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“) 9 FROM A PROPAGANDA GROUP TO A IRAGUD FOR PRYOLUTIOWARY ACTION (This dccunent is in politic,] solidsrity with the "Contribution to the Discussion on West Eurupeen Perspectives" and the recent United Secretariat document on the "Construction of Mass Revolutionary Parties in Capitelist Europe". It does not, therefore repeat the ergunents contained in those statements. ) The aim of this paper is to help to give a precise orientation for the organisat~ ion in the coming few years. Such a precise organiation is a vital necessity for a& revolutionary group so that it knows where it is going and can make maximum use of its limited resources, We have lacked such an orjentation since we ‘ceased to see the building of a left wing in the Labour Party as our basic strategic task, This is not intended to be a deep analytical document but instead will argue some basic propositions upon which my Jine of reasoning in advancing the orientat~ jon i:3 based, The appendices are intended to round out this series of propositions, However, in the coming year or so the JNTSRNATIONAL will have to carry material making a deeper analysis to underpin these propositions, These propositions are: (1) British imperialism is in a chronic crisis which has no immediate solution nor even hope of amelioration. The relative and absolute decline!’ itish imperialism has been one of the major political processes of the twentieth century.
British inperialism commenced the 2Cth century with an empire upon which "the sun never set" - today, direct colonialism is confined to off-shore isiands like the Falklands and historic accidents like Gibraltar, British imperialism hac an almost neo-colonialist relationship, through huge investments, with much of Latin Amerisa, the Middle Fast and even many countries in Europe ~ today United States and. to increasing extent, newer competitors like Germany and Japan have largely repiaced EHriteain in this ficld, The Eritisn navy once ruled the seas and the Britisa eirferce ari army were anongst the strongest in the world — today British nilitery power bas declined to ouch an extent that the sending of a few thousand troops to Northern Ireland threw it into a crisis, However, it would be a mistake to think that British imperialism is dead or on the point of demise - only the British working cless will put e final end to "nerfidious Aibion". Through neo-colonialist forms 6f éxploitation huge trib-= ute is still exacted from former colonies and other under-~devoped countries. When the relationship of forces is favourable British imperialism will show its decayed and gnaried teeth: the Nizerian civil war, the invasio: of Anguilla show its true character. But Suez was its final fling in trying to hold back the wheel of history by direct force on a massive scale, The drastic and rapid decline is show by its reaction to the recent events in Libya, The latter was one of British imperialisn's flew successes in the second world war, in fact the country is a creation of British imperialism, Yet the new regime was able to order Britain out of the bases with scarcely a murmur from Whitehall. (2) British imperialism's economic, political and social institutions were built on the basis of its yvorld dominant position ~ hence their archaic and parasitic features, Now tne basis for these institutions has almost completely eroded they are thrown into a deep structural crisis in adapting themselves to the new situatfon, British industry, long protected by imperiai preferences,now has to fight for markets against more modern opponents; it has been ill-equipped to do this because of the chronic under-investment caused by investors preference for higher yielis in the empire, The city no longer finds itself monopolising currency, commodity and insurance transactions. The balance of payments position is less and jess shielded by investment incones, The Tory Party, once the great champion of the "Joliy Old British Eapire" and social stability now tries to posture as a modern European party with a mildly refornist policy, The Labour Party, once the party of reform, is now incapable of carrying out tho mildest reforms; since coming to power it has made the poor poorer (see the CPAG report) and breaks the record with unemployment figures; its record on the social servicos e.g., housing,is appalling even by Tory standards, The other major party of the past, the Liberal Party, is reduced to comic opera status, compelled to put up television personalities in an attempt to win a few parliamentary seats, and compelled to tolerate an extremely radical youth organis~ ation - a far cry from the days when its leader, Lloyd George, was the most intelligent representstive of British imperialism at the height of its power, None of these parties has an arser to the crisis - principally because there is none - and all are thrown into a crisis just trying to find « policy to ameleriote the position. The two principal reasons for the crisis are both aspects of the
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development of the world revolutionary process; Dsatain's decline vis-a-vis we colonial revolution, other imperielisms and the workers states; and the changed relationship of forces between employers and workers in Britain itself, About the first factor, British imperialism, its institutions and parties can do nothing except react as the process develops. It will, furthermore be difficult to change i aot forces between the working class and the bourgeoisie in Britain the relationg 4. in the presenefesntext. (3) The iatest attempt to solve this crisis (or at least ameliorate it) - the Wilson Labour Government - has been an almost complete failure, Its sole major "success" - that of temporarily improving the balance of paymants position - has been achieved mainly by attacking the living standards of the British people through monetary policies (especially the devaluation of the pound). However, the social function which the capitalist class hoped Labour would fulfil - that of instituting an incomes policy, thus incorporating the unions almost entirely into neocapitalist "planning", has beenfoiled by the resistance of the workers. The Labour Government has also failed in its attempts to change decisively the the relation-= ship of forces between the working class and employers in particualr key industries ¢ - docks, motor cars, printing, etc. In this sense, the struggle against the antitrade union legislation, conducted under the leadership of the CP and certain sectors of the "left" trade union bureaucracy was a partial success. However, because * it was conducted under the leadership of these people there are greater), oES that a variant of the incomes policy: that of incorporating productivity, reeh Re wage bargaining will have some success, The other, though much less important, "success" of the Labour Government - that of helping to accelerate the rate of monopolisation of British industry is one of the clearest indications of the class politics of the Wilson Government, However, even this "success" has an obverse side: thebringing together of workers in larger units and huge intornational and national monopolies creates the objective basis for a development of class consciousness, A corollary of the increasing trend towards monopolisation has been moze and more combine shop stewards committees and working relations between different grouvs of trade unionists in particular industries. One of the results of all this has been the parity committee which, despite the disgusting behaviour of people like Scanlon, has been able to ring huge wage increases out of the employers, So even here the Labour Government's policies have reaped a very different harvest from the one it thought it was sewing. (4) The next possible attempt to solve the crisis of British imperialism - a"modern" Tory Government - seems no more likely to succeed. So much so that sections of bourgecis opinion are by no means certain that they want the Tories to win the next election, The position of the ECONOMIST is typical of this trond (see article attached as appendix). However, the ECONOMIST does not tell the whole tale: a possible variant of trying to solve the immediate problems of British imperialism would be to try to carry out a massive cut in the standard of living of the British people by huge cuts in social services, There would, of course, be less resistance to this form of reducing living standards than to the equivalent cut in wages.
However, even this solution would have its dialectic: the long term effects of cutting social services would give rise to a deeper and more directly social opposition to capitalism. The Tory Government, because of its traditions and composition s would have less difficulty than a Labour Government in carrying out this kind of operation, It could even mobilise a great deal of "public support" by a massive campaign against'scroungers,! However, there is no body of opinion in Britain which really thinks that the Tories have the answer to Britain's crisis. (5) Thus we have a perspective of continuous crisis - economic, social and political - with no bourgeois leadership capable of presenting a decisive policy for solving it in the immediate future. The usual solution in such a situation: a Labour Government has been tried and found wanting. At present no bourgeois leadership (or its agencies) scems likely (or capable of) an outright confrontation with the working class. Some tendencies automatically assume that the TUries will begin an immediate attack on the trade unions, if returned in the next election. They would, of course, feel more confident than Wilson does now but they seem too astute to lightmindedly begin a process which will rapidly result in mass struggles against them. Wo can never preclude the possibility of the enemy making a mistake but on balance it scems unlikely that the Tories will assist us in this respect. (6) This crisis will almost certainly be intensified by a number of factors: = renewed balance of payments difficulties because of the U.S. recession (one of Britain's best export markets) and expected big increases in imports to rebuild stocks of raw materials which have been excessively run down in the last period; also there is likely to be a cost push inflationary pressure which effect prices Ox: exports.
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a” @&) = - structura’ preblems which will be worsonea by eny slow-down Im vue evencmys regional imbalance, the problem of Northern Ireland, inability to absorb the black populatzon, the contradictions in all branches of education (see apendix). - the growing alienation of the young, (7) Such problems are not new and in the past the leadersnips of the traditional workers orgaiisations - both right and "left" - have always come to the rescue of capitalism, when it has faced them; by diverting and heading off struggles, However, there are a number of indications that these leaderships are less and less able to do this in this = iod: - the inability of the Labour Government to impose an incomes policy and the hagt that it had to withdraw the nenal clanses, - the inability of the right wing trade union leaders to stop militant Bio against the Labour Government and employers; strike figures are eloquent testimony to this ° - the decline in the grip of the Communist Party over militants which has acted as a second line of defence for the trade union bureaucrats in demobilising workers struggles. The importance of the Communist Party's influence and role is shown by the way it controlled the one-day strikes last year, On the other hand, the recent miners strike showed that its former dominant position in this field has declined and that the process is continuing. The CP was unable to stop its members from calling for the resignation of its nominee for NUM secretary, Lawrence Daly. - the fact that the young people of today have contempt for the leaderships of the traditional workers organisations, There is no indication that young: . .trade unionists take the leaders of their orgonisations seriously (right or "left"), In anothcr sphere we can note that the membership of the LPYS and YCL has drastically declined since the rise of the youth vanguard, But it would be a mistake to think that the seciai democrats and stalinists have lost completely their ability to disarm the working class, At this point in time the staze is rips for anothor variant of the social role of the bureaucracy of the vorkers organisations: that of "lett" social democracy in opposition making loud noises agsinst an overtly anti-worling class Tury Yovernmeni. But there are big limite ‘so the viability of such a maneouvre: at the present stage anything likely to tr oo off mass actions by the working class presents the possibility of uncontroliedtand unstonpable struegies breaking oute<Labour-<in opposition would have to be enraful how fiercely it criticised the Tories! (8) . ‘ination of 2 semi-permanent crisis situation with the inability of any bourgeois leadership to solve it, and the fact that the leaderships of the traditional workers organisations are less and less able to disarm the workers and youth, means we can look fonyard to a whole period of political, economic, industrial and social struggles, leading in some cases to explosions, It would be rash to predict the certainty of a "May" in Britain in the coming year or so but certainly we have to do all in our pover to be prepared for really stormy struggles which can break out very suddenly and be violent.
This is not to say that the level of working class consciousness has transcended an "economist" outlook. Whilst, on the one hand, there is a tremendous accunulated discontent, on the other, there has been, amongst older workersesrecially, a decline in the level of consciousness, This is due to the treachery of the Labour Party leadership and the failure of a mass left to appear. However, the key thing is that more ard more sections of workers are prepared to struggle. The task of the vang-= uard is to use these struggles to develop socialist consciousness anongst more and more layers of workers; hence the importance of inserting transitional demands into these struggles which always raise the question of workers power.
This state of continuous crisis, with upsurges and even explosions, can continue for @ protracted period but not indefinitely, Sooner or later a shift one way or the other will have to come. There will be a growing tendency in the ruling class to look for a solution via the creation of some kind of "strong state". An obvious ex-= ample would be a Tory Government, with a huge majority and strogPowellite tendencies to give itself 2 mass base, which plecge itself to "deal with the unions and the troublemakers". Another possible model would be a coalition Government brought into existence after some severe crisis, However, the"strong state" will not be brought into existence unless the working class has suffered big defeats. It must - be noted, however, that one of the forms of a defeat for the workers to accept big cuts in their living standrrées without a fight - the imposition of the Gaullist regime in France is an example of this, A workers solution to the present crisis vould require a conscious leadership. None of the existing organisaticns is anything like approaching this and there is no sign
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of such a leadership crising "spontancotsly”" fro the present struggles. In fact, it is only the strength of the workers organisations and the world-wide favourable relationship of forces which has prevented . big defeats from being inflicted on the workin; class in the period since the second world war, lack of a leacership, even a most primitive kind, has prevented the working class from gaining anything like it could from the present favourable conjunctural circunstances. Sooner or later, unless a leadership is built defeats will be inflicted upon the workine class and the way will be open for an evolution to the right in British politics.
Thus we have at most a few years to help to create a conscious leadership, largely from our own efforts. The alternative is clearly a decisive defeat for the working class and a period of reaction, In the longer term one can say that in the next few decades (maybe only one or two) we must create a conscious leadership in the advanced capitalist countries, capable of winning the struggle for power, or the likely alternative is disaster for mankind (say through a nuclear war). (9) If the bourgeoisie has a crisis of leadership one can say that the workers movenent is in a worse state, Our strategy of “Labour to Power" was premised upon the assumption that a period of L-bour Government would lead to the emergence of a mass left-wing within the Labour Party, this leading to a split, the left wing of which would provide the bais for a further evolution towards a revolutionary party, This has not taken place because of the impotence of reformist schemes in a period of capitelist crisé and the consequent confusion and demobilisation. The beahaviour of sectors of the left was an important contributing factor: part of the traditjional (ex-Bevanite left joined Wilson in attacking the working class (Barbara Castle is now chief advocate of the incomes policy), another part limited itself to impotent gestures, whilst evolving to the right just one pace to the left of Wilson (Paul Rose now castigates the Governnent for capitulating to the Libyans by withdrawing from the bases) and SLL chose to pull out of the Labour Party immediately after Wilson was elected (nlthough it must be noted that its policy had been galloping in that direction for 2 or 3 yeats.. The betrayals of the Labour Government and the impotence of the major left forces to oppose its rightwerd evolution had far-reaching effects in demoralising for a period whole layers of Labour Party and trace union activists. Thus the left wing of the Lebour Party was weakened by the L-.bour Government and many thousands of activists were either demoralised or “virtually depoliticalised (althouch carryine-on- their trade—umion activities), The Communist Party has been quite unable to make any real advances in a period which one might have thought would be extremely favourable to it. It has gone further to the right putting all its e:gs in the basket of "unity of the left"; this meaning an alliance with the 'left'trade union leaders and parliamentarians. As these gentlemen have evolved to the right the CP has been dragged along. Among the youth and intellectuals of the CP, the international crisis of Stalinism has had a devastating effect, Thus in a period of rising’ trade union struggles and the radicalising of wide layers of youth the CP's membership and influence has gone down. fis noted by the recent CP conference its membership fell by 6% ond sales of the Morning Star by 5,000 in the last two years. The YCL lost no less that 37% of its membership in the year leading up to its conference last summer, The Socinlist Labour League, despite its considerable technical achievement in bringing out a 5-times a week newspaper, has been quite unable to jump out of its sectarian. skin. It hac the chance with the launching of this paper to make a turn - there are even signs that at least sectors of its leadership recognise the need for a turn, hence the Vietnam campaign - however, instead it has continued to concentrate its main efforts on justifying its refusal to work with other tendencies and in particular its separation from the world Trotskyist movement. It is likely to make individual gains curing the coming struggles but its ability to hold these whilst it continues its sectarianism is extremely doubtful. It too has lost members since the election of the Labour Government and while reliable figures are hard to come by it is useful to compare the SLL's own figures for participation on its demonstrations. These show a real cecline as highlizhted by its January llth demonstration where SLL forces amounted to less than 1,000 (probably many leas +. it must be noted that the WORKERS PRESS claimed a total of 1,500 including the IS, VSC and IMG contingents) after many weeks of preparation and propaganda. In the past the SLL has always brought out a minimum of 2,000 on such efforts and sometimes Many more, But more important is the fact that the SLL with its present policies will be quite unable to make the qualitative breakthrough which is required to construct a revolutionary leadership in Britain.
The International Socialism group made considerable gains in membership during the latter part of 1967 and the beginning of 1968, then stagnation set in. As could be (and was) predicted the effect of trying to build an all-embracing organisation on ff ; SN a
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ew @ einctpled basis pro@uved & SWiiipe IS i8 deeply Oppurbiuslol iii viase avata 1% ma ree its alogene and programme in face of a low political level among the people it is trying to influence. ‘This is the basic explanation of why ae has adopted a deeply economist approach in trade union activities and for its disastrous fiasco of intervention in Northern Ireland. ‘The latter case 28 extremely instruct~ ive and has been well documented by the Workers Fisht tendency. At all stages in this affair because it hoped to convert Peoples Democracy to the Trish TS it capitilated to PDis political backwardness. This reached its peak when IS refused to call for the withdrawal of British troops from Ireland and attacked those taniiencies that did, This is highly instructive because the real test of/tendency is the way it ochav.ies in important crisis situations, By this example alone (ond there are others) IS demonstrated its incapacity to provide a revolutionery leadership to struggles unless it basically alters its policies. Having said this it must be noted that IS reflects something in the movement - the pressure of radicalised petty bourgeois sectors which are hostile to adiswiplined political programme; this mood has a real echo among the radicalised youth and not just among petty pourgeois!'.
Hence until a really authoritative revolutionary organisation is developed IS is likely to be with us and could even grow in particular situations. it must also be noted that IS scems to be trying to commit political suicide by adopting a more and more anti-student, anti-youth vanguard policy. However when the full fruits of es this become apparent it is likely that the empiricists in the leadership of IS wi make a turn, Finaatly it has become nore and nore apparent that wider and wider sectors of the left are recognising IS as a non-serious organisation and seems it may have taught youth militants a negative lesson in respect to organisational principles.
Solidarity has made gains in the last period, especially from the disillusioned jibertarians who left IS because of its alleged adoption of democratic centralisne It has done serious and useful work in several industrial struggles (notably Fords and the squatters campaign. However, it too is a prisoner of its own dogmes and, in fact, its vory success have led to a further fragnentation in practice. Now it has goveral local bases it is establishing local papers which are quite free to put forward any policy they like. A cryStal ball is not necessary to see where this will leed, Solidarity may give a lead to local struggles but is quite unable to even begin the job of constructing a national leadership, Many of the militants in Solidarity will probably find their way to the revolutionary perty of the future, via the process of-splits and fusions. ‘We snoutd, therefore, seck to have“working relations with then.
The Communist Party of Britain (M/L), which contains a number of important industrial militants and has succeeded in stabilising itself to the extent of having a regular printed monthly paper, a bookshop and a headquarters, seemed a likely contender for the hegenony of the Mcoist forces in Britain. This has not come to pass and the CPB's addiction to the thoughts of chairman Mao and the beacon of socialism in Hurope ~- Albania - is not the only explanantion of this failure. The CPB's industrial militants have not been able to work out a separate strategy for thenselves. Indeed, Reg. Birch and the group around hin seem to be able to keep their union positions only on the basis of their personal records of militancy and combinations with other forces: (not always of the left!). Some hundreds of potential revolutionary militants are trapped in the CPB and other Maoist groupings and are thus abstracted out of the process of building a revolutionary leadership in Britain, The Chinese leadership sees these groups (in all countries) as pawns in its struggle with the Moscow bureaucrats. It is not interested in forming a mass party but one which will pay its respects to Chairman Mac. Thus the Maoist nilitants sre prisoners of their dependence on Peking and will suffer continuous frustration in thoir endeavours to build up influence in this country. They are likely to get real surprises emanating from Peking in the form of sharp shifts in policy.
Despite their rabid anti-Trotskyism it is important for us to maintain unity in some action at least with the serious Macist militants, The Revolutionary Socialist League has continued to work patiently at its Labour Party work, It would claim to have notched up some considerable success in the oe —— Young gry uae and in the labour movement generally on the Morsey— e However, most cf these successes exist on paper only: despite i i position in the LPYS it has neither stopped the rata ddofine oe ie chpeiada tice nor converted it into an organ of even the most modest struggle. Transport House is unlikely to be worried by the paper resolutions of the LPYS whilst its main act~ ivities are selling raffle tickets and canvassing, The coming General Election is likely to cause a crisis within the RSL - which should do a little to exacerbate) as they are faced with the difficulty of getting their members to canvass for Labou in a virtually uncritical manner, Because the RSL is a passive organisation which comments rather than tries to intervene it will be unabie to play a role in mass struggles. However, we should note that the RSL too has made sharp turns in its orientation and we should certainly follow its activities and policies,
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OO ™ ee — Wy ‘ C494-2 “ 2 . oo EA f With a great fleurish ena rolling of drums, unipusi Inunched the Soctalist Charter> This has turned out to be nothing more (and perhaps less) than Victory for Socialism Whilst it represented a step forward insofar as it conceded the necessity for the : left to organise within the Labour Party, its main function hes been to organise a discredited forn of activity: arranging the victory cf Soctalist Charter candidates in selection conferences, etc, Of ccurse, there has to be sone trappings: conferences, participation in demonstrations with huge banners and tiny contingents, etc.
But the real purpose of the Socialist Charter - ensuring the return of more “lett parliamenterians has been show by attempts to democratise its structure. Clearly, the enthusiastic welcone Siven to Socialist Charter by the MILITANT was wishful thinking, The trede union "lefts" have shown no sign ofdoing more than speaking at MORNING STAR rallies and adopting a more sensitive policy in industrial struggles. Apart from the gesture by the TGWU in announcing that its panel of MPs would be reviewed the Jones, Secanlons and even Jenkins have not ventured into the political arena, It is clear thet the "left" trade union leaders have no intention of using their great power in the Labour Party - from affiliation, etc. - to present a real challenge to Wilson, ‘The degeneration of Lawrence Daly is a terrible warning to those who would see "left" trade union leaders playing a major role in developing a left 1 — J . ™ & uch JC es + x in the labour movement, ping ai ternative > (10) The situation of the left would be extremely gloomy if it were not for the coming on to the scene of a new force: the youth vanguard, Before going on it must be said that this youth vanguard in Britain is small and backward by comparison with other countries, The recent resurgence of student struggle and the inevitability of @ huge crisis in all fields of education indicate that this youth vanguard will grow and cevelop in the next few years, It is also a question of what we, and other left organisations, do to help this growth and development, The youth vansuard has cone into existence with the following characteristics: (s) it has emerged quite outside the framework of the traditional workers organisations s (b) it has been inspired by the Vietnamese and Cuban revolutions in particular and anti-imperialist struggles in general; (ec) it tends to be anti-imperialisi, anti-capitalist, anti-Stalinist and is contenptuous of reformism; : 7 7 (a) it tends to equate organisation with bureaucracy; °4 it has been unable to create any stable organisations of its own; and (f) it is very internationalist oriented and longs for unity with the working class.
Its full potentiality. in Britain was shown by the size of the October 27th, 1968, demonstration, Of the 100,000 on that demonstration a big majority were youth and various samples collected indicate that about 2/3 of the participants were for the overthrow of capitalism. With all this is mind it is not surprising that nearly all the increase in size of the left groups has come HERES mileu. Only the CP and SLL (for different reasons) have failed to make substantial inroads. It is also clear that with the paave charactoristics we have a vast potential for growth and increase in influence¥ a ave only just begun to scratch the surface of, Even the negative features give us the opportunity to speak to thousands about basic Marxist theory (on the construction of 2 party, democratic centralism, etc.) where before we spoke to tens or hundreds. This phenomenon is not merely quantitative: it amounts to us being harmony with a whole social layer. ® (11) In addition to the new youth vanguard other likely re-inforcements exist for the revolutionary potential of the British working class: These are: (a) The black workers who are overwhelmingly young proletarians and who are completely alienated from all the traditional parties of British capitalism (see appendix) (b) Women workers who are becoming more and more unionised and conscious of the double exploitation they suffer. The conscious factor is very important and the influence of the growing woemn's liberation movement is likely to be explosive among the young. Housewives, who will directly face the consequences of growing inflation, are likely to be drawn in too, The Government's "Equal Pay" law, even assuming it is not shelved after the General Election, has 211 kinds of anomalies and will even worsen the position of some women, Its application and the expectations that it has aroused will help to strengthen militancy rather than damp it down providing there is some kind of leadership - even an economist one, “linet (c) newly unionised sectors. It is one of the many contradictions of modern capitalism that previously conservative sections of the working class ~ public employees, administrative staff, etc., can become very militant, very quickly. Such sectors tend to fall behind in the wages race precisely because of their previous lack of militancy, Not having a history of struggle they are not held back by leaders with a former "left" prestige. Lastly, as neo-capitalism is forced to rationalise more
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O '~ and more these scctions fecl the presemmes ul the epced uy, ote, This not only creates general discontent it "proletarianises" them by knocking out of their heads their former ideas of higher social status, (a) the Irish immigrant population. As explained elsewhere, the problem of Northern Ireland has no acceptable solution in foreseeable circumstances. The sending of trrops, the granting of niggling reforms and lack of leadership has enabled the Government to temporarily dampen down last year's struzgles. But already the relative stability is breaking down, If a reali mass campaign could be developed in this country - even something as modest as the VSC in its best days - a really explosive situation would develop. The Irish in this country, who in their large majority support the oppressed Catholics, are bound by a million strands to the situation in Ireland, The siturtion in the Republic, already very volatile,is likely to be stirred up by a recession and developments in the nationalist movement. The Irish in this country are mainly workers in industry, building, etc. andtend already to be more militant than their “nglish counterparts.
All the above sectors, together with the youth, share two common characteristics: they will be relatively harder hit by a recession 4nd they are more volatile in crisis situations, Their specific weight in the coming struggles will, therefore, be much greater than their numerical proportion would indicate, (12) The IMG has been in existence for just over five years;although one can say that it only became a national entity during the latter half of 1966 and the first half of 1967 as the Vietnam campaign developed, Essentially its first task was, starting from scratch, to lay the foundations of British section of the Fourth International. - this task being forced upon us by the degeneration of the main stream of Trotskyism in this country, Starting off with inexperienced and heterogenous forces - virtually confined to one town for a period - it has achieved certain basic tasks which made its recognition as a section possible at the last world congress (a) trebled its size (hopefully by the time of the conference quadrupled):on the basic of a big qualititative improvement in membership commitment (by a process of development, selection and the splitting off of groups wich were opposed to democr-= atic centralism); (b) established itself as an national entity, thus demonstrating very hater that the SLL isnot the only Trotskyist force in the firerds-~ (c) intervened in and even initiated struggles which have a national impact, especially the creation of VSC, which helped to alter the course of British politics; (a) accumulated a very modest infra-structure: a national office, full-timer, etc, However, we must be objective and assess Our present stage as that of being essentially a propaganda group. Obviously from the situation described previously this is . quite inadequate - what can a propaganda group do in the case of big industrial struzgles (in particular a general strike)? If we are to play our role in the historic task of helping to bring into existence a revolutionary leadership we have to transcend being a propaganda group.
We are, in a sense, in a vicious circle just now: our ability to intervene in the many struggles and even explosions which are inevitable in the coming years is strictly limited by our small sizes; and yet unless we can intervene in this kind of struggle we will find it difficult to grow in size and influence, The example of the Northern Ireland struggle last summer, where we could not send someone over until 2 or 3 months after the main action and where we were incapable of taking the political initiative, is a warning, We will not automatically grow in size and influence in even the most militant struggles, Put another way we can say that unless in the coning years we can go from being a propeganda group to? league for revolutionary acticn the opportunity may be lost for a whole period. Moreover, other larger groups are likely to grow in the coming situation, thus making the long-term job of building ea revolutionary leadership that much harder, Our essential task is to use the few years! breathing space that we have - which will keep us many opportunities - to make the qualitative leap from a propaganda group to a league for revolutionary action - this is the only way to break the vicious circle, (13) By a league for revolutionary action I mean an organisation capable of initiating campaigns in an increasing number of fields, able to intervene in most of the important political processes and able to take the initiative in the decisive strug~ gles, It is not yet a revolutionary party - it is not substantial enough and has not yet got the support of a decisive section of the working class. However, because it is seen as a serious force by the whole left it can act as an important pole of attrection which militant workers will respect. It is, furthermore, an organisation which already poses the question of the formation of the revolutionary party by a
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quantitative growth and qualitative development through fusfons und regroupments.
A propaganda group is restricted on most questions to commenting and trying to infl-~ uence the programmes and actions of the principal forces actually playing a role in the struggle. Of course, it is quite possible for a propaganda group to take initiatives and even lead campaigns in particular fields; however these are the ex~ ceptions and due to the coincidence of favourable circumstances or untypical relationships of forces in limited sectors. in example of the latter being our leadership of the Vietnam struggle in Britain. ts) The prerequisites for a league for revolutionary action are: a) to have a substantial number of disciplined militants organised along Bolshevik lines - able to act as one man in a crisis or decisive struggle; iP to be/national body with functioning cells in all the important centres; (c) to have a nationally known press which puts forward a clear line on all the | important political issues of the day and which all sections - friend and foe respect and take into consideration; (ad) to have a strong centre able to dispose of considerable resources which can be “ thrown into decisive struggles s : (e) to have a political leadership whichhas a worked out perspeutive of action and " authority within the league and respect without. J (15) The IMG clearly has a very long way to go to reach these objectives, but the writer is convinced that we have both the possibility and the necessity to travel this path in the next few years » after that it may be too late for a whole period.
Conecretely, the achievement of the following aims over the next year would constitute & qualitative advance towards this objective. Their achievement would, furthermore, decisively change the relationship of forces between us and the other groups thus making the next stage of development relatively easier: te the doubling of our size as from conference; ») the creation of twice the number of branches and groups as we have now; with the systematic attempt to create mucleii in the major industrial towns; (c) the creation of a strong centre based upon a core of professional workers, mak- | ing an intelligent division of labour possible and giving us the possibility of | intervening far more ag¢cressively-in.decisive struggle as they come up 3 . te the creation of a viable autonomous youth organisation; (e) the establishment of a large circulation weekly political newspaper, capable of issuing agitational material in important struggles; the same paper acting as the league organiser; (f) the establishment of more of the»Bolshevik norms of internal life: a functioning political leadership, which gives continuous day-to-day leadership via a structured POLITICAL discussion, ideological work via a theoretical journal and special publications and an internal bulletin; @) the creation of a meaningful national trade union fraction, with a public face; h) the establishment of a viable publishing house; i) the establishment of an educational department; (j) the establishment of national caucuses, which are know and functioning, in the fields of: 1) Women's works - 2) black work; and 2 3) teaching (in its widest sense); : (k) helping VSC to achieve a minimum necessary infra-structure to enable it to retain * its hegemony of the anti-imperialist wing of the anti-Vietnam war movement by continuing to organise united front-type mass activities while ever the war continuess (1) in view of-our international possibilities and the fact that the Middle East coule become the "Vietnam" of the early 1970's, create a nuclues - based upon our Arab comrades and others designated to that activity - which will enable us to move uickly into a dominant position in this field; (m) the creation of an Irish caucus - based upon Irish comrades - to enable us to intervene in the.coming struggles in this field; (n) the establishment of a sound financial structure based upon the pledge system and strict budgeting,. (16) The reiterntion of all the things we should be doing is not, of course, an orientation. In the past we have had central focuses which enabled our comrades to orient themselves in a unified national manner. These were Labour Party work and Vietnam work, The former gave us an instrument through which to mediate our endeav~ ours in a variety of cempaigns: the left wing of the Labour Party. The latter gave us a dynamic andnationally known campaign with which we could insert ourselves in / various mileu: the labour movement, student movement, putting pressure on the CP and YCL, forcing other groups into 2 united front, etc. ~ t/
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a Se ai ae Ui Neither of these two orientations is sufficient u-we ebviously we can no longer focus everything around the Labour Party; the Vietnam issue isnot sufficent in this respect because: (a) there are a large variety of other campaigns in which we must be active; and (b) the youth vanguard has matured and is no long prepared tc be limited to singleissue campaigns.
Moreover, we must note that our special relationship to Vietnam work corresponded to a certain stage of our development: our small size prevented us from taking up a variety of issues and, for Vietnam work, we had access to resources far beyond our means. We must also note that our ability to force a united front on other groups was also partially because these groups did not see us so much as a competitor as they do now, Several of them, particuaarly IS, saw the reldionship as being one where we did the work and they reaped the benefits.
What then is the central focus which will enable us to intervene in all these fields and yet not just dissipate our efforts? This focus, I would suggest, is the concept of our need to go from being a propaganda group to a league for revolutionary action, The means to express this focus should be two-fold: (a) the rapid creation of the youth organisation; and (b) the building up of the large circulation weekly newspaper. (But with the rider that there should be a continuous campaign to recruit people to the IMG and to build new branches, ) (17) There is to be another document on the youth organisation and I do not want to duplicate what might be said there. However, it is essential to the theme of my argunent to say that the youth organisation should be seen as a cadre organisation with a high level of commitment able to intervene in and extensively recruit from the youth vanguerd, In a certain sense, one might say that the youth organisation is - in its original projected form, anyway - a special device to enable us, as it were, to ‘enter’ the youth vanguard.
This being the case, then the forces vitally necessary for us to intervene and build nucleii in all the,fields I have listed will be gained directly from the youth organigation. In the main our interventions in mass struggles will be mediated through the youth organisation, which will go-directly-to those engaged in struggle, The winning of several hundred cadres through the youth organisation will give us the K young workers for the trade union base, the young black workers, the Irish, Arabs, women unionisis, etc. (18) Detailed examination of the practical steps necessary to establish the weekly political newspaper fall outside the scope of this document. Its exact character and launching will be determined by processes very difficult to predict exactly at this stage. However, I am inclined to say that it would be wrong to build it up as a& youth paper, Whilst the youth organisation would use the weekly paper as its face to the outside world it would also need a specifically youth paper - say a monthly which would cater for the special needs of the organisation. This would enable us to avoida clash between the paper serving the league and the one serving the youth organisation, The political weekly would be the means of intervening, locally and nationally, in all manner of struggles and political processes. Local branches would both centre their activities around the distribution of the paper and use it for their particular needs. A paper of this kind would be the means whereby the league could express itself massively and .quickly on the important issues of the day. The editorials of the weekly would become both directives and political guides for the members of the league, the youth organisation and sympathisers,.
There is huge scope for such a paper providing it is well written, technically good and organised properly. This makes some form of collaboration with other forces essential until we have grown (and recruited these forces). (19) The campaign to go from being a propaganda group to becoming a league for revolutionary action should start immediately after the conference. Once having taken the major decisions, each unit should draw up a plan to apply them in its locality or field of work, Conditions would vary from place to place but where we are properly established the organising of a large public meeting to launch the youth organisation (rnd later the papers; or vice versa according to circumstances) would seem to provide a focus for activities. At the seme time to enable us to make the growth in membership, etc. possible a plan would have to drawn up for real contact work; not merely the sending of letters or inviations to meetings. The branch or group should have a project or recruiting a given number of people over a period and a short list drawn up to work on. Then visting should eb organised.
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ib Es combos ‘wat-aiso capable-of.working jwith sectors of. the-labour moyement. Lenin said . .j a4 =— ee ehcp as: age \ etter eb eee era (20) This orientation by no means envisages thé chuedenecs.t of our central concept for the necessity for there to be some structural fragmentation of the traditional workers organisationsfor a mass revolutionary party to be built. This question is ’ examined the United Secretariat resolution and it is only necessary to say here that what is being put forward here is a different idea as to how we can help to bring about that fragmentation, I am arguing that we will best help this process by putting pressure from the outside rather than by trying to bring about an organic development within, Our experience since the election of the Labour Government in 1964 shows ‘us that with the present relationship of forces the radicalisation of the working class tends to by-pass the actual Labour Party. In fact it can be clearly demonstrated that the Labour Party has shifted to the right appreciably since 1964.
This needn't necessarily be a permanent feature but it is difficult to envisage any circumstances where, in the next period, a mass left will grow in the Labour Party as a result of the radicalisation of the working class.
On the other hand, a league for revolutionary action would be a poie of attraction for some of the most advanced militants in the trade unions and maybe even the . - Lebour Party. The best thing for us would be to recruit some existing activists in ] these fields, We should, therefore, have a conscious policy of keeping a watch on developments in the Labour Party, ceaneul maintaining forces in the LPYS and i Socialist Charter. We should also continue to direct some propaganda towards the Labour Party. Such is the situation inside the Labour Party that worthwhile militants no longer have a shibboleth about working with people outside the party. In no way should we advocate that people resign from the party.
This flexible attitude is the one best suited to our present situation and the tasks that face us, (21.) To sum up, we have to do the ground work in the next year that will enable us to go from cormentary politics to the praxis of intervention. This in a period that will be charaterised by sharp turns and bewilderingly fast changes. Our major enemy | in this change of orientation will be conservatism, In our drive to build and change the nature of the organisation a further threat of organisational sectarianism faces us. We do not intend to assembie a cadre force as if motivated solely by a collect— ors mania. The cadres and the organisation must not only be capable of leading and to consider not only the short term needs and dictates of our present organisation but also the tasks that face us historically; the major one being the formation of a revolutionary party. It is for us to avoid the organisational sectarianism of IS and the SLL and build our organisation not in competition with but for the labour movement. + "polities begin with millions", in this pre-history "Dolitics"” we ‘have always a In conclusion, it must said that what it put forward in this docunent is very ambitious and will require a tremendous pace of activities, This will mean a radical break from the methods of thinking and activity inherited from the past. The era of the small group is now over; the main function of the Trotskyist movement in not any more that of preserving and defending a body of ideas against Stalinism and ormism, Today, the task is to rapidly set about the job of laying the basis for mass revolutionary parties. This in turns reflects the speed up in all political ‘ processes; a phenomenon which is gathering momentum. We have no choice in this nat= 5 ter ~ our situation is determined by objective processes over which we have no con= ». trol (even if we wanted to slow things down!) To paraphrase Truman: its going to be hot in the kitchen and those who don't like it hot had better abandon revolutionary 4 politics!
But there is more involved. It should be the aim of every revolutionary to live a full life which does the maximum to achieve what Lenin called the noblest task: the liberation of mankind, We are lucky: we live in a period when capitalism is in its final death agony and when its main props, social democracy and Stalinism, are both in mortal crisis.* Thus our efforts can achieve much more and be more frujzful than those of our predecessors who were active in less fortynate times, Thus we and our co-thinkers have the opportunity to really help bring about what Engels called mankind's leap from the barbarism of his prehistory to real humanity when man-— kind's history will really begins failure will exact a terrible price: at best the pus back of nankind for a whole historical era. Thus we must set about this task/utnost determination and a terrible energy. In this process formalism, egoism and pettiness must be swept aside and be replaced by the wonderful comradeship of revolutionaries setting about a vital task:
FORWARD FROM A PROPAGANDA GROUP TO A LEAGUE FOR REVOLUTIONARY ACTION! * Even if we are wrong about this, we must agree with Trotsky that “it is better to 4 have been a SpartacuSs+eecee” <