming the Lebour Party into an instrument of anti-Tory gtruzgle, Concretely this would involve there wbeing an alternative leadership to the Wilson clique. Where is there any yvign of this emerging? Instead we see the further degeneration of the TRIBUNE enng ~ Heffer accepts to serve under astle as a spokestian a against the Bill, cannot rule out these developments - but ct prevent there is no gn whatso oever of them coming to fruition, But noving yold this ed to keep a watchful eye on the possibility of vuch trends cevel-~ ve should continue our policy of holding a vatching brief on inter nol life of the Labour Party. The maintenance of few comrad TT 9 ig «4 Bg 6 bo Bo ng Cx \ j Oj ti in key centres, the careful ytudy of Labour Party documents and (ugh!

TRIBUNE would seen sufficient. The SL could play its role in this unvevoury task by paying some attention to the LPYS.

AD

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(8) coxc Lus IONS What is put forward in thiy document is a de application of the general line adopted at las the neceusity for rapidly going frou a propaganda group to a league for revolutionary action, ‘iectry to give yvone conerete QUSVeLrs ays to wheat the stages will be in that PrOO Ones Our politicsel bavis for arguin in this way rests upon the basic analyvis we meade in Last yoar'y cocument, This together with the international discuy-= sion material, the economic pervpective, the trade union document, the journals document, the youth perspective cdocunent, the Irish work paper, anc the vomen'ts work document givesa fully rounded political porspective,. led ond dynamic car's conferences:

Meny of the thingy mootec here will perhaps strike some comrades aos too drastic = even adventurisytic. In partieular, the proposition . for the rapid regroupment ~- in whatever form ~ with hundreds of new comrades won ving the Spartacus League will strike et any novto atgia arising from the cosiness of small-group solitical atmoyphere,. Ve . are sorry to shock people in this way but the feult is not ours. A terrible urgency prevails, Over the next period the class struggle will be ata veers point in Britain ~ oll fcelingys of complacency must be ywept ayide Hitner the orking clasy makes big advances in thet period or a “pight wing deve lopment Will teke place. We have &® major responsibility for doing the groundyvork for the creation of a cevolutionary party.

Tf we fail the price will be a high one. British eepitelion is completely unable to mect the challenge of the prevent-dar cap ital ist vrorld in its prexent form, Ve do no’ Tont to emulete the hysteria of the SLL when it saw fascism around the corner yome 10 years ago out we woula be leys then serious if we did not point out the grave dangers. British capital ivm, Lf it to SULVIVC, iy conpelled to atte Ok the Living vtoandards of the working class in a dramatic Manner, This cttack is bound sooner or later to. have ac political expression, The victory of de Gaulle in France lec to 10 vears of political vtagnation and apathy broken only by the student, and then worker, upsurge of Hay, 1968, In ‘Britain, a Similar period of polite cal inertia would oxact a much higher price. (11) All of us feel the terrible frustration of knowing what vosvyibilite des there are but which we cannot consumicte, There iy no Cay onsver,. Everytning we do - expecially the big veteps we take - will be full of dangers, But it is much be otter to try and fail than to rcnain safe but impotent. We say eretegorically that the day of the Shall group is over = we grow large or we cegemerate into c sect.

The choice is ours: .do we try to intervene in tho conning struggles and endeavour to influence their ..outcome? or do wo see our future oS writing articles - oh yo brilliant ieena alysing them and explaining how all the other groups vent vrong? Lf you reject the yvecond option you must face up to the implications anc be prepercd to dump into the Vatere | C Ve should proceed with seriousness and intensity borne of de eep polite ical conviction, Oury is the hardest but mout important task in the world; the building of a masg intcrnational revolutionary party. A A6

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aqecisive advance in Britain vould have huge international conyvecuens ces = a defeat would etrike a severe blow at the world's revolutionary forees, first of all in the rest of Burope. Let anywne unwilling to face this gigantic task leave nov, Let us co avay with anything Within our ranks which hincery our effeevivencss — tne inefricicneles, the stupidities, ell ametuvrishness, unreliability anc all Taek of sorilousness, Let us instead have the highest degree of mavivery of Ll = which ere . necessary in jill techniques ~ potatiea! anc teehnica c this great struggle. Just ay soldiers who cannot fire guny will not win wars, we can hardly expect the yvoecial revolution to be mace by people who cannot make specehes, write articles, type end duplicete,.

Workers are not Likely to ont rust solitical Peawe vhip to people who turn out illitera © ond illcgible leafle } Ooup Although «© declare the era of the small/fis over we are fortunate, indeed, that small groups of people - viry isolated in many casey ~ kept alight the flame of revolutionary marxism in the terrible cecondecs of the thirtios, fortics and fiftics Aithough our task is huge it is rwuch lighter than the birty and hes much greater, vous ibility of succes’, we should never forget the debt we ovwefand should seck to enulate their tenacity and principle, | flarx once said: "The philosphers have only intorpretod the wv orld, in various ways; the point, hovwev on. is to change it" (Phesis on Fouerbach). That is ceoxactly our task today: to go from intecrorcting to changing. “e can face this task with confidence and optimism - never before have our possibilities and potonticlitieys becn yo great. Today the relationship of foreces on a world scale iv more favoureble than ever before. Hovever, we should never forgct that our will-power and determination are objective freetors in the situction, Trotsky a has teucght us thet without Lenin's single-mindedness there vould have been no October Revolutions Ve ecnnot all be Leninys but we _ean seek to be ays cetermined and decisive as he was. But let us never forget ~ we hbaventt all the time in the worlc. t a Lot us go forward in the second stage of our evolution from a propaganda group to a league for revolutionary action}

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NOTES BY PETER PETERSON (1) The following esppearcd in THE BCONOMIST of Februc ry 20th, 1971: "THBY'RE JUST NOT INVESTING | The trickicst part of Mr, Berber's budget next month will be thinking up vayy of gectting industry to invest again, "MAlL the forccasts have been pointing to a slide in investment, but none of then sugrested one on the scale implied by the current drop in British ordery for machine tools, Provivsionally, the mechine tool industry thinky thet the value of ite domestic oracrs in the. last quarter of Laut year wes only 58% o0f their value st the same time in the previous year. When price rises are allowed for, the volume of orders has probably halved. Exyporty of machine tools, on the seme kind of caleulation arc down by between one-fifth and one» ° quarter, Tovwerds the end of lest year most machine tool men Were guevsing that total home orders were «<lown by about 30% but never by as much ay this, Sherp cutbecks are also being made in investeé~ " nent in othcr forny of plant. British Petroleum has gust postponed One new chemicel plent on which vork wes due to start this year, and has slowed down extensions being made to another; a few vwecks ago, Shell Chenicals did much the veme....." (2) It is interesting to compere the poxvition of British ca ,italisn with thet of Italy. If the crgunents of the basyves and governuent were correct one would think that Italy, vtrikeeridden os ib is, would be very badly off economically. On tne contrary, thiy is what the TIMES BUSINESS SUPPLEMENT had to say on February 26, 1S71s: : (In Italy) ".. the number of working days lost through + strikes in the last four months of 1969 was over three times ays great ay the United Kingdom's total in the whole of 1970 = itself the vorst year in Britain vince 1926 and cebout five times the annuel «verege for the first half of the 1960's, noes Organsect ton for Reondonic Comoperction end Development hes stimeated (Survey of Italy, 1970) that the loys of out sut in Ticly in 1969 ~mount d to 2% of gross national product, "recucing", they adc, "the advance in real GNP, in 1969 to cround 5%. That last . connent is enough to make the mouth vater of anyone concerned with the United Kingdom econony, In Britain in 1970 strikes may conceivably have cost the country o small pert of 14 0f GNP reducing the advance in real GNP to barely 2%! "Despite an 18=nonths standstill in industrial production to the end of 1L9OTO the OECD was still able to ex Gainate ond predict for Italy annual real growth rates of grovy domestic product at market prices of 4.8% in 1969, 644% in 1970 and 62% in L971. (OECD, BCONOLIC OUT LOOK, 8 December, 1970)." (3) Our opponents who broke with us on a "left" ticket have moved for to the right; | .

Posadas who refused to rennin in the Fourth Internetional because it would not accept the "inevitable end Gevirablo nuciear third world war theses," going as fer as cco laring his followers the real F.I., now sees workers states everywhere. His tiny groups support 48 TEED

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TO pe GO WW Om OD oct he military regimes in Bolivia and Peru. The fusion of Egypt, Syria na Sudan vay greeted at revsrevyenting the biggest advance vince the hinese revolution. Bach vpeech of Boumecdience iss combed for refers nees to "prove" that Algeria is moving tovards becoming a workers tate (I have not seen RED FLAG for e Few weeks, unybe thet process 3 conupleteo, according to Poyadas). From claining that the Chinese eadership would fuse with the Fourth International (vccond stage oyadist a he has now done a hop, skip and jump end Llended in a quare which proclains thet "there is strong evidence that the leaders oLlp of the Sovict Union draws politiecel inspiration from the vritengs of" » guess who =— "comrade Posnadas". At one stage he ge vies Fe e on the brink of saying thet this iv why the Russiecn bureaucracy ad inveded Cucchoslovakia - his Argentine group cid sey thet so he expelled then, yaying thet they were led by wild animals who, like wild aninals should be stransled and drowned, s The Lambe pt iste h.ve continued thoir evolution to the right. The group works mainly in the FO trade unions, which are the brain-child ld of a coldewar gylit in the French trade union movement, fineneed by the international department of the C10/AFL (and orobaoly the CTA) -~ that is not to say thet itg not a genuine trade union moviment, however. This group "celedroated"” the Perlis commune by o enniy ing g, meeting in collaboration with the Guy iollet SFIO .nd host of kincrec groups, including two Freemesons! lodges!

The Healvites evo lut ion to the right iv cisvguised by their ultrarevolutionary gjorgon,. Heovever, in the past few months the SLL hay gone couplete ly overboard on the "Labour Party to pover with «a sociciest programme line", They compare phe clection of such a jovernuent teen o general strike — with the Peris Counune! Their line of general strike leading to a Labour Covernnent With « socialist proe ranne should be seen in light of Trotsky's remarks on the nature of general strike - yee note (8). 203 9 tf p. (4) The ECONOMIST of 3 April, 1971, noted that the receysion had officially already begun:

Peeethe expected profile for the cconony in the year aheac, which energces from the detailed tables in the Trensury's Financail State. ment is important and strange. Firvt, the Treasury reports that the long-~forecayvt British receysion has alrecdy begun. It calculates that real GDP in this first half of 1971 is aircady running some 4% below GDP in the last half of 1970, end the 3.1% rise forecast bet ween now ond the first helf of 1972 therefore yitartys from this dcepressed level. Secondly, the rise in vs pending ayvocicted with this 3.1% rise in GDP is expected to concentrate in precisely the two least desirable sectors, The biggert forecast of all between the first helves of 1971 and 1972 is for a 6.443 rise in the volume of dmoorts, against only a 2.3% rise forecast in exporty; as the rive in import prices (cs pecially of oil) must be added to ‘this, the im pl iention is thet the Government iy expecting yome bad yety of monthly trade figures in the year nhead =~ although it cpverently trusts thet Britain's everebuoyant inv is ible receipts, plus some further rise in export prices, will keep the current balance of payments in the bleck..." aed liost of the financial experty do not expect the budget to decisively alter the trend. The SUFDAY TIMES BUSINESS NEWS is typical: 49

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MweuY THe BUDGET VAS NOT ENOUGH "The Bucget did not go far enovgh, Unemployment anc spore capacity will continue to grow through 1971 and 1972 unless the Choaneclior telkes further expasnionary meesures, These ore the conclusions of the posteBudget cconomic forceeast prepared for BUSITDESS NES oy Profeysor Jim Ball and Terry Burns of the Loncon Buyinexs Senool, "Output will continue to grow at a rate vignificantly below the erovth of capacity, and once again, they argue, tne Treasury has o over=estinctcd the short-term effect of a Budget. “utout this year will be only 1.4 ! above last yeer, which itvclf was only 1.5% above 1969. Ane the inercese in production for the whole of 1972 will be only a further 2.5% comoared vith the over 3% envisaged by Barber, "The Pudget will also heve Little effect on the battle against inflation, The cut in SET will not bring about any g.nceral reducte ion in pricey, which this yesr will average 73 above 1970. Next , year aysuming oa Voge rate increase settling down at 9 , prices should increase by 5.3%4 But Bell and Burns are o,tinmiviic about the balance of payments. Theybelieve foreigners will react only slowly to rising Biitish prices, The current account surylus is estimated at £570 million in 1971 end £550 million next yoore.." Lith April, 1971, isvsuce . (5) In passages preeeding I have incorporated yvone, but not all, of OO’ sucegestions made to me by comrade Singh, 1 (6) In points preeeding I have incorporated passages yvuggested by conrede Matthews, 0S (7) It is interesting to read wheat Trotsky scid about the transite ional programme in "Discussion on the Transitional Program" and "Moro Discussion on the Transitional Program" (VRITINGS OF LEON TROTSKY ~ 1938-9). Here are sone of the key passages: "The revolutioncries clways consider that the reformy and ac uivite » ions are only o by-product of the revolutionary struggle. IF we vary thet we will only demand what they can give, the ruling clays will give only onextenth or none of Whet we cemond, When we cenand more and can impoye our demands, the capitalists are compelled to give tire maximum, The more extended and militant the spirit of the vorkers, the more is demanced and von." | "nverywhere I ask what should we do? Meke our program fit the objee ive situation or the mentality of the workers? and I believe tha this cuestion must be put before every courade who says that this program iy not fit for the Anerican yituation, This program is a scientific program, It is based upon an objective analysis of tne objective situation, It cannot be understood by the vorkers as a whole, It would be very good if the vanguard would understand it in the next period and that they would then turn anc say to the vorkers, "You must save yourselves from fascisu.” what co we understand by objective vituntion? Here wo must analyse the objective conditions for a socinl revolution, These concitionys are given in the works of Morxelngelis and remain in their cvvence unchenged todaye...." 30 TR