Zambian neo-colonialism

Zambian neo- colonialism Readers of "Africa in Struggle" will be well aware of the background to recent political developments in Zambia. These can be summarised briefly as follows: 1. The economy is at an all-time post-independence low. The main features of this are: (a) The price of copper, which accounts for more than 90% of exports stands now at approximately the same level as in 1965. Meantime import prices have increased 150%. The price recession has now lasted for four years. All but the most protitable mines are operating at a loss. No dividends have been declared for three years. The government, which is still paying for its 1969 takeover of a 51% stake in the mines, has therefore received no dividends from its investments. (b) Transportation difficulties have compounded the problems. The Benguela railway to the port of Lobito on the Atlantic, which used to carry more than half the country's trade, has been closed since the Angolan Civil War in late 1975. The Tazara railway to Dar es Salaam has had numerous technical problems. The port facilities at Dar are incapable of handling its load. There are now at least 100,000 tons of copper trapped somewhere along this route. The closure of the Rhodesian border since 1973 means the quickest route to the sea, at Beira, is cut off. Attempts to substitute for the railway by a new road through Tete province in Mozambique have foundered. (c) Efforts to stimulate local farming to replace imported foods have generally failed. The country is in most years selfsufficient in the staple food, maize, in sugar, fresh vegetables and pig and poultry products. Milk, wheat, beef, butter, fruit products, cooking oils etc. must still be overwhelmingly imported. As a percentage of food sold, imports increase year by year. The development of even the relatively successful commercial farming sector has of late been hampered by shortages of machinery, fertiliser, stockfeed and other (d) As a result of these problems, Zambia's international debt is now at an all time high. Most of the leading imperialist countries, the World Bank and IMF, have advanced loans in the past two years. Conditions laid down by the last named included devaluation (leading inevitably to higher prices) and a (e) Government issues no up to date figures on the key indicators for the standard of living: wages and prices. The latter were, however, rising by at least 25% per annum in the first half of 1976. The former have been legislatively limited to a 5% p.a. rise. Every indication since then suggests that even more rapid inflation has occurred. (f) Social services, transportation etc. are crippled. Frequent reports appear of hospital deaths caused by shortage of drugs, student strikes against lack of adequate diet in schools, chaotic conditions for travellers, etc. 2. Politically, the one party regime of the United National Independence Party, UNIP, presided over by Kaunda, is more potentially unstable than ever: (a) The UNIP has never, since independence, been a mass party. Its members are overwhelmingly those dependent for economic and social status on their holding office in party and government. This explains their willingness to accept without question every twist and turn of the leadership upon whom they are dependent for position. (b) Economic problems have led to substantial rumblings of discontent amongst the masses. This has in tur found reflection at the highest levels of leadership. Minister of 13 Finance, Mwanakatwe, was last year chairperson of a parliamentary select committee that concluded its report by advocating, amongst other things, greater assistance to private enterprise and openings for foreign investment, more charges for social services and a relaxation of the "Leadership Code" that supposedly restricts investment by Party leaders and civil servants. All these positions had been specifically rejected by Kaunda during the previous few months: The cry for the measure now taken of reopening the Rhodesian border, had been voiced by numerous MPs and had big popular resonance for several years. It has combined with an extremely reactionary tendency to place all the blame for Zambia's economic ills on the "sacrifices" being made on behalf of the "ungrateful" people of Zimbabwe. (c) The effect, at top level, of such an upsurge of discontent, has been effectively stifled by Kaunda's control of the bureaucracy. It is in particular clear now that the re-admittance to the party of ex-Vice President Kapwepwe and his associates from the former United Progressive Party (banned in 1972) was done only in order the better to stifle At the UNIP National Conference held at the beginning of September, the threat of Kapwepwe's standing in the fortheoming election against Kaunda was effectively squashed A motion was forced through "on the nod" that made sure only one candidate would stand and that he/she would be selected by the National Council of the Party, most of whom were appointed by Kaunda. An attempt by Kapwepwe and another potential candidate, Nkumbula, to challenge this in the High Court, is at the time of writing still sub judice: (d) If Kapwepwe had been able to stand against Kaunda there was a fair chance of his receiving at least a substantial minority of votes - even with the entire party machine, press, TV, radio etc. ranged against him in a charade of democracy. The positions which he was putting forward, especially regarding the reopening of full trading relationships with the white south and an end to support for the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front; had a superficial attraction. It is still likely that a good number of candidates putting similar positions will win seats in Parliament against the long time "loyalists". This will probably happen especially in the more "politicised" areas where the working class element in the population is higher, the Copperbelt, Lusaka and some parts of the Southern Little comfort will be taken from such a development by those Zambians who understand that the country's fundamen. tal economic problems arise from the monopoly of power and hence of economic position by members of the country's "bureaucratic bourgeoisie". These individuals, led by Kaunda, and including incidentally many of the ex-UPP leaders who were on the same gravy train until 1972, have used their government office to acquire wealth and privilege. In doing this they have worked in close collaboration with the imperialists whose continued exploitation of Zambia's resources and workers they have ensured. TANZANIA ZAIRE ZAMBIA RHODESIA ROADS BOTSWANA President Kaunda (tifth from left) escorts his hosts - (from left) David Owen, Andrew Young, Presidents Nyerere and Machel - to the State House in Lusaka for talks on the Anglo-American proposals tor a Rhodesian settlement. Kapwepwe's recent evolution bears an uncanny resemblance to that of he and his party in 1972. Then he made a similar "populist" appeal. For his "natural" constituency, the miners of the Copperbelt, who were then suffering the effects of the last economic recessions, attacks on government "fat cats" and insistence on the right of workers to a fair standard of living were the main tune. It was this that won him a by-election at Mufulira just before his detention that year. Simultaneously, again in alliance with Nkumbula, he advocated the same reactionary line of re-opening full economic relationships with the white south. Now however Kaunda appears to have played his ace card and completely unhinged the opposition's central plank with his announcement on October 6th of the re-opening of the Rhodesian border for Zambian trade. No doubt this move was partly mooted in the talks with Callaghan at Kano, 22 September. Kaunda entered them breathing fire over the revelations of UK oil firms' sanctions busting activities. He came out apparently entirely reconciled with his "friend Jim". Key to the outcome, for sure, were 90,000 tons of fertiliser (destined for Zambia and essential to begin maize planting in early November) which were stuck at various places en route from Maputo with little hope of arriving in time. Obviously Callaghan; who had it in his power to solve the problem at a stroke by organising an emergency airlift, used the opportunity to force the issue. In doing so he certainly reflected the aims of imperialism generally. Politically, no doubt, Kaunda would have preferred to delay this decision until after the Anglo-American "settlement" had been forced onto the Zimbabweans, preferably with the "stabilising" influence of Nkomo at the helm in Salisbury. Then an heroic victory could have been claimed. Economically, however, it was impossible to wait. In taking this step Kaunda has enormously assisted imperialism's strategy in southern Africa. The ailiance of the 5 front line states had been rendered shaky by revelations of the Smith/Nkomo/Kaunda meetings. Now an open breach has been created. Reports in the "Guardian", 9 October, suggest. that the Mozambicans will not allow the fertiliser still lying at Maputo to pass through into Rhodesia. A much more important development which will be awaited expectanțly by the imperialist powers is that a wedge has almost certainly been driven into the Patriotic Front alliance. Nkomo has already admitted that his Zambia-based fighters will be forced to stop attacking communications targets for fear of disrupting trade. More decisive is that Nkomo's ZAPU wing, totally dependent on Kaunda, will be under strong pressure to enter a quick "settlement". For sure, after this, every ZAPU leader will feel at least a little apprehensive of what can occur in the future and a little more willing consequently to make a deal. Since ZAPU has by far the better conventionally trained and equipped armed wing, the majority remaining in reserve, they would be well encouraged to do so without ZANU. Kaunda's move has more significance for Zambia than as. just another episode in his love affair with imperialism or as part of an internal political battle. The re-opening of the border on a permanent basis makes it certain that the future Zambian economy will be gradually reintegrated into that of Southern Africa, dominated by the Apartheid Republic. For 10 years, the government has tried via nationalisations, initiation of state-controlled industry in collaboration with a variety of imperialist firms, redirection of trade, ete. to build its own independent industrial base and break out of these historic links. At tremendous cost it has at least considerably diversified its trade sources. But the economic recession has broken a strategy that was central if there was to emerge a strong independent bourgeoisie in that country (albeit one totally dependent on the state for its position). For the workers and small farmers of Zambia the result of this move will not be, as Kapwepwe and others have claimed, a new era of prosperity. On the contrary, the superiority of South African industry will enable it; if allowed, to easily reconquer Zambia. The result of that would be stagnation. For revolutionaries there is one lesson that can and must be drawn above all others, and which must stand at the centre of their propaganda throughout the neo-colonial states of this area. Against all the populist propagandists of the quick and easy solution it is necessary to insist (and time will quiekly show this to be correct): There can be no "settlement" in southern Africa that is not based on the expropriation of the imperialists, of the various local bourgeoisies, black and white, and the formation of a single socialist economy that will ensure a fair distribution of resources throughout this immensely rich and geographically homogeneous region. John Blair, 9 October 1978. Kenneth Kaunda