The ethnic question

THE ETHNIC QUESTION DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND THE ETHNIC QUESTION: A FIRST CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISCUSSION. For a very long time the national and ethnie question has deeply concerned anti-imperialist Africans. No other issue has so many implications for the internal political life of the African nationalist movement, where conflicts have partially reproduced the contradictions of the ethnic structure. The MPLA's experience with the Chipenda faction (which eventually went over to the FNLA), the Kawandame split from FRELIMO, the battles inside FROLINAT (Chad) and the divisions amongst the Zimbabwe nationalists are all typical Evidently these are the political consequences of precise historic phenomena: the backwardness of the 'social formation' in Africa and the manipulation of inter-ethnic rivalries by imperialism. Foreign intervention has fossilised the traditional structures and used the most backward of them to stabilise its power. Simultaneously the petty-bourgeois programme of nationalism has made it impossible to transcend this situation. Several generations have been trapped in a dead end of moralism: it became an issue of principle to avoid 'tribalism' at all costs, without giving any programmatic form for the concrete intervention of militants. An exhaustive treatment of the 'ethnic question' in Africa cannot be given in the present article. It would, moreover, be presumptuous to claim to have the answer to everything about this matter. A large dose of empiricism must necessarily guide the vanguard here. Many points will only gradually be resolved as the struggle itself develops. Our aim is the more modest one of posing certain methodological guidelines. Later articles should develop more precise examples. THE STRATEGIC FOUNDATIONS For revolutionary marxists the revolution which has to be carried out is a socialist one. This means that the seizure of power by the masses, led by the urban and rural workers, must move simultaneously towards resolving democratic tasks and creating the dictatorship of the proletariat. This strategic conception implies that the working class takes the leadership without compromise with the indigenous bourgeoisie. For this class is incapable of satisfying the democratic demands of the people, and becomes a counter-revolutionary force from the moment the wind of social change begins to blow. This means that the working class must draw the peasantry and impoverished petty-bourgeoisie into the revolution. The winning over of these groups does not mean that they will become as conscious as the workers of the social and political implications of the revolutionary crisis. Certainly there will be a peasant vanguard whose members will link up with that of the working class; there will also be genuine revolutionaries emerging from the urban petty-bourgeoisie. The most likely eventuality however is that the workers will put forward demands and forms of organisation whose dynamic is far more subversive of bourgeois order than those of the peasant and petty-bourgeois masses. This is obvious if we see that the working class alone has the capacity to halt the productive machinery and impose its own control over it, in the course of building its own structures of political power. This gap between the consciousness of urban workers and that of the peasant masses is not necessarily an obstacle to victory. For, by expressing its strength and determination, the working class can pose, in the eyes of the masses, as agent of a possible solution to all the democratic tasks. The worker-peasant alliance is forged under the leadership of the workers and becomes a living force once they impose on the bourgeoisie and imperialism those demands which the peasantry and the impoverished have always sought: democratie freedoms and an end to exploitation and Democratic demands are therefore essential for revolutionaries. This has nothing to do with conceptions of 'democratising' society or its institutions. Rather it is a matter of launching the masses on the struggle for democratic rights so that they take the first steps towards being conscious of their own strength. Thus the struggle for democratic demands is the first step in the mobilisation of the masses against the power of the bourgeois state and ruling classes. The ethnic question must be approached in this framework. DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND "TRIBALISM' Many confusions persist in this discussion. The fear of "balkanisation' - that is, the refusal to accept the divisions nurtured by imperialism — has obscured a great many problems. Rejecting 'tribalism', in the sense of backward-looking divisions, almost always means limiting discussion to questions of form (imperialist manipulations) at the expense of basic questions (historic, social and political causes). The term 'tribalist' is nearly always used to describe a form of peasant discontent. The 'tribe' becomes dissident, it is said, in order to impose certain anachronistic and reactionary traditions. The tribe thus becomes the 'anti-nation', in essence a counterrevolutionary institution. But the history of contemporary black Africa shows that the question is far more complicated: 1. Apart from imperialism, the African ruling classes have for a long time had no forces apart from their groups of regional followers to keep them in power. Lacking firm economic or ideological foundations, they turned to family, village and ethnic group to provide themselves with a social base. Consequently, divisions amongst politicians invariably follow regional lines. Political instability leads to civil war in which the peasants bear the costs of the struggle. 2. But are the feelings of frustration of a particular ethnic group, objectively founded in oppression, backward? Obviously not. Is it sufficient to proclaim ourselves for the revolution in the abstract to win over this peasantry? Is it enough to put forward certain 'national' demands aimed at the peasantry to unite these different populations in common struggle? No. The struggle for socialism requires the mobilisation of the great mass of the peasantry. It is therefore necessary to show them that, unlike the petty-bourgeois democrats and phony advocates of local socialism, we stand for their rights. This means that, even when reflected through an 'ethnic' consciousness, peasant demands on questions of democracy, on the right to have a say in determining their own standard of living and daily existence, are just. Struggles around these issues are often the first steps towards peasant revolt. They must not therefore be separated from the other embryonic forms of mass consciousness. They have a frustrated and ambiguous character. But at root they are the first symptoms of the peasants' entry into the era of permanent revolution. Yes, we are for the right of instruction in the local language in schools. Yes, we are for defence and enriching of different cultures! Yes, we oppose the imposition of particular types of agricultural production on the pretext that they serve the national interest. These are valid grievances. They can, however, be expressed through a frustrated, ethnocratic reaction when the peasantry interprets its exploitation as merely the oppression of its own ethnic group (which certainly exists as well). Closing our eyes to this situation and not responding positively means turning our backs on any revolutionary initiative. The world doesn't provide ideal conditions for carrying out the class struggle. The vanguard has to work with an extremely complex historic legacy. To deny the paradoxes and not to deal with the dialectical play of contradictions, is to abandon marxism. What matters is not Africa as we would like it to be, but as it actually is. Political initiative must start from that. That is why, faced with a precise demand of a particular ethnic group, including that of self-determination, we give clear support and demonstrate our willingness to struggle with them against their oppression. Simultaneously we strive to detach the poor peasants from the political and ideological hold of their chiefs, local clique bosses and 'tribalist' politicians. To do this we advance general demands directed at the entire peasantry, on the ownership and possession of land and herds, against the dowry system, against speculative trade in fertilisers and other agricultural inputs. We also advance many other demands designed to drive a wedge between the masses and the privileged classes. WHY PLAY WITH FIRE'? Fear of balkanisation has thus far blocked any initiative of this sort in the African revolutionary movement. Supporting tribal demands would be to 'play with fire' What do we want?: to mobilise the peasants alongside the workers; to ensure that in a revolutionary crisis ethnic affiliations do not obstruct the mobilisation of the masses in the cities. But these are burdened down with poverty and prejudices. We want the possibility for them to make a leap forward in political consciousness and ability to challenge the system. Is it therefore a matter of indifference to us or to them if education can be carried out in the local language, their only means of participating in large numbers in cultural development? Can there be a real mobilisation leading to forms of self-organisation of the peasants if the 'noble' language is still French, English, Portuguese or a dominant African language? Is it possible that the countryside can be mobilised against the established order if we join the urban petty-bourgeois outery against the particular traditions and demands of ethnic- We do not, however, overlook the contradictions involved. The various self-help groups are led by the elite and are class collaborationist. Regional traditions are not 'naturally' progressive. But revolutionaries will not gain a mass hearing if they appear to be 'authoritarian centralists' like the bourgeoisie, or as repressive as the leaders of the dominant ethnic group. The basis for opening up class divisions between the demands of the peasant masses and the interests of the elite must be laid in the struggle for the broadest possible democratic demands; but it will be impossible to mobilise around these unless one is already involved in struggles for elementary demands against the state's bureaucratic centralism and the oppression of different ethnic groups. The fight for democratic rights is distinet from reformist and nationalist incantations about democracy. We never look at it in a parliamentarist framework or as a process of diplomatic pressure. We envisage the mass movement imposing its immediate demands, understandable by all, and thereby strengthening its position against the bourgeoisie and But aren't these ethnic demands backward-looking? Do not only the bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeois politicians and the elite really advocate them, the masses being merely pulled along behind? This type of argument has a measure of hypocrisy. Every democratic demand can be taken over by a section of the bourgeoisie. That they are also interested is not therefore a special feature of the ethnic question. This has not, however, stopped revolutionaries taking part in struggles for democratic rights. Moreover the ruling classes are not rigidly attached to their regional base and tribal clientele. The development of a genuine African capitalism is leading towards changes in the structure and function of the neocolonial state. Important changes are taking place within the ruling classes, resulting in a more 'universal' outlook, not only 'national' (concerned with the national market) but even international (having an integrated conception of developments in African captial and imperialist invest- ONCE AGAIN — THE SOCIAL FORMATION Regarding balkanisation, it is always argued that our position means an exacerbation of 'separatist' tendencies and that the right to self-determination could, in practice, be carried out under bourgeois leadership and provoke a 10 reactionary geographic explosion. This assumes, however, that there is a real bourgeoisie based solidly on the ethnic group — one capable of carrying the 'national liberation struggle' to its logical conclusion. Does this type of bourgeoisie really exist in Africa today? No. Most often, petty-bourgeois politicians, village elites and traditional hierarchies act as the protagonists in tribal struggles. Genuine bourgeoisies, when they exist, don't participate in this kind of adventure: they are too afraid of losing control of the masses and they don't see their interests being served through cutting themselves off from the national market and the neo-colonial state that created and continues to support them. The Nigerian example clarifies things in several ways. It is perfectly logical that the most aware layers of the bourgeoisie, those with a modern economic base, would remain aloof from clearly separatist demands. Thus the Yoruba bourgeoisie showed great prudence over the pro-imperialist Biafra adventure, while the Ibo petty-bourgeoisie hurled It is unlikely therefore that the struggle for democratic rights of this or that ethnic group will automatically unleash a reactionary balkanisation. It is not, however, for this reason that we 'dare' put forward such demands. In practice, we favour the independence of Eritrea, where a bourgeoisie exists and where the liberation struggle could possibly be conducted in its interests. Involved here is a clear principle — the right of people to self-determination. But it is important to show that our viewpoint will not lead to a bourgeois Africa with dozens of tiny states. It is possible to foresee the vanguard and working class gaining leadership of these peasant movements once they are no longer up against a strong bourgeois offensive. It is therefore logical to believe that only the revolutionary crisis will in practice pose the decisive questions concerning these demands. Then the self-determination of these groups will be expressed in a new framework, of the transition to socialism and of proletarian democracy. The centrally planned economy will be able, through popular mass self-organisation, to satisfy the particular demands of various regions. If on the other hand, some maintain the demand for independence, this should not be opposed on principle, still less militarily. The right to self-determination must be upheld. It can be coupled with a federal formula for state organisation. For Africa this implies two key ideas. First, a revolutionary crisis will speed up the development on the regional level of a very turbulent political situation, and the emergence of a genuine revolutionary party, rooted in the masses. It will, by its example, encourage the vanguard of neighbouring countries. Secondly, we advocate the destruction of the bourgeois neo-colonial states. But we do not say that the socialist revolution means rebuilding, on their ruins, workers' states confined to the same frontiers. That today would be entirely out of date. Equally, however, no-one can foresee what the new geo-political map will look like: marxism is not extra-sensory perception! This imposes upon revolutionaries a doubly internationalist viewpoint, paralleled by the building of revolutionary parties as an integral part of an International. This is the viewpoint of the African militants of the Fourth International. This is the apparent paradox. Revolutionaries struggle for the African revolution in its totality and advance the idea of a United Socialist States of Africa. To reach this point however it is necessary to show the masses that the struggle for democratic freedom can also involve the right to liberation and separation. Lenin said: "the real unity of tomorrow flows from the separation of today". AN EXAMPLE: THE ANGOLAN FNLA Those who have a different approach frequently refer to the example of Roberto Holden's FNLA. Those who believe they are faced with "potential nations' find the basis for their position in the equation FNLA = Bakongo'. Those who, in contrast, believe ethnocentric sentiments are basically reactionary, use the example of the reactionary ENLA and amalgamate it with the entire Bakongo populatión. But the history of the FNLA shows clearly the errors of these